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SOMMAIRE 
 
 
 
 
Cette thèse constitue une étude systématique du lexique du déné sųłiné, une langue 
athabaskane du nord-ouest canadien.  Elle présente les définitions et les patrons de 
combinatoire syntaxique et lexicale de plus de 200 unités lexicales, lexèmes et 
phrasèmes, qui représentent une partie importante du vocabulaire déné sųłiné dans sept 
domaines: les émotions, le caractère humain, la description physique des entités, le 
mouvement des êtres vivants, la position des entités, les conditions atmospheriques et 
les formations topologiques, en les comparant avec le vocubulaire équivalent de 
l'anglais.  L’approche théorique choisie est la Théorie Sens-Texte (TST), une approche 
formelle qui met l’accent sur la description sémantique et lexicographique empiriques.    
Les deux premiers chapitres fournissent les fondations de la présente recherche.  
L'introduction affirme l'importance de la sémantique lexicale pour la description 
linguistique, et offre un survol essentiel de l'histoire et de la langue des déné sųłinés.   
Le chapitre I considère les études linguistiques qui ont été faites sur les langues 
athabaskanes et fait la critique de la lexicographie déné sųłiné précédente.  Le chapitre 
II expose de façon détaillée l'approche Sens-Texte de la sémantique en la confrontant 
avec les courants dominants de la sémantique lexicale.  Ici on trouve aussi une 
description de l'approche lexicographique de la TST.  
La deuxième partie présente les résultats de notre recherche.  Le chapitre III décrit 
les zones sémantiques et syntaxiques des entrées lexicales.  Le chapitre IV contient une 
discussion des relations lexicales qu'on retrouve dans l'échantillon.  Le dernier chapitre 
offre des conjectures sur l’influence de la structure polysynthétique et de certains 
facteurs sociolinguistiques sur les relations lexicales. 
En résumé, la présente recherche relève d'importantes différences entre le lexique 
du déné sųłiné et celui de l'anglais à tous les niveaux: dans la correspondence entre la 
représentation conceptuelle, considérée (quasi-)extralinguistique, et la structure 
sémantique; dans les patrons de lexicalisation des unités lexicales, et dans les patrons de 
                                                                                                                                      iv 
combinatoire syntaxique et lexicale, qui montrent parfois des traits propres au déne ́ 
sųłiné  intéressants. 
 
Mots-Clés: Sémantique Lexicale, Lexicologie, Dene Sųłiné, Langues Athabaskanes, 
Théorie Sens-Texte, Description Linguistique.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
This work constitutes a systematic lexical semantic study of Dene Sųłiné, an 
Athabaskan language from northwestern Canada.  As such, it presents the lexicographic 
definitions, syntactic and lexical combinatorial patterns of over 200 lexical units 
(lexemes and idioms) representing part of the core Dene Sųłiné vocabulary for seven 
semantic fields: terms to describe emotions, human character, physical description, 
position of an object, atmospheric conditions and topographical features.  The 
theoretical approach used is Meaning-Text Theory (MTT), a formal linguistic approach 
with a strong empirical focus on semantics and lexicography.  
The first two chapters provide the foundation for the present research.  The 
introduction reviews the significance of cross-linguistic semantics for linguistics, and 
sketches some basic facts about the history and language of the Dene Sųłiné people.  
Chapter I is a survey of the Athabaskanist literature along with a review and critique of 
the previous lexicographic tradition for Dene Sųłiné.  Chapter II is a detailed exposition 
of the MTT approach to semantics and lexicography, as well as the idea of semantic 
primitives, and covers MTT’s treatment of some major questions in lexical semantics. 
The second part of the thesis presents the results of the current study.  Chapter III 
describes the semantic and syntactic portions of the lexical entries.  Chapter IV contains 
a discussion of lexical relations found for the lexical units in the sample.  The final 
chapter speculates about the impact of polysynthetic structure and certain 
sociolinguistic factors on lexical relations in Dene Sųłiné.   
In summary, this work finds significant differences between Dene Sųłiné and 
English at all levels: in the relationship between of (quasi-)extralinguistic concepts and 
linguistic meanings, in the lexicalization or conflation patterns one finds in meanings of 
lexical units, and finally in the syntactic and lexical combinatorial patterns, which also 
show interesting language-specific tendencies.   
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2    The Dene Sųłiné People and Language.............................................................8 
       2.1.  Traditional Society.................................................................................8 
2.2.  The Southern Dene Sųłiné Region......................................................10 
2.3.  The Language......................................................................................11 
2.4.  Sociolinguistic Status...........................................................................12 
3    Structure of the Thesis.....................................................................................14 
 
PART 1 
Foundations 
 
CHAPTER I Athabaskan Semantics and Lexicography............................................15 
   1   The Lexical Unit in Formal Linguistic Studies .................................................15 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1   COMPARATIVE SEMANTICS 
 
 
1.1.  Questions and Goals.  Many people are drawn to linguistics by a sense of 
wonder at the immense diversity of human languages.  The rich variation in vocabulary, 
morphological structures and sound combinations, as well as the sheer number of living 
languages, is dazzling and fascinating.  Of course, if we can even speak of the “diverse 
varieties” of something, in this case human language, there must be some universal and 
unchanging “thing” which underlies all of its unique instances — human Language.  To 
wonder about the nature and extent of linguistic diversity is therefore to wonder at the 
same time about the linguistic and conceptual unity of humanity.  One of the most 
important tasks of linguists is to sort out the difference between the universal and likely 
innate features of Language from the wealth of culturally variable, learned facts about 
individual human languages.  Only when we have compared many examples of natural 
languages can we form a hypothesis about the traits Language must possess.  
The search for a common core of Language has often focused on the idea of a 
Universal Grammar underlying the syntax of each natural language, proposed as the 
component which would give language its creative and infinite nature.  As the famous 
poverty of the stimulus argument illustrates, knowing a language cannot be simply 
knowing a list of data sets.  Instead, it must be to carry in one’s mind a dynamic system 
for interpreting and creating novel utterances.  Language cannot be in the lexicon at all, 
it is said, because the lexicon is obviously the part which differs most completely 
between languages.  Would it therefore be correct to say that mastering the syntax and 
morphology of a language is what is required to “know” that language?  While such a 
description certainly constitutes a necessary part of this knowledge, we cannot say that 
grammatical knowledge is sufficient to know natural language L, as a linguist can know 
the grammar of a L without knowing how to speak it fluently.  Is knowing a language 
                                                                                                                                      2 
then to hold in one’s mind an adequate list of its lexical entries, in combination with the 
grammar?  Even this, however, seems to be insufficient.  A learner of a foreign 
language may know the grammar and enough of the words to communicate, but will 
arrange them in combinations that mimic his or her native language rather than the 
target language.  This sort of interference is caused by interlinguistic differences is 
pervasive and not limited to phraseologized language.  
Consider an English speaker who is learning a Native American language like 
Dene Sųłiné (Canada, Athabaskan family; ISO code CHP1).  The learner would be at a 
loss to express many simple ideas if his sentences were based on the semantic structures 
of English.  One such simple utterance might be “I’ll give you a cup of tea”.  The 
learner of Dene, knowing the words lidí ‘tea’ and tth’áí ‘cup’ as well as the grammar 
might venture to verbalize “cup of tea”  as *lidi tth’áíé {tea cup:CONS}2 or *tth’áí beyé 
lidí{cup 3:in tea}. In the proper Dene Sųłiné sentence, however, the entity word ‘cup’ 
does not appear at all.  Instead, one says:   
 
(1)   lidí  newaską  
lidí ne–was–ką 
tea  2OB–1OPT–handle.small.container  
    ‘I’ll give you a cup of tea’ 
  
The verb root –ką denotes not the act of carrying nor the transfer from the first person 
to the second person, which is indicated by the prefixes, but the shape and material of 
the object, in this case a small, full container.  A more literal translation would be “I 
will small-container you [with some] tea”. This is interpreted as referring to a cup rather 
than to a plate, because it is part of speakers’ encyclopedic knowledge that tea is drunk 
from cups; if in the same sentence lidí were replaced with etsís, a traditional food made 
                                                
1  Taken from the Web version of the Ethnologue (www.ethnologue.com). 
2 The term “construct state”, abbreviated CONS, is not used in the Athabaskanist literature.  This marker is 
required by a noun syntactically governing another noun or clause. This suffix, which exists in various 
northern Athabaskan languages, is referred to as the “possessed” suffix in Wilhelm & Saxon (2008). 
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of shredded dried moose meat, it would be interpreted as referring to a small plate or 
plastic container.  The same (extralinguistic) conceptual situation is rendered with two 
entirely different linguistic semantic representations in English and in Dene.  Therefore, 
neither semantic representation is innate or universal; both are simply artifacts of a 
given language community.  Clearly, “knowing the language” is not simply a question 
of knowing the syntax and morphology, or even the lexical items, but knowing how to 
represent conceptual situations as meanings and then as lexical units, and knowing 
which meanings are important enough in the language to be nameworthy in the first 
place.  Indeed, separating lexical knowledge from conceptual knowledge is as important 
a task as separating the Universal Grammar from particular language grammars, as 
Chomsky (1965: 160) clearly acknowledges: “It is important to determine the universal, 
language-independent constraints on semantic features — in traditional terms, the 
system of possible concepts.  The very notion of ‘lexical entry’ presupposes some sort 
of fixed, universal vocabulary in terms of which these objects are characterized...”.   
This remark hints at the mistake of viewing the lexicon as a mass of material with 
no structure, and nothing universal or combinatorial in it.  If we can learn new words 
from our own language, or from a second language, our lexicon must be constituted in 
such a way that new meanings can be integrated as configurations or parallels of 
previously known meanings. The lexicon, in addition to the grammar, must therefore 
have some universal base or structure, and it is only when we have understood this 
organization that we can appropriately characterize natural lanuguage lexica.  Lexical 
semantics should therefore be viewed as proceeding from a similar scientific basis as 
grammatical analysis, and as being complementary to it as an essential part of 
describing Language and natural languages.     
Anna Wierzbicka, whose work has constituted one of the deepest and most 
typologically diverse searches for lexical universals in modern linguistics, reminds us of 
how far back this tradition of searching for a universal “alphabet” of human concepts 
and word meanings stretches.  Wierzbicka (2002) cites d’Alembert’s entry for 
“dictionnaire” in volume IV of the Encyclopédie (1754) where he hypothesized about 
“les mots originaux et primitifs” — meanings common to all cultures which would 
constitute a universal alphabet of human thought.  Wierzbicka’s work takes this idea far 
                                                                                                                                      4 
beyond a simple awareness of the necessity of finding this common element in lexica; 
she in fact proposes an open-ended and empirically justified list of universal 
semantic primitives, which she claims can be combined to form the infinite 
variety of linguistic meanings in various languages.  Cross-linguistic semantics aims to 
make a systematic description of how extralinguistic situations are realized as a 
configuration of linguistic meanings, and in turn how this linguistically specific 
configuration is translated into actual lexical units of a natural language.  The mission of 
cross-linguistic semantics is therefore two-fold: one one hand, analysts compare 
meanings in words belonging to different languages and seeks a common psychological 
or conceptual basis on which such a comparison could rest.  On the other, the 
semanticist seeks to elucidate the degree and manner to which comparable semantic 
fields, or (quasi-) comparable words differ between languages, as a result of structural 
or cultural differences. While this is a field which is attracting more and more research 
as the urgency of general language documentation increases, as linguists we are still at 
the foot of the mountain as far as systematic, formal description of lexica is concerned.  
To get the fullest idea of cross-linguistic lexical semantic variation, one would 
need to compare a variety of languages that are geographically separate and historically 
unrelated.  It would also be important to choose languages spoken by speech 
communities with (at least historically) very different forms of social and sociolingusitic 
organization.  For example, a language spoken in an urban mass society and one spoken 
by a small hunter-gatherer nation whose culture was based on extensive shared 
knowledge and face-to-face communication would likely have very different lexica, 
even if the languages were genetically related.  
This work presents a lexical semantic and lexicographic study of Dene Sųłiné, a 
native Athabaskan language from northwestern Canada.  The Athabaskan languages 
constitute one of the most geographically extensive of the language families of native 
North America, covering an area which stretches from Alaska and the Arctic coast to 
the southwestern USA, where Navajo and Apache are among the most prominent 
Native American languages.  With between 8,000 and 15,000 living speakers, Dene 
Sųłiné is one of the major extant languages of the Athabaskan family.  It belongs to the 
Northern branch of the family, which covers the Canadian as well as the Alaskan 
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language groups.  Its closest relatives are Dogrib (Tłįchǫ), North and South Slavey as 
well as, more distantly, Beaver, Sekani (Tsek’enne), Tahltan, Carrier and Tsuut’iina, 
among others.       
For a speaker of a European language like English, few languages could be as 
challenging and as interesting to learn as an Athabaskan language.  Rich in morphology, 
Athabaskan languages are “polysynthetic”, containing verbs with an informational 
content closer to that of a clause in English.  While this type of morphological structure 
may appear alien to some Europeans, this is not an unusual linguistic structure in the 
Americas.  What makes the Athabaskan languages morphologically unique, however,  
is that the verb is not built in a concatenative way but is analyzed as a “template” whose 
elements are ordered in a seemingly unpredictable way.  Many “prefixes” are only so 
etymologically, as in the synchronic language they constitute discontinuous stem 
elements that must be learned as part of the verb’s unchanging form.   
Aside from structural considerations, the social and cultural context in which Dene 
languages came into being differs greatly from that of European languages.  Dene 
peoples traditionally lived in small groups who shared resources and lived off the land 
in the boreal forest, tundra and lakes which cover their territory.  Perhaps because the 
cultural and social history of northern Athabaskan peoples differs markedly from that of 
Europe, Dene lexical items often contain unique meanings, presuppositions or 
connotations with respect to English.  Languages are born as tools to communicate 
within a given culture.  Words are coined according to the needs and interests of the 
speech community and what it finds nameworthy in its collective experience over the 
centuries. The vocabulary for physical description, emotions, character, weather, as well 
as the position and movement of people and objects are among the domains of 
vocabulary which show significant differences with respect to European languages. 
Studying the lexicon of a Dene language in this way is therefore a rewarding journey of 
both scientific and cultural discovery. 
 
1.2.  The Current Study.  This work presents a formal description of part of the 
Dene Sųłiné lexicon, including lexical entries for over 200 lexical units.  The first goal 
is to try to show, for this sample, how the mostly non-linguistic conceptual structure is 
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realized as a set of linguistic meanings, or semantic structures, and how these semantic 
structures are in turn translated into Dene Sųłiné lexemes and phrasemes.  The second 
goal is to elucidate the particular patterms which emerge from this analysis, especially 
to the extent that they differ from English, and finally to correlate the meanings salient 
enough in Dene to be realized as lexical units with on cultural and historical patterns of 
the speech community which may have influenced the lexicon. 
All data used here comes from the on the variety of Dene Sųłiné spoken in Dillon, 
Saskatchewan, a community located near the border with Alberta on Peter Pond Lake, 
by car about six hours northwest of Saskatoon.  Dillon is the population center of 
Buffalo River First Nation and has about 1,000 inhabitants, virtually all of whom are 
Dene Sųłiné.  The author visited this community from August to December, 2008, 
during which time he collected texts and conducted numerous elicitation sessions with 
over 10 speakers, men and women, mostly between the ages of 50 and 80, who 
generously offered their time to this project.   Some additional clarifications and 
verifications of the data in the entries were provided by the same speakers over the 
phone during 2009 and early 2010 as well. 
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           Map 1.  Dene Communities in Western Canada  
         (map adapted from Google Maps™, maps.google.com). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2.  The Southern Dene Area 
(map adapted from Google Maps™, maps.google.com). 
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2   THE DENE SŲŁINÉ PEOPLE AND LANGUAGE 
 
 
The Dene Sųłiné3 are one of the most numerous and widely distributed indigenous 
peoples or First Nations of western Canada, and tens of thousands of people of Dene 
Sųłiné ancestry live across the region.  The Dene Sųłiné are part of a group of 
linguistically and culturally similar Athabaskan peoples in northern Canada collectively 
known as the Dene, including the Dogrib, Slavey and Dene Dhá tribes, among others.  
These Dene peoples are also related to more distant Arctic and Alaskan Dene peoples 
such as the Gwich’in, the Sekani, the Ahtna and the Koyukon, as well as to the Navajo 
and Apache peoples of the southwestern USA.  Any of these peoples may be referred to 
as “Dene” in certain contexts. Dene Sųłiné also use the term “Dene” both for their own 
local tribes and to refer to Athabaskan people generally.  In this study, “Dene” will be 
used as a shortened version of Dene Sųłiné since this work is concerned exclusively 
with the Dene Sųłiné of northern Saskatchewan. 
 
2.1.  Traditional Society.  The Dene Sųłiné were traditionally hunter-gatherers 
who used land covering a vast part of subarctic western Canada, extending from 
Hudson Bay in the west across northern Manitoba and Saskatchewan and extending into 
northeastern Alberta and the southern edge of the Northwest Territories, the Dene 
Sųłiné “heartland” being between Lake Athabaska and Great Slave Lake.  Living 
between the boreal forest and the tundra, the Dene had many resources at their disposal.  
People lived by hunting the barren-ground and woodland caribou, as well as on fishing 
                                                
3 The Dene Su ̨łiné are known as the “Chipewyan” in much scholarly literature, but most Dene Su ̨łiné are 
offended by this name, which comes from a Cree word meaning “pointy clothing” and which has roots in 
the historical tensions between the Dene Su ̨łiné and the Cree.  Because of this negative connotation, I will 
always refer to the Dene Su ̨łiné by their own name, which means “the original people” or “the true 
people”. 
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at the many lakes.  The diet was supplemented by gathering plants, berries, and hunting 
small game animals.  
Dene languages formed a dialect continuum (see Krauss 2000 for a discussion of 
pre-contact Athabaskan languages and identities). Traditional Dene social organization 
was local and probably based on kinship and sharing of resources (Vanstone 1974).  
Because European-introduced diseases decimated the indigenous populations and the 
European fur trade transformed their economic activities in the 18th century (for an 
overview, see Abel 1993), we cannot be certain about every detail of pre-contact tribe 
and band organization.  However, anthropologists have posited three main levels of 
social organization for western subarctic peoples.  Vanstone posits the local band, the 
regional band and the task group as dominant forms of social organization in northern 
Athabaskan societies.  According to Vanstone, the regional band was long-standing 
group of hundreds of people usually linked by marriage and kinship who traditionally 
hunted over a large established territory.  The regional band gathered for part of the year 
for activities that required hundreds of people to accomplish, such as caribou pens or 
some fishing techniques, as well as to exchange information and marriage partners. It is 
not clear whether the regional band corresponded closely with any linguistic division.  
For most of the year, the regional band split into local bands each comprising two or 
three nuclear families who hunted and fished together following a leader, while keeping 
in sporadic contact with the other local bands. A task group was a temporary group of 
varying size which gathered to exploit a resource and which was probably based on skill 
as well as kinship.  Dene languages were part of a dialect continuum, and overlayed on 
this was extensive travel and multilingualism as different Dene groups which grew up in 
contact with each other likely mastered multiple language varieties.    
Direct contact between the Dene Sųłiné  and Europeans began in the early 18th 
century (see Abel 1993 for an overview of 18th-20th century Dene history).  In 1670 
Britain had guaranteed the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) exclusive trading rights in 
what it referred to as Rupert’s Land, covering the entire Hudson Bay drainage system.  
While this covered the eastern edge of the Dene Sųłiné lands, most Dene territory was 
found outside of the HBC lands in the so-called Northwest Territory, which the British 
did not clearly claim to control. The Dene of the boreal forest may have been displaced 
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south by Cree people moving west with the fur trade.  Trade between the British and 
Dene peoples began sporadically, and gradually increased through the 18th centuries and 
accelerated in the 19th century. In 1868 the British government sold Rupert’s Land and 
the Northwest Territory from the “control” of the HBC to the Dominion of Canada 
which united them as the “Northwest Territory” in its new Confederation.  Immediately 
afterward came the numbered treaties between various First Nations and the Canadian 
government, resulting in the first Euro-Canadian state presence in the region and 
instituting the reserve system.  At the same time, the Canadian government was dividing 
the part of the Northwest Territory south of the 60th parallel into the provinces of 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta.  By 1908 most Dene Sųłiné communities were on 
or near reserves divided across areas governed by Treaties 5, 6, 8 and 10 and divided 
across three Canadian provinces and one territory.   
In the 1830s and 1840s, European linguistic and cultural influence was also 
brought in by Catholic and Anglican missionaries who arrived with the fur traders to try 
to convert the Dene to Christianity (while competing against each other for converts).  
By the end of the 19thth century, Roman Catholic and Anglican missionaries had 
already converted virtually all of the Dene to Christianity, but Dene people kept many 
of their traditional beliefs alive as well.  Priests and nuns provided some religious and 
secular education, often in the Dene languge as few Dene spoke English. In the early 
20th century, the churches’ strategy shifted from local evangelization and native literacy 
to total cultural and linguistic assimilation through a coordinated residential school 
system, which (among other social forces) resulted in massive cultural and linguistic 
disruption for the Dene Sųłiné in the 20th century and continuing today.  The current 
sociolinguistic status of the language is therefore a result of this period.   
 
2.2.  The Southern Dene Sųłiné Region. Because the Dene Sųłiné lands were so 
vast, different Dene cultures existed in different areas.  This thesis is concerned with the 
Dene Sųłiné of Dillon, Saskatchewan, located on Peter Pond Lake at the southern edge 
of the Dene Sųłiné language area.  The southern Dene who lived around La Loche, Ile-
a-la-Crosse and Peter Pond lakes had a lifestyle quite different from their caribou-
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hunting counterparts in the Athabasca region who are the focus of many linguistic 
works on the Dene, such as Li & Scollon’s Chipewyan Texts (1976).  Unlike the bands 
of the rocky sub-arctic, southern Dene Sųłiné lived completely in the boreal forest and 
their main resource was moose, which unlike caribou are solitary animals.  The southern 
Dene may therefore have had less need to form massive regional bands to hunt caribou 
and their social organization may have been even more individualistic and local.  The 
southern Dene Sųłiné also had much closer contact with the Cree, and not infrequently 
intermarried with them in addition to fighting with them.  It was also the Dene Sųłiné 
living furthest to the south who were most affected by a settlement-style frontier of 
agricultural Europeans.  All of this means that the traditional and modern culture of the 
Dene Sųłiné from the Dillon area differs markedly from the Dene Sųłiné culture of the 
Lake Athabasca region, which is more prominent in the scholarly literature.   
 
2.3.  The Language.  The Dene Sųłiné language is spoken in over 20 communities 
scattered across a huge territory in northwestern Canada, from eastern Alberta to 
Hudson Bay, and from Cold Lake and Dillon up to the Northwest Territories.   The 
exact number of speakers is unclear, due in part to the conflicting uses of the terms 
“Dene” and “Chipewyan” on government censuses.  Cook (2004) claims there are 
15,000 speakers of Dene Sųłiné, which has been questioned by de Reuse (2006) as too 
high.  As the town of La Loche, Saskatchewn alone is majority Dene-speaking and has 
several thousand residents, and assuming that the fluent speakers in most other 
communities includes anyone over 35-40, the current speaker population might be 
around 10,000.  
The Dene Sųłiné language is historically part of a dialect continuum which shades 
into the Slavey languages in the Northwest Territories and is quite similar to Dogrib as 
well. Dividing Dene peoples into mutually exclusive nationalities and languages is a bit 
artificial.  As described by Krauss (2000), many Athabaskan languages formed a dialect 
continuum, and peoples probably did not have a concept of themselves as a “tribe” 
based only on language.  Dene people traditionally lived in small groups based on 
                                                                                                                                      12 
kinship and resource sharing (Vanstone 1974).  Dene families travelled widely and 
came into contact with other people, so many Dene grew up learning not just the variety 
spoken by their immediate family but those of the surrounding groups with which they 
had contact.  Intermarriage and multilingualism extended to non-Dene groups in some 
places: in Fort Chipewyan, there was such extensive intermarriage between Cree and 
Dene people before the 20th century that many residents had a mixed identity (Li & 
Scollon 1976).  In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, some Dene also married Métis 
people, of mixed Cree and French-Canadian ancestry, adding a distinct French influence 
to the language.   
Nonetheless, today Dene Sųłiné seems surprisingly unified for a language 
traditionally spoken over such a large area (about the size of France).  While speakers 
can instantly recognize each others’ local accents and are often suprised (or amused) by 
the number of different words, people from every Dene community can largely 
understand and be understood by all the others.   
The data cited in this thesis are from the variety of Dene spoken in the area of 
Dillon, Saskatchewan.  Thorough and definitive Dene Sųłiné dialect studies have not 
been undertaken, so classification of the Dillon dialect can only be tentative.  Usually 
people speak more like the people in other towns with which there is frequent 
communication and intermarriage, which would associate Dillon with Janvier and Cold 
Lake in Alberta, and the towns of La Loche and Patuanak in Saskatchewan. People 
from Dillon tend to have less frequent contact with the Lake Athabasca region or with 
other northern fly-in communities.  
  
2.4.  Sociolinguistic Status.  The residential school era was a turning point for the 
Dene language.  Until the mid-20th century, most Dene people spoke only Dene.  People 
followed a seasonal nomadic cycle with their families, and had limited contact with 
white society.  The contact they did experience was usually with HBC traders and 
missionaries who lived in the Dene region and had to learn some Dene to communicate 
adequately. Even Catholic mass was available in Dene, however imperfectly learned by 
some priests.  In most economic and social situations, Dene tended to be used 
exclusively.   The return of the residential school survivors would have introduced the 
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first people who spoke English fluently, and who may have been semi-speakers of 
Dene.  However, these people would have been forced to relearn Dene or readapt to 
using it most of the time in Dillon.  This generation, which grew up in the late 1920s 
and 1930s, taught their children Dene.  Some people, however, may also have taught 
their children some English.  Many residential school survivors may have internalized 
negative attitudes toward speaking Dene as a result of their experience.  
The oldest Dillon residents who did not grow up speaking Dene and who do not 
speak it today were born in the late 1960s.  Soon after this, electricity came to Dillon 
and with it television.  Some speakers report a sharp rise in Dene-English codeswitching 
among Dene children at this time, and a shift toward viewing English as more 
prestigious than Dene.  Even so, at this time there must have been a steep decline in 
mother tongue transmission, because many people in their 30s today are only semi-
speakers of Dene who tend to use Dene only when speaking with older people.  The 
Dene community over 40 is essentially characterized by diglossia, with English used 
exclusively in formal, technical and academic situations as well as in passive 
entertainment products such as movies and television, and Dene used in informal 
conversation in the home and in traditional activities.  Only English is used in written 
communication.   
With few exceptions, people under 20 in Dillon speak to each other in English.  
Most teenagers, and some small children can understand a lot of Dene, but will not 
speak it.  One often hears Elders4 ask questions or call out commands in Dene to young 
people who respond in English.  Teenagers from La Loche who speak Dene fluently 
sometimes visit Dillon, introducing a little Dene into young peoples’ conversations.  
The Dene language is currently taught as a subject at all grade levels, but teachers have 
access to few materials other than what they can find the time to create themselves.  
While most young people do not regularly speak Dene outside of the classroom, the vast 
majority of high school students surveyed view the language positively, insisting that it 
                                                
4 In the context of Canadian First Nations, “Elders”, as distinct from “the elderly” or “seniors” generally, 
are those older individuals who the community recognizes as having great wisdom, spiritual insight or 
knowledge of traditional Aboriginal culture; they are usually considered by Aboriginal communities as 
the most authoritative representatives of traditional culture and linguistic norms.  
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is a central part of the Dene identity to be learned and preserved.  Many Dene people at 
all ages have expressed concern about language shift and interest in language 
revitalisation efforts, to which this research has been linked.    
 
 
3    STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
 
 
This thesis is divided into two parts.  Part 1 contains a detailed description of the 
theoretical foundation, while Part 2 presents the results of the study.  Chapter I contains 
a review of previous lexicographic and linguistic studies of Athabaskan languages 
which are relevant to lexical semantics.  The first section of Chapter II contextualizes 
Meaning-Text Theory (MTT) in the general field of lexical semantics generally, 
touching on MTT’s treatment of some important debates in semantics which have 
consequences for practical lexicography.  Section II-2 contains a more detailed 
description of Meaning-Text semantics and lexicography, including a lot of terminology 
and formalisms used later in the thesis.  Chapter III presents the semantic and syntax 
zones of the Dene lexical entries, organized by semantic field.  Chapter IV illustrates 
and paradigmatic and syntagmatic lexical relations of the lexical units in the sample. 
Chapter V provides some speculation about the role of linguistic typology and lexical 
relations.  Linguistic typology is considered in a broad sense, in terms of morphological 
structure but also from a sociolinguistic perspective insofar as how the very different 
social and historical history of the Dene language might result in very different 
frequencies of some lexical relations with respect to European languages.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
Athabaskan Semantics and Lexicography 
 
 
 
 
There is such a wealth of literature about the many Athabaskan languages that it is 
impossible to summarize it exhaustively here.  This discussion will therefore be limited 
to published materials about Athabaskan languages that are relevant to the current work, 
which concerns lexical semantics and theoretical lexicography.  While little work has 
been done on this precise topic on Dene Sųłiné, there are at least two areas of discussion 
in Athabaskan literature that have important concequences for how the lexical items 
should be defined and portrayed.  The first area comprises discussions in formal 
linguistic studies about the distinction between the Athabaskan verb stem (the unit of 
analysis of most of the lexical items here) versus inflected and derived verb wordforms.  
Secondly, there are a number of previous dictionaries of Athabaskan languages, which 
implicitly treat the verb stem and other lexical items in contrasting ways.  While this 
thesis concerns lexicography at a more conceptual level, the framework of this thesis 
has important consequences for practical lexicography, and indeed was developed partly 
to respond to the requirements of the latter.  It is therefore useful to contrast the 
representation of lexical items in practical lexicographic work with the way they would 
be portrayed in an Explanatory and Combinatorial Dictionary (ECD) of Dene.  
 
 
1   THE LEXICAL UNIT IN FORMAL LINGUISTIC STUDIES  
 
 
1.1. Studies of Dene Sųłiné.  Most of the lexical units described in the current 
study are verbs stems.  The Athabaskanist literature in general is characterized by a 
concentrated focus on the verb and its structure from both a morphological and semantic 
perspective.  The contrasting models of the Athabaskan verb structure which can be 
found in the literature have consequences for what is considered a lexical unit, the basic 
unit of analysis in this work.  There are several reasons for this strong focus on the verb.  
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First of all, in Athabaskan languages the verb constitutes the most significant lexical 
class in  in terms of the sheer number of lexical items.  Furthermore, on the level of 
semantics, there has been much critical debate in the literature about which parts of the 
verbal wordforms should be considered the stem as opposed to derivational or 
inflectional affixes.  Athabaskanists have disagreed over which parts of verbforms are 
learned and which are examples of synchronic morphological complexity.  For example, 
Sapir and Hoijer (1967) refer to the “verb base” as the part of the wordform minus any 
inflection markers.  The “theme” is then the part stripped of the fully productive 
derivational prefixes, and can in turn be divided into “thematic prefixes” and the 
“stem”, the root plus the classsifier.  In this work, a terminology is used, with the “verb 
stem” being defined here as something closer to the “verb theme” in the literature: the 
part of the wordform that is associated with the meaning that the speaker wants to 
express and learns as a unit, in contrast to cases where te speaker coins a new lexeme 
with the free derivational means of the language (see Section III-1.1).  
Sapir’s career bridges the previous anthropological tradition and the rising formal 
structuralist school.  Sapir had obtained his Ph.D. in anthropology and began his career 
studying the Athabaskan oral tradition before becoming increasingly focused on the 
languages themselves.  Sapir’s interest in the region seems to have been inspired in part 
by his colleague Franz Boas, a specialist of northwestern Canadian (but not 
Athabaskan) languages.  Sapir published numerous collections of texts in Native 
American languages as well as articles and monographs about historical and 
comparative Athabaskan morphology.  He also wrote on Yana, Nootka, Algic, Takelma 
and Salishan languages.  But his greatest passion was for the Dene languages.  Sapir’s 
descriptions of individual Dene languages as well as his comparative work (for 
example, Sapir 1915) and his tantalizing speculations about the structural and 
typological origins of the Athabaskan family in his correspondence still constitute the 
foundation of Athabaskan linguistics.   
The anthropological influence on Sapir’s work on the Athabaskan languages is 
quite noticeable and gave his methodological approach a balance which is appealing to 
modern language documentation goals.  For Sapir, the best way of studying a language 
was to collect a massive body of traditional texts and then to produce from grammars 
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and descriptive articles from these.  He transmitted this approach to his students, who 
included Harry Hoijer, Mary R. Haas and Fang-Kuei Li.  Several of Sapir’s students, 
including Hoijer and Li, would go on to form the second generation of Athabasan 
studies; Haas and Li published specifically on Dene Sųłiné , among other languages.  
Hoijer published some major articles on Athabaskan historical and comparative 
linguistics, including Hoijer (1938) and Sapir & Hoijer (1967).  It was in these studies 
that Hoijer and Sapir proposed a template model of Athabaskan verb morphology, even 
though they saw the template as a resource for historical comparison rather than as a 
model of synchronic word formation.  However, as there was no coherent model of 
Athabaskan verb morphology, the template quickly filled the vacuum and came to be 
seen as a model of verb production, to the extent that the Athabaskan languages are held 
out as the major or only example of “templatic” morphology.    
Before Sapir, the first academically trained linguist to publish material on Dene 
Sųłiné was Pliny Earle Goddard (1869-1928), an American ethnographer and linguist.  
His doctoral thesis, The Morphology of the Hupa Language (1904) was a description of 
a major language from the Pacific branch of the Athabaskan family.  Goddard went on 
to publish collections of texts in various Athabaskan languages, accompanied by 
grammatical descriptions.  A typical example of these was his long ariticle on Dene 
Sųłiné, Texts and Analysis of the Cold Lake Dialect, Chipewyan (1912).  This article, 
while not extremely valuable for the morphological analysis, records some early 
mythological texts from the region close to Dillon.   
During and after the time when Sapir was writing, various individual language 
studies were also produced.  Mary R. Haas published several descriptive articles about 
Athabaskan morphology and dialectology, including one on Dene Sųłiné  (Haas 1968).  
While he was not a student of Sapir, Adrien-Gabriel Morice strongly influenced 
Athabaskan studies at this time, as his grammar The Carrier Language (1932) proposed 
a simpler model of Athabaskan verb morphology than the templatic model outlined by 
Hoijer.  Yet another student of Sapir, Fang-Kuei Li, made the most important 
contributions to Dene Sųłiné  specifically, including a collection of Dene verb roots (Li 
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1933) and a description of Dene Sųłiné inflectional and derivational morphology (Li 
1946).  Years later, he published a collection of Dene texts, in phonetic transcription 
with only a free translation (Li & Scollon, 1976).  His unpublished slipfile, compiled 
during his 1928 stay in the Dene Sųłiné and Cree community of Fort Chipewyan, also 
contains useful data.  More recently, Eung-Do Cook published a grammar of Dene 
Sųłiné  (2004), based on his fieldwork in the region in the 1970s.  Cook has also 
published numerous articles on Dene Sųłiné  phonology and semantic studies of specific 
prefixes (for example, see Cook 1992).  A few lexical semantic studies of specific 
lexical domains have been published, included a description of position verbs (S. Rice 
1998) and of giving and transfer verbs (S. Rice 2002).  A book on telicity in Dene 
Sųłiné and German has also appeared (Wilhelm 2007) as well as new work on number 
and count nouns (for example, Wilhelm 2006).   
 There is no room to provide an exhaustive review of all literature on Dene Sųłiné  
culture and history, not is all of it directly related to the questions addressed in this 
work.  Some sections, however, do present a rather culture-based view of language and 
try to relate particar areas of vocabulary with attested concepts and values in Dene 
society.  These suppositions have been inspired not only by the author’s fieldwork but 
also by the careful studies of several anthropologists who have worked with Dene 
peoples (in the broad sense).  Among the works one must mention are Vanstone’s 
(1974) Athabaskan Adaptations: Hunters and Fisherman of the Subarctic as well as 
Rushforth (1992) and Rushforth & Chisholm (1991), which are relevant to the analysis 
of Dene words for human personality.  A useful history of the Dene peoples can be 
found in Abel (1993).  Quiring (2004) compiles a great deal of information specifically 
about the 20th century history of Northern Saskatchewan, including the research area.   
 
1.2.  Other Northern Athabaskan Languages.  Dene Sųłiné  is part of a dialect 
continuum with the surrounding languages, and is particularly close to South Slavey, its 
neighbor to the north.   Even though we can consider Dene Sųłiné, South Slavey, North 
19  
Slavey and Dogrib as non-mutually intelligible languages5, the grammatical studies and 
dictionaries made for these other languages are of great use to students of Dene Sųłiné.  
Rice (1989) is a massive grammar of Slavey and the most exhaustive grammatical 
description of a Northern Athabaskan language.  Rice (1989) incorporates data from the 
many varieties of Slavey, some of which are quite close to Dene Sųłiné.  Rice also 
published an excellent comparative study of Athabaskan morphology (2000) that, while 
truly pan-Athabaskan in scope, cites much data from Northern Athabaskan languages.  
This work is important not only for its description of the derivational and quasi-
inflectional morphology historically related in each language, but for her innovative 
model of the Athabaskan verb: in contrast with the traditional template, Rice introduces 
the concept of semantic scope as a means of explaining interlinguistic variation in the 
order of the derivation and quasi-inflection markers.  There has been relatively less 
work on the other northern Athabaskan languages.  In addition to studies on Dogrib 
syntax, Saxon has published articles on the grammar and semantics of individual 
prefixes in Dogrib, including a study of the impersonal marker, here referred to as the 
“default human subject marker” (Saxon 1993) and of reflexive pronoun markers (Saxon 
1990).  
 
1.3.  Other Athabaskan Languages.  Despite the number of works cited above, 
the Northern Canadian branch of the Athabaskan family has received relatively less 
attention than the Alaskan and Southwestern branches.  In Alaska, the Alaskan Native 
Language Center (ANLC) is a research and teaching center where several linguists 
write grammars, dictionaries and pedagogical materials in the native languges of that 
state, in addition to historical and comparative studies.  Among the most influential 
works in this collection, one can cite Kari’s (1979) study on Athabaskan verb theme 
categories and Leer’s (1979) important historical reconstruction of Proto-Athabaskan 
                                                
5 As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the term “Dene” is used variously to describe all these 
northern Athabaskan peoples with substantially similar languages, or to describe all Athabaskan peoples, 
or to describe specifically the Dene Su ̨łiné.  To avoid ambiguity, in this work “Dene” will always refer 
only to Dene Su ̨łiné, the focus of this research, unless otherwise indicated. 
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verb roots.  More recently Alaskan Athabaskan languages have been the objects of 
ANLC-based research, including a study of aspectual derivation in Koyukon (Axelrod 
1993) and a grammar of the Tanacross language (Holton 2000).   
 The Southwestern branch, dominated by the Navajo and Apachean sub-branches, 
contains the largest Athabaskan languages in terms of absolute numbers of speakers, 
with more than 300,000 speakers of Navajo and 12,000 of Apache.  After Sapir’s early 
studies (e.g. Sapir 1967), and Hoijer’s (1945, 1946, 1948, 1949), the most important 
work has been that of Robert Young (to cite one study among many, the detailed 
description of Navajo verb morphology in Young 2000), and a recent grammar of 
Apache by de Reuse (2006b).   Midgette (1995) is a study of the semantics of the 
Navajo progressive in discourse.  Smith (1996) is a review of the semantics of aspectual 
markers while Smith (2000) is an analysis of the verb stem (called the “verb base”) in 
Navajo.    
 
 
 
2   THE LEXICAL UNIT IN ATHABASKAN LEXICOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
A core priority of the theoretical approach used in this work (see Chapter II) is to 
build an analytical lexicon of natural languages which will clearly distinguish between 
forms which are learned as units and those which are freely composed via the 
productive grammatical means of the language.  Although this seems like a common 
principle of linguistic description, when one is compiling a dictionary of an Athabaskan 
language, for which the status of the verb stem is a source of debate (see Section III-
1.1), one must take a position and list lexical items by verb word or by verb root.   
On a sociolinguistic level, the dictionaries can be divided into three groups: 
pedagogical dictionaries written by Christian missionaries for the purposes of 
translating religious materials from French or English into Dene languages, with other 
missionaries as the target audience; dictionaries compiled by professional linguists and 
destined to an academic audience; and various pedagogical dictionaries created by 
linguists in close cooperation with Dene communities or self-published by the Dene 
bands themselves as part of their school curricula and internal language planning 
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efforts.  Community-based dictionaries noun dictionaries and other dictionaries 
designed for specific purposes which do not focus on the verb stem are discussed 
separately, in Section 2.3.  
The existing dictionaries of Dene Sųłiné are all bilingual and unidirectional, 
usually from Dene into French or English.   Many, however, contain English indexes of 
topics or translation equivalents of Dene keywords.  
 
2.1.  Word-Based Dictionaries.  These are dictionaries which use a full verb sem 
(“verb theme” in Athabaskan linguistics) or an inflected verb word as the citation form.  
Most missionary dictionaries are of this type and were produced in the latter half of the 
19th century.  At that time, the Athabaskan peoples of northwestern Canada were the 
object of a rivalry between (English-speaking) Anglican and (French-speaking) Roman 
Catholic Oblate missionaries.  The latter converted nearly all of the Dene Sųłine ́  
villages to Catholicism in the 19th century and brought them under a francophone 
sphere of influence.  The first dictionary of Dene Sųłiné  was published in France in 
Dictionnaire de la langue déné dinjié ou chippewyane (1874) by Émile Petitot, a 
missionary in the region.  Petitot's dictionary is from French into four northern 
Athabaskan languages arranged in left-two-right columns: Dene Sųłiné, two Slavey 
languages, and Gwich’in.  In terms of format, the dictionary presents several 
challenges: Petitot heard and transcribed the Dene words as a French speaker, and 
failed to make several phonemic distinctions which did not exist in his language, such 
as the difference ejective versus non-ejective cononants.  Petitot also failed to 
distinguish between some phonemes, such as /t/ and /d/ that can be found in French.  
Finally, while Petitot’s dictionary is widely cited, it is unclear that he conducted a 
thorough study of Dene Sųłiné  because the modern Dene Sųłiné speakers with whom I 
attempted to re-elicit Petitot’s data found the vast majority of Petitot’s wordforms 
incomprehensible and utterly different from any Dene Sųłiné which might be a 
translation of the French keyword, even though they easily recognized most words 
from other sources from the same time period.  One wonders whether Petitot 
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mislabelled his group as “Chipewyan” (Dene Sųłiné) while it was in fact another 
language, or whether he generated the Dene Sųłiné entries by analogy based on the 
entries in the other languages, or simply using his own intuitions as a second language 
speaker of Dene Sųłiné.  
The second missionary to publish a Dene Sųłiné  dictionary was Laurent LeGoff, 
whose 1916 Dictionnaire de la langue montagnaise is based on what he learned with 
the Dene between 1880 and 1900.  This unidirectional French-to-Dene dictionary seems 
to have been generated by trying to render the headings of a monolingual French 
dictionary in Dene, based on the presence of entries for words such as ‘emperor’ but no 
entry for frequently used native words like ‘tipi’.  Vaster and much more phonetically 
accurate and consistent than Petitot’s dictionary, LeGoff’s dictionary also contains 
numerous verb paradigms.  Although LeGoff’s data is still cited in academic articles, it 
seems that perhaps 40% of the Dene words he lists seem to have been generated by 
LeGoff himself, even in cases where a Dene equivalent of the French word was readily 
available.  Many of the Dene words and phrases in the dictionary are based on calques 
from French.  For example, ‘skin’ in English (or ‘peau’ in French) has two translations 
in Dene, –tth’í to describe the skin and superficial flesh of a living being, and dheth, 
which describes a disembodied hide of a skinned animal.  In English and French, these 
are two senses expressed by the same signifier.  LeGoff’s dictionary often uses the 
sense of ‘disembodied hide’ to refer to living people’s skin, e.g. sedhéth 
{1PO:hide:CONS} as the Dene equivalent of “ma peau”, ‘my skin’.  ‘Bandage’ is 
rendered as eya dhéth {pain hide:CONS}, which would mean “bag of pain” in Dene; the 
correct of referring to this situation would be dene kąé hecheth {person wound:CONS 
3IPFV:tie} ‘a person’s wound is tied up’.  ‘Peninsula’ is rendered as k’asjené nu, lit. 
“almost island”, a rendering of the Latin etymology of peninsula, while Dene has a 
frequently used word, hochéla, for peninsulas and promontories.  The Dene word for 
‘rust’ is claimed to be tsątsné tsné lit. “excrement of metal”; in Dene to refer to the 
situation of ’rust’ one would use the verb stem ‘to rust’, dí...ts. Although it is clear that 
many of the words and phrases in LeGoff’s dictionary are unlikely to have been uttered 
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by native speakers, perhaps 50% of the entries (or their near-equivalents) were 
confirmed by native speakers during this research project.   
At the same time that Petitot and LeGoff were writing, the Oblate missionaries 
produced a number of devotional works and hymn books in Dene Sųłiné, written in a 
form of syllabic writing.  In the latter 20th century, Protestant missionaries produced a 
dictionary with little grammatical information, but with authentic data and a very good 
phonetic transcription (Elford & Elford 2001).  
A few dictionaries by professional linguists have used inflected verbforms as 
citation forms.  Among the dictionaries for Northern or Canadian languages of this type, 
one must mention the Dogrib dictionary by Siemens & Saxon (1996), perhaps the most 
usable dictionary of a northern Athabaskan language for non-specialists.  For Navajo, 
the massive dictionary by Young & Morgan (1987) uses the first-person form as the 
citation form but contains an index of lexical units by verb root.    
 
2.2. Root- and Stem-based Dictionaries.  Most of the Athabaskan dictionaries by 
professional linguists have been of this type, which certainly reveals the most 
etymological information which is highly valuable for comparative studies.  Of 
particular note is the excellent dictionary of Koyukon (Jetté & Jones 2000).  The native 
speaker linguist Eliza Jones compiled this dictionary by checking and verifying a corpus 
of data from an early 20th century missionary dictionary by Jules Jetté, whose linguistic 
notes were far more accurate and culturally sensitive than the missionary dictionaries 
which appeared for Dene Sųłiné.  The Koyukon dictionary is adopts a combination of 
ways of listing lexical items, as the main entry is by verb root, but is then followed by a 
series of full verb themes (“verb stems” in our terminology).  The Ahtna dictionary by 
Kari (1990) contains over 6,000 entries with numerous examples of productive 
derivation and includes an English to Ahtna index. Kari’s Dena’ina dictionary (2007) is 
of similar depth and complexity. 
 
2.3.  Other Athabaskan Dictionaries.  Some smaller pedagogical dictionaries 
have appeared for languages of the lesser-known and more endangered Pacific branch 
of the Athabaskan family.  Of these, one should mention at least Golla’s (1996) 
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dictionary of Hupa.  Sharon Hargus has compiled a topical noun dictionary of Sekani 
(Hargus 1986) and of Witsuwit’en (Hargus 1997) as well as an interlinearized collection 
of stories in the latter language (Hargus 1995). Rice (1977) is a noun dictionary of a 
north Slavey variety while Rice (1983) is a topical noun dictionary of another Slavey 
variety.   Norwegian & Howard (2004) is a verb dictionary of South Slavey.  All of the 
above dictionaries are unidirectional, from the Athabaskan language to English, except 
for the Dogrib dictionary, which is bidirectional.   It should be noted, however, that 
virtually all of these dictionaries contain some type of English-to-Dene index.   
Dictionaries produced by Dene communities themselves have been slow to appear. 
Schools in most Dene communities are trying to implement language preservation and 
revitalization programs, requiring a curriculum with pedagogical materials.  Most of 
these are published informally and circulated among a few educators.  Dene tribes have 
also produced a number of Web sites with generous word lists and texts, some 
accompanied by sound recordings.  A council of Slavey First Nations produced their 
own dictionary, Guzagi K’ugé (“Our Language”) in 1997.   
In summary, Athabaskan lexicography contains a variety of currents which reflect 
conflicting sociological contexts and concrete purposes.  In most dictionaries by 
linguists, Athabaskan verbs are presented as morphologically complex, and there is 
often not a strong concern about separating diachronic morphological combinations 
from synchronic ones.  This follows a general semasiological tendency in Athabaskan 
and Americanist linguistics, or a focus on analyzing forms to arrive at their meaning.  
This choice has the advantage of revealing extensive etymological and comparative 
information.  On the other hand, some dictionaries (mostly pedagogical) list only 
wordforms without any word-internal analysis.   The current lexical semantic study, if 
translated into a partial Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary (ECD) of Dene, would 
represent an additional type, one focusing on the synthesis of forms by speakers to 
express meaning rather than the analysis of existing forms.  A Dene ECD would 
therefore list both “verb themes” and “verb stems” as keywords, according to whether 
the latter were autonomous signs in the synchronic language independent of any non-
inflectional material.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
Semantics and Lexicography:  
Theoretical Foundations 
 
 
 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to associate given lexical units in Dene Sųłine ́ 
with particular meanings, expressed as lexicographic definitions, and to contrast quasi-
synonymous definitions where possible.  This correlation is complicated at both ends.  
First, there is no consensus in the literature as to what exactly a basic Dene lexical unit 
is, at least where verb stems are concerned.  Second, the purpose and construction and 
indeed the validity of a lexicographic definition varies markedly according to the 
particular lexical semantic framework adopted.  Up to this point, we have reviewed how 
the current study fits into the Athabaskanist literature, and it is certainly vital to make 
clear which Dene signifiers are treated as a units of semantic description (for the 
structure of the verb stem in this work, see Chapter III, Section 1.1).  However, it is 
equally critical to outline exactly what the lexical semantic side of the study aims to 
accomplish as well as its context within lexical semantics.  
Lexical semantics, perhaps more than any other subfield of linguistics, is 
characterized by an eclectic mix of goals and approaches.  Sometimes these reflect 
particular problems and interests rather than a whole-language documentation approach.  
Some of the more prominent topics in semantics include investigation of the syntax-
semantics interface and explorations into the structure of cognition underlying lexical 
items. Some semantic approaches, such as truth-conditional semantics pioneered by 
analytical philosophers such as Frege and Carnap, are more closely located in 
philosophy and logic than in linguistics proper.  Currently, one also finds many studies 
dedicated to topics such as metaphor, metonymy and semantic extension, as one can 
find in the work of Langacker, Lakoff and Croft.  Language philosophers Saul Kripke 
and Hilary Putnam have also identified problems with the concept of lexical definition 
and meaning as it pertains to certain classes of lexical items.  So while the lexical 
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semantics literature is rich, varied and suggestive of multiple paths for future 
exploration, lexical semantics has remained less an articulated science than a common 
subject matter discussed by a heterogeneous mix of linguists, lexicographers and 
philosophers.  In comprehensive reviews of lexical semantic theories, these 
heterogeneous projects are often treated as mutually exclusive models, even though they 
often deal with unrelated questions. 
The current description of the Dene lexicon is anchored in the approach of 
Meaning-Text Theory (MTT), a relatively lesser-known approach with respect to some 
of the above theories.  MTT emerged in the 1960s in Russia and is largely coterminous 
with the Moscow Semantics School, which began in connection with Soviet machine 
translation efforts and which therefore required an extremely detailed and accurate 
formal model of language in all its aspects. The creation and articulation of MTT was 
primarily the collective effort of three Moscow-based linguists, Alexander Zholkovsky, 
Igor Mel’čuk, and Juri Apresjan, whose early efforts resulted in Explanatory 
Combinatorial Lexicography (Zholkovsky & Mel’čuk 1965, 1966, 1967), also known as 
the Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary (ECD) approach.  While most MTT 
researchers, including Apresjan, have remained focused on semantics and lexicography, 
Mel’čuk’s extremely prolific writings have extended a solid foundation for MTT in 
morphology and syntax.  After his emigration to Montreal, Canada, in 1978, Mel’čuk 
produced much new MTT work in English and French.  He continued lexicographic 
research after the 1970s, particularly with the French-language ECD (Mel’čuk et al. 
1984; 1988; 1999) the Russian-language ECD (Mel’čuk & Zholkovsky 1984), and 
numerous other lexicographic articles and monographs. Mel’čuk’s writing on 
morphology is extensive, particularly the five-volume Cours de Morphologie Générale 
(Mel’čuk, 1993-1997; much of this is condensed in Mel’čuk 2006a); important syntax 
works include the volumes Mel’čuk (1988) and Polguère & Mel’čuk (2007).  
Semantics: From Meaning to Text (Mel’čuk, to appear) is a large textbook on 
theoretical lexical semantics.  The pedagogical application of MTT lexicography to 
second-language learning has begun to be addressed; see for example Mel’čuk & 
Polguère’s Lexique actif du français (2007), the first general public dictionary based on 
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MTT concepts.  With the publication of all of these works, MTT has gradually gained 
appeal and prominence as a tool for global empirical linguistic.   
With its roots in semantics and lexicography, MTT adopts positions with respect 
to many of the major theoretical questions in lexical semantics.  These choices have 
obvious consequences for how MTT’s practical lexicographic description is carried out.  
Some theoretically charged terms like “semantic component” or “definition” need to be 
explained in their MTT context versus what they might mean in other approaches.  
Although MTT may be unique in certain aspects, readers may be surprised to discover 
that some of its goals and assumptions are shared with more dominant linguistic 
theories.  In order to render this work accessible to any readers with an interest in 
lexical semantics and Athabaskan languages, it is therefore important to outline the 
particular assumptions and formalisms of MTT semantics before proceeding to the 
analysis of the Dene lexicon itself, so that the former may not obscure the latter.  This 
chapter therefore has two goals.  Section 1 provides the necessary background to MTT 
lexical semantics as compared with other approaches, for readers interested in semantics 
in general but unfamiliar with this particular approach.   Sections 2 and 3 are aimed at 
readers familiar with MTT and discuss why the present work contributes to MTT itself 
by introducing a language family that has not been discussed in the MTT literature, one 
that is both typologically different and that comes from a very different cultural and 
sociolinguistic context with respect to the languages widely discussed in MTT semantic 
studies so far.  
 
 
1 MEANING-TEXT THEORY IN LEXICAL SEMANTICS 
 
This section compares the tenets and methods of MTT with other major 
approaches to lexical semantics whenever the theoretical positions adopted have 
important consequences for practical lexicography.  In these cases, Dene lexical items 
are referenced along with English ones to illustrate the correlation between the 
linguistic model and the lexicographic definitions.     
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1.1.  The Scope of Lexical Description in Meaning-Text Theory.  Semantic 
description cannot be separated from linguistic description generally.  Linguists 
approaching the lexicon from a specific theoretical framework will approach this 
enterprise with a particular view of the syntax-semantics interface.  As a result there is 
no consensus among linguists as to what information should be included in 
lexicographic description, as the difference between the grammar and the lexicon is 
often “a function of one’s theory” (Pawley 1985).  MTT is an approach which is highly 
focused on lexicography and less on syntax, assigning to the lexicon a high 
informational content which includes information which counts as syntactic in some 
other theories.     
The basic tenet of Meaning-Text Theory, as expressed by Mel’čuk in Semantics: 
From Meaning to Text (to appear) is the following: 
 
Any act of linguistic communication between a Speaker and an Addressee involves three 
major entities: 
(a) A mental, or psychological, linguistic content that the Speaker wants to express via 
physical linguistic signals (and that can be received and understood by an Addressee); 
this content will be referred to as meaning. 
(b) A physical linguistic signal—acoustic, graphical, or gestural—that the Speaker uses in 
order to express the intended mental linguistic content (and that can be perceived and 
deciphered by the Addressee in order to get to this content); this signal will be referred to 
as text. 
(c) A mapping between meanings and texts, or a set of rules establishing correspondences 
between them; this set of rules, encoded in the Speaker’s (and the Addressee’s) brain, 
taken together with the set of meanings and the set of texts, is nothing else but a (natural) 
language. 
 
 
Of language, only the signifiers, be they sound, graphic or gestural signs, are directly 
perceptible, as are the meanings (to each of us, because we choose them); the rest of 
language is obscured within the brain –– language is a “black box” into which we 
cannot peer.  Whatever language is and however it ultimately exists as architecture in 
the brain, it must constitute the link between the speakers’ meanings and their 
perceptible texts.  This correspondence can be abbreviated as follows:  
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(2)        A Meaning ⇔ Text Model of Language 
                        language 
 
  
{Meaningi}   ⇐correspondence⇒  {Textj}    |  0 < i, j  ≤  ∞ 
 
Linguistics, like quantum mechanics or cosmology, is a science which has as its object 
something which is not directly observable. To describe an object which we cannot 
observe directly but only by deducing its traits by observing its effects, scientists must 
have recourse to a model, “an abstract system of symbolic expressions” (Mel’čuk 
1997a).  A functional model does not claim to behave like the object of study in 
every respect.  It merely seeks to represent those aspects of the object’s behavior or 
functioning which could explain the phenomena we see.  Mel’čuk (1997a) cites the 
example of the Bohr-Rutherford model of the atom, which was not claimed to look like 
an atom but simply to model certain facts we can deduce about atoms based on what we 
know about matter. 
What, then, should a functional model of language consist of?  MTT is an 
equative model of language.  As expressed by the central tenet of MTT above, 
language is simply described as a set of correspondences between an infinite but 
denumerable set of meanings and an infinite but denumerable set of texts.  In this way, 
an equative model is in contrast with a generative model which seeks to represent the 
language component which generates all and only the grammatically correct utterances 
of a language and in which the focus is not on the lexical units which are learned but on 
language as a mental structure which enables the creative assembly of these lexical units 
into novel utterances.  
MTT does not specifically deny the existence of Universal Grammar or an innate 
language faculty (cf. the Cognitive Grammar approach, and others).  MTT simply 
refrains from making detailed claims what the architecture of Universal Grammar must 
be.  The priority is shifted to fully describing the lexical semantic, pragmatic, 
morphological and syntactic facts about the widest array of natural languages.  In this 
aspect MTT may resemble a return to earlier structuralist approaches.  MTT also does 
not attempt to integrate data from diverse languages (or diverse structures within the 
same language) into a single abstract underlying form, but simply posits a typology of 
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relations (for example, syntactic or lexical semantic relations) which can be found in 
multiple languages.  
The rules in an equative model like MTT link various modules or aspects of 
language in order to show how, starting from a semantic representation, one can arrive 
at a set of phonological representations, or texts.  MTT rules are not dynamic and 
transformational, translating a mental structure or deep structure into surface structures 
(cf. classic phrase structure rules are followed by transformational rules in Chomsky 
1965, or Merge and Movement followed by Spell-Out in Chomsky 1993).  Equative 
rules are static and declarative, representing simple correspondences between the 
meanings and the sounds that express them, along with each logically inferrable 
intermediary level of representation (see Figure II-1).    
 
Representations                Rules 
Semantic Representation  
↕  
 
}   semantic component 
Deep Syntactic Representation 
↕  
 
}   deep syntactic component 
Surface Syntactic Representation 
↕  
 
}    surface syntactic component 
Deep Morphological Representation 
↕  
 
}    deep morphological component 
Surface Morphological Representation 
↕  
 
}    surface morphological component 
Deep Phonological Representation 
↕  
 
}    deep phonological component 
Surface Phonological Representation  
 
 
Figure II-1.  Representations and Components in Meaning-Text Theory. 
 
Equative rules have no input and output of the rules in a traditional sense, but link 
wholly “other” levels of analysis.  This is indicated by the bidirectionality of the arrows 
⇔ in the rules that consitute each module.  While the rules work in either direction, 
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MTT chooses to privilege the onomasiological direction, or the direction of synthesis: 
starting with the meaning, one proceeds to the tangible phonological representation.  
This is in contrast with the semasiological direction, or that of analysis.  The central 
question is not, therefore, “What do lexical units L1, L2, ... Ln of this language mean?”, 
but “How does one express ConceptR1, ConceptR2, ... ConceptRn in this language?”.  
There are several reasons for this choice, amply justified in Mel’čuk (1993, 1997b, 
among others).  
Once the speaker has started with a (mostly non-linguistic) configuration of 
concepts he or she wishes to express, linguistic meanings which correspond to these 
concepts are selected.  The speaker juxtaposes these meanings freely and transparently 
in the case of a free phrase, in which each linguistic sign has the same signifier 
and signified it would have had outside of the phrase.  The sum of this semantic and 
grammtical combination is called an act of linguistic union, represented by 
the symbol ⊕.  The defining criteria of a free phrase formed by an operation of 
linguistic union are first that the signified has been combined unrestrictedly and 
regularly on the basis of the Conceptual Representation (see section 2.1 below), and 
second that the signifiers have also combined unrestrictedly and regularly according to 
the grammatical rules governing the combination of all lexical units (Mel’čuk 2006a: 8).  
(For a typology of non-free phrases, see Section II-3.1.3.)  
One could call the MTT approach more “lexicocentric” than most linguistic 
currents.  Lexicocentrism can be defined in the weak sense, as the constatation that 
lexical facts constitute numerically the vast majority of what must be documented in 
order to describe a speaker’s knowledge of a language.  As Mel’čuk et al. (1995: 17) 
puts it, “les lexies forment... la partie primordiale de la langue.  En exagérant quelque 
peu, on pourrait même dire que l’ensemble des lexies est la langue.  En effet, une langue 
est constituée de lexies et de règles servant à la manipulation de ces dernières”.  Or 
Mel’čuk (2006b): “MTT considers the lexicon as the central, pivotal component of a 
linguistic description; the grammar is no more than a set of generalization[s] over the 
lexicon, secondary to it”.  There is also a stronger interpretation of lexicocentrism, one 
which suggests that the lexicon actually influences the content or functioning of the 
grammar, as the statement “le lexique d’une langue prime logiquement sur sa 
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grammaire” (Mel’čuk et al. 1995: 17) suggests, although such a claim could be 
interpreted as referring either to diachronic change or to some sort of synchronic 
relationship.  
The lexicocentrism of Meaning-Text Theory is certainly partly due the fact that 
MTT, unlike most other linguistic approaches, has its roots in practical lexicography. To 
some extent, lexicocentrism and syntactocentrism appear as simply different sets of 
priorities reflecting equivalent ways of dividing up the linguistic facts, which differ 
mostly for theory-internal reasons.6  This debate concerns which information is assigned 
to the lexicon versus the grammar.   However, there seem to be a number of advantages 
to choosing a lexicocentric model, at least in a weaker sense of lexicocentrism.  One 
concrete example is the treatment of syntactic combinatorial information often referred 
to as “event structure” outside MTT and known as the government pattern in the 
MTT framework.  Event structure has been explored in great detail in a number of 
systematic descriptions and classifications, such as Levin (1993).   In a classic insertion 
model of the syntax-semantics interface, lexical items are inserted at the bottom of 
syntactic trees that are formed at a prior stage.  The lexical items are chosen according 
to their subcategorization rules which correspond to actant structure and 
subcategorization constraints.  In this way, features like subcategorization or “verb 
categories”, classes which share an argument structure, must be posited to account for 
these combinatory patterns.  In classic generative approaches, meaning does not 
motivate syntactic structure:  “I am assuming throughout that the semantic component 
of a generative grammar, like the phonological component, is purely interpretive” 
(Chomsky 1965: 75).  While event structure and subcategorization are lexically 
specified, their relationship with the lexicographic definition is generally not made 
explicit.   
In a Meaning-Text model, semantic combination is closely linked to syntactic or 
morphological combination.  This unity would explain as regular some features of 
syntactic combinatory patterns which a lexical insertion model might render more 
                                                
6 So far, there seems to be evidence for influence in both directions, i.e. of lexical knowledge on syntactic 
knowledge and vice-versa, at least in the context of language acquisition (see the ample literature on 
“semantic” versus “syntactic bootstrapping”, especially Pinker 1989 and Gleitman & Landau 1994). 
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arbitrary or coincidental.  The government pattern and its syntactic combinatorial 
requirements are not superimposed on the lexical meaning to the same extent, but often 
flow organically from the lexicographic definition.  As a trivial example, the verb DIE 
could not be used with inanimate subjects not because of an arbitrary parameter but 
because the meaning ‘cease to live’ invokes such a subject. Another example is the 
treatment of many “optional” actants.  If one places a stronger focus on the syntactic 
combinatorial requirements than on the meaning, one might underestimate the extent of 
polysemy of verbs and fail to meticulously sort out their subtly variant senses.  This 
causes some actants to be viewed as optional when in fact there may be distinct quasi-
synonymous verbs whose meanings may contain different sets of semantic actant.  If the 
verb SHÉ...TI in the sentences k’aní shéghesti {just.now 1PFV:sg.eat2} ‘I just ate’ and 
łue ghą shéghesti {fish of 1PFV:sg.eat1} ‘I ate fish’ is the considered to be the same 
verb or the same sense, then the object must be optional.  If, on the other hand, the verb 
in łue ghą shéghesti, SHÉ...TI1, has the definition ‘living being X chews and swallows 
Y’, an object is always required.  This sense can only be said if the subject is presumed 
to be eating a specific object.  The presence of a second semantic actant is part of the 
definition.  The sense SHÉ...TI2 in k’aní shéghesti would be intransitive and telic, 
meaning ‘X consumes a meal’, in reference to habitual or planned acts of eating.  The 
same difference exists between the English quasi-synonyms EAT1 (I ate an orange) and 
EAT2 (let’s eat, then leave). Because quasi-synonyms of EAT1 lack the component 
‘meal’, and cannot be extended to this sense, they cannot be used in the same context: 
let’s *devour 〈*nibble, *wolf down〉, then leave.  In the MTT view, these differences do 
not appear as arbitrary parameters once the meanings have been properly analyzed and 
tested.  Indeed, the syntactic combinatorial constraints are seen in MTT as important 
insights into the subtly variant meanings of the keywords. This one will find a 
proliferation of quasi-synonyms such as the various verbs meaning roughly ‘to be 
sad...’, ɁANE...ɁÁ1, ɁANE...ɁÁ2, ɁANE...ɁÁ3 in Chapter III.  Of course these senses 
are united by a common element (see Section 1.3 of this chapter) but it is important to 
compare their subtle difference including in the number of semantic actants.  In the 
lexical entries in this study, the strong link and frequent cross-referencing of the 
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lexicographic definitions and the government patterns is due to this concept of influence 
of the semantics on the syntax.   
 
1.2.  Semantic Components in Meaning-Text Theory.  MTT presupposes the 
discrete character of meaning and this thesis will continually mention “semantic 
components” which are necessary and sufficient to obtain the meaning of the Dene 
keyword.  This is liable to cause confusion because many readers will recall the 
“componential” approach truth-conditional semantics, which also invoked a “necessary 
and sufficient” set of conditions for rendering the meaning of a keyword.  Some 
linguists have even gone so far as to speak of various “componential” approaches as a 
common school, despite the fact that this term is used in incompatible semantic 
traditions.  For example, the following passage from Geeraerts & Cuyckens (2007: 144) 
lumps Plato, Aristotle, Locke and Carnap together under the umbrella of “necessary and 
sufficient conditions for their application”: 
 
The traditional concept... is sometimes referred to as the Classical Theory of concepts, 
which has had a long history in philosophy dating back to antiquity (e.g. Arisotle 1984, 
Plato 1981; Locke [1697] 1960; Carnap 1978).  Its main tenet is that concepts have 
definitional structure in the sense that they encode necessary and sufficient conditions for 
their application.  For example, the concept ‘bachelor’ can be interpreted in terms of the 
Classical Theory  as a complex mental representation that is composed of a set of features 
(semantic markers) such as male, adult and not married (see Katz and Fodor 1963)... I 
will discuss the ways in which Cognitive Linguistics developed a prototype-based 
conception of semantic structure that goes against Classical Theory 
 
It is in fact inappropriate to conflate decompositional approach like MTT with truth-
conditional decomposition in the sense of analytical philosophy.7 “Decomposition” 
means something quite different in MTT with respect to how this term is used in truth-
conditional semantics, to which MTT is not  related. Analytical philosophers such as 
Carnap were interested in language as a symbolic system of utterances which, like 
mathematical statements, could express truth and knowledge about the referents.  
Utterances were described in terms of the necessary and sufficient truth conditions 
                                                
7 Wierzbicka (1986: 307) notes, “sweeping attacks on ‘Western philosophy and linguistics’ based on 
vague references to an alleged ‘standard view’ and to unidentified ‘standard theories’ are, in my view, in 
questionable taste”.  Haser (2005) offers a meticulous deconstruction of Cognitive claims about other 
philosophical schools.    
                                                                                                                                      36 
under which the utterances could be true or meaningful.  Sentences were taken to have 
the same meaning if they were true under the same conditions. The interest was in 
language as a means to learning about the referents (the world).  Frege’s sense/reference 
distinction (or Carnap’s intension/extension) was important as a means of isolating the 
referent.  The meaning of a word could be “decomposed”, as Carnap did, by describing 
it in terms of meaning postulates, analytical statements such as (3) which could be listed 
so that the user of the language system could choose the precise set of referents to 
which the name could apply. 
 
(3)   (MP)(∀x)(bachelor(x) ⊃ ~married(x)) 
‘For any X it is true that: if X is a bachelor, then X is not married’   
 
Analytical semantics is mostly sentential; lexical meaning was important only to the 
extent to which it contributed to the understanding of the utterance.  According to 
Marconi (1997: 8) lexical meaning not a focus of the analytical school also because the 
choice and interpretation of lexical units was considered a mechanical translative 
operation:  
 
Another reason that structural issues prevailed was that there were thought to be no 
lexical semantic issues... Genuine objects have internal properties, and so do their names, 
but such properties are regarded as purely combinatorial... The internal properties of a 
name (whatever they are) are not conceived of as making up its ‘semantic content’: the 
semantic content (the Bedeutung) is just the object named, and as for sense, they have 
none.  Everything else in language is composition.  
   
MTT is the reverse of this sort of componential approach.  Instead of focusing on the 
truth conditions necessary for the utterance to be true, MTT semanticists are interested 
in linguistic conditions under which a certain lexical unit can be used.  In other words, 
MTT is interested in the meaning of lexical units for their own sake rather than to learn 
about the referents.  In fact, MTT does not address the question of truth or absurdity at 
all.  An untrue or bizarre meaning such as that of the sentence Colorless green ideas 
sleep furiously is odd because the speakers, with their extralinguistic knowledge, would 
find this combination of meanings odd, not because of anything in the meanings 
themselves.  MTT instead posits the meanings of lexical units can (in most cases) be 
decomposed into a set of semantically simpler meaning components, salva 
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significatione, which constitute its paraphrase.  The term salva significatione 
refers to the requirement that native speakers must feel that meaning is preserved and 
still communicated when the decomposition is used instead of the keyword.   
Some linguists might assume that this sort of semantic decomposition must be 
subjective, perhaps culture- or context-dependent.  As Riemer (2006) states, “Whether 
or not a word’s meaning has been successfully explicated, and its understanding thereby 
achieved, cannot be determined by the extent to which a proposed explication conforms 
to a pre-established scheme: ... [it] is sensitive to ... the cognitive, cultural, and historical 
contingencies of each individual in the learning experience. This is a truism which I 
take to be so obvious as not to require any argument”.  MTT posits that there are 
objectively more and less successful semantic decompositions.  This is based on tests of 
semantic simplicity, a concept developed in Mel’čuk (1995), which I will follow here.  
When comparing the semantic complexity of two lexical units (LUs), if LU1 is definable 
in terms of LU2, but not the reverse, then LU1 is semantically more complex than LU2.  
In the following pairs the latter member is semantically more complex and the former is 
simpler: close ~ open, wet ~ dry, Islam ~ Muslim, Indiana ~ Hoosier, linguistics ~ 
linguist.  This is empirically testable and falsifiable.  If we attempt to define wet as 
‘with / having liquid’ and we suppose that wet is semantically simpler than dry, we will 
define dry in terms of wet, i.e. dry = ‘not’ + ‘wet’, or more fully as dry = ‘not 
with/having liquid’, which seems to work.  If however we supposed that dry was 
semantically simpler than wet and tried to define wet as ‘not’ + ‘dry’, then it is unclear 
what dry could be defined as.  If we said that dry meant ‘not with / having liquid’, then 
we are back where we started.  Similarly, if we decided that Islam was semantically 
simpler than Muslim, then we could define Muslim in terms of Islam, i.e. Muslim = ‘one 
who practices Islam’.  In turn, the definition of Islam would be ‘a religion which... [a 
list of its specific features]’.  If we chose the reverse, that Islam could be defined in 
terms of Muslim, i.e. Islam = ‘the religion practiced by Muslims’, we would have to add 
the differentia to Muslim, making its definition ‘someone who practices a religion 
which... [specific features]’.  Therefore, a full explication of Islam would be ‘the 
religion of the people who practice the religion which... [specific features]’, which is 
obviously redundant and should be shortened to ‘the religion which... ‘.  Similarly, 
                                                                                                                                      38 
Indiana ‘a US state located...’ is semantically simpler than Hoosier ‘someone who lives 
in Indiana’, rather than Indiana = ‘place where Hoosiers [people who live in Indiana] 
live’.  Linguistics should not be defined in terms of linguist, i.e. ‘a science practiced by 
linguists’ (even though sometimes it feels that way).  Rather, linguistics = ‘the science 
of language’ and linguist = ‘someone who studies the science of language’.  So 
semantic simplicity emerges naturally through analysis and provides a clear answer as 
to which word is simpler than the other.   
In Dene one can similarly posit that dáhháre...tį ‘to open’ is also semantically 
more complex than dáre...tį ‘to close’.  Interestingly, the morphological complexity of 
some Dene wordforms mimics their semantic complexity, as in the above case where 
the verb meaning ‘to open’ is (historically) derived from the verb meaning ‘to close’ by 
adding the prefix hhá– ‘out’.  Sometimes, Dene lacks the more semantically complex 
member of an antonym pair, as for the pair na...tser1 ‘to be (physically) strong’ versus 
na...tser1 íle ‘to be weak’, literally a simple negation of ‘to be strong’.  In this case, 
the morphological re-analysis provides a visible clue of the underlying semantic re-
analysis.  It would be quite misleading to imply that morphological complexity always 
indicates  semantic complexity or vice versa, as the two forms of complexity or 
simplicity are logically independent of one another.  
Meanings can be decomposed into a configuration of simpler meanings that are 
necessary and sufficient to denote the meaning of the word being analyzed.  For 
example, the meaning of the noun PROFESSOR [X] of [Y] to [Z] at [W] is ‘person X 
who, having expert knowledge of subject Y, teaches students Z at institution of higher 
education W’ comprises the components ‘person’, ‘teach’ and ‘employ’ and has the 
semantic actants ‘higher education establishment’, ‘students’ and ‘subject’.  If one of 
these components is missing then the lexeme PROFESSOR no longer applies. If 
someone never teaches, he or she cannot be called a professor in English, but perhaps a 
researcher.  To be called a professor in English, one must be currently employed by 
some institution of higher education; it sounds strange to call someone a ?private 
professor or a ?freelance professor.  It is interesting to note that ‘employed by an 
institution of higher education’ is only a connotation of this word’s French (quasi-) 
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equivalent, PROFESSEUR.  One can be a professeur de piano à domicile (a private 
piano “professor”).  The verb RENT1 ‘person X acquires the rights of possession of 
commodity Y for duration T from person Z in exchange for quantity of money W 
(which Z asks of X)’ requries an owner of a commodity, another person, a time frame 
and a quantity of money.  These components are considered obligatory not because they 
must be mentioned in every utterance containing the lexemes PROFESSOR or RENT, 
but because the speaker and addressee must be aware of them at some level.  This is the 
meaning of a componential approach salva significatione.  MTT’s componential 
approach to meaning is crucial for cross-linguistic semantics, because many or most 
words from other languages do not have an easy translation equivalent because they do 
not share all semantic components, as in the case of professor/professeur above.  Slight 
differences in the set of components are pervasive when comparing lexica of two 
languages.  The English verb CRY ‘X has liquid come out of X’s eyes’ is seemingly 
easy to render in most languages.  But CRY has a denotational range different from 
many of these quasi-equivalents in other languages.  In English one can cry blood from 
an illness or cry from cutting onions.  In Russian, is one such case, described in Melcuk 
(2004a):  the Russian quasi-equivalent of CRY,  PLAKAT’, cannot be used in this 
context because the cause of ‘strong emotion’ is a semantic component of PLAKAT’ 
but not of the English CRY: *Ot vetra ona zaplakala   *‘She started crying because of 
the wind’.  One can compare English and Dene lexemes in the same way.  In Dene 
Sųłiné, CRY is usually rendered by the stem –TSAGH.  However, –TSAGH has an 
obligatory participant that CRY does not, namely ‘strong emotion Y’.  One cannot –
tsagh for a non-emotional reason, e.g. *tł’oghtsené nast’ath ɂá 〈*senaghé eya ɂá〉 
hestsagh {onions 1IPFV:cut.up because 〈1PO:eyes it.hurts because〉 1IPFV:cry} *‘I’m 
crying because I’m cutting onions 〈*because I have an eye illness〉’.  In these situations 
one would have to use sená tué {1PO:eyes water:CONS}‘my eyes are watering’.   
 
1.3. Necessary and Sufficient Components in the Definitions.  In MTT, 
meanings of lexical units are described as configurations of simpler semantic 
components.  These semantic components are selected so that taken together they match 
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the denotational range of the keyword.  They are, in other words, classic or criterial 
categories, defined using necessary and sufficient elements.  For example, if the lexeme 
PROFESSOR refers to a classical or discretely drawn category of referents, then every 
human either falls in or outside of the category PROFESSOR.  In lexical semantics, 
classical categories have come under heavy criticism in recent decades with the 
popularity of prototype categories, which became popular in linguistics after Eleanor 
Rosch (1973, 1975) published her research on the psychological perception of 
categories.  These studies showed that there were significant “prototype effects” on 
people’s perceptions of individuals’ membership in a category.  Most of the examples 
were of natural and cultural kinds, e.g. characterizing the prototypical category referred 
to by BIRD based on whether various individual birds were considered “good” 
examples.  Some more recent schools of linguistics, primarily the Cognitive Grammar 
(CG) approach, have adopted and formalized prototype categories and applied them to 
the study of word meanings.  Taking up Rosch’s thesis, CG linguists (e.g. Lakoff & 
Johnson 1980) argued against the validity of classical categories and criterial definitions 
of lexical meanings.  In the CG approach, a lexical meaning is described as a content 
which evokes a series of “cognitive domains”. For example, Langacker (2008: 55), cites 
the domains which “figure into” the meaning of WATER, including a picture of a half-
full glass of water as including space, wetness, liquid, container and the cultural practice 
of pouring water into a glass.  There is no established inventory of “basic domains” in 
CG and so the domains should not be considered semantic primitives in our sense, but 
“are better thought of as realms of experiential potential” (Langacker 2008: 56).  CG 
criticisms of classical categories such as Lakoff & Johnson (1980) and Langacker 
(1987) frequently cite the later Wittgenstein’s family resemblence model as an 
antecedent of a prototype category model of lexical meaning, the most famous example 
of which was the word/category GAME from his Philosophical Investigations 
(Wittgenstein 1953, §66):  
 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games’ ... What is common to them 
all? — Don’t say: ‘There must be something common, or they would not be called 
“games”’ — For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, 
but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.  To repeat: don’t think, 
but look!” 
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Two issues in particular motivate this criticism and are important to discuss, as they are 
of critical relevance to the present work.  The first is the idea that necessary and 
sufficient categories cannot be listed due to the criss-crossing “family resemblance” 
model of meaning.  The second is the idea that linguistic meaning as expressed in a 
lexicographic definition of a keyword cannot be separated from encyclopedic 
knowledge about the referents or situations invoked.  
The MTT framework supports both the possibility of selecting a necessary and 
sufficient set of discrete components as well as the clear distinction between lexical 
meaning and extralinguistic knowledge.   The use of criterial definitions is justified by 
rigorous analyses of substantial samples of lexical units from many lexica, especially in 
its lexicographic module known as the Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary (ECD).  
Systematic ECD-type lexical databases and dictionaries illustrate that the majority of 
lexical items in a language are usually verbs and nouns denoting linguistic situations. 
As configurations, these are quite amenable to definition by paraphrase, as are many 
entity terms, in spite of extralinguistic “prototype” effects.  Even accepting 
Wittgenstein’s view of meanings as family resemblences based on use, it does not 
follow that criterial linguistic definitions such as MTT’s are incompatible with it.  MTT 
does not make specific claims about the mental reality of concepts, it merely posits a 
formal model that explains speakers’ actual linguistic behavior.  The widespread 
polysemy of many words (which made GAME “undefinable”) is also why MTT speaks 
of “lexical units” (LUs, i.e. lexemes and phrasemes) rather than of “words”.  It is 
assumed that a given phonological string, i.e. /rәn/ or /gejm/, will be recycled and used 
as many different linguistic signs, each of which will have its components and actants 
and which deserves to be described as a lexical unit in its own right.  If the lexical units 
share the same signifier are linked by a semantic bridge or common semantic 
component they can be classified in the same vocable in an ECD-type lexical 
database.  A vocable is a common signifier subsuming multiple lexemes that are 
semantically related, in other words a polysemous word or phrase.  It is not necessary 
for vocables to be categorized based on necessary and sufficient criteria — the semantic 
bridge underlying the vocable can be of a family resemblence type.  But still each 
lexical unit within this constellation of senses will have a criterial definition, even if the 
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polysemy is quite extensive.  Naturally, this kind of relationship between lexical units 
belonging in a vocable be posited only after the analyst has elicited the meaning each 
lexical unit separately. 
The debate about the validity of classical versus prototype categories to describe 
word meanings is closely related to the question of whether linguistic meaning can be 
sharply delimited from encyclopedic knowledge.  At least for the bulk of the lexicon 
(rigid designators may be a distinct class, see Section 1.4 below), MTT makes a sharp 
distinction between the purely linguistic meaning of lexical units and the 
speakers’ extralinguistic or encyclopedic knowledge about the referents. Mel’čuk 
(1993: 42) explains:  
 
Le terme sens doit être interprété ici de la façon la plus étroite possible. Il ne s’agit 
aucunement du sens que nous obtenons comme résultat d’une bonne compréhension du 
sens d’un énoncé quelconque, que nous en dégageons grâce à la logique, à nos 
connaissances extralinguistiques, etc., c’est-à-dire qu’il ne s’agit pas du « vrai » sens, qui 
est, en fin de compte, la seule raison d’être de la communication... Nous ne visons que le 
sens purement langagier : le plus superficiel, le plus littéral, celui qui est accessible 
uniquement grâce à la maîtrise de la langue en cause. 
 
This sharp distinction between linguistic meaning and encyclopedic knowledge is 
fundamental to MTT semantics.  The consequence is that anything claimed to be part of 
the meaning must be imposed by the language and invariable between speakers. In 
cases of extreme variation, only those meanings common to all speakers can be 
considered to be part of the linguistic meaning.  For example, if some speakers in 
different areas, social classes or centuries have different knowledge of that the lexeme 
SUN refers to, linguistically it can only be ‘the bright object that rises and sets each 
day’, excluding any non-universal definition.  Any definition posited must be the same 
for all speakers, and must be gathered through elicitation.  This is particularly important 
to be aware of when writing lexicographic definitions for items like –KŲ ‘house’, 
DENÍ ‘moose’ and so forth.   
Methodologically, one posits the components of a lexical meaning by testing a 
hypothetical set against speaker intituitions.  This can indeed be challenging for entity 
terms which are subject to a wide degree of variation according to extralinguistic 
factors.  For example, if one attempted to list the necessary and sufficient semantic 
components denoted by the English lexeme HOUSE1, one could proceed with 
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elicitation with native speakers designed to separate houses from non-houses, e.g. by 
discussing and looking at photos of various houselike structures mixed with examples 
of other clear non-houses.  Depending on which culture we live in, the stereotypical 
house look different or have a different cultural role with respect to houses in the 
anglophone world. A Mediterranean villa may be a commercial property only occupied 
part of the year.  Some “houses” may not even be man-made structures, but natural 
features heavily modified and furnished with amenities, e.g. the converted cave houses 
of Matera (Italy).  Some houses are dug downward into the ground instead of build 
upward on a foundation, such as the troglodyte houses of Matmata (Tunisia).  Other 
types of houses, such as Inuit igloos, grass huts, tipis, bark houses built and used by 
hunters, seem more ephemeral.  A prototype definition of HOUSE1 would have to rely 
on cognitive domains common to all of these cultures, or else falling into a quietly 
ethnocentric definition.  And any definition or schema reduced to the common 
denominator across all instances begins to closely resemble a criterial definition.  If 
HOUSE1 is defined as a ‘a man-made autonomous intracommunicating walled structure 
made for people to live in’, this seems to match the denotational range: A mansion 
〈igloo, villa, troglodyte house, grass hut, leanto, bark house〉 is a kind of house;  *A tent 
〈*tipi, *apartment, (refurnished) *cave, *apartment building owned by one family〉 is a 
kind of house.  If the structure was intended for some other purpose, HOUSE1 does not 
apply: one does not say *A shed 〈*barn, *stable, *treehouse, *doghouse, *lighthouse〉 is 
a kind of house, even if a person lives in it.  This definition of HOUSE1 also seems to 
include specfically linguistic information that speakers have access to, rather than 
expert knowledge.  When when asked to justify their categorization of a structure of a 
house or non-house, for example, consultants are usually able to cite specific criteria 
such “it’s permanent” or “it isn’t man-made”.  Moreover, speakers tend to change their 
answer if their criteria about the referent are discovered to be false (“It isn’t man-made?  
Ok then no, it’s not a house”).  The semanticist could then hypothesize that HOUSE1 
refers to a ‘a man-made autonomous intracommunicating walled structure made for 
people to live in’, where ‘autonomous’ means ‘not a part of a larger building’. Speakers 
tend to have clear intuitions about whether a word has been misapplied, and 
lexicographic definitions as a paraphrase must be general enough to cover all the 
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referents to which the speaker’s intuitions apply, even when they are subject to a great 
deal of extralinguistic variation, as in the case of HOUSE1.  
The usefulness of classical categories is even more striking when applied to words 
for linguistic situations rather than entities, such as RENT1, STEAL, and BORROW1.  
The linguistic definition of DRINK1 may be ‘X takes a liquid Y into X’s mouth and 
swallows it’.  It is part of our extralinguistic knowledge that the situation denoted by 
drink usually involves a glass or a cup.  But upon hearing a sentence like The exhausted 
hiker collapsed by the stream and drank, no English speaker would think to ask But 
where did he find a glass?  If a second-language speaker said He drank some 
mouthwash and spat it out, English speakers would say that this person did not know 
the meaning of DRINK1.  Indeed, much of the difficulty with criterial definitions comes 
precisely when examples of natural kinds such as BIRD, WATER and perhaps HOUSE1 
are attempted.  But this is due not to the invalidity of criterial definitions for the 
majority of lexical meanings, but due to the special linguistic properties of natural kind 
terms.     
What has been missing from the debate about categorization so far has been a 
careful and systematic testing of prototype and classical categories against a 
representative sample of lexical units from from typologically diverse lexica.  The 
lexicographic enterprise can also be supplemented by psycholinguistic testing of which  
type of categorization better represents the speakers’ intuitions8 of lexical meanings.   
Finally, it is also important that such a study include both LUs denoting both entities 
                                                
8 Pinker and Prince (1999) and Pinker (1999: 278) reviewed a large body of psycholinguistic studies, and 
concluded that the evidence is mixed: “The facts about verbs [the subject of the Pinker and Prince study] 
and the facts about concepts converge to suggest that the human mind is a hybrid system, learning fuzzy 
association and crisp rules in different subsystems... some modelers even link the rule system to the 
frontal cortex and the exemplar-based system to the temporal and posterior cortex”.  However, the studies 
Pinker cites dealt only with names for entities, mostly natural kinds, which have special properties.  
Moreover the prototype effects always disappeared when the researchers pressed the subjects to motivate 
or carry out real instances of categorization rather than testing reaction time, etc.  All of this evidence 
could be explained, perhaps better, as prototype effects on classical categories rather than in prototype 
categories themselves. 
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and those referring ti situations, as natural kind terms (such as WATER) have distinct 
semantic properties, to be discussed in the following section.   
 
1.4.  Lexicographic Definitions and Natural Kind Terms.  So far, MTT’s use of 
criterial definitions which can can be substituted, salva significatione, with the keyword 
has been illustrated for lexemes like PROFESSOR, DRINK1, and HOUSE1.  While 
criterial definitions work well in practice for situations terms, for a minority of entities 
this method can be more challenging.  Entites can be divided into two classes, proper 
names (Aristotle, Mexico) and semantic kinds.  “Kinds” should be understood in a 
technical sense here as referring to any entity which can be part of a taxonomy, not in 
the sense of Wierzbicka’s (1988) semantic kinds or any other sense.  These kinds can be 
divided into natural kinds, artifacts, formal objects (electron, soul, or in Dene įk’zé2 
‘spiritual medicine’), and relational nouns.  Natural kinds include names for kinds of 
living things, including all species and genera names (įyeze ‘bird’; dechen ‘tree’); 
topographical features (sheth ‘hill’; hhátaįlį ‘spring’) and atmospheric phenomena (chą 
‘rain’; yath ‘snow on ground’) and naturally occurring substances (tu ‘water’, tthe 
‘stones’).  Artifacts can be cultural kinds, i.e. nameworthy items frequently used by the 
speech community, such as nįbále ‘tent’; egané ‘dried meat’, or in English sofa, 
pencilN, breadN, or unique objects created for a specific purpose.  Relational kinds 
include names for persons or biological material in relation to another, such as kinship 
terms (–tá ‘father’ –skéné ‘children’) and body parts (–tth’éné ‘leg’ –hhaié ‘roots’).  A 
typology of semantic classes is outlined in Figure II-2.    
Kripke (1972/1980) and Putnam (1975) demonstrated that proper names, natural 
kinds, and some artifacts are rigid designators, which always refer to a specific 
group of individuals regardless of the encyclopedic facts we know or discover about 
them. Kripke and Putnam showed that for proper names and natural kinds, essential 
criteria in their definitions can be altered, and the word still applies.  For instance, the 
Longman definition for LEMON (Bullon 2005) is ‘a fruit with a hard yellow skin and 
sour juice’; that of TIGER is ‘a large carnivorous wild animal that has yellow and black 
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lines on its body and is a member of the cat family’.  We can envision surprising 
biological discoveries such as the existence of some tigers with no stripes or lemons of 
another color.  Surely we would not change our use of the words TIGER and LEMON 
as a consequence.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Figure II-2.  A Typology of Lexical Semantic Classes. 
 
Usually when people express incorrect beliefs about rigid designators, we feel that 
it is the speaker’s ideas, rather than his or her language use, that is incorrect.  For 
example, a 1999 Gallup poll9 revealed that nearly 20% of Americans believed that the 
Sun revolved around the Earth, which is incompatible with the definition of what 
planets and stars are; before the modern era nearly everyone believed this.  We do not 
feel that people who use SUN this way do not understand the linguistic meaning of the 
lexeme SUN, but rather that their knowledge about the referent is not up to modern 
community standards.  It was once believed that the word WHALES referred to a sort 
of very large fish. These beliefs reflect the naïve-linguistic categorization of the speech 
                                                
9 “New Poll Guages Americans’ General Knowledge Levels”.  Gallup.  July 6, 1999. 
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community; experts cannot with their greater knowledge better represent the meaning of 
these words.  To be concrete: a killer whale is still a whale in the English language, 
even though a few people might believe (erroneously) that they are fish, and a few 
know (correctly) that they are really large dolphins.   Rigid designators as words are 
resistant to change even after the community changes their scientific beliefs about the 
referents.  Thus when describing the denotational range of a Dene word like GU, which 
roughly corresponds to ‘insect’ or ‘bug’ in English, it is not necessary to claim that, 
because of the  phraseme GU DETTH’ÉNÉ ‘crab’, lit. “a (multi-)legged gu” really 
means that crabs are or were categorized by Dene people as a kind of insect.  The 
important question is identifying the range of entities referred to by these labels. 
 In MTT lexicography and lexical semantics, natural kind terms like WATER (or 
TU1 in Dene) cannot be decomposed into semantic units such as ‘chemical’ or “H2O” 
which invoke scientific or expert extralinguistic knowledge. Even if such a definition 
could match the denotational range of the referents, the speakers are not necessarily 
aware of these ‘simpler’ meanings and they do not combine these to build the meaning 
of the keyword.  Most English speakers may not know that water has the chemical 
structure H2O, or they did not know it 50 or 100 years ago, so this information cannot 
be used to represent the linguistic meaning of WATER.  It is not clear how many and 
which features are necessary and sufficient to define these words, or conversely which 
features could be subtracted or altered for for this intuition to be violated.  Rigid 
designators work more like pointers for items that we have direct experience with than 
like semantic units.  
Putnam expressed this by saying that knowing the meaning of rigid designators 
means knowing certain obligatory “stereotypes”, or standard beliefs that the linguistic 
community requires members to hold about the referents.  The stereotype of the referent 
of WATER, for example, includes the beliefs that it is colorless, odorless, drinkable, 
runs through faucets, and so forth.  Putnam’s concept of stereotype thus resembles 
MTT’s minimal paraphrase definition based on naive-linguistic categorization.   
Another example of the difference in in conceptualization between rigid 
designators and other words/categories with criterial definitions can be found in the 
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cultural shift which occurred with the discovery of evolution by natural selection.  As 
Pinker (2007) notes:       
 
Before Darwin (and among creationists today) people used to think that every species 
could be defined by a set of neccessary traits that characterized its essence... But someone 
who thinks that way will have trouble wrapping his mind around the very idea of 
evolution, because evolution entails the appearance of intermediate forms that are literally 
neither fish nor fowl.  According to this “essentialist” mindset, a dinosaur has a 
dinosaurian essence and can no more evolve into a bird than a triangle can evolve into a 
square.  One of Darwin’s conceptual breakthroughs was to treat a term for a species as a 
pointer to a population of organisms (a rigid designator) rather than as a type that is 
stipulated by a fixed set of traits... embracing the members that were originally dubbed 
with the label, their contemporaries who could breed with them, and some portion of their 
ancestors and descendents who are sufficiently similar to them.  
 
Two concepts from this passage are crucial.  First, rigid designators receive their name 
from an act of “baptism”, as posited by Kripke, while this is not true for the majority of 
LUs.  Second, natural class categories can be extended to unclassified entities which are 
“sufficiently similar” based on some underlying conceptualization, while the majority of 
LUs have strict criterial definitions.  Putnam extended rigid designation to some 
artifacts or cultural kinds, such as PENCIL.  
The question of communitarian standards for “knowing a word” has recently been 
examined by Marconi (1997), who proposes that knowing the meaning of a word (and 
most of his and others’ examples are rigid designators) involves a blend of two kinds of 
knowledge, which he calls “inferential” and “referential competence”.  Inferential 
competence involves the ability to use a word correctly in sentences and to draw 
inferences from sentences containing that word (an ability which, in Marconi’s scheme, 
is not sharply differentiated from encyclopedic knowledge).  In contrast, referential 
competence is the ability to perform real-life tasks which require mapping word-
concepts onto real examples of objects.  Marconi compares a bookish biologist who 
knows everything there is to know about Aulularia clemensi (an invented species of 
butterfly) but cannot recognize an example of one in nature as quickly a child who grew 
up around them.  This is an extreme example of differentiation between the two; for 
most words they overlap.  For any natural kinds, such as foreign species and exotic 
elements, which only experts deal with, the community standard for “knowing the 
word” is very low, and the faintest inferential competence may provide referential 
ability to “know the meaning”: “if I cannot recognize uranium but I know that it is an 
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element with a heavy atomic weight, radioactive under certain circumstances, and so 
forth, few would say that I don’t know what ‘uranium’ means ... but if I am presented, 
on a tabletop, say, with a fruit I don’t know, an animal I never saw before, and a bit of 
uranium and I am asked to pick the uranium, I will easily do it”.  For locally relevant 
words more is required, even specifically of referential competence: “if I know that 
dolphins are sea mammals frequently spotted even in the Mediterranean, etc., but I do 
not have the faintest idea of what a dolphin looks like, there may be doubts concerning 
my competence” (Marconi 1997: 66).  The degree of inferential and referential 
competence required to “know the word” is determined by the standards of the speech 
community; both are separate from encyclopedic knowledge, which is not subject to 
such a standard.   
The discovery of rigid designators was taken up by opponents of criterial 
definition (see Geeraerts 1986) as an argument against all attemps at necessary and 
sufficient definitions of any lexical units.  However,  the case of rigid designators does 
not challenge the essential tenets of semantic analysis by decomposition into 
paraphrases.  Criterial definitions are still an effective, psychologically realistic model 
for the vast majority of lexical units.  It is unfortunate that many debates in the lexical 
semantics literature revolve around a few examples of proper names and natural kind 
terms like CAT, BIRD, WATER, THE MORNING STAR, and so forth, which are 
treated as representative examples of lexical meanings.  Only the names of entities can 
be rigid designators, but the numerical majority of items in the lexicon of a natural 
language describe linguistic situations, which as configurations cannot be rigid 
designators.  It would therefore be unfortunate to dismiss the whole field of lexical 
meaning as intractible just because of the existence of this interesting but relatively 
small class of rigid designators.     
 
1.5.  Whose Definitions?  So far we have seen that the MTT view of meaning is 
based on the native speakers’ intuitions. While ECDs may incorporate examples of the 
use of lexical units from corpora, the core methodology for elaborating the entries is not 
based on inductive corpora studies but on elicitation (see Section III-2.5, on the research 
methodology).  Speaker intuitions have themselves been challenged as a reliable source 
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of knowledge about lexical meaning.  Placing intuition as the best source of knowledge 
would seem to suggest a wholly mentalistic concept of meaning: meaning is in the mind 
and the referent corresponds to whatever semantic components the speaker has in his or 
her own meaning for that lexical unit.  Putnam (1975) famously leveled a powerful 
objection to the idea that meaning determines reference with his well-known 
elms/beeches thought experiment. Putnam admitted that, in his ignorance of Latifolia, 
these two words had precisely the same mental representation or “definition” for him.  
But it seems wrong to conclude that the linguistic meanings of the words ELM and 
BEECH are the same, much less that their referents are the same.  Putnam’s famous 
assertion that “meaning just ain’t in the head” can be interpreted in the context of MTT 
as a reminder that the speech community has shared norms about what meanings are 
carried by lexical units. 
This turns out to be a methodological issue for MTT. Although our approach is not 
usually concerned with the sociolinguistic aspect of language, the data used in ECD-
type definitions must conform to the same standard of any other intuition- and 
elicitation-based approach: a responsible semanticist cannot base the analysis on data 
from only one or two consultants, if the definitions are claimed to be valid for the whole 
language.  Usually semantic statements in MTT works such as the ECD do not claim to 
be absolutely authoritative — individual speakers may disagree with the intuitions 
presented — but they are based on input from multiple native speakers of presumably 
the same linguistic variety.  As such, they are meant to stand as a (tentative) description 
of the standard meaning of the community rather than of a single person.  In most of the 
major lexicographic projects so far, MTT linguists have worked on their native 
languages (although Apresjan has done extensive research on English, and Mel’čuk 
focuses on French).  All of these settings involve European languages with numerous 
native speakers who can verify the data.   Because this project concerns an endangered 
Native American language spoken in small communities, it is quite challenging to have 
such a thorough level of verification (see Section III-2.5 on the research methodology).  
Still the intuitions must be agreed upon by at least three speakers within the same 
community.  Cases where this standard has not been met or where there is disagreement 
between speakers must be noted.  
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2  LEXICAL SEMANTICS IN MEANING-TEXT THEORY 
 
Up to this point we have seen some of the fundamental ideas of  Meaning-Text 
Theory and what their relation is to some of the popular frameworks and debates in the 
general field of lexical semantics.  Now let us take a closer look at how lexical semantics 
is actually formalized and done using the MTT approach. Sections 2.1 and 2.2  will 
closely follow the description of the MTT semantics and the semantic structure 
outlined in Mel’čuk’s Semantics: From Meaning to Text (SMT, to appear).   
 
2.1.  The Content of a Semantic Model.  At the beginning of Section 1.1. we 
saw what Mel’čuk calls the core tenet of MTT, the idea that language is a set of rules in 
speakers’ minds which establish correspondences between an infinite and denumerable 
set of meanings and an infinite and denumerable set of texts: 
 
(4)                             language 
 
 
{Meaningi}   ⇐correspondence⇒  {Textj}    |  0 < i, j  ≤  ∞ 
 
 
This model requires between the Semantic Representation and the Phonological 
Representation two intermediate levels of representation, syntactic and morphological.  
The Syntactic, Morphological and Phonological Representations are divided into deep 
and surface levels, giving seven total levels of representation and six modules which 
establish the mapping correspondences between them (recall Figure II-1 above).  
Meaning, however, does not begin as a Semantic Representation out of thin air, but as a 
Conceptual Representation formed by the speaker who observes and wishes to verbalize 
something in relation to the world.  A Meaning-Text Model of language is therefore part 
of a larger world ⇔ sound model of human linguistic and paralinguistic behavior.   
 
 (5) {WORLD}  ⇔ {SemRi}  ⇔  {SPhonRj}  ⇔  {LINGUISTIC SOUNDS} 
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MTT excludes phonetics, or the correspondence {SPhonRj}  ⇔  {SOUNDS}, from its 
model of language proper.  At the other end, it also excludes the correspondence 
between the Concept[ual] Rep[resentation] and the Sem[antic] R[epresentation].  The 
former is supposed to be  “the fragments of the outer world that interest the speaker”, “a 
component that produces a discrete cognitive representation of observed continuous 
reality of the universe” (Mel’čuk, SMT, to appear).  The nature of the ConceptR is 
mostly extralinguistic (casting aside a radically Whorfian perspective).  It is however 
“minimally motivated by language.  It is not an objective, ‘photographic’ reflection of 
reality, ... yet the imprint of language on it is rudimentary”.  There must also be a 
correspondence which links the this to verbalizeable semantic units, i.e. a  {ConceptRh} 
⇔ {SemRi} module, which Mel’čuk calls conceptics.   Because the left-side 
element is  (mostly) nonlinguistic, this component lies at the intersection of linguistics, 
the philosophy of language, cognitive science, and other domains.  “It presumably has a 
very complex structure, of which, at the present state of our knowledge, one can only 
advance hypotheses”.  It must be excluded from the model of language proper, which is 
concerned with the purely linguistic modules of human linguistic behavior.  Although 
MTT models do not describe conceptics or phonetics directly, it is acknowledged that 
an MTT model of language is joined to both of them.  MTT describes only the portion 
between the Semantic Representation and the Surface Phonological Representations: 
 
(6)                             language (proper) 
 
 
   {SemRi}   ⇐correspondence⇒  {SPhonRj}    |  0 < i, j  ≤  ∞ 
 
 
The Semantic Representation of an utterance or lexical unit comprises four sub-
representations: the Semantic Structure or SemS; the Semantic-Communicative Structure 
or Sem-CommS, the Rhetorical Structure or RhetS, and its Referential Structure or 
RhetS.  For the aims of the present investigation, we are interested only in the SemS or 
semantic structure, the representation in MTT of the purely linguistic meanings of 
lexical units and utterances, independent of pragmatic information and the encyclopedic 
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knowledge of the speakers.  We will limit our review to MTT’s characterization of the 
SemS which models this message-independent, objective meaning of the LUs under 
analysis; we shall exclude, for reasons of space and relevance, MTT’s treatment of the 
three other elements of the SemR.    
 
2.2  The Semantic Structure.  We will consider first the elements which we can 
safely posit the SemS must contain based on linguistic evidence, before reviewing how 
and why they are represented as they are in the MTT framework.   
 
2.2.1.  Content of the Semantic Structure.  The Sem[antic] S[tructure]  of a 
lexical unit (LU) is usually a decomposition of the LU’s meaning into simpler meanings 
which, taken together, form its paraphrase.  In MTT, linguistic meaning is considered to 
be “the invariant of the (quasi-) synonymic paraphrasing that can be carried out without 
any recourse to extralinguistic information” (Mel’čuk, to appear).  Therefore the SemS, 
as a representation of linguistic meaning, is not just the SemS of the sentence in 
question, but also of all of its paraphrases and with the same semantic content.  The 
sentences ‘he’s a professor of chemistry’ and the ‘he’s a person who masters chemistry 
and teaches it to students at an institution of higher education’ would therefore have the 
same SemS, and are semantically equivalent once we exclude pragmatic, 
communicative and rhetorical levels of analysis.  It should be noted that while the 
prototypical SemS is of an utterance rather than of a linguistic unit, in this work focused 
on lexical semantics most examples will be of SemS of lexical units.  Two SemS are 
semantically equivalent if speakers intuitively feel that they “say the same thing” 
(decomposition salva significatione) even if they are not used in the same 
extralinguistic situation.  If the reverse is true, i.e. that two different expressions are 
used in exactly the same extralinguistic situation but do not “say the same thing” (one 
can think, for example, of the multitude of different ways people express the ideas of 
‘thank you’ or ‘happy birthday’ in the languages of the world) we cannot say that they 
are semantically equivalent.  From a language-universal viewpoint, Mel’čuk states, the 
combination of ordinary semantic structures is free and filtered by only encyclopedic or 
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pragmatic considerations.  In this understanding, the problem with semantically 
unacceptable sentences, such as the famous Colorless green ideas sleep furiously, is not 
really linguistic, but lies in the fact that the meanings themselves are strange in this 
combination for speakers.   
The decomposition of the keyword’s meaning such as one finds in the semantic 
structure can, in principle, proceed to the level of semantic primitives (see below).  
However, the meanings in the SemS must always be based on verifiable meanings of 
the language at hand.  This is, for Mel’čuk (to appear), the first substantive requirement 
of the SemS.  His second requirement of the SemS is that it “must be maximally 
homogeneous”, i.e. the SemS is composed entirely of these simpler SUs belonging to 
the language and the links between them.   
The first requirement of the SemS has other important consequences.  If the SemS 
must be composed only of real semantemes in the language, then the content of specific 
SemSs is language-specific.  One cannot say that the semantic structures of lexemes 
with the “same meaning” belonging to two different languages are identical.  The 
closest the analyst can come to saying that two semantic structures from different 
languages are equivalent is to say that their semantemes and the relations between them 
stand in a one-to-one correspondence.  This relies on the assumption that some simple 
meanings, such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘you’, ‘want’, etc., which are available and comparable 
between different languages, although complex configurations of simple meanings, such 
as ‘condescension’ or the Portuguese ‘saudade’ may not be comparable in this way 
between culturally different languages.  (The principle of semantic primitives will be 
addressed in much greater detail in Section 3.3.)   
When meanings are represented in MTT as lexicographic definitions rather than as 
a SemS, they are written using a controlled metalanguage based on the language of the 
researcher and reader, but this is only to render them more accessible.  MTT assumes 
that the true syntax of lexicographic definitions is based on simple logical relations, and 
not on the syntax of any natural language or some underlying natural language syntax 
common to all languages. 
Assuming that there is a level of semantic decomposition at which one can posit a 
one-to-one correspondence between semantemes in different languages, cross-linguistic 
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differences in the SemS arise because the patterns of lexical conflation, or  
packaging of a group of semantemes into one lexical meaning, and then lexical unit, are 
different.  Mel’čuk (to appear) posits that there is a set of language-specific constraints 
governing lexical conflation patterns.  From a descriptive, language-specific 
perspective, a well-formed SemS should not contain  configurations of semantemes that 
cannot be lexicalized in L, i.e. that are not expressible as LUs in that language.     
 
2.2.2.  Representation of the Semantic Structure.  The SemS contains all and 
only the semantemes that make up the meaning of the SU corresponding to the LU 
under analysis, and the relations between them.  This information is represented in MTT 
semantics as a labelled, directed, connected graph which constitutes a semantic 
network.  Each of the vertices on this graph, called a node, stands for one of the 
semantemes that make up the meaning of the sentence represented by the graph; the 
relations between the nodes are called arcs, and are labelled with numbers that 
indicate the relations between them (a topic to be developed below).  A graph is 
multidimensional and nonlinear, so the exact position of the nodes (semantemes) is not 
meaningful.  The arcs of the network describe the predicate-argument relations and are 
numbered to differentiate them rather than to classify them as different types of 
semantic relation; in MTT the predicate→argument relation is the only type of semantic 
dependency.  
 
 
Figure II-3.  Simple and Decomposed SemS of the English ‘wet1’  
(adapted from Mel’čuk, to appear).   
≅ 
‘wet1’ 
‘X’ 
1 
‘have2’ 
‘on1a’ 
‘X’ 
‘surface2’ 
‘liquid1’ 
1 2 
1 
1 
2 
‘water-like’ 
1 
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The arrow of each arc points to the argument of the predicate at its tail.  Below are two 
example networks, one simple and one decomposed, for the same English adjective, 
WET1 (‘X is wet1’ ≅  ‘X has2 a water-like liquid1 on1a X’s surface2’), seen in Figure II-
3.  The communicatively dominant node is at the top and underlined; this 
constitutes the barest paraphrase of the whole  meaning.   In other words, ‘X is wet1’ 
means ultimately ‘X has2 something on it’, not ‘X is water-like’ or ‘X has a surface2’.  
Mel’čuk and his colleagues chose semantic networks to represent semantic 
structures for three reasons (according to Mel’čuk, to appear):   
1) Based on the data, there is no reason to imagine that meaning is linearly ordered — 
rather it is unordered, organized only by certain relations between objects  - a network is 
a formal object which mimics this unorderedness. Because the network is 
multidimensional, it allows a semantic unit to be simultaneously in multiple relations 
with other SUs, i.e. an actant of multiple SUs at the same time.  This represents what we 
know about semantic dependencies.   
2) We know that meaning contains two kinds of elements: meanings themselves or 
semantic units, and the relations between them.  A network is also composed of two 
elements, nodes and arrows indicating relations.  
3)  The connected and directed structure of a network mimics in a formal object the 
structure of an SU in the fully interconnected nature of its component meanings and the 
directed nature of the relations between them.   
 The semantemes which label the nodes of the semantic network must correspond 
to the signifieds of full lexical units (lexemes or idioms) of the language.  By full, 
Mel’čuk means to exclude elements which have signifieds but which do not constitute 
semantic units, such as empty support verbs or syntactic grammatical signifieds, which 
should not be represented in the SemS.  The relation between the set of semantemes and 
the semantic unit corresponding to the keyword is characterized by paraphrase and 
decomposition.  In MTT’s componential approach, meanings can be decomposed into 
semantically simpler semantemes, until one reaches the level of semantic primitives, or 
semes, as they are called in MTT (Mel’čuk, to appear).  In the above SemSs for ‘wet1’, 
the semantemes ‘on’ and ‘have’ might be considered semes, but semantemes ‘liquid’ 
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and ‘surface’ can presumably be decomposed further into even simpler meanings.  MTT 
semanticists call deep those SemSs or definitions which decompose meanings further 
down toward semantic primitives, and shallow those that retain more complexity.  
How deep should the decomposition proceed?  An extremely deep or fully decomposed 
SemS would seem to offer more detail.  However, the fullest extent of decomposition 
into semes would make the network unreadable, much as a definition entirely composed 
of primitives  would occupy several pages, would distract the reader with unneccessary 
detail, and thus would be of little descriptive use.  At the same time, the level of 
decomposition should not be arbitrary, so Mel’čuk proposes the principle of 
minimal decompostion (Mel’čuk, to appear), which states that “The canonical 
SemS of a given utterance U is as shallow as possible: it uses the minimum number of 
decompositions possible, this minimum being determined by the actual lexical stock of 
L (and thus by the available stock of semantemes)”.  Naturally, “as shallow as possible” 
depends on the analytic task at hand.  If the decomposition is too shallow, it may 
obscure relations pertinent to the analysis.  For example, adverbs may have semantic 
scope over an “internal” element rather than the whole clause, so the utterance should 
be decomposed to a level that makes this element “visible”.  In the case of Jane taught 
the students CLEARLY, the first SemS would be incorrect because it does not show the 
semantic scope of clearly, while the second SemS does.   
 
 
 
 
 
To ensure that the SemS is not so shallow that it obscures important relations and 
semantic scope, Mel’čuk (to appear) also proposes the condition of maximal 
explicitness, which states that “the canonical SemS of a given utterance U is 
decomposed sufficiently to explicitly and univocally indicate all semantic links between 
its semantemes”; this is the condition of sufficiency for the SemS to be canonical.  The 
two rules, minimum decomposition and maximal explicitness, pull the SemS in opposite 
‘cause2’ ‘Jane’ ‘lesson’ 
‘learn’ 
2 
1 
1 ‘clear’’ 
‘students’ 
2 
2 
1 ‘students’ 
‘clear’ 
‘teach’ 
‘Jane’ 2 1 
1 
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directions, one toward depth and one toward shallowness.  A well-formed, canonical 
SemS therefore lies at the just equilibrium between the two.   
 Another question about semantemes has to do with which label to choose when 
there are several synonyms or quasi-synonyms.  In MTT, the meanings of all 
synonymous lexical units are represented by a common semantic structure.  Mel’čuk (to 
appear) supports choosing the most literal, the most neutral stylistically, and the 
simplest and most flexible syntactically item (‘steal’ rather than ‘abscond’, or ‘snake’ 
rather than ‘serpent’).  The  lexical class should be maintained between the keyword and 
the communicatively dominant node of the SemS whenever possible.   There are cases 
when both of the above ideals must be violated due to the idiosyncracies of the language 
or if it strongly enhances readability.  
 Formally, the semantemes of a language can largely be divided into two classes, 
semantic names and predicates.  A semantic predicate is a “binding” meaning 
which requires the presence of other meanings (participants or semantic actants).  
Semantic names, by contrast, are independent, non-binding meanings. The category of 
predicates and names are not coterminous with the lexical classes of verbs and nouns. 
Semantic names tend to be realized as nouns.  Many linguistic situations can be 
expressed as nouns in European languages, i.e. BEAUTY, SADNESS, even though 
these are usually derived from adjectives.   Some predicate nouns such a HEIGHT (of a 
person), are only etymologically derived from verbs.  While nouns can be predicates, 
verbs, adjectives and adverbs can never be semantic names.  Overall in English 
predicates tend to be verbs and adjectives.  In other languages, i.e. languages like Dene 
Sųłiné, the noun class is virtually always restricted to natural kinds, artifacts, people and 
places; situations and qualities are always expressed with verbs.  It must be noted that 
“semantic name” is not synonymous with “entity”, as entities such as relational and 
kinship terms (‘leg’, ‘father’) conceptually require the presence of other entities, their 
actants.  These predicate nouns are referred to as quasi-predicate. 
A predicate semanteme, usually denoting a situation, has certain obligatory 
participants.  Situations can typically have up to six obligatory actants.  A classic 
case of a five-actant verb is RENT1.  The situation referred to by this verb requries five 
participants: an owner of a commodity, a commodity, another person, a time frame and 
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a quantity of money, listed in (7) in propositional form: 
 
(7) RENT1: person X acquires the rights of possession of commodity Y from person Z 
in exchange for quantity of money W (which Z asks of X)  for duration T 
 
There are also zero-place predicate semantemes, such as weather and atmospheric verbs 
like ‘rain’ (also plentiful in Dene to describe atmospheric phenomena and topographical 
features).  The obligatory participants are not obligatory in that they are required to be 
mentioned in any utterance containing the keyword — often in the case of RENT1, one 
just says I’m renting an apartment downtown or Did you buy or are you renting? 
without mentioning the owner, duration of time, the money, or the commodity.  But the 
speaker and addressee are still conscious of the existence of these participants, and if 
any of them is missing conceptually, the situation cannot be described as renting but 
rather as borrowing, buying, etc.  “An element Ψ of the situation denoted by L is called 
its obligatory participant if and only if it satisfies the following condition: if Ψ is 
removed from SIT(L), then what remains either cannot be denoted by L or ceases to be  
a situation” (Mel’čuk 2004a).  Obligatory participants may almost never be mentioned, 
or even impossible to mention to mention in some cases.  There are often more 
participants in a linguistic situation than there are syntactic actants.  For example, a 
lexicographic definition of the English intransitive position verb LIE might be ‘to 
remain in a horizontal position’.  But even though LIE is intransitive, it has two 
obligatory participants, the subject and a hard surface which is supporting the 
experiencer, e.g. porch in the sentence the cat is lying on the porch.  This surface might 
only be mentioned if marked, but the speaker and addressee must be aware of it: if there 
is no supporting surface, e.g. the someone floating horizontally in water, the situation 
cannot in English be referred to as lying. 
 
2.2.3  The Semantics-Syntax Interface.  The translation of semantic units into 
lexical units is done as part of the mapping correspondence between the Semantic 
Representation and the Deep Syntactic Representation, as mentioned above:  
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(8)   {SemR}:     [SemS; Sem-CommS; (Sem-)RhetS; RefS]   
          ↕  
{DSyntR}:  [DSyntS; DSynt-CommS; DSynt-AnaphS; DSynt-ProsS] 
 
The correspondence rules the cover the translation {SemRi} ⇔ {DSyntRj} are globally 
referred to as semantic transition rules, or Sem-rules.   Mel’čuk (to  
 
 
Figure II-4.  Mel’čuk’s (to appear) Typology of Semantic Transition Rules. 
 
appear) contains a lengthy discussion about all of the Sem-rules; they can be divided 
into four categories which translate each subcomponent of the SemR to its counterpart 
Lexical Lex-Sem-
rules 
for actual LUs 
Lexemic 
Lex-Sem-rules 
[for lexemes] 
Arborization [= Syntactic] Sem-rules 
[= sagittal rules] 
A: Genuine Lexical Lex-Sem-
rules  
Inflectional Lex-Sem-rules Lexical Lex-Sem-rules 
B: Constructional Lex-Sem-rules 
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Sem-rules: 
Sem-CommS 
 ⇔ DSyntS 
 ⇔ DSynt-CommS 
Lexical Lex-Sem-rules for potential  
LUs: 
word-formation rules 
Lexical-Functional 
Lex-Sem-rules 
[for semantic deriv-  
ations and collocations] 
Compounding 
Lex-Sem-
rules 
Derivational 
Lex-Sem-
rules 
Affixal derivational 
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Lex-Sem-rules 
Lexicalization Sem-rules 
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Specific Lexical Lex-Sem-rules  General Lexical Lex-Sem-rules 
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Lex-Sem-rules 
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 ⇔ DSynt-AnaphS 
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in the DSyntR, e.g. {SemSi} ⇔ {DSyntSj} rules, {Sem-CommSi} ⇔ {DSynt-CommSj} 
rules, and so forth.  
As this outline of MTT lexical semantics is limited to the semantic structure, we 
will correspondingly limit our discussion of those rules that model the correspondence 
between the semantic structure and the deep syntactic structure.  These are the 
lexicalization Sem-rules or lexicalization rules.  These are the 
only rules that will be exemplified for the Dene lexical items in this study.  Figure II-4 
shows the place of the lexicalization Sem-rules in Mel’čuk’s overall typology of the 
Sem-rules. This kind of rule includes three elements: the semantic network that 
constitutes the semantic unit, the lexical unit which has a given part of speech and basic 
diathesis (semantic ⇔ syntactic actant correspondence), and a set of conditions under 
which the rule can apply.   
The lexicalization rules are, essentially, the core semantic part of lexical entries of 
a language.  Describing these is the central task for the semanticist seeking to describe 
the language at hand.  Our review of lexicalization Sem-rules will be further restricted 
to the subset of them relevant to the current description of Dene: the Lexical Lex-Sem 
rules for the formation of actual  lexical units, of which there are three types: Lexemic 
Lex-Sem-rules; Phrasemic Lex-Sem-rules; Lexical-Functional Lex-Sem-rules, covering 
semantic derivations and collocations, Compounding Lex-Sem rules and Derivational 
Lex-Sem-rules. 
 
1. A Lexemic Lex-Sem-rule (Mel’čuk, SMT):  
 
The semantic ‘X murders Y for a political reason’ is realized in English as its own 
lexeme, the verb assassinate (X assassinates Y), where X and Y are both realized by 
‘murder’ 
Mostly Unitary 
⇔ 
‘politics’ 
ASSASSINATE 
L((X)
) 
I II 
L((Y)
) 
‘X’ ‘Y’ 
‘reason’ 
2 
2 1 
3 
1 
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(nominal) lexical units.  Lexicalization Sem-rules such as this are actually an 
abbreviation of two separate rules, the first of which forms an actually establishes the 
equivalence between the (sub-)network of more primitive meanings and the semantic 
unit at hand:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polguère (1990: 86) refers to this formation of semantic bundles or units as 
lexicalization (proper), and the basis for semantic paraphrase, which he contasts 
with lexemization,  which refers specifically to the transition between the Semantic 
and Deep-Syntactic levels of representation (see Polguère 1990 for a well-developed 
discussion of the semantic-syntax transition, concerning both lexical and sentential 
semantics.)  For the sake of brevity, in the present work we will represent the Lex-Sem-
rules as if they were one, and call them “lexicalization rules”, but the reader should keep 
in mind that they refer to both lexicalization and lexemization (phrasemization, ...) 
subcomponents.   
The above semantic network is marked as “Mostly Unitary”.  This is because some 
sets of components are usually lexicalized and realized as a unitary word, but do not 
have to be: one can say X murdered Y for political reasons as well as X assassinated Y.  
Some Lex-Sem-rules are completely optional, as for TRADEV ‘X gives X’s possession 
Mostly Unitary 
‘murder’ 
‘X’ 
‘Y’ 
1 2 ≡ 
‘X’ 
1 
2 1 
3 
‘reason’ ‘politics’ 
‘Y’ 
 
‘assassinate’ 
2 
‘X’ 
1 2 
 ‘Y’ 
 
‘assassinate’ 
⇔ 
ASSASSINATE 
L(‘X’) 
I II 
 L(‘Y’) 
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Y to Z in exchange for Z’s possession W’.  One can just as easily say the decomposition 
as the keyword.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other Lex-Sem-rules are obligatory: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It sounds very strange to say X ceased to live; the lexicalization rule must be applied. 
Phrasemic Lex-Sem-rules are similar to Lexemic Lex-Sem-rules, the only 
difference being that the realization at the DSyntR is a phraseme rather than as lexeme. 
They follow the same typology of optionality:  
 
Good: We’ve run out of sugar.  
      ‘need’ 
⇔ 
RUN OUT OF 
I II 
L(‘X’) L(‘Y’) 
Preferably Unitary 
‘’resource’ 
‘consume’ 
  ‘X’ 
1 
1 
‘Y’ 
2 
1 2 
‘completely’ 1 
‘cease’ 
‘X’ 
⇔ 
L(‘X’) 
I 
      DIE  
  ‘live’ 
1 
1 
Unitary 
⇔ 
     ‘trade’ 
‘X’ 
‘Z’ ‘Y’ 
 ‘W’ 
1 
2 3 
4 
   TRADEV 
‘X’ 
‘Z’ ‘Y’ 
 ‘W’ 
I 
II III 
IV 
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Acceptable: We’ve consumed all the sugar and we need more.  
 
The bird took off is acceptable; ?The bird started to fly is strange.  Start to fly, for a bird, 
has the special meaning ‘begin to be able to fly’; the same expression sounds odd when 
applied to an airplane: ?Ten minutes later, my plane finally started to fly.  Phrasemic 
Lex-Sem-rules have, additionally, a Phrasemic DSynt-rule that specifies their 
realization as Deep-Syntactic units, e.g. that for PULL [Y’s] LEG (Mel’čuk, to appear): 
 
Lexical-Functional Lex-Sem-rules specify which meanings are realized as regular 
lexical relations or lexical functions (see Section 3.1.4 and Chapter IV).  These, too, are 
assigned degrees of optionality, as the following examples from Mel’čuk (to appear):  
S1 (agentive derivative: person who does action (P)): 
 
He’s a good cook.   ?He’s a person who cooks well.  
PULL 
LEG 
L/Pronposs(L) 
dir-objectival 
possessive/ 
determinative 
⇔ 
PULL Y’S LEGl 
II 
L((Y)) 
(P) 
(person) 
⇔ 
S1(L((P))) 
Unitary 
1 
 ‘start’ 
‘X’ 
⇔ 
L(‘X’) 
I 
TAKE OFF2  
   ‘fly’ 
1 
1 
Unitary 
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Magn (intensifier of X): 
A huge meal; a gorgeous sunset; a very big meal; a very beautiful sunset  
This concludes our discussion of the semantic structure and the realization of 
semantic units as lexical units.  Let us now turn our attention to how this semantic 
framework is applied to practical language description.  The following section will 
outline MTT lexicographic principles consistent with the semantic model described 
above, which will also provide a justification for the above model.   
 
3   LEXICOGRAPHY IN MEANING-TEXT THEORY 
 
Lexicography is, in the current approach, essentially applied lexical semantics.  
One could easily state that in the social history of linguistics lexicography has usually 
proceeded as a discipline divorced from theoretical semantics: linguists “do not actually 
compile dictionaries according to the theoretical principles which they spell out; when 
they do tackle dictionary-making, grammarians generally  switch hats and become 
conventional lexicographers” (Pawley 1985).  This is unfortunate, as lexical semantics 
and lexicography share a natural symbiosis.  To communicate and record the meanings 
lexical items in a language, lexicographers must craft definitions that accurately 
represent the elements of meaning of the keywords as the speakers understand them.  
Semanticists also need to test the scientific understanding of what meaning may involve 
against a body of data obtained through lexicographic elicitation.  In this way, semantics 
and lexicography are essentially theoretical and applied sides of the same discipline.  As 
noted by Mel’čuk et al. (1995: 27):  
 
La différence entre la lexicologie et la lexicographie est la même que celle établie entre la 
physique et le génie, par exemple.  La physique se préoccupe des lois générales de la 
matière, de l’énergie et du mouvement; le génie s’intéresse à l’application industrielle de 
ces lois : à la construction des ponts, à la fabrication d’avions, à l’extraction du pétrole. ... 
‘intense’ 
‘X’ 
1 ⇔ 
ATTR 
L(‘X’) 
Magn 
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Aucune de ces deux physiques n’est pourtant autonome : la physique théorique ne peut 
pas exister sans mise à l’épreuve — par la physique expérimentale — de ses hypothèses 
et modèles, et la physique expérimentale a besoin d’hypothèses et de modèles à mettre à 
l’épreuve. .. Il en est parfaitement de même pour la paire « lexicologie ~ lexicographie » 
... La lexicologie (comme la physique) a sa théorie — l’étude générale du lexique des 
langues naturelles, au niveau formel et abstrait, tout en ayant, elle aussi, sa pratique — la 
description expérimentale du lexique. 
 
Naturally, this is not how the two disciplines have evolved so far.  The historical 
isolation of the two disciplines is highlighted by the fact that there is no comfortable 
equivalent of lexicologie in English, lexicology being underused.  In English a more 
common translation of lexicologie, besides “lexical semantics”, might be “theoretical 
lexicography”, although its theoretical aims would seem to be rather far outside the 
realm of the English lexicographic tradition.   
 
3.1.  The Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary.  The Explanatory 
Combinatorial Dictionary (ECD) is not the proper name of a book but a template for 
Explanatory Combinatorial Lexicography, MTT’s lexicographic approach and an 
application of its semantics module to lexicography and its realization as a dictionary 
(such as Mel’čuk et al. 1984).  As such, the ECD is the first “lexicologist’s dictionary”, 
the model for compiled dictionaries rooted in theoretical semantics rather than in 
practical or commerical lexicographic considerations.  Mel’čuk (2006) describes its 
origin as follows: “The ECD is a monolingual dictionary, proposed in the late 1960s by 
Alexander Zholkovsky and myself... A little later, Juri Apresjan joined us, so that the 
very first versions of ECD’s lexical entries for Russian were authored by all three of us.  
In its present form, the ECD implements many of Apresjan’s ideas”.  As Mel’čuk 
(2006b) elaborates, “An ECD is an active, or encoding dictionary: the information about 
words and expressions it contains is collected and presented exclusively from the point 
of view of text synthesis,” i.e. the ideas that one wants to express through speaking or 
writing. The ECD and its related projects constitute the foundation and the bulk of the 
work in MTT to date.  
The ECD’s guiding principles are formality, internal consistency, uniform 
treatment and exhaustivity (Mel’čuk et al. 1995).  Formality means that the descriptions 
in ECD entries must be formulated using a strictly controlled metalanguage that must 
decompose the meaning of the keyword into simpler meanings.  Internal consistency 
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refers to harmony between the different types of information (semantic, syntactic, ...) 
about a lexical item described in an entry  This is of critical importance because an ECD 
entry contains several zones with different areas of specialization which may conflict if 
compilation is incomplete. To illustrate this, Mel’čuk et al. (1995) cites the case of the 
French ECD entry for the noun BLESSÉ ‘a wounded person’, whose definition is 
(translation mine) ‘a living person who has one or several wounds’.  BLESSURE 
‘wound’ had previously been defined in the French ECD as a ‘visible lesion to the 
tissues of a living being by an exterior cause’.  But if the adjective intensfier grand ‘big’ 
is placed before BLESSÉ, it means that the wounds which can particularly damage the 
health of the subject.  When adding modifiers such as intensifiers to a keyword, the 
ECD analyst must always ascertain which aspect of the meaning of the word is 
modified.  In this case, the component ‘damage the health of the subject’ had to be 
added to the definition of BLESSURE ‘wound’ to allow for the meaning of the 
expression grand blessé ‘a seriously wounded person’.  The principle of internal 
consistency means that each part of the ECD entry is continually updated and refined to 
in light of information ascertained form research on the other zones and other entries.  
The principle of uniformity requires that whenever there are parallels between lexical 
units, they must be described in parallel.  For example, the English vocable CHICKENN 
would include the sense referring to the animal (which is countable — two chickens) as 
well as another sense, ‘flesh of...’, which is uncountable (a bit of chicken).  Once both 
of these senses are included in the ECD entry for CHICKEN, they must also be added to 
entries for all edible fleshy animals and plants (TURKEY, FISH, MELON, and so 
forth).  The principle of exhaustivity is an ideal which refers, at the macro-level, to the 
effort to describe as many lexical units of the subject language as possible.  At the 
micro-level, exhaustivity refers to the representation of the various kinds of knowledge 
the native speaker possesses of the keyword: its definition, its morphological forms, its 
semantic and syntactic actants, and so forth. 
As a reflection of these principles, the ECD entry for a lexical unit has an intricate, 
multifaceted structure.  An ECD entry is usually much longer, more detailed and 
requires more research than a traditional dictionary entry, but this is necessary if the 
ECD principles are to be followed faithfully.  An entry contains several zones for 
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different types of information about the keyword.  The keyword itself may represent a 
single lexical unit, i.e. lexeme or a phraseme, or a whole vocable.  When different 
senses or lexemes belong to the same vocable, one is usually the base lexeme, of which 
the others are metaphorical or metonymic extensions.  Each lexeme is described in 
terms of four types of information or zones: phonological, semantic, syntactic and 
lexical-combinatory.  The entry begins with the phonological information including the 
wordform itself and its phonetic variants and any contrastive prosodic information.  The 
other three zones (semantic, syntactic and lexical-combinatory) are much longer.   
 
3.1.1.  The Semantic Zone.  The semantic zone contains the definition of the head 
LU and its connotations.  As we limited the scope of our review of MTT semantics to 
the representation and translation of the Semantic Structure (excluding the pragmatic 
and communicative components of the Semantic Representation), we will only discuss 
the definition here.  The definition is actually an explication which also must follow 
precise principles.  Those listed below are compiled from Mel’čuk 2004a and Mel’čuk 
2004b):   
 
1.The ECD definition must be necessary and sufficient to describe the keyword, 
without including any superflous or encyclopedic knowledge of the world.   
2.The ECD definition must be decomposable into semantically simpler 
meanings, avoiding circularity. 
3. The ECD definition should contain no ambiguous items or items  
synonymous with the keyword. 
4. The Maximal Block rule: if the lexicographic definition of the keyword 
contains a semantic configuration composed of the meanings ‘σ1’ + ‘σ2’ +, ..., + 
‘σn’ such that this configuration is semantically equivalent to the meaning of 
another LU that exists in L, then that LU and not the above configuration of 
(simple) meanings must appear in the definition.  
5.  The ECD definition must guarantee absolute mutual substitutability with the 
LU in text: the LU must be replaceable by its definition and the definition of L 
must be replaceable by L in any imaginable context. 
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A brief explanation of the reasoning behind these rules rules will follow.   
Rule 1:  The definition must contain all and only the semantemes which together 
are necessary and sufficient to describe the denotational range of the keyword. This 
includes all semantic actants and/or obligatory participants (recall the previous 
examples for CRY, DRINK, etc.). The components of the definition constitute the 
purely linguistic meaning of the lexical unit; the definition cannot include 
extralinguistic or cultural knowledge which is not encoded in the language (recall the 
discussion of linguistic meaning versus encyclopedic information in Sections II-1.3 and 
II-1.4).  
Rule 2: The definition must be decomposable into semantically simpler meanings; 
this requirement avoids circularity in the definition.  For example, if ASTRONOMER is 
defined as ‘a person who does astronomy’, and ASTRONOMY as ‘the science done by 
astronomers’, this would be unhelpful for a user who does not know the meaning of the 
keyword.  If ASTRONOMY is defined as ‘the science of celestial bodies’, one has a 
much clearer idea of its content and what other words it shares some affinity.  
Rule 3: The ECD definition should contain no ambiguous items, those which 
could be interpreted as denoting different and mutually exclusive semantemes 
synonymous with the keyword.  Nor must the definition be circular within the 
dictionary (though not the entry), by defining the keyword using one of its quasi-
synonyms of equal complexity, e.g. rich defined as wealthy and vice versa. Instead, the 
keyword must be explicated using semantically simpler meanings. 
Rule 4: In Section II-2.2, it was shown that semantic decomposition could be 
shallow or deep, continued to the level of semantic primitives or quasi-primitives.  The 
correct semantic decomposition was found at the equilibrium between the principle of 
minimum decomposition and that of and maximal explicitness.  These principles have 
their effect in lexicography as the maximal block rule, which states that if the 
lexicographic definition of L contains a semantic configuration composed of the 
meanings ‘L1’ + ‘L2’ +, ..., + ‘Ln’ such that this configuration is semantically equivalent 
to the meaning of LU ‘L’ that exists in the lexicon, then ‘L’ and not the above 
configuration of (simple) meanings must appear in the definition. This intermediate 
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level of semantic decomposition helps prevent ECD definitions from being inordinately 
long and unwieldy.  
Rule 5: Finally, mutual substitutability between the definition and the keyword in 
texts is a critical criterion.  The goal of a definition is to reflect the native speaker’s 
knowledge of the keyword.  Therefore, the definiens and the definiendum must be 
mutually substitutable in all contexts.  If the speaker can use the explication in lieu of 
the keyword in all contexts, this is very strong evidence that they are equal in content 
and that the definition really represents the meaning of the keyword.  For this reason, 
Mel’čuk (2006: 38) asserts that mutual substitutability is “the central methodological 
requirement of the MTT approach to theoretical semantics and the lexicon... Without 
substitutability, we cannot claim that the definiendum is equal to that of the definiens, 
and thus the concept of definition itself collapses”.  This does not require the definition 
and the keyword to be stylistically equivalent in speech — usually the explication used 
in lieu of the lexical unit is pragmatically odd.  Still this test remains a powerful way of 
elucidating differences between the definiens and definiendum which one had not 
considered. 
Let us recall that the lexical units of a language can be divided into these self-
contained semantic names on one hand and predicates or quasi-predicates on the other.  
Quasi-predicates are, for example, relational names and kinship terms such as father or 
leg. The above rules cover the definition of all lexical units, semantic names and 
predicates, in the MTT approach.  Additional requirements, however, are specified for 
the definitions of predicates and quasi-predicates, such as MAGAZINE and 
ASTRONOMER.  According to Mel’čuk (2004a), “predicates denote facts: actions, 
activities, events, perceptions, processes, states, relations, properties, quantities, 
localizations, and so forth”. Precisely because  their meanings require actants, to 
correctly write the definition of predicates or quasi-predicates in the MTT approach, 
additional rules are required governing their treatment in lexicography.   
The following rules cover the handling of obligatory participants as well as various 
types of constant and optional participants.  In addition, there is a discussion of how to 
distinguish true semantic actants from circumstantials, and presuppositional semantic 
components from assertional ones.  
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6. Predicate definitions are expressed in propositional form.  
7. Predicate definitions contain all obligatory participants of the situation 
denoted by the keyword. 
8. The situation denoted by the predicate inherits all obligatory participants 
of any lexical meanings which are contained in it. 
9.   Presuppositions, and other nonassertional semantic components, must be 
distinguished from assertions about the actants. 
10. A principled distinction must be made between optional and 
circumstantial participants. 
11. Constant participants may not be expressible in the text even if they are 
obligatory. 
 
   Rule 6:  The definition of a lexical unit denoting a situation, in addition to 
explicating the situation itself, must illustrate the role of the actants.  For this reason, the 
definition of a predicate is in propositional form to better illustrate the placement of the 
actants with respect to the keyword: EAT   =   ‘X eats Y: being X chews and swallows 
Y’.  The letters X, Y, Z, etc., describe the semantic actants of the situation. 
 Rule 7:  These semantic actants or participants in the situation are considered 
obligatory if, once they are removed from the situation, the keyword can no longer 
denote the same situation or ceases to indicate a situation.  For example, a situation of 
eating cannot be described by EAT1 if X does not chew and swallow something but 
simply chews with an empty mouth, without any substance Y.  All of the elements, 
including participants X and Y, are necessary for this lexical unit to be used. 
Rule 8: Naturally, a lexeme ‘inherits’ all the semantic components denoted by a 
moderately complex lexeme within the definition (the rule of maximal block).  If one of 
the components of the meaning of the predicate is itself a predicate with its own actants, 
the keyword then ‘inherits’ all of the actants of the lexemes that make up its definition.  
This is known as the “Obligatory Inheritance Principle”. 
Rule 9: It is critical to distinguish presuppositions from assertions in the 
definition.   Not all components may have the same status in this respect.  Many 
components express facts about the keyword or about an actant, but others may be 
presuppositions or semantic taxononomic restrictions on an actant rather than 
                                                                                                                                      72 
assertions.  Often the difference can be clearly seen when the analyst adds a negation 
or intensifier to the keyword.  Which components are negated or intensified?  Mel’čuk 
(2004a: 45) cites the case of WIDOW: the definition of this word cannot simply be ‘X 
is a woman who has lost her husband and has not remarried’ because the negation, as 
in Zhu is not a widow, does not negate the fact that Zhu is an adult female.  The 
gender of the primary actant must be a nonassertional semantic component, referring 
to a taxonomic restriction or presupposition about the actant X.  This is shown by 
putting this information in a nondefining relative clause embedded in the defintion: 
‘X, who is a woman, has lost her husband and has not remarried’.  In this study, there 
are  many instances of nonassertional components in Dene motion and position verbs, 
which feature intricate conflation patterns incorporating detailed nonassertional 
information about X’s shape, texture and number (see Chapter III).    
Rule 10: Sometimes a component is merely suggested to be present but is not 
strictly required for the definition to apply.  These are called weak or default 
components (see discussion in Mel’čuk 2004a and 2004b).  For example, the adverb 
STUBBORNLY strongly suggests that  the agent continued to do (or to refuse to do) 
something in spite of better alternatives.  That would be the automatic interpretation of a 
sentence such as she stubbornly refused to come with me.  But this meaning can easily 
be contradicted by certain contexts, as in he stubbornly fought the cancer.  We would 
not want to say that these are two distinct senses of stubborn.  A similar but greater 
challenge presents itself when the analyst must decide whether to include in the 
definition of a verb those entities that are obliquely part of its  situation but perhaps not 
so closely involved as to be called participants. a “circumstants”, and lie outside of the 
definition.   Figure II-5 from Mel’čuk (2004b) shows the following hierarchy between 
circumstants and optional participants: 
 
Sentential Adverbs > Time > Place > Manner > Cause>   Goal  >   Means >   Instrument 
Circumstantials         ⇐  ⇒                          Actants 
 
Figure II-5.  Hierarchy of Circumstantials and Actants (Mel’čuk 2004b). 
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If the analyst labels something an optional participant if the participants differ between 
two instances of a word, then the linguistic situations they are distinct, and we must be 
in the presence of two separate senses.  For instance, shall we say that the intransitive 
eat in the whippet ate from my plate and the transitive eat in the whippet ate something 
from my plate are different lexemes belonging to EAT?   
 Mel’čuk (2004b) defines five criteria for deciding that something is part of a 
circumstantial phrase (solution 1) to be described by a nonstandard lexical function if its 
expression is somehow controlled by the keyword, or an optional participant of the 
situation itself (solution 2): 
  1. Its semantic role: if the nominal in the situation is closer to the right side of the 
hierarchy in Figure II-5, then we should consider it an optional participant.  In the case 
of Brake for moose!, the circumstantial for moose is on the right half of the table. 
 2. The semantic homogeneity of different possible circumstantials/participants: if 
there is a very limited and unitary range of them, they are more participant-like.    
 3. Its lexical boundness by the keyword: the fewer lexical restrictions on the 
phrase in question, the more the analyst should opt to consider it an optional participant.   
 4.  Its semantic boundness by the keyword: the fewer semantic restrictions on the 
phrase in question, the more the analyst should opt to consider it an optional participant. 
 5.  Whether or not the language has a lexical function (see Chapter IV) that would 
normally relate the keyword and the phrase in question.   If so, considering it a 
circumstantial would be more in keeping with the overall description of the lexicon.  
For example, for the phrase drink from a glass the lexical function Labreal  (denoting 
the typical use of the keyword) can relate the two items: Labreal(glass) = drink.  
 Rule 11: One category of obligatory participants are the constant 
participants, whose expression is restricted.  They are usually not expressed in the 
text because their presence is assumed and unworthy of mention.  For example, for the 
lexeme SEE, the body part ‘eyes’ is a constant participant, necessary for the concept of 
seeing, but one rarely mentions the eyes overtly.  One mentions them if they are 
somehow marked, i.e. She could barely see with her failing eyes.     
There are four types of constant participants, each indicated with a distinct symbol 
in this study.  Constant participants which cannot be expressed are surrounded by 
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square brackets [ ], those which can only be expressed if characterized explicitly by 
curly brackets { }, those which are entirely optional by parentheses ( ), and those which 
must be expressed without a marking (in the original Russian ECD).  The constant 
participants which are included only if characterized explicitly include those 
participants which must logically be part of the situation, i.e. the lips with which one 
kisses, the eyes with which one sees, but which are only mentioned overtly if particular 
attention is being drawn to them, as in he pointed at me with a pencil.  Some 
participants simply cannot be expressed, even if they are obligatory.  Thus, if a 
definition of the Dene idiom X obj.agrX–įní k’éch’á, lit. “against X’s mind” (referring to 
X’s feeling of anger at a situation caused by someone else) is usually expressed in an 
independent clause, which could suggest that the definition would be ‘person X feels 
angry because person [Y] does or did situation [Z] that X does not want’.  Y and Z must 
be present in the situation but expressed in a previous clause or understood in the 
discourse.  However, in many instances definitions will list semantic components as 
expressible if they are usually uttered in an adjoining clause within what is judged to be 
the same utterance.  This is relatively common in Dene.  
 
 
3.1.2.  The Syntax Zone.  The second major zone of the ECD entry is the 
syntactic combinatorics zone, constituted essentially by the government pattern of the 
keyword.  The government pattern (GP) provides two types of information.   First, it 
specifies how the semantic actants X, Y, Z, etc. from the definition correspond to deep-
syntactic actantial roles, indicated by Roman numberals I, II, III, etc.  This part is 
referred to as the diathesis of the lexical unit.  Which deep-syntactic actants are 
obligatory and which are optional must also be indicated.  Second, the GP illustrates the 
various possibilities of how the deep-syntactic actants can be realized as surface-
syntactic actants, real members of sytactic classes in the language.  Table II-I shows the 
GP for the English verb HELP1. As can be seen in Table II-I, the surface realization of 
the syntactic actants are numbered.  The default reading of the GP is that any of these 
surface realizations from each column can be used with any of the surface realizations 
from the other columns.  Sometimes combinations, however, may be odd or 
unacceptable.  If so, the odd or erroneous combinations must be indicated.  In Table II-I, 
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for example, realizations 3 and 4 from the column for Deep Syntactic Actant III are 
undesireable with the realization 1 of Deep Syntactic Actant IV. 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II Z ⇔ III W ⇔ IV 
1. N 
 
1. N 1. 
2. to  
3. with 
4. with 
5. in 
6. PREPdir             
Vinf 
Vinf 
N 
Vgerund 
Vgerund 
N 
1. with 
2. by 
N 
Vgerund 
 
 
Table II-I.  Government Pattern for the verb HELP1 (Mel’čuk 2008). 
  
For example, the sentence ?Kathleen (I) helped Arthur (II) with his work (III) with her 
advice (IV) is odd.  Similarly, the GP must specify whether any of the combinations, 
while permissible, carry a special meaning.   The first surface realization of Deep 
Syntactic Actant I means that the semantic actant X was not directly involved in action 
Z: X was not performing action Z, but providing resources to Y so that Y could do Z.   
  
3.1.3.  Phraseology in the ECD.  The final zone of an ECD entry describes how 
the keyword is related to and combines with the other lexical units of the language, 
wherever that combination is somehow irregular or phraseologized.  According to 
Mel’čuk (2008), “[in] a dictionary of language L... any phraseologized or non-free word 
combinations involving the keyword must be described in the final zone which concerns 
lexical combinatorics, which is concerned with how the keyword may be combined with 
the rest of the lexicon.”  The ECD treatment of of phraseologized language is best 
understood starting with what MTT defines as a compositional, free phrase.  
Let us recall, from Section II-1.1, that in MTT language is described as a set of 
many-to-many correspondences between an infinite set of meanings and an infinite set 
of texts.  An act of language use begins when the speaker observes, experiences or 
conceives of a situation using his or her extralinguistic mental faculties.  Once the 
speaker has chosen the relevant linguistic meanings and signifieds needed to express the 
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conceptual representation, the speaker juxtaposes them through acts of linguistic union 
to produce a compositional complex sign which is the sum of the signifieds and the 
signifiers of its constituents.  The is a free phrase, as opposed to a phraseme.  According 
to Mel’čuk (2006:8) to be considered a free phrase involving the linguistic union of A 
and B the combination of A⊕B must satisfy two conditions “its signified ‘X’ = ‘A⊕B’  
is unrestrictedly and regularly constructed on the basis of the given Concept[ual] 
R[epresentation] (which the speaker wants to verbalize) — out of the signifieds ‘A’ and 
‘B’”, and furthermore “its signifier /X/ = /A⊕B/ is unrestrictedly and regularly 
constructed on the basis of the SemR ‘A⊕B’ — out of the signifiers /A/ and /B/”.  For 
example, a speaker of English can select the lexemes KICK and BALL with the 
meanings ‘kick’ and ‘ball’ and the phonological forms /kΙk/ and /bal/ and, using rules 
that apply to most of the lexical units of English, form the phrase kick the ball.  The 
combination must be chosen and interpreted as compositional at every level.   “A free 
phrase is thus 100% compositional and replaceable by any other sufficiently 
synonymous phrase” (Mel’čuk 2006b). 
But much of language is not free.  People seem to speak largely in set phrases and 
using phraseology.  The idiom KICK THE BUCKET, for example, is not formed by 
building on the speaker’s selection of the concepts of ‘kick’ and ‘bucket’, like the 
phrase kick the ball is.  The concepts ‘kick’ and ‘bucket’ are entirely absent from the 
speaker’s conceptual representation of a situation of dying denoted by KICK THE 
BUCKET.   Instead, KICK THE BUCKET must be listed with its own entry in the 
lexicon (dictionary).  This follows from MTT’s principle treating phrasemes and 
lexemes and equally “deep” in the lexicon.   
Phraseologized or non-free language, in which at least one part of one of the 
signifieds or signifiers is combined in a nonregular or restricted way, is not a side 
curiosity in the lexicon, but may well constitute the bulk of the vocabulary.  Example 
(9), taken at random from a major American newspaper, shows all non-free expressions 
in bold. 
 
(9) Racking up exorbitant mobile charges is easy to do if you are not careful 
about using your cellphone internationally. AT&T charges 99 cents a minute 
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to use your phone in Italy (rates vary by country), and that is if you pay for 
the carrier’s international calling plan. If you do not, the charge goes up to 
$1.29 a minute.10 
 
It is almost impossible to overstate the prominence of set phrases or phrasemes in 
natural language, so one tenet of the MTT approach is that the dictionary should give 
adequate attention to them.  There is a diverse typology of non-free or phraseologized 
language which in the ECD approach is based on on which of the two necessary 
conditions of compositionality mentioned above is violated and how.   Table II-II 
summarizes the four types of phrasemes in the ECD.   
The vast majority of phrasemes, like the rest of the language, represent meanings 
freely chosen by the speaker to represent a given conceptual representation (the idea of 
translating a meaning into a text).  An exception is the case of pragmatemes, for 
which even the pre-linguistic conceptual structure is restricted.  A pragmateme is a 
fixed phrase that one must use in a given situation.  Even its meanings cannot be 
selected unrestrictedly by the speaker to express this situation.  Many greetings, speech 
formulas, proverbs, religious and ritual language, and quotations are pragmatemes.  For 
example, in English one must say good luck to someone about to undertake a difficult 
task; one cannot use the semantically equivalent good fortune or may you be lucky in 
this situation. 
For all other phrasemes, the meanings that they express are freely selected by the 
speaker and only their forms are restricted.  Full phrasemes, or idioms, are cases 
in which the meaning of a sequence formally composed of the signifiers /AB/ does not 
actually involve the meanings ‘A’ or ‘B’.  For example, RED HERRING denotes 
something neither red nor a herring. KICK THE BUCKET neither involves the meaning 
‘kick’ or ‘bucket’.  In these cases the meanings ‘diversion’ or ‘die’ are selected by the 
speaker, and to verbalize them he or she selects a multi-word expression as a whole 
unit.   
 
                                                
10 “Cheap Mobile Calls, Even Overseas”, Joanna Stern.  New York Times (online edition), January 6, 
2010.   
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  PRAGMATIC PHRASEMES SEMANTIC PHRASEMES 
for phrase /AB/ pragmateme idiom collocation quasi-idiom 
structure ConceptR(SIT) ⇒ 
<‘X’;/A+B/> 
< ‘C’; /A+B/> <‘A+C’; /A+B/> <‘A+B+C’; /A+B/> 
signified restricted X    
signifier restricted X X X X 
signified irregular sometimes sometimes  X 
 
Table II-II.  Typology of non-free phrases in the ECD. 
 
 Semiphrasemes, on the other hand, are cases where the sequence /AB/ denotes 
the meaning ‘A’ and second meaning which is not ‘B’.  The selection of signifier /B/ is 
not free but is imposed by the selection of /A/.    These are also known as collocations.  
For example, if the speaker wants to express the meanings ‘armed’ and ‘intensely’, the 
speaker must say heavily armed or armed to the teeth.  It sound strange to say ?very 
armed.  The signifier ‘armed’ is freely chosen but the expression of ‘intensely’ is 
restricted to certain modifiers.   Finally quasi-phrasemes, or quasi-idioms are 
cases in which the sequence /AB/ conveys the meanings ‘A’ and ‘B’ transparently, but 
other unpredictable meanings are added as well.  For example FISH AND CHIPS does 
refer to fish and to chips, but not in just any way.  The fish and the chips must be served 
warm, and in a certain way, or else the items cannot be referred to as FISH AND 
CHIPS.  Similarly, CHRISTMAS TREE indeed refers a tree and one buys and displays 
it at Christmas-time.  However it must be a large evergreen tree, and it must be 
decorated.  If someone purchases a bonzai or palm tree two weeks before Christmas, it 
would be strange to refer to it in conversation as a Christmas tree.  
Phrasemes also exist on a morphological level, where the signifier of a seemingly 
complex wordform appears to be linearly divisible, but its meaning is unpredictable or 
phraseolgized rather than a case of the regular union of morphs provided for by the 
grammar.  This is referred to in MTT as a morphological phraseme (Mel’čuk 
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1997a: 246-9), which are elementary signs on the level of the signified but not on the 
level of the signifier.  Let us recall that inflectional and derivational affixes are 
considered to be true elementary signs (=signs “not representable as [a combination of] 
other signs united by a meta-operation of linguistic union”, Mel’čuk 1993: 64) with 
transparent grammatical meanings.  Following Mel’čuk’s (1993: 311), definition of 
derivation a derivateme is a standard grammatical meaning which can be productively 
added to members of a lexical class, so that speakers can add the derivateme to existing 
words to coin new lexemes readily interpretable to other speakers.  This definition of 
derivation presupposes that the base is an extant word in the language, so all derived 
stems are complex.  The above would fit a novel coinage like stacker, but not a 
morphological phraseme like stapler.   
Following Mel’čuk (1993: 64), quasi-elementary signs are those 
wordforms whose signifiers are linearly divisible into smaller parts.  However, these 
signifieds that would correspond to these signifiers if they appeared as part of a free 
phrase cannot be isolated from the meaning of the whole word.  Alternatively, some 
grammatical signifieds (such derivatemes or inflectional values) can be isolated from 
the meaning of the word although their markers cannot be.  This is the case of 
wordforms such as am, which are commonly called portmanteaux.  For Mel’čuk (1997: 
246-9) morphoids are quasi-morphs which still bear a plausible semantic link with 
the meaning of the whole word, and submorphs are those which no longer have so 
clear a link. In English, the quasi-suffix –er in scanner and stapler is a morphoid 
because the semantic component ‘instrument’ is still a component of the meaning of the 
word, regardless of the word’s idiosyncratic meaning.  Many Dene wordforms contain 
morphoids rather than derivational affixes.  For example, the iterative ná–, meaning 
‘again’, is a derivation marker in the wordform nánasther [ná+nasther] 
{ITER+1IPFV:stay} ‘I stay again’, but a morphoid in the form nóresker [ná+horesker]  
{etymologically ITER+1IPFV:ask} ‘I beg’, lit. “I ask again”.   
These complexes of quasi-morphs which are semantically different from the sum 
of their parts are referred to as morphological phrasemes.  One can distinguish 
inflectional morphological phrasemes, a sort of morphological idiom 
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whereby the language recycles inflection markers to express inflectional value other 
than those typically denoted by those markers, from derivational 
morphological phrasemes, which are complex signifiers analyzable as an (ex-) 
derivational morphoid with a supposed lexical base.  In all cases, the morphological 
phraseme must be learned by the speaker.  To call a wordform a derivational 
morphological phraseme, there must be evidence for the existence at some point of the 
base to which it was once added, e.g. repeat is not a morphological phraseme, since 
peat is not a speech verb in English.  While a word such as garlic is a compound word 
or phraseme from a diachronic point of view, its component parts are no longer part of 
the English language.  The noun gar (Old English, ‘spear’) has been lost and leek has 
shifted from referring to roots to referring to another set of plants.  Its vowel is also 
phonologically reduced.  For these reasons, we would not want to analyze garlic as 
being morphologically complex, even on the level of the signifier.  The MTT approach 
thus allows for an interesting continuum of forms, from free phrases to monomorphemic 
items, in addition to providing a typology of intermediate cases and describing how they 
differ from both free and monomorphemic forms. Morphological phrasemes are of 
particular relevance to Athabaskan morphology and many of keywords discussed in the 
rest of this thesis are considered to be morphological phrasemes. 
 
3.1.4.  Lexical Relations.  Collocations have typically been classified as a type of 
semantic relation.  “Semantic relations” is a broad term referring to patterns of how 
words are related to each other in the lexicon.  Paradigmatic semantic relations such as 
synonymy and antonymy are those in which the two words can replace each other in the 
same context, as in this book is good/bad.   Syntagmatic or phrasal semantic relations 
are between words which usually appear together.  In MTT, semantic relations are 
formalized as lexical functions, which are regular meaning relationships between sets of 
words in a language.  In order to qualify as a lexical function, a semantic relation must 
satisfy two conditions:  
1.  Homogeneity of the LF: the inputs are linked to their values by a common relation, 
such as antonymy, synonymy, intensification, and so forth.  
2.  Diversity of Expression: the expression must be unpredictable and phraseologized. 
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For example, the meaning ‘intense’ mentioned above can be added to many adjectives 
and verbs, but its expression is diverse: thunderous APPLAUSE, heavily ARMED (or ARMED 
to the teeth), sharp CONTRAST, radical CHANGE, EASY as pie.  When an English speaker 
uses these expressions, he certainly does not think of thunder, sharpness or pie.  He 
simply wants to add the meaning ‘intense’ to the words applause, armed, easy, etc., and 
is forced by the conventions of English to use these collocations.  It is extraordinarily 
challenging for a second-language learner to use these collocations correctly.  Mastering 
the collocations of a language is an essential part of learning that language, and so the 
user is given this information in ECD-type entries.  For example, the meaning ‘intense’ 
is formalized as the lexical function Magn (from the Latin magnus ‘big’).   
Magn(contrast) = sharp 
Magn(applause) = thunderous, heavy 
Magn(armed) = heavily, to the teeth 
Magn(beautiful) = // gorgeous  (// indicates a fused value) 
Magn(naked) = stark 
This information would be listed in the ECD dictionary entries for SHARP, 
APPLAUSE, BEAUTIFUL, etc.  If English had a standard modifier or affix that meant 
‘intensely’, with no unpredictable expression, then Magn would not be relevant to the 
English lexicon, and would not be included in the English ECD.  A lexical function 
reveals a meaning relationship salient enough to be repeated for many pairs in the 
lexicon despite not being expressed by its own standard marker.  The names of the 
lexical functions are Latinate in origin and it is conventional in MTT to write them in 
bold.  In the current version (Mel’čuk 1996) there are 60 standard lexical functions 
posited to exist in various languages.  LFs 1-22 cover paradigmatic functions such as 
Syn (synonymy), Anti (antonymy) and Convij (conversives), as in Conv(husband) = 
wife or Conv21(send) = (receive).  In Meaning-Text Theory, part-whole relations 
(hyponymy and hyperonymy) are considered to be encyclopedic rather than lexical 
knowledge, so they are not included as lexical functions.  Only hyperonymy is 
expressed as a function when it involves a conventional metaphor (Gener and Figur for 
‘generic’ and ‘figurative’ respectively).  LFs 22-60 are syntagmatic lexical functions.  
They involve constructing a phrase based on the keyword, either as a means of changing 
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its lexical class or because it is simply a common phrase in the language.  This includes 
Centr, a conventional phrase for the culminating part of a situation and modifier 
reations such as Magn, described above, Ver and Bon, as in the following: 
Centr(crisis) = the peak [of the ~] and the Magn derivatives above.  
 Finally, some lexical functions may denote a non-regular semantic relationship 
that covers only a few lexical items in a language.  These are referred to in the ECD as 
nonstandard lexical functions, and they are usually language-specific.  
There is no space to fully discuss lexical functions here.  The reader may find a more 
detailed description, with examples of each of the LFs, in Chapter IV, dedicated to 
lexical functions in Dene.   
 
3.2.  Apresjan’s Dictionary of Synonyms.  A second direction in Explanatory 
Combinatorial Lexicography has been the detailed semantic analysis of synonymy and 
the compilation of theoretical dictionaries of synonyms.  The main works in this current 
are by Juri Apresjan, his Dictionary of Synonyms, a database begin in the early 1990s 
and has resulted in three volumes of a Russian synonym dictionary so far, amply 
summarized in Apresjan (2000). Entries in the Dictionary of Synonyms (not italicized 
because it also refers to an ongoing project and approach) naturally share much in 
common with the ECD entries. This general outline therefore concentrates on the 
differences between them.   
Rather than presenting an alphabetical list of unrelated and self-contained entries, 
synonym dictionaries are organized in meta-entries comprising series of quasi-
synonymous words.  For example, in Apresjan (2000: 188) describes the KHOTET’ [to 
want] series for Russian, comprising the following lexemes: khotet’1 [~ to want], zhelat’ 
[~ to wish], mechtat’2 [~ to yearn for], and zhazhdat’ [~ to crave].  The structure reflects 
the comparative goal of the work.  Like the ECD, the synonym dictionaries are basically 
monolingual, but when they are aimed at an audience whose native language differs 
from the object language, the explications are supplemented with translations.    
The choice to focus on synonymy is advantageous because it commits the analyst 
to effecting a extremely fine-grained semantic and combinatorial analysis in order to 
distinguish the meaning and use of the words in the series.  Conversely, the subtle 
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semantic differences between the synonyms uncovered by ECL-based synonymy 
studies have led to the discovery of new dimensions of systematicity in the lexicon, 
such as lexicographic types (see Apresjan 2000: 163-166).  As an applied methodology, 
synonym dictionaries are a type of production dictionary aimed at teaching the user to 
distinguish between the meaning of synonymous words in a second language.  For 
Apresjan, three features are essential to the mastery of the lexion of another language: 
semantic precision (the ability to select the appropriate quasi-synonyms according to 
express one’s meaning), idiomatic usage (the mastery of lexical and syntactic co-
occurrence restraints) and flexibility, or the ability to paraphrase. “It is clear that if a 
dictionary of synonyms is to help the user towards accurate expression it should contain 
a full, non-redundant and absolutely explicit description of their semantic similarities 
and distinctions.  A description is full if it mentions all substantive characteristics of the 
lexmes at issue; it is non-redundant if no superfluous characteristics are ascribed to any 
lexeme; lastly it is explicit if nothing is left unsaid and every characteristic is clearly 
stated in a manner which can and should be understood literally, with no recourse to the 
reader’s deductive powers” Apresjan (2000: 4).  The systematicity comes not only from 
the exhaustiveness of the description of lexical portraits and of the series, but in the 
selection of the keywords and series themselves.  The goal of Apresjan’s study is to 
depict the overall culture-specific “naïve linguistic view of the world” which emerges 
from the study of the lexical means of depicting all the main human systems — lexical 
items denoting emotions, desires, sensory perceptions, mental activities, physical 
movements, and so forth.    
The entry for each synonym series is divided into six smaller zones or sections 
rather than the three main zones of the ECD.  After the phonological form, the first 
section is the heading or the name of the series, to which only lexemes of the same part 
of speech may belong (Apresjan 2000: 55).  The quasi-synonyms either have similar 
semantic content or they are morphologically derived from each other.  Among the 
quasi-synonyms there is a dominant, “the lexeme which has the most general 
meaning in the given series, has the broadest application and co-occurrence, and is most 
neutral from the point of view of style, pragmatics, communicative value, grammar and 
prosody, etc.” (Apresjan 2000: 56).  Sometimes the dominant is a semantic primitive, 
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present in all the other members of the series, but it can also possess some idiosyncratic 
features that do not figure into the other more complex quasi-synonyms.  After the 
heading is an indication of the stylistic level, which is particularly relevant to literary 
European languages such as Russian and English.   
 
3.2.1.  The Zone of Meaning.  This zone of the dictionary contains numerous 
subsections.  As a series, the quasi-synonyms are arranged by degree of semantic 
similarity.  The zone of meaning for the entry therefore begins by listing the semanteme 
common to all of the elements in the series, and mentions whether this is a semantic 
primitive.  This is followed by an explication of the meaning of each quasi-synonym.  
The explication has four functions (Apresjan 2000: 64): to explain the meaning of the 
lexical items, to indicate their place in the “semantic system of the language”, to 
represent semantic mapping rules between their semantic and deep syntactic 
representations and finally to preview the lexical combinatory rules in the following 
sections.  This is followed by a “synopsis”, which lists the semantic parameters by 
which the quasi-synonyms differ, i.e. intensity, duration, probabiliy of realization (for 
verbs of desire), etc.  Next the reader is provided with a meticulous description of the 
semantic similarities and differences (not only in the explication but also pragmatic, 
referential and connotative divergences) so as not to burden the reader with the task of 
comparing the quasi-synonyms manually.  A subsection describing prosodic and 
communicative properites indicates which items of the series can receive phrasal stress 
and be rhematic, if there are such differences between the quasi-synonyms.  Similarly, 
any restrictions on the use of the words due to extralinguistic considerations is 
mentioned, as are any context in which the regular semantic and communicative 
differences between the quasi-synonyms are neutralized.   The zone of meaning ends 
with any notes on synonyms not included in the series (being peripheral, archaic or 
obsolete), other meanings related but not similar enough to be included in the series, 
and other senses of the words in the series that fall outside of it.   
 
3.2.2.  The Form Zone.  The Dictionary of Synonyms has more elaborate formal 
information than one finds in the French and English ECDs that have been published.  
85  
This zone details any irregularities among the inflectional forms of the keyword, i.e. if a 
verb has an unpredictable form in a given aspect or mood, or if the plural of a noun is 
irregular (ox > oxen).  Also noted are any restrictions on the use of certain grammemes 
with one of the keywords.  For example the English verb BELIEVE is not typically 
used in the progressive aspect: ?I’m believing you.  The Form Zone also lists any 
unpredictable semantic or communicative traits a keyword has in one of its inflectional 
forms.  For example, the past tense form of KHOTET’ ‘to want’ can be used in question 
but it belongs to a different and lower register than the other forms (Apresjan 2000: 79). 
Finally the zone includes what Apresjan refers to as “non-proper forms”.  These are 
instances in which a verb has a defective paradigm and forms from a synonymous verb 
are conventionally used to fill in the missing forms in the contexts in which they would 
have been used.   
 
3.2.3.  The Syntax Zone.  This zone corresponds loosely to the Government 
Pattern in the ECD, because it lists all the unpredictable syntactic combinatory patterns 
of the keyword, but it focuses especially on the possible realizations of the surface-
syntactic actants, including any restrictions or idiosyncrasies in meanings.  This 
information is also structured differently from in the ECD, in paragraphs, to compare 
use within a series.  There may be some language-specific parameters in this zone as 
well.  The Russian version of the Dictionary of Synonyms specifies whether there is a 
difference in meaning if the verb is used in the “absolutive construction”, a context in 
which a normally transitive verb is used intransitively.  It also lists whether the keyword 
can be the main verb in a clause with a subordinate clause, with any attendant semantic 
differences.   
 More similarly to the ECD and the methodology outlined in Mel’čuk et al. 
1995), the Dictionary of Synonyms tests the semantics of interrogative and negative 
sentences types, which frequently carry idiosycratic meanings.  Unlike the ECD, word 
order beyond the Government Pattern is a separate parameter, and this is specified if 
there is any difference in semantic scope or meaning from way such a word order would 
normally be interpreted.  Finally, any peculiarities in its combination with words of 
other lexical classes (for example, if a verb is rarely used with adverbs) are listed.   
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3.2.4.  The Co-occurrence Zone.  This zone is quite different from the ECD, 
which divides the entry into syntactic patterns on one hand and on the other semantic 
combinatorics, which concerns mostly lexical functions and phraseologized language.   
Instead, the Dictionary of Synonyms divides the profile of the grammatical forms of the 
keyword in the syntax zone from the description of any irregularities in the combination 
of the keyword with other lexical items in the language, be they induced by semantic, 
lexical, morphological or syntactic traits of those other lexemes.  In the Dictionary of 
Synonyms, all of this information is listed in the  co-occurrence zone, which might list 
co-occurrence restrictions with individual semantic components (of any lexical unit).  
For example, the subject of certain verbs must be human.  This information is specified 
in the explication in the ECD.  Also in the co-occurrence zone is whether the keyword 
blocks any morphological values on the items it combines with.  For example, in 
Russian some otherwise synonymous subordinating prepositions have different 
requirements as to which aspect the verb in the subordinate clause may occur in 
(Apresjan 2000: 89).   
 
3.2.5.  The Illustration and Auxiliary Zones.   Apresjan’s Illustration Zone is 
quite detailed compared to the ECD, containing ten or twelve examples of many 
keywords.  Part of this is to justify the many claims made about the keywords in the 
entry, but this also contributes to more pedagogical aims of the Dictionary of Synonyms 
with respect to the ECD.  Another particularity is that the Dictionary of Synonyms 
draws heavily on examples from corpora (including many literary examples), while the 
ECD is based on elicitation from native speakers and occasionally supplemented with 
examples from corpora.   
 The auxiliary zones comprise several small subsections.   There is a listing of 
any quasi-synonyms which are phrasemes, as the actual synonym series in the 
Dictionary of Synonyms contain only lexemes in almost all cases (Apresjan 2000: 94).  
The subsection of “analogues” lists hyperonyms, hyponyms and co-hyponyms for 
words of which one semantic component may appear in the definition of the keyword 
series elements, but which is not semantically close enough to be the dominant.  Further 
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subsections list conversives of keyword verbs and of their “analogues”.  Finally, there is 
a listing of exact and inexact antonyms (depending on how many and which semantic 
components are being negated or reversed) and list of morphological derivatives, which 
is relevant to the Russian version.   
 
3.3.  Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage.  The third semantics 
approach on which the present work is based is not actually part of Meaning-Text 
Theory but comes from the MTT’s “sister school” founded by Anna Wierzbicka, the 
Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach. The NSM framework shares many 
affinities with Meaning-Text Theory, and the two approaches have evolved in such 
close contact with each other from the beginning of both that they may be said to have 
mutually influenced each other.  It will be useful to explore the areas relevant to MTT 
that have been borrowed from NSM, or further developed in that school than in MTT 
proper.  
The Natural Semantic Metalanguage is an analytic framework for lexicography 
and lexical semantics pioneered by Anna Wierzbicka, a semanticist of Polish origin who 
has spent much of her career at Australian National University in Canberra.  Wierzbicka 
was later joined in her approach by other linguists, most notably Cliff Goddard, and the 
NSM project has now produced perhaps a few hundred research articles and attracted 
enough followers that it may be dubbed a school of lexical semantics. In general, the 
NSM is much less formalized than MTT, but it is based on extensive cross-linguistic 
data from diverse language families.  In contast, MTT semantics is highly formal and 
perhaps more systematic for single-language description, but has mostly been developed 
with a focus on a restricted sample of typologically similar European languages. 
Like MTT, Wierzbicka adopts the functionalist view of language as essentially a 
tool for expressing meaning.  As she evocatively states, “To study language without 
reference to meaning is like studying road signs from the point of view of their physical 
properties (how much they weigh, what kind of paint they are painted with, and so on), 
or like studying the structure of the eye without any reference to seeing.  Curiously, 
however, this is precisely how many linguists study language” (Wierzbicka 1996: 3).  
Wierzbicka’s “semantocentrism” is more radical than MTTs –– like, the Cognitive 
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Grammar approach, she extends even to the description of morphosyntax, which she 
views as encoding meaning like other linguistic signs (this aspect of her theory is 
elaborated in The Semantics of Grammar, Wierzbicka 1988).  
If language exists primarily to communicate meaning, then it stands to reason that 
part of this meaning will express “universal” concepts, those which are common and 
intrinsic to human experience, and a much larger part will be subjective, rooted in the 
experience of a particular human community and oriented toward the concerns and 
priorities unique to that group.  Much of language is untranslatable to others who do not 
share the experiences and concepts of the speech community.  Human communities 
differ as to social organization, economic foundation, physical surroundings, 
supernatural beliefs, priorities, interests and history.  If a language is primarily an 
instrument for communicating meaning and reality, it is normal that the linguistic stock 
of a language will contain items denoting the places, artifacts, and ideas salient enough 
to the speech community to be considered nameworthy, and that much of such content 
will differ from language to language.   Wierzbicka is open to a weak version of the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (not as much towards Whorf’s determinism): “As a society 
changes, these tools [conceptually specific words], too, may be gradually modified and 
discarded.  In that sense, the outlook of a society is never wholly ‘determined’ by its 
stock of conceptual tooks, but it is clearly influenced by them” (Wierzbicka 1997: 5). 
In order to compare quasi-synonyms within a language or so-called concept 
equivalents between different languages, or render of the denotational content of lexical 
items which have no near-equivalent in the native language of the academic audience, 
the definiens of these lexical items explicate their meaning in terms of simple, universal 
meanings. The second position Wierzbicka takes (like MTT) is that the definiens of a 
lexical item must be its decomposition into semantically simpler meanings.  “one cannot 
understand the concepts of ‘promise’ or ‘denounce’ without first understanding the 
concept of ‘say’, for ‘promise’ and ‘denounce’ are built upon ‘say’.  Similarly, one 
cannot understand the concepts of ‘deixis’, ‘demonstration’, or ‘extension’ without first 
understanding the concept of ‘this’...” (Wierzbicka 1988: 10).  Wierzbicka believes that 
decomposition can proceed until the analyst reaches indefinibilia, those elements which 
are unversal and innate.  
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3.3.1.  Semantic Primitives.  In the study of another language, the indefinibilia or 
semantic primitives such as IF, GOOD, FEEL, HERE, and SOMETHING are best rendered by 
translation or paraphrase, as any attempt to define them only obscures their meaning.  In 
her various works, Wierzbicka provides a list of semantic primitives which she 
considers undefinable and which she predicts will have lexical equivalents in the 
languages of the world. These indefinibilia constitute the Natural Semantic 
Metalanguage (NSM).  This is an empirical claim, based on a growing body of 
empirical studies of how these meanings are rendered as lexical items in diverse 
languages.  
 
Substantives I, YOU, SOMEONE, PEOPLE, SOMETHING/THING, BODY 
Relational substantives KIND, PART 
Determiners THIS, THE SAME, OTHER/ELSE 
Quantifiers ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MUCH/MANY 
Evaluators GOOD, BAD 
Descriptors BIG, SMALL 
Mental predicates THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR 
Speech SAY, WORDS, TRUE 
Actions, events, movement, contact DO, HAPPEN, MOVE, TOUCH 
Location, existence, possession, 
specification 
BE (SOMEWHERE), THERE IS, HAVE, BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING 
Life and Death LIVE, DIE  
Time WHEN/TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT 
TIME, FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT 
Space WHERE/PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE 
“Logical” concepts NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF 
Intensifier, augmentor VERY, MORE 
Similarity LIKE 
 
Table II-III.  A current English Version of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (Goddard 2007) 
 
The inventory is continually revised to accomodate new data, but as a framework for 
elicitation of word meanings it has been relatively successful and consistent.  The 
current version contains over 60 items, summarized in Table II-III. The definiens of a 
lexical item is a list of semantic components, in a numbered list, each written in 
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propositional form.  The actants of a verb can be indicated by X, Y, Z, etc., as in MTT, 
or alternatively using natural language pronouns such as I, someone and something.   
It is important to note that logically prior concepts are semantically simpler.   
Being conceptually prior has at times been confused with having been learned or 
mentioned previously in the dicourse: “In claiming universality for its simplest semantic 
elements, NSM escapes this objection by, in effect, asserting an identity between the 
simplest meanings and the already-known ones... Only if greater simplicity is 
substituted for prior knowledge as the universal characteristic of semantic explanation 
does a level of ultimate simples become necessary: the process of definitional 
simplification cannot, clearly, go on for ever. But if semantic explanation is assumed to 
operate by relating definienda to meanings which are already known, no universal array 
of absolutely simple ideas need be supposed” (Riemer 2006).  This objection confuses 
prior in a chronological sense with conceptually prior, which is what is meant here.  
Meanings which are simpler must be prior.  The only way for the speaker to understand 
a complex sign as a union of subcomponents is if he or she already has knowledge of 
those simpler units.  One could, in principle, learn the word linguists as a label one can 
apply to a group of people who recently arrived in town for a conference, and have 
some referential ability to identify those individuals, but one cannot understand the 
meaning of linguists as  ‘people who do linguistics [the science of language] if one does 
not know what linguistics or science or language are; one cannot understand Hoosiers 
to refer to ‘people who live in Indiana’ if one does not know that Indiana exists.  
If no meaning were semantically simpler than any other, and no concept were 
conceptually prior to another, then lexical meanings would be so unpredictable that 
speakers would have an immensely difficult time integrating new meanings from their 
own language or from new languages into their existing mental framework, 
undermining the communicative function of language. In order for new meanings to be 
processed, they must be decomposed, and this decomposition would procede logically 
to indefinibilia or primitives which can be learned in another language only through 
translation.  There is some slight disagreement between the MTT and NSM schools as 
to whether all the primitives can be verbalized as lexical units in natural languages and 
whether they are always comparable.  Also, the NSM school has revised the particular 
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set of primitives as more data from more languages has become available.  The usability 
and universality of the primitives remains an ongoing empirical question.      
 
3.3.2.  NSM Definitions.  The defining metalanguage to the items in the NSM list.  
Example (10) cites the definition of AFRAID (Wierzbicka 1999: 75): 
 
(10)  Afraid (X was afraid)  
   (a)  X felt something because X thought something  
   (b)    sometimes a person thinks about something: 
   (d)    I don’t want this to happen 
   (e)    I don’t know if I can do anything now” 
   (f)    when this person thinks this this person feels something bad 
   (g)    X felt something like this 
   (h)    because X thought something like this 
 
Sometimes a single primitive will be rendered by a few different lexical items in 
complementary distribution.  This is referred to as allolexy (Goddard 1994).   
Semantic primitives are used to explicate words from another language without a 
precise equivalent in the language of the analyst.  The language of the definition is not 
important because it is assumed that such a definition reduces the meaning to a level of 
universal conceptualization, whose meaning is only loosely related to language 
(resembling somewhat MTT’s Conceptual Representation). 
When it is not used for cross-linguistic semantics, the NSM is used for a fine-
grained comparison of quasi-synonyms in a language, much like in the Dictionary of 
Synonyms. These quasi-equivalents between two languages or quasi-synonyms within a 
language may share many of the same primitives in its definition, but there will also be 
differentia – additional semantic components which enable the reader to 
understand the difference in use and denotational range between the two quasi-
equivalent words.  For example, in comparison with (10), Wierzbicka’s definition of the 
German angst, loosely equivalent to ‘fear’, is the following (Wierzbicka 1999: 134): 
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(11)  Angst (e.g. X hatte Angst vor dem Hund / vor der Prüfung) 
   (a)  X felt something 
   (b)    sometimes a person thinks for some time: 
   (b’)   “I don’t know what will happen  
   (c)    many bad things can happen to me 
   (d)    I don’t want these things to happen 
   (e)    I want to do something because of this if I can 
   (f)    I don’t know what I can do” 
   (g)    because of this this person feels something bad for some time 
   (h)  X felt something like this 
 
Each one of these components must be verified with linguistic evidence to check for 
semantic compatibility.  For example, the presence or absence of the portion ‘for some 
time’ in component (b) differs between the definitions in (10) and (11).  This is a 
concrete prediction that angst cannot be used to express a transient or momentary fear, 
while afraid can: I heard a loud bang, and I was afraid for a moment 〈*felt angst for a 
moment〉.   
But in the NSM theory, the value of basic sentences using primitives goes far 
beyond providing evidence for components of the definitions of lexical items.  The 
authors view the basic combinatorial properties of the words which encode these 
primitives in a language as constituting a sort of basic grammar of that language.  A 
specific definition of “basic combinatorial properties” has not been presented, but one 
imagines that it might refer to the actant structure and government patterns of these 
lexical items.  Since lexical primitives form a sort of alphabet of basic human concepts, 
Goddard imagines that once we have a list of the “basic combinatorial properties” of 
words encoding lexical primitives from a large sample of languages, general patterns 
will emerge which will be evidence of a sort of universal grammar, although of a very 
different sort from that posited in generative approaches.  As Goddard (2002: 31-32) 
explains it: 
 
Every language L contains an irreducible semantic core, with universal lexical and 
syntactic (combinatorial) properties.  As we describe, for any language, the L-specific 
realisation of this core, we are describing what may be called the “core grammar” of that 
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particular language.  That is, in the process of identifying and describing the local 
exponents of the universal semantic primes, we are also describing the essential 
morphosyntactic characteristics of that language... In this way, the establishment of any 
L-specific NSM can be seen as a foundational step in the comprehensive grammatical 
description of that language 
 
Such a study has not yet been undertaken in depth, but it is interesting to imagine that a 
sort of universal grammar could emerge from a study universal lexical combinatory 
properties.  Indeed, every aspect of Wierzbicka’s and Goddard’s NSM approach invites 
empirical verification (and the authors themselves strongly encourage linguists to apply 
this approach to as many languages as possible).   A fairly decent body of such lexical 
semantic studies of various languages already exists.  Perhaps the most fruitful and 
popular subfield of study has been the study of lexical units denoting emotions in the 
languages of the world (see Wierzbicka & Harkins 2002, and numerous sources cited 
below).   
 
3.3.3.  Areas of Divergence.  Meaning-Text Theory and the Natural Semantic 
Metalanguage share interests, core principles and some methods.  Both have been 
referred to as “neostructuralist” (Geeraerts 2009) as they assume a compositional view 
of meaning: semantically complex linguistic signs can be decomposed into semantically 
simpler components, salva significatione, the compositional sum of which is equivalent 
to the meaning of the semantically complex sign.  Both approaches are heavily focused 
on lexical semantics and lexicography.   Specific studies in both approaches often treat 
similar topics such as ethnosemantics and cross-linguistic comparison.  However, there 
are several important points of divergence.  The first point of divergence concerned the 
status of the semantic primitives in the explications.  With respect to the NSM 
approach, Apresjan (2000: 228-229) agrees that the meaning of a keyword can be 
decomposed into simpler units but suggests that the resulting metalanguage would be 
language-specific: “with thie aid of a semantic metalanguage, conceived as a sub-
language of the object language, the national semantics of that given language may well 
be described”.  Furthermore, a set of quasi-synonymous semantic primitives denoting 
mental predicates (i.e. two words meaning ‘feel’ or ‘want) may have meanings too 
simple to be further decomposed using actual lexical items in the object language, but 
semantic differences between them still remain. Citing the difference between two 
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simple quasi-synonyms for ‘want’ in Russian, Apresjan (2000: 8) concludes that neither 
are true primitives:  
 
 This lexical ‘incommensurability’ is typical above all of words which have fairly 
complex meanings: the greater the number of different ideas encapsulated in one 
dictionary sense, the greater the likelihood that the combination of ideas will be unique.  
Conversely, the simpler the meaning, the fewer basic ideas contained in it, the greater the 
likelihood that it will be expresed in one word in many, perhaps all the languages of the 
world.  Sometimes, however, even relatively simple senses display similar lexical 
incommensurability...  
 
The true primitive, the “component forming the intersection between them... cannot be 
verbalized”.   Apresjan terms these true sub-lexical primitives “semantic quarks”: 
“senses which actually exist but which are not materialized in the vocabulary of natural 
languages”.  Following this argument, there must also be a degree of “lexical 
incommensurability” between quasi-primitives in the various languages.  A set of 
semantic primitives is therefore unique to the object language.  “Semantic primitives in 
our perspective are language-specific, unlike universal primitives of human thought 
introduced by Wierzbicka.  In point of fact, in MTT, we should speak of the semantic 
primitives of English, Chinese, Swahili, Totonac, etc.  This does not preclude (near-) 
identity of the sets of semantic primitives for different languages” (Mel’čuk, Semantics: 
From Meaning to Text, to appear).  While forming a list of primitives is a critical task 
for the semantic analysis of a given language, one should be cautious about cross-
linguistic comparison: “a universal (cross-cultural) semantic metalanguage should 
obviously be based on an artificial logical language, the words of which are true 
primitives — the intersecting parts of words which partially translate one another in 
natural languages”.   
The second difference between the NSM and Meaning-Text Theory relates to 
potential disagreement over the of viability of bilingual explications, an issue closely 
connected to the question of whether semantic primitives are truly universal.   If many 
semantic primitives are assumed to be language-specific in some aspects of their 
meaning, then it is difficult to write a scientific explication in a controlled metalanguage 
based on language A of a lexical unit from language B; true definitions can only be 
monolingual.  The NSM school, by contrast, assumes that there is a set of real 
semantically simple linguistic signs in each natural language which reflect universal 
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human concepts which cannot be further decomposed and which are therefore truly 
comparable cross-linguistically.  Following this premise, it does not really matter which 
natural language is the source of the defining metalanguage used in explications, as long 
as that metalanguage is rigorously composed from the “bottom-up”, starting from 
universal semantic primitives.  A Russian or Totonac or Dene word can therefore be 
explicated using an English defining mini-language because it is assumed that the 
component words of its definition correspond equivalents in the source language.   
A third point of divergence concerns the internal structure of the explications.  In 
term of the depth of semantic decomposition, NSM explications are “flater”: more 
semantic components of the keyword are fully decomposed into primitives.  The result 
is very long definitions which are not amenable to practical lexicography.  For instance, 
Mel’čuk et all (1995: 84) cites Wierzbicka’s (1985: 310-311) definition of LEMONS, 
which fills over two pages even though it contains some intermediately complex 
components. ECD definitions, by contrast, are “textured” or hierarchical, containing 
elements of different degrees of semantic complexity.  Following the maximal block 
rule discussed above, the meaning of the keyword is decomposed to the extent needed 
to define it.  If a cluster of semantic components in the definition can be replaced by a 
single and more complex lexical unit that subsumes their meanings, and which is still 
simpler than the meaning of the keyword, then this intermediately complex lexical unit 
must replace the cluster.  In addition to being better adapted to practical lexicography, 
this rule results in a definition that better reveals the semantic relationship between the 
defining components.    
The two schools may not be as unreconcileable as these issues would seem to 
suggest.  Methodologically MTT and NSM they are not mutually exclusive.  Both 
schools are concerned with teasing apart the universal items from the culture-bound and 
specific.  While the NSM primitives are claimed to be undefinable and universal, the list 
is continually revised on the basis of empirical verification of whether these terms are in 
fact culture-based or complex.  While TT definitions must be in the object language to 
be substitutable with the keyword, MTT authors have sought parallels metalanguages. 
While the NSM is claimed to explicate lexemes from different human languages and 
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cultures on an equal basis, authors using the NSM often seek to supplement their 
explications with partial explications in the object language.  
 
3.4.  Other Studies.  There is a fairly large and evolving literature on both MTT 
semantics and the Natural Semantic Metalanguage.  While in previous decades these 
schools began with larger theoretically-oriented volumes, there is more and more 
current work being done on the lexical semantics of individual languages, particularly in 
the NSM school.   
 
3.4.1.  Other ECD-Based Studies.   To date, full ECD dictionaries or databases 
have been compiled for Russian (Mel’čuk & Zholkovsky 1984) and French (Mel’čuk et 
al. 1984-1999). There is also an ECD-based dictionary of collocations for Spanish 
(Diccionario de colocaciones del español, Alonso Ramos 2003, 2004). Mel’čuk & 
Polguère (2007) released the Lexique actif du français, which is a unique ECD-based 
dictionary adapted to a non-specialist audience as a pedagogical tool for teaching 
vocabulary to learners of French (see also Polguère 2007 for a discussion of the tension 
between the ECD formalisms and general public use).   
Polguère (1990) is a PhD dissertation which features an extensive presentation of 
the whole semantic module and the SemR DSyntR transition in MTT.  It treats the 
other components of the semantic representation (i.e. the semantic-communicative and 
pragmatic components) and includes a detailed discussion of semantic paraphrase at the 
lexical and sentential levels.  Milićević (2007) is a book dedicated to paraphrase, 
focusing particularly on sentential semantics.  Mel’čuk et al. (1995) is a cours manual to 
teach Explanatory Combinatorial Lexicography. There are numerous articles and 
conference presentations about specific subtopics in the ECD approach.  Besides a rich 
literature concerning almost all areas of the ECD in Russian, there are articles about 
lexical functions in German (Mel’čuk & Wanner 1996), in Spanish (Barrios 2009, 
Sanromán Villas 2009), and, for French, articles on the definitions in the semantic zone 
(Barque & Polguère 2009), lexical functions (Jousse 2010), polysemy (Barque 2007, 
Venant 2009), and collocations (Augustyn & Tutin 2009).  The ECD approach is 
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currently being adopted by an increasing number of researchers around the world, 
applying it specific questions such as morphological phrasemes in Chinese (Nguyen 
2007), lexical functions in Japanese (Panina 2007), and polysemy of Korean adjectives 
(Lim 2009), as well as specific translation and lexicographic topics in other languages).  
Indigenous languages of the Americas have received relatively little attention from 
researchers applying ECD concepts, but these include studies of lexical functions in 
Huichol (Grimes 2002), morphological phrasemes in Totonac (Beck, Holden & Varela 
n.d.), and communicative structure in Lushootseed (Beck 2009).  There have been 
relatively few large-scale ECD lexicographic studies of American languages or other 
small oral languages, but two self-published dictionaries by Grimes (1981) for Huichol 
and Mackenzie (2006) for Eastern Penan (Malaysia) are exciting debuts.    
 
3.4.2.  Other NSM-Based Studies.  There is a small but growing literature 
about the Natural Semantic Metalanguage.  As an approach designed for cross-linguistic 
lexical semantic comparison, it is frequently applied as “ethnosemantics”, studies of key 
concepts in individual, often lesser-studied languages.  Two major collections of studies 
are Goddard & Wierzbicka (1994) and Harkins & Wierzbicka (2001).  Specific-
language studies may be global surveys of NSM primitives in the object language, as 
has been done in the first collection mentioned above for Ewe (Ameka 1994), Acehnese 
(1994), the Australian languages Kayardild (Evans 1994) and Yankunytjatjara (Goddard 
1994), the Austronesian languages Longgu (Hill 1994) Samoan (Mosel 1994) and 
Kalam (Pawley 1994), as well as for larger official languages such as Russian 
(Gladkova 2008), French (Peeters 1994), Spanish (Travis 2002), Japanese (Onishi 1994, 
Rie 2000), Chinese (Ye 2000), Thai (Diller 1994), Korean  (Lee 2005) and Amharic 
(Amberber 2008).  The NSM has been applied to the indigenous Canadian languages 
Cree (Junker 2004, 2008) and Sm’algyax (Stebbins 2004).  So the cultural and 
typological range to which this approach has been applied has been growing 
exponentially.  As more and more data is integrated, the selection of primitives and the 
definition of specific emotion concepts has been refined. Many studies have been aimed 
at postulating new primitives or questioning or refining the status of current primitives.  
Quite a few NSM studies are  comparisons of the realization of similar semantic content 
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in two more more languages. Until now NSM linguists have focused heavily on the 
semantic field of emotions, as in Jean and Harkins (2001), Wierzbicka (1996, 1999) but 
some of the studies in Wierzbicka (1988) treat artifacts.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
The Semantic  and Syntax Zones  
 
 
 
 
 This chapter describes the semantic and syntatic information specified in the 
lexical entries.  This information corresponds to the semantic and syntax zones in 
Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary (ECD) entries.  However, before launching this 
discussion of the semantics and syntactics of Dene Sųłiné (DS) lexical units, Section 1 
of this chapter provides the reader with some more information about the DS lexicon, 
including what is claimed to be the verb stem, and outlines a typology of phraseologized 
forms which constitute lexical units mentioned later.  Section 2 also includes a 
discussion of the choices that were made to adapt the ECD methodology to this type of 
cross-linguistic study.  It is important to address a few issues of translation, semantic 
equivalency and defining lexical units using a semantic metalanguage based on a 
natural language other than the one under study.   Section 2 also describes the 
motivation for the choice of semantic fields and provides some more information about 
the research methodology.  Once these critical questions have been addressed, the 
chapter proceeds (from Section 3) to the description of the lexical entries themselves.   
 
 
1     THE DENE SŲŁINÉ LEXICON  
 
The reader may recall from Chapter I that Athabaskan verbs have a typologically 
unusual structure and that there are debates in the Athabaskanist literature that have 
consequences for how lexical entries should be described.  While the reader may benefit 
from knowing the Athabaskan literature in greater detail, two topics in particular are 
essential to understanding the current chapter.  The first is the structure of the 
Athabaskan verb stem and its the basic morphological properties.  The second concerns 
the different types of phraseologized forms which occur in Dene and which are claimed 
to have the status of lexical entries.     
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1.1.  Overview of Dene Sųłiné Verb Morphology.  The vast majority of lexical 
units discussed in this work are verb stems, and the verb is the only part of speech with 
extensive morphology.  This section will therefore focus on the elements in the Dene 
verb structure, outlined in Figure III-1, which contains an example of a simple 
intransitive stem, two discontinuous intransitive stems and a discontinuous transitive 
stem.    
 
verbform stem INFL stem INFL stem        gloss 
     CL root  
hejen      ø d yen ‘s/he sings’ 
łegháįdher łeghá   į  dher ‘s/he died’ 
nászé ná   s l zé ‘I hunt’ 
hasonéłtą ha se hone H ł tą ‘s/he taught me’ 
Figure III-1.  A Basic Outline of the Dene Verb. 
 
Dene verbs are almost exclusively prefixing, the final syllable being the verb stem or 
part of the verb stem.  Verbs are inflected for aspect and mood as well as for subject and 
object person and number agreement.  The only values of inflectional categories marked 
as prefixes on the verbs are imperfective and perfective aspects, and the optative mood. 
There are also derivational categories such as secondary aspect, adverbials and 
directionals.   
The verb stem is defined here as the part of the wordform necessary to learn or 
utter to obtain the meaning of the verb, such as ‘to hunt’, ‘to teach’ or ‘to speak’.  For 
example, someone wanting to learn the Dene verb meaning ‘to hunt’ would have to 
learn the stem ná...lzé.  In this work, the “verb stem” is defined as “the part of the 
wordform w that does not include any inflectional affixes which are part of that 
wordform and which express the inflectional values that characterize w as a whole” 
(Mel’čuk 1997a: 72).  The final syllable –– commonly referred to as the “verb root” or 
“verb stem” in the literature –– is often combined with one of three elements known as 
“classifiers” in Athabaskanist literature.  These single-syllable “verb roots” or “root-
classifier” combinations thus constitute the simplest type of verb stem, to which a 
subject agreement/mood/aspect inflectional marker is prefixed.   In addition to simple, 
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monosyllabic stems, there are discontinuous stems, combining the right-side stem 
elements with one or more elements to the left of the aspect/mood subject agreement 
inflection markers.   
This terminology is very different from that used in the Athabaskanist literature.  
For example, Sapir and Hoijer (1967: 85) recognize three three levels of analysis: the 
verb word minus the inflectional affixes is the “verb base”.  The verb base can be 
divided into a “verb theme” and a productive derivation marker. These derivations 
which are part of the verb base but not the verb theme would include productive and 
transparent incorporated postpositions, adverbials, directionals, etc.  The “verb theme”, 
in traditional terms, provides the basic nonderived meaning of the verb such as ‘to hunt’ 
or ‘to speak’.  The “verb theme” can in turn be divided into “thematic prefixes”, a 
classifier and a “verb stem”: “A verb form is analyzed in three steps: (1) the base is 
separated from the inflectional prefixes, (2) the base is divided into its adverbial 
prefixes, if any, and its theme, and (3) the theme is divided into its thematic prefixes, if 
any, and its stem”.  For example, the form yałti ‘s/he speaks’ would traditionally be 
analyzed as comprising the verb theme ya...łti ‘to speak’ plus a zero-marked third 
person affix.   The verb theme ya...łti would then be divided into the thematic prefix ya– 
with the stem/root –ti plus the classifier –ł.  The minimal “verb theme” is a classifier-
root combination, so for most Athabaskanists there is always a contrast between the 
“verb theme” and the “verb root”, which is felt to be somehow more basic.  
There is a lack of a consensus in the literature over whether the “classifiers” are 
part of the verb stem or synchronic grammatical markers, or both.  Sapir and Hoijer 
(1967) and Young and Morgan (1980) consider the classifiers to be part of the stem: 
they do not constitute a morpheme and are not paradigmatic.  For many Athabaskanists, 
it is simply a convenient convention to parse this portion of the stem from the “root” for 
a number of reasons.  The first is the probable historical origin of the classifiers as 
inflection markers (of voice) or as derivational markers (of valence).  This is seen in the 
existence of numerous lexical pairs, such as ‘to use’ and ‘to be used’, where one stem is 
a “passive voice” item and the other “active”.  For example, alternation of the classifiers 
l– and d– is the only diﬀerence  the verb forms k’ólyą ‘he knows it’ and k’óją ‘it is 
known’.  The existence of many such pairs gives the impression that the classifiers are 
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still grammatical morphs.   Cook and Rice (1989: 29) state, “Confusion about the status 
of the classifiers seems to arise from the fact that the classifiers have two distinct 
functions”: they are probably historically derived from valence-changing derivation 
markers, but synchronically the classifiers must usually be learned as part of the stem. 
The above views of the Athabaskan verb incorporate information about language 
change and may well show the relative age of the different elements within the “verb 
theme”.  In some cases the origin of these left-side stem elements is obscure, while in 
other cases they resemble fossilized grammatical prefixes, incorporated adverbs or 
nouns, or fossilized agreement material, which historically gave rise to monomorphemic 
discontinuous stems.   While such an analysis reveals interesting etymologies, this is not 
the approach adopted in this work.  Meaning-Text Theory, with its roots in analytical 
lexicography, takes a boldly synchronically angle on linguistic analysis: a central 
concern is separating what is learned by the speaker as a unit and which forms are freely 
composed by the speaker through an act of linguistic union.  Verb stems, following 
Mel’čuk’s above definition, are considered to be non-decomposable on a semantic level 
–– they are elementary linguistic signs, those whose signifiers and 
signifieds are “not representable as [a combination of] other signs united by a meta-
operation of linguistic union” (Mel’čuk 1993: 64).  In cases where a discontinuous 
string of elements is always necessary to express a meaning, e.g. ha...hone...łtą  for ‘to 
teach’ (PFV), the entire string will be called the “verb stem”.  Where a productive 
derivation marker such as a directional, adverbial or aspectual prefix is added to a verb 
stem that also exists without that prefix, it is called a “derived verb stem”.  In this work, 
the “verb root” is also viewed as simply a stem element without a distinct status from a 
synchronic perspective.  As classifiers and “thematic prefixes” must be learned as part 
of the stem, they are considered here to be simply stem elements with partially visible 
etymologies.  Finally, because in MTT it is considered that only values of inflectional 
categories can be zero-marked, the current analysis assumes the existence of three rather 
than four classifiers (in most Athabaskanist literature, a fourth zero-marked classifier is 
assumed).  Here, verb stems which do include one of the classifier elements l–, d– or ł– 
are considered not to have a classifier element at all.   
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Sorting what is learned as a lexical unit associated with a given meaning from 
those forms which are freely composed by the speaker is particularly relevant to Dene 
verbforms because the language (and the current sample) is full of examples of both 
derived verb stems and morphological phrasemes (see definition in Section 1.2 below), 
whose signifiers but not their signifieds are considered to be representable as a 
combination of units.  Because discontinous stem elements may have the same 
phonological form and may even be historically derived from derivation markers, 
establishing whether a stem is a case of linguistic union or not is critical — if the root-
classifier pair is not an autonomous lexical unit in the modern language and therefore 
cannot act as base for derivation, then it is assumed that the left-side element is a stem 
element rather than a derivation marker. When stem elements are discontinuous they are 
separated by three dots, e.g. ya...łti.   
 
 
1.2.  Phraseology in Dene Sųłiné.  Chapter II provided an overview of 
phraseologized language from an MTT perspective.  There are basically four types of 
phrasemes, as outlined in Mel’čuk’s (2006) typology of idiomatic phrases, and 
described in Section II-3.1.3: pragmatemes, full phrasemes (or idioms), semiphrasemes 
(or collocations) and quasi-phrasemes.  All four of these types seem to be much less 
common in Dene than in European languages.  However, Dene has many morphological 
phrasemes (see Section II-3.1.3), which are the morphological equivalent of a multi-
word phraseme.   
Each type of phraseme mentioned above has distinct semantic properties.  A 
pragmateme is a fixed but semantically transparent phrase that one must use in a given 
situation, whose meanings cannot be selected unrestrictedly by the speaker to express 
this situation.  For example, to state the number of people in a group, in English one 
must say There are [four] of us, while in French the same information must be stated as 
Nous sommes [quatre], lit. “we are [four]”.  Many greetings and speech formulas are 
pragmatemes.  Dene uses the expression sinié, lit. “I am happy”, in some of the 
situations in which one says thank you in English, such as in expressing gratitude to 
someone who has rendered a great service or shared some important knowledge.   
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Full phrasemes, or idioms, are cases in which the meaning of a sequence formally 
composed of the signifiers /AB/ does not actually involve the meanings ‘A’ or ‘B’ at all, 
such as KICK THE BUCKET.  Dene seems to have relatively few of these, examples 
being X Y GA NE...DA {X Y next.to sg.sit} ‘X to marry Y’, lit. “X to sit next to Y’ and 
EŁGA obj.agrX–KÉ {REC:next.to du.sit} ‘to be a (romantic) couple’, ‘to be married’, lit. 
“to sit next to each other”.   This is a full idiom because the idea of ‘to be a couple’ does 
not contain the meanings ‘sit’ or ‘next to’.  Semiphrasemes or collocations are cases 
where the sequence /AB/ denotes the meaning ‘A’ and a second meaning which is not 
‘B’.  These can sometimes be found in Dene, as in the case of many position verbs 
where the difference is linguistic rather than conceptual, as well as a few Oper1 
collocations such as Oper1(łue ‘fish’) = ~ ghą na..dher ‘to sit next to ~’, meaning “to 
fish”.   
Quasi-phrasemes, or quasi-idioms are cases in which the sequence /AB/ conveys 
the meanings ‘A’ and ‘B’ transparently, but other unpredictable meanings are added as 
well.  These are somewhat more numerous, i.e. HHAYE HO..ŁTSI {winter AR...make} 
‘to set winter camp’, lit. “to make [a structure] in winter”; numerous food entities 
similar to FISH AND CHIPS, e.g. ŁUE NATSĮ́S ‘fish made with crumbled dried fish’, 
lit. “crushed fish”.  Among the entries for this study, only semiphrasemes and quasi-
phrasemes occur frequently.  
 
 
 
2     APPLYING MTT SEMANTICS TO DENE SŲŁINÉ 
 
 
Although the major currents of MTT semantics and lexicography, including the 
Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary (ECD) and the Dictionary of Synonyms as well 
as the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) are shared, Section II-3.3.2 mentioned 
some areas of divergence.  This section concentrates on a few of these differences 
which are most relevant to the bilingual nature of this study.  The first difference 
between the NSM and MTT schools concerns the possibility of semantic equivalence 
between an L1 and an L2, an issue also referred to as “lexical incommensurability” in 
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some of the MTT literature.  The related question of the status of bilingual 
lexicographic definitions is a direct consequence of this debate.   
 
2.1.  Problems of Semantic Equivalence in Bilingual Lexicography.  In 
Section II-2.2 it was said that the SemS of a lexical unit must be maximally 
homogeneous, or composed entirely of semantic units from the language and the 
relations between them.  Semantic decomposition can proceed to the level of semantic 
primitives and no further, because the SemS (or the definition) must always be based on 
real semantic units of the language at hand, expressible as other LUs, and the relations 
between them.  These relations, on the other hand, are unordered and cross-
linguistically universal: MTT assumes that the true syntax of definitions is based on 
simple logical relations, and not on the syntax of any natural language or some 
underlying natural language syntax common to all languages (this is in contrast with the 
position of the NSM school on the syntax of the semantic metalanguage, see Goddard 
2002 and Section III-2.2 below).      
Because definitions or semantic structures must comprise real meanings from 
the language, then the content of specific SemSs is language-specific.  “Even when 
languages L1 and L2 have semantemes that are in one-to-one correspondence, say, in 
case of what is known as semantic primitives, for instance, [English] ‘I’ ≡ Fr[ench] 
‘moi’, these semantemes are still the signifieds of different lexemes of two different 
languages. They are by no means identical; the most we can say about them is that they 
stand in one-to-one correspondence” (Mel’čuk, SMT, to appear).  The closest the analyst 
can come to saying that two semantic structures from different languages are equivalent 
is to say that their semantemes and the relations between them stand in a direct relation 
to one another, as the NSM school supposed in the case of semantic primitives.  
Complex configurations of simple meanings do not have such direct correspondences.   
This study assumes the essential viability of decompositional bilingual 
explications on the above premise.  If the notion of lexical incommensurability were 
taken its strongest possible interpretation, then linguists could never compare meanings 
of quasi-equivalent lexical units from different languages.  Translation would be 
impossible, as would cross-linguistic semantics and bilingual lexicography.  However, 
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such comparisons are possible, and many examples are found in the MTT literature, like 
the comparison of CRY with its Russian quasi-equivalent PLAKAT’ mentioned 
previously, from Mel’čuk (2004a).  
By testing words in equivalent contexts, one can control for differences, and 
ultimately make a productive comparison between the SemS or definitions of words 
from different languages.  Drawing on the ample empirical body of word of Wierzbicka, 
Goddard and the other members of the NSM school, we will cautiously assume that 
much is in fact shared between the sets of primitives in each language.  Naturally, the 
list of semantic primitives has to be independently verified in each language, and the 
researcher must ascertain whether they are felt to be equivalent in the same contexts.  
Once the semantically simpler units have been verified to have the same denotational 
range, then the truly ‘untranslateable’ words from another language can be compared.  
In Dene, for example, the emotion verb k’éne...tą2 (‘X Y k’énetą: ‘person X feels very 
sad because X suddenly wants to be in contact with person Y intensely a long time 
after X has lost Y’) has no direct equivalent in English.  It could be rendered in 
colloquial English as ‘to be suddenly overcome with nostalgia for a lost person’.  A 
Dene-language definition or decomposition of this could be:  
 
(12)   X Y ghąnetą       {X Y 3IPFV:love}    
‘X loves Y’ 
         
     Y hule thá hots’į    {Y 3IPFV:be.absent long.time AR:from}  
‘Y has been gone a long time’ 
 
    Et’ahhą X Y henalní  {suddenly X Y 3IPFV:remember} 
    ‘X suddenly remembers Y’ 
 
    X ha dúé        {X for it.is.bad} 
    ‘X feels sad’ 
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The sentences in example (12), taken together, could be uttered in place of k’éne...tą2 
(with pronouns or names in place of the variables X, Y, etc.).  But a fluent Dene speaker 
who uses the appropriate words for concepts would know to use the verb k’éne...tą2 to 
denote the situation.  The lexemes ghąne...tą ‘to love’,  hena...lní  ‘to remember’, and 
so forth, must in turn be independently verified as being equivalent to the English  
semantemes ‘love’, ‘remember’, and so forth.  In this case, ghąne...tą11 ‘to love’ is 
restricted to situations where Y is a living being rather than an inanimate object, as in “I 
love ice cream” or other contexts of the English ‘love’.  Once this sort of information 
has been verified, one can construct a SemS of the Dene keyword using English 
semantemes that stand in a one-to-one correspondence with their Dene equivalents:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The English-language SemS and definitions are to be read as translations of the Dene 
ones that could, in principle, be constructed in their place.  
Concerning the depth of semantic decomposition, this study rigorously follows the 
ECD approach in applying the maximal block rule (see Section II-3.1).  Because the 
keywords are in Dene and their explications are in English, maximal block should be 
                                                
11 Interestingly, the lexemes ghąne...tą and k’éne...ta ̨1 share the stem element –ta ̨, which would be 
referred to as the “verb root” in the Athabaskanist literature.  This suggests an etymological, as well as a 
semantic, relation between the two verb stems.   
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1 
 ‘feel.sad’ 
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1 
1 2 
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                                                                                                                                      108 
understood in the following way: English words used in the explications are formed in a 
bottom-up fashion, based on the standard English-language set of semantic primitives as 
specified by the NSM school.  The Dene-language NSM primitives correspond closely 
to this English set (with some exceptions, which are noted).  Any English words used in 
the definition which are not primitives are themselves explicated in the introduction to 
each synonym series or set of entries.    
 
2.2.  Semantic Primitives in Dene Sųłiné.  Naturally, assuming crosslinguistic 
translation in this study hinges on verifying existence and equivalence of the NSM 
semantic primitives in Dene.  In some cases, this is not so obvious.  This section will 
therefore concentrate on those semantic primitives which are difficult or impossible to 
render in Dene.  The NSM list contains some primitives whose meanings are too simple 
to be verbalized as one lexical unit in Dene, which instead has several quasi-equivalent 
terms.   These problems of quasi-complexity and equivalency between primitives 
especially concerns a handful of semantic primitives, specifically those denoting mental 
predicates: FEEL, WANT, and THINK.  There are also several other NSM semantic 
primitives that have no equivalent at all in Dene Sųłiné  and which may therefore need 
to be removed from the canonical list or replaced with other semantic primitives. Table 
III-I shows a list of Dene equivalents of the most recent version of the NSM primitives 
(Goddard 2007).  Six primitives do not seem to have easy translations in Dene: BAD, 
MOMENT, FEEL, KIND, PART and CAN.  In addition, NEAR and SMALL are infrequent.   
To understand why BAD, NEAR and SMALL are absent or rare, we must review the 
Meaning-Text treatment of antonymy (see Mel’čuk 1995: 451-452).  Antonymy is 
usually described as a single paradigmatic relation between words with “opposite” 
meanings, but in MTT antonymy subsumes four specific types of semantic differences: 
negative oppositions (open/close); more/less oppositions (near/far); positive/negative 
oppositions (beautiful/ugly) and deictic opposition (e.g. north/south).  The first type of 
antonymy is equivalent to adding ‘not’ to one of the components.  For the pair 
open/close [a container], close means ‘cause that the edges of the cover for an opening 
and the edges of the opening are in contact’, while open must involve a negation of part 
of this meaning, i.e. ‘cause that the edges of a cover for an opening and the opening are 
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not in contact’.  The two meanings are asymmetrical in that the meaning of open 
contains            
 
Substantives si (PRO) ‘I’, nen (PRO) ‘you (SG)’, ełta (PRO) ‘someone’, dene (N) 
‘person’/‘people’, ɂasí (N) ‘something’/ ‘thing’, ––zi ́ (N) ‘body’ 
Relational substantives *’kind’, *’part’ 
Determiners diri (PRO) ‘this’ / ‘these’, ełe...lt’e (VI) ‘to be same as each other’ -nasi ́ (PP) 
‘other.than’ 
Quantifiers įłághe ‘one’, náke ‘two’ (NUMERALS), nahi (PRO) náni ̨ (PRO) ‘some’, horely 
(QUANT) ‘all’, łą (VI) ‘much’/‘many’ 
Evaluators ne...zǫ (VI) ‘to be good’, *bad 
Descriptors ne...chá́ (VI) ‘to be big’, tsélé (ADJ)  ‘small’ 
Mental predicates ne...dhen (VI) ‘to think’, k’áho...lyą (VT) ‘to know (it)’, horé...lɂį (VT) ‘to want 
(it)’, * ‘feel’, -ɂį (VT) ‘to see (it)’, de...tth’agh (VT) ‘to hear (it)’ 
Speech he...ni (VI) (to say), yati (N) ‘word(s)’, at’óho...di  (VI) ‘be true’ 
Actions, events, 
movement, contact 
-łtsi (VT) ‘to do’, nóre...tth’i (VI) ‘to happen’, naghe...da (VI) ‘to move’, here...lni 
(VT) ‘to touch’ 
Life and Death ghe...na (VI) ‘to live’, łegháne...dhi (VI) ‘to die’ 
Location, existence, 
possession, specification 
na...dher (VI) ‘sg is present’, [classificatory verbs] ‘be (somewhere)’, hu ̨lį 
‘there.is (thing)’, ts’į ̨  (PP) ‘of’ = ‘have’, a..t’į  (VI) ‘to be (person)’, a..t’e  ‘to be 
(thing)’ 
Time t’ahú/ú (CONJ) ‘when’, dųhų (ADV) ‘now’, ts’én tth’ú (PP) ‘before’, tł’ (PP) ‘after’ 
thá (ADV) ‘a long time’, hotsélé (ADV)  ’a short time’, *‘moment’ 
Space t’ahok’é (PRO) ‘where’, ją (PRO) ‘here’, hodá (PP) ‘above’, yághe2 ‘below’,   
–dhá (VI) ‘to be far’, –łdúé (VI) ‘to be near’, ga (PP) ‘beside’, yághe3 (PP) ‘inside’ 
“Logical” concepts íle (CLITIC) ‘not’, húto (PART) ‘maybe’, *‘can’, ɂá (PP) ‘because’, dé (CONJ) ‘if’ 
Intensifier, augmentor hotíé /hųtł’édhé (ADV) ‘very’, ɂzé (PP) ‘more.than’ 
Similarity k’ézį (PP) ‘like’  
ADV = adverb 
CONJ = conjunction 
N = noun 
PART = particle 
PP = postposition 
 
PRO = pronoun 
QUANT = quantifier 
 
VI = intransitive verb 
VT = transitive verb 
Table III-I.  A Dene Sųłiné Version of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage 
 
within it the entire idea of close, but not the reverse, and open has the added component 
‘not’.  For this reason the negated antonym is semantically more complex than the non-
negated member (see discussion in Mel’čuk 1995: 451-453).  The same stands for the 
pairs lock/unlock, cover/uncover, hide/reveal, etc.  Depending on the scope of the 
negation, a word can be in an antonymic relation with multiple words.  There is no 
English word meaning ‘not cause to exist’, but there is one meaning ‘cause not to exist’ 
(destroy).  If both existed in the language they would be distinct antonyms of create.  A 
subset of this antonymy by negation involves binary parameters, those with only two 
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possible values, whereby negation of the main component produces the other logical 
possibility, as for the pairs blind/sighted and asleep/awake, where asleep means ‘in a 
state of not perceiving’.  The negated value is semantically more complex and can be 
further decomposed in a way that would be circular if applied to the affirmative value. 
 More/less oppositions involve gradient parameters where there is some sort of 
“middle ground” between the two antonymic values.  For example hot and cold are 
antonyms at either extreme of the scale of temperature, but there is also a middle value, 
lukewarm, that is neither hot nor cold.  This type of antonym “should by no means be 
misinterpreted as negation.  The semantic element ‘Anti’ is equivalent rather to the 
mathematical minus: cf. the difference between ‘-2’ and ‘not 2’” (Mel’čuk 1995: 451).  
Values like hot and big effectively mean ‘having a greater temperature’ or ‘having a 
greater size’ than the standard example of something.  So we can speak of a “huge 
bumblebee” or the “warmer ice at Europa’s core and the colder ice of its outer crust” — 
these examples are characterized relative to the average traits of the object described 
rather than in absolute terms.  Other examples of this type of antonymy are heavy/light, 
tall/short, and big/small. Wierzbicka (1996: 54) agrees that, for this type of antonymy 
the ‘more’ value is semantically simpler than the ‘less’ value, i.e. the meaning of heavy 
is more basic than that of light, etc.  Similarly, for gradient parameters of subjective 
value such as good/bad and beautiful/ugly, the positive extreme is semantically simpler 
than the negative extreme.  The final type of antonymy involves deictic oppositions 
such as north/south and left/right, which are based on contrast with each other and for 
which neither value is semantically more complex than the other.  This framework for 
antonymy would suggest that the ‘less’ and ‘bad’ members of the pairs may not be true 
semantic primitives.  
 The Dene language reflects this asymmetry by frequently expressing antonymy 
with the negation marker.  This is true of the first type of antonymy but also of the 
second and third types, degree and value oppositions: 
 
(13)  nárédhá    {3IPFV:be.high}       ‘it is high (off the ground)’  
nárédhá íle {3IPFV:be.high NEG}     ‘it is low (off the ground)’  
    diłt      {3IPFV:be.expensive}    ‘it is expensive’  
diłt íle   {3IPFV:be.expensive NEG}  ‘it is cheap’    
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The negation marker is polysemous for antonyms: it can be interpreted as indicating the 
middle or neutral value of a gradient parameter or the less/negative extreme.  Thus,  
diłt íle can be interpreted as a simple negation of the positive extreme, i.e. ‘it’s not 
expensive’ in response to the question “Is it expensive?”, or as the opposite extreme, 
“it’s (particularly) cheap”.  This is shown by the the fact that “very, very cheap” is 
expressed by adding an intensifier to diłtį́ íle:, hotíe diłtį́ íle sį  {really 
3IPFV:be.expensive NEG EMPH} ‘it’s very cheap’ i.e. literally “it is really really not 
expensive”.   
 The current NSM primitive set contains four  sets of antonyms: FAR/NEAR, 
GOOD/BAD, BIG/SMALL, and LONG TIME/SHORT TIME.  In Dene all of the primitives 
denoting the negative/less values are rare or absent, and would be expressed most 
frequently by negation:  
 
(14)   nidhá íle   {3IPFV:be.far NEG}   ‘it is close’   
nezǫ íle    {3IPFV:be.good NEG } ‘it is bad’  
     nechá íle   {3IPFV:be.big NEG}  ‘it is small’ 
thá íle     {long.time NEG}    ‘a short time’ 
 
Dene does, however, have lexical equivalents for NEAR, SMALL, and SHORT TIME, which 
do not occur in the corpus but can be elicited. Although antonym pairs are usually 
required to be members of the same lexical class, SMALL is only available as an 
adjective rather than a verb.   
  
(15)   niłdúé     {3IPFV:be.far NEG}   ‘it is close’   
     tsélé      {small:ADJ}       ‘small’  
     hotsélé     {AR:small:ADJ}     ‘for a short time’  
 
As was seen above, the less/negative values are not in fact semantic primitives but are 
semantically complex and can be explicated in term of the more/positive values. 
 The other “missing” primitives are MOMENT, CAN, FEEL, KIND, and PART.  There 
are two senses of the noun MOMENT in English, one meaning ‘short duration of time’ 
and one meaning ‘point in time’; some of the canonical contexts seem to be ambiguous 
between the uses.  Below are some canonical contexts of MOMENT and how they would 
be rendered in Dene.  There is no noun or other word referring to a ‘point in time’ as an 
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entity in Dene; one can simply specify the adverbial sense of ‘for a moment’ or 
‘precisely now’: 
 
 English Dene literal translation 
(16) for a moment he [V]-ed hotsélé [V] AR:small:ADJ V 
 at this moment dųhų dedané  now right.away 
 at the same moment [V] hotíe ełá [V] really together [V] 
Goddard and Wierzbicka (2002: 74-75) defend CAN as a semantic primitive, citing the 
following canonical contexts for it, among others:  
 
(17)  This person can/can’t do it        Something bad can happen to me 
I can’t move                You can’t do things like this 
I can/can’t think about this right now  I can’t see it 
 
Of course this list blends incompatible deontic and epistemic senses of ‘can’, which are 
expressed by the lexical units belonging to the same vocable CAN in English.  
Anticipating criticism, they admit that “linguists tend to resist the suggestion that CAN is 
a semantic prime.  Don’t we know that there are various “kinds” of CAN: for example, 
the “can of ability” vs. the “can of possibility”?  In our view, these designations are 
really classifying different ways in which CAN can be used, not identifying distinct 
meanings of CAN.   In fact, one of the hallmarks of CAN is its vagueness”.  They insist 
that “in language after language a modal element is reported which is vague in this way, 
just like English can”. I will have to join the “linguists” in rejecting CAN as a primitive, 
as it has no equivalent in Dene, or perhaps many other languages. The English CAN is a 
vocable whose first lexeme CAN1 is the deontic sense, indicating permission to do 
something, as in French citizens can study in Quebec without paying foreign tuition, or 
Children can’t drive.  CAN2, the epistemic sense, expressing possibility, as in It can 
sometimes snow in April or deduction as in That can’t be James at the door — he’s in 
Florida.  Both interpretations are not possible for many contexts, making the English 
CAN polysemous rather than vague.  CAN therefore cannot be included in a list of Dene 
semantic primitives.  In Dene, not only is no word subsuming both senses CAN1 and 
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CAN2, there is no specific lexical unit to express even one of the senses.  Below are 
Dene renderings of both senses of the English CAN.   
 
    Deontic:    
 
(18)  Sekwi beschené k’élni ha hoɂą íle  
{children vehicle 3IPFV:drive FUT it.must NEG} 
‘Children can’t drive’ , lit. “It must not be that children drive”  
 
Nets’én phone asłe ha asųt’e íle ú?  
{2SG:to phone 1IPFV:do FUT 3IPFV:have.problem NEG Q} 
‘Can I call you?’, lit. “Is it not a problem if I call you?” 
 
Epistemic:    
(19)  Tųlú k’é hojéré íle, Edmonton nassa ha dúé íle 
    {road on AR:dirty NEG I1IPFV:sg.go FUT impossible NEG} 
    ‘The road isn't bad, I can go to Edmonton’, lit. “it's not impossible to...” 
 
The positive deontic CAN is expressed by the negation of aso...t’e ‘there is a problem’, 
so an English sentence like I can come to work at nine o’clock if I want to would be 
rendered literally as “there is no problem if I come to work at nine o’clock”.  A CAN 
indicating ability due to knowledge would be expressed with k’ó...lyą ‘to know (how 
to)’ as in dení dhéth hestsi k’óshą  {moose hide:PO 1IPFV:make 1IPFV:know} ‘I know 
how to make moose hide’.  The epistemic CAN is expressed ha dúé íle, the negation of 
the phraseme ha dúé meaning ‘impossible’, as in (19).  Each of these senses denotes the 
absence of an obstacle, be it the result of social, physical or experiential lmitations.  All 
of this indicates that CAN is both culturally specific and semantically complex, 
indicating ‘absence of an obstacle’ or ‘removal of an obstacle’, and that, if anything, 
CAN’T would be a better candidate as a semantic primitive.     
  Another traditional NSM primitive is FEEL in its sense ‘to experience an 
emotional state’.  The English verb feel has direct equivalents (It. sentirsi, Fr. se sentir, 
etc.) in other European languages.  Many non-European languages express the concept 
of FEEL as a distinct sense of a noun that also denotes the locus of emotion, such as 
‘heart’, ‘liver’, ‘guts’, etc.  Wierzbicka (1999: 277) cites Lutz’s (1987, 1988) studies of 
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emotion words in the Ifaluk language of Polynesia, which represents feelings as a 
distinct sense of the word niferash, meaning ‘our insides’.  These body part terms for 
emotions are not metaphorical extensions in the synchronic language in that one can 
have a whole conversation about emotions in an abstract way without referencing the 
literal body parts.  To ask an Ifaluk speaker how he or she feels, one would ask literally 
‘how are your insides?’, to which the response might be ‘my insides are good/bad’.  
What is common to all of these lexical items, feel, sentirsi, niferash, etc., is that they are 
semantic predicates with two obligatory participants.  They link the experiencer with the 
lexeme denoting the emotional state, often a noun or an adjective, i.e. I ⇐ feel ⇒ 
happy, je ⇐ me sens ⇒ triste or in Ifaluk “my ⇐ insides ⇒ are.good”.  In each 
language, the word meaning FEEL is essentially a support verb.  Such a word is 
unnecessary in Dene, as most individual emotions are expressed by intransitive verbs, 
as those in (20).   
 
(20)   estenesthen               henęli ̨  
estene–s–dhen            hene–N–li ̨ 
     feel.sad–1.IPFV–feel.sad (IPFV)   feel.happy–3.IPFV–feel.happy 
     ‘I feel sad’              ‘he is happy’ 
 
Dene has a large repertoire of verbs and phrasemes denoting many specific emotions, 
but apparently no abstract word equivalent to ‘emotion’, ‘feel’ or ‘feeling’ in English.  
To ask someone ‘how do you feel?’ in Dene, one must ask simply edlánet’e?, or how 
are you?, to which the response must indicate a specific emotion verb, such as those in 
(20).  Similarly, to say something like ‘I feel mixed emotions’ (about a life change, 
moving, etc.) or ‘I feel different emotions’, one must list specific emotions, as in (21).  
 
(21)   ją   sinié     kúlú   nastheri,      kúlú  sįní        natser       íle 
     here 1:be.happy EMPH  1IPFV:live:REL but12  1PO:mind  3IPFV:be.strong NEG 
‘I am happy to be living here (in this new place) but I am sad’, i.e. “I feel 
diﬀerent emotions about moving here”  
 
                                                
12 Kúlú is the signifier for two unrelated lexemes, a conjunction and a particle; all homophones or 
lexemes in a polysemy chain are always glossed according to the sense at hand. 
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Observing the idiom sįní natser íle, lit. “my mind is weak”, meaning ‘I feel sad’, one 
might be inclined to think that sįní, lit. “my mind”, in is in fact specific sense denoting 
feel, much as “our insides” was in Ifaluk.  There are quite a few idioms in Dene in 
which the mind or the heart are represented as the locus of an emotion.  However, 
unlike in Ifaluk these are all fixed phrasemes in Dene; one cannot speak or ask about 
“the mind” in an abstract way, as in (22).  
 
 
 
(22)  *edlt’ú   nįní     /   *nedzíé  
      how   2PO:mind       2PO:heart 
*‘how is your mind’ / *‘...your heart’?  
  
To ask what someone’s emotions are, one must used the fixed pragmateme 
edlánet’e? ‘how are you?’, or guess at a series of specific emotions, i.e. ninié ú? na 
dúé ú? ‘are you happy?  are you sad?’.  When asked about a word for feel or emotion, 
one speaker said matter-of-factly “some words we don’t have in Dene”, meaning they 
express rich emotion talk without recourse to a word equivalent to emotion or feel in 
English. 
 Also apparently “missing” in Dene is a lexical equivalent of KIND, as in ‘type of 
[entity, situation]’.  This is another “semantically light” primitive which is used to 
establish a taxonomy of items in a language.  One does not find any lexical unit 
equivalent to KIND in contexts similar to its canonical contexts, as shown in the various 
Dene translation of the English sentences with kind:        
 
(23)    ełk’éch’á  jíe             edlt’į  jíe     ɂonįyą   ú 
different  berries           what   berries  2PFV:pick Q 
‘different kinds of berries’13     ‘What kind of berries did you pick?’   
 
                                                
13 Dene nouns are not inflected for number, and will be glossed in English as singular or plural according 
to the context.  
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(24)    tsótsie įyeze  ąt’e          náke jíe   ghą  shéghesti  
robins  birds  3IPFV:be        two  berries of   1PFV:sg.eat 
‘robins are a kind of bird’      ‘I ate two kinds of berries’ 
 
(25)   t’ąt’i     ɂasí  tsádhéth 
REL:what  REL  fur 
‘any kind of fur’ 
 
Dene has a number of other options for referring to “kinds” of things.  One sense of the 
Dene word is its adverb meaning ‘like this’, and another is its use as a demonstrative 
pronoun meaning ‘this kind’ or ‘this type’.  It is used in virtually all of the situations in 
which one would use this kind in English, as shown in examples (26)-(28). 
 
(26) Kú  kųt’i   power   ɂá    hedi,   dódí      nį.    
    but  like.this        with without  there.was.none  PAST  
    ‘But not this kind of power [electricity], that didn’t exist’  
 
(27)  kųt’į    yú    thela   
   like.this   cloth  3IPFV:pl.lie 
  ‘there were [pieces of] this kind of cloth’  
 
(28)  Kųt’į    ké  tth’i  dáłtsi    dųt’ú.  
    like.this   shoes also  DIST:3IPFV:make  like.that  
 ‘This kind of mocassin they would make like that, too’  
 
Another way of indicating “this kind” or “the kind” is to use a relative pronoun 
construction with a verb meaning ‘to be’ or another existential verb, so “the kind of 
forest” or “this kind of land” would be expressed as “the forest that it is”, or “how the 
land sits”, as in example (29):   
 
(29) Dechen t’a    hųt’e        nį      eyer   ɂasí  neba  nila       helesį  
 forest   REL  AR:3IPFV:be PAST  there  thing 2:for 1PFV:bring.pl 3OB:1IPFV:say 
 
 dé  eyi  gháré       yułɂá       hoha. 
 if that by.means.of    3D:3IPFV:recognize AR:for   
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‘He’ll recognize what kind of bush it was if I bring back  something [from 
there] for him’ 
 
A similar relative pronoun-existential verb construction is equivalent to any kind, i.e. 
any kind of fur would be rendered “whatever fur it is” or “whatever fur it might be”, 
as in (30)-(31).   
 
(30) Tsádhéth  náni  thełtsi  dé   nánik’é Hudson Bay  náyełni      hoyį,  
 fur  sale  3PFV:make when store         3D:3IPFV:sell  REP 
 
 t’ąt’i   ɂasí  tsádhéth,  eyi   ɂá       tsąba.    
         REL:what   REL fur      that   with  money 
   ‘After they trapped fur Hudson Bay would buy them, any kind of fur’ 
 
 
(31) Nak’e    egané     híltsi    ú   t’a   ber   wali    sí  
  sometimes  dried.meat  1PL.IPFV:make and  REL   meat PROB   REL  
  ‘Sometimes we would make dried meat with any kind of meat’ 
 
The Dene constructions resemble those of colloquial English, in which kind can also 
easily be omitted, as in What birds did you see?; Hundreds of birds are native to 
this province; You can put diﬀerent meats in it; Whatever paint you want to use; 
Any paint will do just fine, etc.  As a whole, it does not seem that KIND is a 
universal human concept or that it even needs to be expressed lexically.  
 The final NSM primitive which does not have an easy Dene translation is PART.  
The word part indicates a particular relation between two things, i.e. The prologue 
was a part of Renaissance plays or Vermont is part of the United States.  In Dene 
this is not rendered by a single lexeme denoting the relation.  When the English 
word part is used to indicate ‘a portion’ of something, a quantity adverb meaning ‘a 
little’ is used in Dene: 
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 (32)  eyi  honi  yaaze   na   hosni       ha  
that story a.little   2.for 1IPFV:tell.story FUT 
‘I’ll tell you part of that story’  
 
In sentences that are translated into English with the word part indicating the 
relation, i.e. body parts or parts of a car, the postposition ts’į ‘of’, which also indicates 
possession or origin, is used.  Parts of a moose would be rendered as deníe bets’į 
ɂasí, literally “things from a moose”, as in the following narrative about cutting out 
the diﬀerent parts of a moose after a hunt:  
 
(34)  Kú  eyi    deníe   bets’į  ɂasí   horely  hílchú    ųt’e  la 
so    that  moose 3:of  things all      3IPFV:take ASSERT 
 
betthí       tth’i  hílchú,       betthú       ú,    bets       ú,  benághé  
      3PO:head  also  3IPFV:take  3PO:tongue  and  3PO:nose   and 3PO:eyes 
 
ú   bedzághé  ú   eyi  horely  beghą   
and  3PO:ears  and that all    3:of  
 
shéts’élyi     nį   ųt’e la.   Bets’į    ɂasí    ɂóghedi             íle. 
      DS:3IPFV:pl.eat  PAST ASSERT   3:from    thing  3IPFV:throw.away   NEG 
‘‘Every part of the moose is taken.  The head is taken as well, and its tongue, 
its nose, its eyes, its ears.  People would eat all that.  No part is wasted’   
 
The inherently possessed nominal –ts is attested in one text, in the form łue ts 
translated as “fish pieces”.  However, it descibes a small leftover fish parts boiled for 
broth or grease, and –ts seems to be etymologically related to łue natss ‘shredded 
fish’, so łue ts probably means something close to ‘little fish bits’ rather than ‘parts’.  
In a few situations Dene speakers are forced to translate English phrases with parts.  For 
example, in the Dene-language curriculum at Dillon’s secondary school, the lesson on 
“body parts” was dubbed sezí in Dene, meaning ‘my body’.  All of this indicates that 
part is not a Dene concept and that Dene people have a variety of ways to indicate part-
whole relations without recourse to a particular lexical item denoting it. 
119  
 In this study, we will exclude from the SemS and definitions all those 
semantemes which do not have more or less direct equivalents in Dene.  This includes 
CAN (at least as a primitive), PART and KIND.  The primitives FEEL and MOVE, however, 
can be included in the Dene definitions.  Although FEEL and MOVE are not verbalizable 
as generic LUs in Dene, they are uncontestably part of the meaning of feeling and 
movement verbs in general.  While it is likely that Dene does not conceive of ‘parts’ or 
‘kinds’ as entities or unitary concepts, it is impossible that they do not conceive of 
movement or of feelings.   Any other semantemes in the definitions or SemS which are 
not semantic primitives must be explicated.  For example, ‘sad’ and ‘entity’ are 
complex, so in their definitions their meanings must be explicated in using terms that 
have a close correspondence with existing Dene semantemes.  A word like ‘sad’ may 
not have one direct equivalent in Dene.  ‘Sad’ expresses a configuration of meanings 
and/or a cultural script which may differ slightly from its quasi-equivalents in other 
languages.  One can start with the assumption that ‘sad’ refers to a configuration of 
simpler meanings such as ‘X can’t change a bad situation’; ‘because of this, X feels 
something bad’.  Unlike ‘angry’, ‘sad’ feeling do not drive the experiencer to actively 
revolt against the negative situation.  As the English word sad refers to all of these 
meanings at once, whenever it appears in the lexicographic definition of a Dene verb, 
the same components must be claimed to be expressed by the Dene keyword, even if 
they cannot be expressed in isolation from other language-specific meanings.   The 
same can be said of the English word entity, even if there is no lexical unit meaning 
‘entity’ in Dene: in a Dene-language definition, one would be forced to choose between 
specifying ‘things’ (ɂasí), ‘wildlife’ (tįch’ánádé), ‘people’ (dene), etc.  In Dene all of 
these things can be listed separately, but the English term ‘entity’ is just a convenient 
category which refers to all of them.  So the reader should keep in mind that complex 
English words are merely convenient shorthand ways of referring to clusters of ideas 
whose existence in Dene has to be empirically verified. 
Certainly, one can never be entirely free of the danger of imposing the meanings of 
own meanings on another language one is sudying, and this risk is only increased when 
comparing word meanings between two languages as historically and culturally 
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removed from each other as Dene and English.  Still, if we exercise the proper caution, 
we will certainly benefit from the comparison between these two lexica.   
 
2.3.  The Structure of the Entries.  Overall, this project follows the lexicographic 
approach common to the ECD and to Apresjan’s Dictionary of Synonyms (DS), while 
also incorporating some methodological elements from the NSM school.  Although 
entries in the ECDs and in the Dictionary of Synonyms share a basic tripartite format, 
with semantic, syntactic and lexical combinatory levels of description, there are some 
important differences.  As was mentioned in Chapter II, Apresjan’s DS has six main 
zones: the Zone of Meaning, the Form Zone, the Syntax Zone, the Co-occurrence Zone, 
the Illustrative and Auxiliary Zones.  A fine-grained comparison of the semantic traits 
of the quasi-synonyms is possible, but lexical functions are less of a focus in the 
Dictionary of Synonyms than in the ECD.  Keywords do not correspond to vocables but 
to whole series, groups of lexical units which are quasi-synonymous.  The words 
included in the series do not receive exhaustive treatment as vocables — any senses not 
synonymous with the series are excluded. ECDs, by contrast, have a “flat” structure, 
with each entry dedicated to one vocable (but all of the lexemes in that vocable).  The 
selection of entries is not based on particular semantic considerations.  ECD entries 
usually have a Semantic Zone, a section for the Government Pattern, and a 
Combinatorial Zone, which includes lexical functions and phraseology. 
 The entries elaborated for the current project have a hybrid structure between the 
ECD-type entries and those of the Dictionary of Synonyms .  The overall goal is to 
describe a selection of lexical units covering several major semantic fields in Dene.  
Consequently, more emphasis is placed on analyzing the means Dene has for describing 
a given concept rather than on describing multiple senses of a vocable. Where possible, 
entries are dedicated to an entire synonym series rather than to single lexemes or 
vocables.  However, because this project involves analyzing words from a language 
very different structurally and culturally from English, there is a risk of imposing 
English conceptual categories on Dene when grouping lexical items together into series, 
especially those series for which there is no lexical primitive in Dene.  It is important to 
begin the entry for a lexical item or for a synonym series with a fairly detailed 
introduction, whose goal is to justify the comparison of the keyword(s) and their 
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translations in English in terms of primitive concepts. For example, since anger is an 
English representation of an English conceptual category, one must justify grouping 
together some Dene lexical items into a group denoting ‘anger’.  The introduction for an 
“anger” series therefore must justify that Dene “anger” words have a similar conceptual 
basis and indicate a similar physiological and social process as those denoted by the 
English anger.  After this introduction, the microstructure for synonym series entries is 
slightly simplified with respect to the Dictionary of Synonyms: entries for each series 
contain a Semantic Zone, with the heading, the dominant, a list of definitions and the 
parameters by which the quasi-synonyms differ, a comparison of their definitions, and a 
mention of pragmatic and extralinguistic conditions on their use, if applicable, followed 
by any other notes; a Grammatical Zone (essentially the Government Pattern); and a 
Co-occurrence Zone, which lists paradigmatic and syntagmatic lexical functions and 
idioms in which one of the keywords participates.  Unlike in the Dictionary of 
Synonyms , examples are shown throughout the entry rather than in their own section. 
Some lexemes from a semantic field have no quasi-synomyms and so are described in 
stand-alone, ECD-type entries, which include a Semantic Zone (Heading, Definition, 
Pragmatic or Extralinguistic Notes), a Government Pattern Zone, and a Co-occurrence 
Zone, also listing lexical functions and idioms.  For all entries, the Semantic and Syntax 
(Government Pattern) Zones will be discussed in Chapter 3 below.  For reasons of space 
and ease of consultation, the Co-occurrence Zone of the entries will be illustrated 
separately in Chapter 4, preserving the same order of exposition of the semantic fields 
and series.   
 Goddard and Wierzbicka diverge from the Meaning-Text lexicography on 
another point, the syntax of the language of explications.  While neither approach treats 
the metalanguage syntax as a meaningless means of linking the primitives, they differ as 
to its importance and ideal form.  The Moscow Semantic school assumes that the syntax 
of the definitions should be based on an “artificial logical language”, as noted above.  In 
the NSM approach, by contrast, suggests that the syntax of the semantic primitives is 
revealing of an underlying common configuration of human concepts.   
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2.4.  Semantic Fields Selected.  What is considered nameworthy in a language is 
at least partly contingent on the culture, historical experience, beliefs and interests of its 
speakers.  As Apresjan (2000: 103-4) describes it: 
 
Each natural language reflects a specific way of perceiving and organizing (i.e. 
conceptualizing) the world about us.  The meanings expressed in natural language form a 
unified system of views, a kind of collective philosophy which becomes obligatory for all 
speakers of that language... This way of conceptualizing reality (the world-view) inherent 
in a given language is partly universal and partly national-specific, such that speakers of 
different languages may view the world in slightly different ways, through the prism of 
their languages.   
 
Therefore: 
The primary task of systematic lexicography is to reflect the naive worldview which a 
given language embodies–its naive geometry, physics, ethics, psychology, and so forth.  
The naive pictures of each of these areas are not chaotic but form definite systems and 
should therefore receive a homogeneous description in a dictionary. 
 
By “naïve” one does not mean unsophisticated or uninformed of scientific realities.   
Language as a communitarian creation reflects the cumulative historical interests as 
well as past interests and beliefs and may eventually become archaic.  Language may 
act as a museum that reflects folk characterizations and taxonomies.  Following 
Apresjan, our goal is to reflect a general, total ‘picture of man’ and the world as 
reflected in lexical data. For Russian Apresjan (2000: 107) identifies several of the 
“main systems which make up a human being: the organs which house them, produce 
certain states, and perform certain functions and the semantic primitives which 
correspond to these systems, organs, states or functions”.  These main human systems 
include physical perception, physiological states, thought and speech, which are all 
central enough in human communication to merit a particularly rich and subtle 
repertoire of vocabulary, such as important to people, which concern their inner reality 
and reaction to external forces and events.  The systems are interrelated, at least 
linguistically: verbs of physical perception may be extended to refer to purely mental 
activity: I see what you are trying to say, I smell a hidden agenda, and physiological 
reactions are part of and even stand for the expression of emotion meanings: I shiver / 
turn white with fear, etc.  
 In trying to describe the “main lexical systems” of a language like Dene, which is 
culturally distant and historically unrelated to English, we cannot benefit from the same 
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insider’s perspective that Apresjan had for Russian.  Still, we can identify several 
“human systems” that are important enough to merit a particularly rich vocabulary.  To 
these are added a few, such as topographical features, which are encoded in a very 
different way with respect to English.  The “main systems” described for this study are: 
feelings (emotions and desires), character (generous, kind, nosy), physical description 
(red, tall, prickly), motion (swim, trot, jump), physical posture or position (lie, sit), 
topographical features (cliff, grove), and time/atmospheric conditions (dusk, snow, 
thunder).  Several other systems such as perception and physiological reactions 
(tremble, smile) can be partially observed as well in a thorough description of those 
seven core semantic fields.   It is important to note that we are using “semantic fields” 
here not in its technical sense of ‘series of lexical units that share a semantic bridge’ but 
by its informal definition of lexical units related to a certain topic, synonymous with 
“human systems” described above.  By examining words from each of these fields we 
will attempt, as best we can given the limitations of time, space and cultural knowledge, 
to illustrate a Dene view of these systems, be it close to the English one or quite distinct 
from it.   
 
2.5.  Methodology.  The data were nearly all collected during the author’s stay in 
Dillon between August and December, 2008.  In some cases, clarifications or other data 
were obtained from speakers by phone between December 2008 and the time of writing.  
Most of the data come from five speakers, 3 female and 2 male.  All were born in Dillon 
except the oldest speaker who was born near La Loche.  All are aged between 72 and 
84, except one speaker who is in her early 50s.  All speakers use Dene as their main 
daily language but are completely fluent in English as well, except for the oldest 
speaker who is monolingual.  Data were confirmed with at least two speakers, and three 
in the majority of cases.   
The MTT lexicographic methodology is elicitation-based.  It relies on speaker’s 
intuitions to estimate and express the extent to which a Dene word is the translation 
equivalent of an English word.  Normally the author presented  a series of contexts in 
which the English quasi-equivalent could be used, and then tried its various quasi-
equivalents in Dene in the same contexts.  In addition, the speakers were asked to 
provide open-ended information about any differences they felt might exist between the 
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quasi-synonyms in a series.  Finally, each keyword was checked with each lexical 
function (see Chapter IV) that it could conceivably have an output for.  In a minority of 
cases, examples were taken from narratives and stories which were recorded from the 
speakers by the author during the same time period.  Any data which come from 
published sources are labelled as such.   
It is very challenging to establish the meaning of words when one has only partial 
knowledge of the language and culture.  Of course, one can expect that certain 
differences between the English or Dene quasi-equivalents and the keywords might 
have been missed, or that the keywords in a series may differ according to contexts, 
connotations or sociolinguistic considerations that have not yet been identified.  
Whenever the consultants provided comments that seemed relevant to establishing the 
meaning of the keywords, these are included verbatim in the various sections.  While 
the result may not be as complete as what has been obtained in more massive 
Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary projects for major European languages, for 
which frequent access to native speakers, corpora and self-elicitation are possibilities, 
this project should be seen as an important basis for further semantic research into Dene 
verb stems and idioms.  
  
 
3    THE SEMANTIC AND SYNTAX ZONES 
 
3.1.  Dene Emotion Terms.  Words referring to emotions form a rich semantic 
class in world languages.  However, it is important to note that, as Wierzbicka (1999) 
describes in further detail, this semantic field is not exactly coextensive with the 
conceptual category denoted by the word emotions in English. Other languages may 
have categories which, while rather similar to ‘emotions’, nevertheless differ in a few 
interesting ways from that grouping.  For example, the ancient Greeks had a category 
called pathos, which included not only what we would label emotions in modern 
English, but also other feelings such as physical desires and appetites including ‘hunger’ 
and ‘thirst’.  According to Wierzbicka, even in English the term emotion is rooted in 
specifically modern ideas of psychology and socialization that were not widespread 
before the 18th century. Emotion denotes a category of feelings that imply both a 
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physical process, such as “shaking from fear” or “to be radiant with joy”, and an 
intellectual component, such as ‘to think that something can harm oneself, someone or 
something one cares about’ in the case of ‘fear’.  If only one of these elements is 
present, we cannot call the feeling an “emotion” in English.   For example, one cannot 
speak of an *emotion of hunger, because ‘hunger’ contains no intellectual component.  
It also sounds strange to speak of an ?emotion of loneliness, as ‘loneliness’ is not 
associated with specific physical changes in the experiencer.  Even the “natural” or 
“obvious” division of emotions into is culturally specific.  As Wierzbicka (1992:121) 
notes, even “basic” emotion categories such as ‘fear’, ‘anger’, ‘sadness’ are subject to 
interlinguistic variation: 
 
English terms of emotion constitute a folk taxonomy, not an objective, culture-free 
analytical framework, so obviously we cannot assume that English words such as 
disgust, fear, or shame are clues to universal human concepts or to basic 
psychological realities. Yet words such as these are usually treated as if they were 
objective, culture-free 'natural kinds'. 
 
Wierzbicka asserts her position against a large body of psychological and biological 
studies attests to the biological, rather than cultural, nature of emotions.  As early as the 
19th century, Charles Darwin (1991/1872) concluded that various emotional states such 
as “joy”, “anger”, and “reflection” are universal, as most facial expressions and 
gestures, although some specific expressions such as kissing may be a culture-specific.  
Later models developed the idea of emotions as adaptations that helped humans survive 
in the ancestral environment (e.g. Pinker 2002), much like physical traits and impulses.  
Studies and psychology manuals and articles such as Kemper (1987), Izard (1991), 
Plutchik (1994) and Birch (1995) also assume the biological innateness of specific 
“basic emotions” such as ‘fear’ and ‘sadness’.  How, then, could linguistic evidence 
ever contradict the universality of emotion categories?  
 Wierzbicka does not argue with the goals and findings of these studies, but she 
sees an interpretive error rooted in language.  The universalists’ error, following the 
NSM argument, lies not in assuming that there are some universal emotional 
experiences denoted by, for example, ubiquitous facial expressions and gestures, but in 
assuming that the conceptual categories designated by these signs are precisely 
coextensive with the range of experiences denoted by English concepts ‘sadness’, 
‘anger’, ‘depression’, ‘resignation’, and so forth.  Assuming that the categorization is 
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isomorphic with the English taxonomy amounts to nothing more than a reification and 
universalization of Anglo-American emotion categories.  A more prudent approach, 
according to the NSM school, would be to assume that emotion-type categories in a 
given language correspond to words which exist in the language rather than to an a 
priori schema.  As Wierzbicka (1999) notes:  
 
It is ethnocentric to think that if the Tahitians don't have a word corresponding to the 
English word sad (Levy 1973), they must nonetheless have an innate conceptual 
category of "sadness"; or to assume that in their emotional experience "sadness" - for 
which they have no name - is nonetheless more salient and more relevant than, for 
example, the feelings of tiaha or pe'ape'a, for which they do have a name (although 
English does not).” 
 
According to the NSM school, what is universal is that all cultures have “emotion talk”, 
or the use of lexical units that refer to inner states (understood flexibly enough for the 
border between emotions and non-emotions to be different from that of English).  For 
example, a given language may express the range of feelings denoted by the English 
words fear and shame with a single word.  Conversely, English has no direct 
equivalents for emotions nameworthy in other languages, such as saudade in 
Portuguese, the German Schadenfeude, or dedore..lni in Dene, which refers to a mixture 
of shame, respect and humility that prevents one from speaking excessively around 
Elders.  Presumably many of these words can be associated with cultural patterns that 
have existed at least historically in the societies which speak these languages.   
  While the lexical items themselves often cannot be translated with precise, one-
to-one equivalents into other languages, their meanings can be decomposed into 
primitives such as WANT, FEEL, I, HAPPEN, GOOD, BAD, etc., concepts which are claimed 
to be universal.  Emotion concepts in world languages can then be explicated as 
belonging to the basic genera of “to feel something good” , “to feel something bad” 
(using Wierzbicka’s terms), or “positive emotional states” and “negative emotional 
states” (Iordanskaja 1970). It is these states, for Wierzbicka, that are the universal inner 
states studied by the psychologists, although individual languages tend to express these 
in combination with language-specific differentia which can in turn be explicated with 
semantic primitives.  Once the definition of a keyword from another language has been 
decomposed into semantic primitives, a direct cross-linguistic comparison is possible. 
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Wierzbicka contrasts the meanings of the Ifaluk words SONG and LIGET with the 
meaning she claims for the English ‘anger’ below: 
 
‘X is angry’ 
(35)   (a)  Y did something bad 
(b)  X doesn’t want this to happen 
(c)  X wants to do something because of this 
 
The Ifaluk word LIGET has, according to Wierzbicka, the components (b) and (c) 
above, but component (a) would be ‘something bad may happen’ rather than ‘Y did 
something bad’.  One can work in one’s garden “with liget” because one does not want 
one’s neighbors to think that one is lazy.  By comparison, onecould not work on one’s 
garden “with anger” in English.  Another Ifaluk quasi-equivalent of ‘anger’, SONG, 
would have the components (a) and (b), but not (c).  One may feel SONG at a slight or 
insult, but in Ifaluk culture, Lutz claims, this is directed inward, resulting in depression 
or private agitation, rather than linked to a desire to react with “anger” to the one who 
did something bad.  According to Lutz, this is related to how the Ifaluk, a small group 
of people living on an isolated island, have adapted their social dynamics to a context in 
which daily cooperation is essential and interpersonal conflict must be avoided at all 
cost.  Wierzbicka cites these studies to highlight why it is important to decompose 
culturally specific emotion terms into simpler and more universal primitives in order to 
make such comparisons of quasi-equivalents belonging to different languages.   
Methodologically, to apply this approach one must first semantically decompose 
words of the semantic metalanguage likely to be used in lexicographic definitions and 
semantic structures, at least to a level “shallow” enough that more direct comparison 
may be possible with semantic and lexical units in the target language.  For example, 
one can divide emotion LUs into positive and negative emotional states.  Next one can 
build simple definitions of positive and negative emotion words using simple 
components.  For example, ‘sadness’ would have a decomposition similar to (36) but 
with a contrasting component (c), namely ‘X feels that X cannot do anything to change 
(a)’.  While ‘sad’ does not translate to a single lexical unit in Dene, one could render 
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‘sad’ by through a target-language decomposition that closely follows the claimed 
English-language decomposition: 
 
    ‘X is sad’ 
(36)   (a)  Edhu   hoɂa   ha dúé  
different  AR:3IPFV:stand  impossible  
‘[The situation] can’t be changed’ 
     
(b)  ɁAsí  hestsi   ha dúé   eyi  hoha   
thing  1IPFV:do  impossible  that  AR:for  
‘I can’t do anything about it’  
 
(c)  X  nidhen  ɂa,    kúlú  ba    dúé       
3IPFV:think ASSERT but  3:for  it.is.bad  
‘X feels something bad  because X thinks this’ 
 
There is actually no single word in Dene with precisely the same denotational range as 
‘sad’ in English.  Instead, there are several similar words which that would incorporate 
the above ideas and reactions, but with other additional meanings and connotations that 
renders them a bit more specific.  If no Dene word is a clear equivalent of ‘sad’, how 
can the English word sad to be used in a metalanguage used to explicate the meaning of 
these Dene sad-type word?  It must be assumed that that all of the elements denoted by 
the English ‘sad’ are common between Dene and anglophone culture. When English 
labels such as ‘sad’, ‘angry’ and ‘love’ are used in the semantic metalanguage, it is they 
may serve as abbreviation of for such a cluster of meanings which the analyst can 
established as shared, even though they may not have been lexicalized in the same way 
in both languages.  
Already on this basis we do find that Dene shares very similar emotion categories 
with English.  However, an additional level of evidence is provided by associating 
lexical items (in English and Dene) with a certain set of observable responses.  For 
‘sad’, this may include physical reactions, such as crying, and cultural scripts, such as 
withdrawal and silence.  For this reason, Apresjan (2000) considers it too broad to 
simply divide emotions into genera such as “positive” and “negative” emotional states, 
as “negative emotional states” would group ‘hatred’, ‘fear’, and ‘disgust’ together, for 
example.  Instead, Apresjan places emphasis on the connection between individual 
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negative and positive emotions and psychosocial scripts that differentiate them 
qualitatively.  Each emotion such as ‘anger’, ‘fear’, and ‘joy’ is associated with certain 
thoughts, bodily sensations, physical and social manifestations.  For example, the 
process for ‘fear’ (or its direct equivalent in Russian) is described as the following 
(Apresjan 2000: 208): 
 
To experience fear one must (1) perceive or at least imagine a certain situation and (2) 
apprise it as dangerous to oneself or to something or somebody close.  The result is the 
emption itself, (3) an unpleasant sensation evoked by (1) or (2).  This sensation may 
manifest itself (4) in certain physiological reactions (pallor, trembling, etc.), over which 
the subject has no control, and/or (5) in wishes (for example, a wish to hide, shrink, etc.), 
which may lead us in turn to (6) deliberate motor activity or (7) to speech. 
 
A similar account of emotions as physical-psychological processes that occur in 
response to particular stimuli can be found, for example, in Iordanskaja and Mel’čuk’s 
(1990: 335) analysis of the Russian verb BOJAT’SJA ‘to fear’.  In the MTT analysis of 
emotion words, emotion or feeling concept categories are thus established inductively, 
by observing the whole process that is associated with a given lexical item.  If in a given 
language and culture situations which in English we would label as “fear” and “shame” 
are associated with the same lexical units as well as the same physiological reaction and 
wish (to hide, or to run away), then there is no empirical basis for positing separate 
conceptual categories, and a more appropriate English rendering of these lexemes 
would be something like “fear/shame”.  One can search for the same anger-, sad-, fear- 
and shame-type emotions in world languages as one finds in English, but the analyst 
must always keep in mind that these may be combined or categorized differently on the 
basis of these physiological reactions. (These reactions include not only those 
observable to others, such as sweating or the hair standing on end, but also imaginary 
internal events such as a “broken heart” or “blood boiling”.)   Linguistic data on 
reactions are thus also vital for categorize the emotional experiences in a culturally 
appropriate way.    
  Section II-3.1.4 outlined lexical functions, MTT’s formalism for a diverse 
array of lexical relations.  Among these was Reali, a relation whose outputs referred to 
typical ways of realizing (hence the name) or actualizing the keyword.  For example, 
cry or withdraw into silence could be realizations of sad.  Once a plausible semantic 
decomposition has been suggested for some Dene lexical units, one must then test to see 
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if there are outputs of Reali for them and whether they are the same as for the English 
LUs in the metalanguage. This puts us in a position to distinguish at least three types of 
emotionally unpleasant states in Dene: 
a.  ‘sadness’ = ‘emotionally unpleasant state which causes one to want to do less’ 
Real1(‘feel.sad’) = –tsagh ‘to cry’, e.g. hestsagh ‘I cry’ 
b.  ‘anger’ = ‘emotionally unpleasant state which makes one want to do something 
bad to someone not in self-defense’ 
Real1(H...lch’e) = ‘attack Y’, e.g. bech’á yasti, eyi dene hest’ús ‘I talk against 
him, I hit that person’ 
c.  ‘fear’ = ‘emotionally positive state which causes X to move away from X because 
Y can do something bad to X or something/someone that X cares about’ 
Real1(‘feel.afraid’) = ‘to run away’, e.g. eyi dene ch’ázi tthísha ‘I run away from 
that person’ 
The use of English emotion words in lexicographic definitions of emotion-type LUs in 
Dene is therefore justified by this two-pronged approach to establishing equivalency.  
A final problem concerns the definition of “emotion talk” to the exclusion of 
similar semantic fields.  Apresjan (2000) distinguishes between the “basic [emotion] 
vocabulary” and “words which, while not denoting emotions in the strict sense, include 
in their meaning an indication of the subject’s emotional state at the moment of 
performing some action or being in a certain state”, such as ‘admire’, in the sense of ‘X 
feels something good for Y that X is watching’.  Another division made by Apresjan 
(2000: 123) separates emotions “into more and less elemental, having respectively a 
greater portion of feeling proper and a greater proportion of intellectual appraisal”.  The 
semantic field of emotions in this work includes LUs that denote basic and secondary 
(or simple or complex, to use Apresjan’s terms) emotions.  So ‘fear’, ‘saudade’ and 
‘admire’ would all qualify according to this definition.   Also included in the vocabulary 
of emotion is any term for which the root of the definition refers to an emotional state, 
regardless of the secondary components.  Conversely, words for which the root of the 
definition denotes mainly intellectual appraisal are excluded, even if their definitions 
have secondary emotional components (Apresjan’s “less elemental” emotions).  For 
example, ‘pride’ is included because at its core it is a feeling and not a way of 
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appraising something intellectually.  ‘Agree’ and ‘doubt‘, on the other hand are 
excluded because, while they carry certain emotional connotations, primarily describe 
the subject’s belief or disbelief in a proposition.   
 
3.1.1.  Definitions.  Section 3.1.1 presents the lexicographic definitions of the 
emotion LUs in the current sample.  In most cases, the lexical units fall naturally into 
series of quasi-synonyms.  In some cases, the keywords are not as directly comparable 
to any other Dene LUs and are discussed as stand-alone entries.   
 
3.1.1.1.  The ‘X is angry’ Series.  Following Apresjan (2000) the meaning 
‘anger’, based on English linguistic data (in turn based also on his Russian synonym 
series), can be defined as following psychosocial process:  
 
To experience anger one must (1) perceive or at least imagine a certain situation and (2) 
apprise it as something unjust and bad for oneself or for something or someone that one 
cares about.  The result is the emotion itself, (3) an unpleasant sensation evoked by (1) or 
(2).  This sensation may manifest itself (4) in certain physiological reactions (shaking, 
increased heart rate), over which the subject has no control, and/or (5) in wishes (for 
example, to scream, hit the responsible party or something or some else), which may lead 
us in turn to (6) deliberate motor activity or (7) to speech.   
 
Dene concepts of ‘anger’ appear to share much in common with this English-based 
schema.  Like the English ‘anger’, Dene ‘anger’ words have the components ‘X feels 
something bad towards person Y because of something that Y caused that was bad for 
X’.  The component ‘angry’ will therefore be shorthand for those components in the 
following definitions.  Dene ‘anger’ words are associated with a similar physical 
reaction as the English ‘anger’, e.g. sedzíé naghełna {1PO:heart 3IPFV:move.fast} ‘my 
heart is racing’ and hlch’é ɂá betth’í hełdél  {3PFV:feel.angry because 3PO:flesh 
3IPFV:shake} ‘his skin (surface flesh) is shaking with anger’.  The locus of ‘anger’ in 
Dene is considered to be the heart: bedzíé ɂá sets’lch’é {3PO:heart with 
1SG:to:3PFV:get.angry} ‘he was very angry with me’, lit. “he got mad at me with his 
heart”.  As in English, Dene ‘anger’ words imply a desire of X to react in some way 
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against Y, i.e. by screaming (hlch’é ɂá hezíł {3PFV:get.angry because 3IPFV:scream} 
‘he screams from anger’).  One diﬀerence with respect to English is that Dene lacks a 
generic word for ‘angry’ independent of aspectual derivation.  X’s current state of 
anger (‘X is angry’) is rendered by a stative perfective of what is at least 
etymologically an inchoative derivation: hílch’é ‘s/he gets angry’.     
The ‘X is angry’ series is H...lch’é, ná...lch’ogh, X OBJ.AGRX–įni k’éch’á, 
hene...łkon, hune...lch’ogh and dzíre...lch’ogh.   Of these, all are verbal lexemes 
except X bįni k’éch’á, which is a quasi-idiom.  Normally hune...lch’ogh and 
dzíre...lch’ogh would be respectively be analyzed as habitual and perambulative 
derived stems (“verb themes” plus derivation, in traditional terminology), but the 
remaineder –lch’ogh has been lost as an extant stem in 21st century Dene, at least in 
Dillon, so they merit inclusion in the series as quasi-elementary verb stems.  The 
definitions are the following (following the NSM, “does/did” indicates performing or 
causation): 
1.  H...lch’é <X Y ts’én hílch’é Z ɂá: person X starts to feel anger at person Y 
because of situation Z that Y did> ; common English translation: to get angry. 
2.  ná...lch’ogh <Y, X nálch’ogh Z ɂá: person X feels intense anger at situation 
Y>; common English translation: to be really, very angry / to be furious.   
3.  X OBJ.AGRX-įní k'éch'á <Y, X bįni k’éch’á: person X feels angry at situation 
Y>; common English translations: to disagree / to be upset / to be angry. 
4.  OBJ.AGRX-hene...łkon, <Y, øSG X benełkon: person X feels angry at situation 
Y that some people sometimes do that many people feel is bad>; common English 
translation: to be oﬀended, to be irritated, to be fired up. 
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5.  hune...lch’ogh <X hunelch’ogh: person X regularly feels very angry because 
of situations that people do>; common English translation: to get angry often / to be 
an explosive person / to be short-tempered. 
6.  dzíre...lch’ogh <Y, X dzírelch’ogh gha ná...dher Z: because person X is very 
angry at situation {Y}, X moves to many places within area Z>; common English 
translation: to storm around / to go around angry.   
The quasi-synonyms diﬀer by the following parameters: 
1. The nature of the feeling: hene...łkon is usually due to a perceived deliberate 
offense or breach of social rules on the part of someone else who did something that 
would be considered wrong by most people in the society. X bįni k’éch’á is due to a 
deliberate action or choice on the part of someone else that X feels hurt or oﬀended 
by.  It implies an intellectual disagreement as well as an emotional reaction: i.e. 
seyaze kontúé hedą, sįní k'éch'á kúlú asolesį íle  {1PO:son 3IPFV:drink, 1PO:mind 
against but 1IPFV:say.something NEG} ‘my son is drinking whiskey, I'm upset but I 
don't say anything’; holą sįní k’éch’á kúlú asorusį íle, kųt’ú setíkwi senéshą la 
{many.times 1PO:mind against but 1OPT:say.something NEG, like.that 1PO:parents 
1OB:3PFV:raise ASSERT} ‘Even if a lot of times I disagreed [with what adults were 
saying], I felt I mustn’t say anything, that’s how my parents raised me’.  The others 
are more versatile in their cause, indicating a general anger with multiple possible 
causes, with a similar range to angry in English  
2.  Intensity: H...lch’é, hune...lch’ogh and dzíre...lch’ogh are relatively neutral 
in intensity, and can take both intensifiers and attenuative adverbs.  By contrast,      
ná...lch’ogh is more emphatic (and is consequently less acceptable with intensifiers).  
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Less intense are bįni k’éch’á and hene...łkon, which are closer  to ‘oﬀended’ or 
‘irritated’ rather than ‘angry’.   
3.  Duration: hune...lch’ogh refers to a customary situation. Dzíre...lch’ogh 
involves traveling around and so suggests (but not strictly require) a longer duration.  
The others are relatively neutral as to duration, but none of these words are used for 
very long-term anger or hostility that one may harbor, i.e. towards an enemy over a 
period of months or years.   
4.  Presence of reason required in the subject: H...lch’é does not require reason, 
and can take an animal subject; this is impossible with all of the others.   
5.  Presence of motion during the emotion:  only dzíre...lchogh involves 
physical movement from place to place; the others do not specify a motion 
component . 
 
3.1.1.2.  The ‘X dislikes Y’ Series.  For X to ‘dislike’ or to ‘hate’ Y, (1) X must 
know the situation or entity Y that X dislikes and (2) apprise this situation or entity Y 
as bad or unpleasant or having done something that was bad for X, which leads to (3) 
a negative feeling toward Y, usually leading to the X’s (4) avoiding contact with Y 
(bech'ázį hessa {3:away.from 1IPFV:sg.walk} ‘I walk away from him/her/it’; bech'ázį  
nasther {3:away.from 1IPFV:stay} ‘I stay away from him/her’; bedáresdeth 
{3OB:1IPFV:turn.off} ‘I turn it [radio, TV, music] oﬀ’) or (5) negative speech toward Y 
if Y is a person (dáįlaze helesį  {2IPFV:pee 1PFV:say} ‘I tell him/her to piss oﬀ’, 
likelyy a calque from English) or X’s negative speech to someone else about  Y.  
 There are at least four lexical units in Dene that fit this schema.  They are the 
lexemes ch’áre...t’e and dakure...la and the phrasemes X Y ch’á...di íle and X Y 
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hene...lį íle.  The latter two are quasi-idioms, the signifiers being simply negated 
verbs.  But the positive forms (without íle) differ in meaning, ch’á...di meaning ‘to be 
emotionally dependent on’ or ‘to cling to emotionally’ rather than ‘to like’. Hene...lį íle 
{like NEG}, lit. “not to like” is probably a quasi-idiom because it implies not only a lack 
of liking but an active dislike (which, incidentally, is also suggested by its English 
equivalent, as in I don’t like him).14 Hene...lį íle is the dominant of the series as its 
meaning is general and underlies those of all its quasi-synonyms.  The definitions are 
the following: 
 1. hene...lį íle <X Y henęli íle Z ɂá: living being X feels something bad 
towards situation or entity Y because of Z>   
 2. ch’á...di íle <X Y ch’ádi íle Z ɂá: person X feels something bad towards 
situation or entity Y because of a bad situation or quality Z that Y did or is like> 
 3. ch’áre...t’e <Y X ha ch’árįt’e Z ɂá: person X feels something bad towards 
person Y because of a bad situation Z that Y did>  
 4. dakure...la <X Y Z-i dakurela: person X feels something bad toward 
situation or entity Y that continues to make a sound that X does not like or who 
continues to do action Z that makes a sound that Y does not like>  
 The quasi-synonyms diﬀer by the following parameters: 
1.  The cause of the feeling: one feels ch’á...di íle and hene...lį íle are very 
versatile and can be caused by virtually any action or characteristic of the entity or 
situation that X dislikes.  One feels ch’áre...t’e towards someone based on that 
person’s negative actions or personality: Jean sa ch'árįt'e ch'erelɂį ɂá, dene {J. 
1SG:for 3IPFV:be.hateful 3IPFV:be.bad because person} ‘I hate Jean because he's 
                                                
14 Its status as a quasi-idiom could still be questioned, as in many cases in Dene the negation íle is 
ambiguous, with both attenuative and antonymic readings possible. 
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without a conscience, that guy’.  One feels dakure...la because one is fed up with 
somebody’s incessant talking or a continued irritating sound that something makes, 
i.e. nerakuresła eyi shen ch'elé horįłtth'ąi  {2OB:1IPFV:dislike that music worthless 
2IPFV:listen:REL} ‘I am fed up with you listening to that worthless music’.  The 
stimulus must be auditory. 
 2.  The object of the feeling: ch’á...di íle and particularly hene...lį íle are 
flexible and can be felt towards people, other entities or situations: eyi dene bech’ásdi 
íle ‘I dislike that person’; tųlú k’é hojéré bech’ásdi íle ‘I dislike when the road is 
washed out’. Ch’áre...t’e can only be felt towards a person, and there is a strong 
suggestion (but not requirement) that the person feels the same way about the 
experiencer.   
3.  Presence or reason in X: hene...lį íle does not require a human subject; all of 
the others do.   
4.  Intensity: ch’á...di íle and particularly hene...lį íle have relatively low or 
flexible intensity and easily take attenuative or intensifying adverbs. Ch’áre...t’e is 
stronger, although it is a general attitude as well. The most intense is dakure...la 
because it is related to a specific incident.   
5.  Duration: ch’á...di íle and hene...lį íle are flexible in their duration; 
ch’áre...t’e must occur over a long duration of months or years, and dakure...la must be 
fleeting, temporary feeling of exasperation.   
6.  Contact between the experiencer and the object: it is somewhat strange to 
use ch’áre...t’e towards someone with whom one does not have direct contact, such 
as the prime minister: one would use ch’á...di íle and hene...lį íle in this situation.   
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3.1.1.3.  The ‘X is afraid/worried’ Series.  The schema for ‘fear’ or ‘anxiety’ is 
understood as the following: X must (1) perceive or at least imagine a certain situation 
Y and (2) X apprises Y as dangerous to X or to something or someone X cares about.  
As a result (3) X experiences a negative emotional state evoked by (1) or (2).  This may 
manifest itself in (4) X’s characteristic physiological reactions, such as X’s pallor and 
trembling (setth’í neljer {1PO:surface.flesh 3IPFV:fear} ‘I am shaking’, lit. “my skin / 
surface flesh is afraid”; sedzíé deltth’er {1PO:heart 3IPFV:run.fast} ‘my heart is 
pounding’, setth’í nįk’ath {1PO:surface.flesh 3PFV:MOM:be.cold} ‘my skin grew cold’), 
over which X has no control, and/or (5) X’s wishes to take action (for example, to run 
away, to withdraw, etc., which may lead in turn to (6) X’s deliberate motor activity 
(tthísha {1PFV:flee} ‘I ran away’) or (7) to speech.  Based on this pattern of emergence 
(which also follows Apresjan’s) Dene is rich in terms meaning ‘afraid’ or ‘worried’, 
with at least seven lexical units in ordinary use.   
The series contains four verbs, ne...ljer, k'éne...tą2, te...łgheth, hhahore...łi and 
three phrasemes, X PO.AGRX–įní łą, lit. “X’s mind is much/many”, X PO.AGRX–dzié 
na...tser íle, lit. “X’s heart is weak”, and X k'eniré...lya íle, lit. “X is not calm”.  The 
first two phrasemes are full idioms and the third is a quasi-idiom, i.e. the negation of 
the intransitive verb k'eniré..lya, meaning ‘person X feels no anxiety because X 
thinks that nothing bad is happening or might happen to entity Y’, but with a slightly 
unpredictable meaning.  Te..łgheth is morphological phraseme containing a quasi-
morph which is probably historically the inceptive prefix te– (rather unusual with a 
verb denoting a state).  There is no extant stem –łgheth, and the perfective form is 
used to denote the emotional state.  This is a rare word, and unlike what happens 
with the other quasi-synonyms in this series, speakers disagree about its existence, 
with only a few people using it. The dominant of the series is ne...ljer, a generic and 
widely applicable term translating to general ‘fear’.  The definitions are the following:  
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1.   ne...ljer <X Y ch’á neljer: living being X feels afraid of Y>; <X Y ba neljer: 
living being X feels afraid that something bad could happen to Y that X cares about>; 
colloquial English translation: to be afraid, to fear.   
2.   k'éne...tą2 <X Y k'énetą:  person X suddenly feels intensely afraid that 
something bad might happen or have happened to person Y after X has not been in 
contact with Y for a long time>; colloquial English translation: to be suddenly 
overcome with worry. 
3.  te...łgheth <X tełgheth Y ɂá: living being X suddenly feels intensely afraid 
because X saw or heard Y that X thinks could do something bad to X>; colloquial 
English translation: to get scared, to be suddenly frightened. 
4.  hhahore...łi <X Y OBJ.AGRY–hhórełi / X Y OBJ.AGRY–hhórełi Z SUBJ.AGRY:  
person X is afraid that Z may cause situation Y which would be bad for X>; 
colloquial English translation: to be cautious, to be wary. 
5.  X PO.AGRX–įní łą <X bįní łą Y ɂá: X feels afraid for a long time because of 
continued situation(s) Y>; colloquial English translation: to be worried, to burdened 
with a lot of worries. 
6.  X bedzié na...tser íle, lit. “X’s heart is weak”.  <Z, X bedzié natser íle Y ha:  
person X feels afraid to do action Y because X knows that X will be in contact with 
situation Z which may be bad for X>; colloquial English translation: to be filled with 
dread, to be anxious. 
7.  k'eniré...lya íle <X Y ghą k'énirélya: person X feels afraid because X thinks 
that something bad is happening or might happen to entity Y>; colloquial English 
translation: to be worried, to feel anxiety. 
The quasi-synonyms diﬀer by the following parameters: 
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1.  Cause and nature of fear: ne..ljer  has a very wide range of application, and 
can be used with more situations than any other quasi-synonym in the series.  In 
response to the question edlt’į ch’á nįljer ɂá ? {what against 2IPFV:fear Q} ‘what do 
you fear?’, speakers may cite a wide range of fears.  Some state general fear in their 
lives because of a present or future situation, as in yanadhé dé tsąba dódí dé, nesjer 
ląt’e {future when money there.is.none if 1IPFV:fear ASSERT} ‘I’m kind of afraid that 
I’ll have no money in the years to come’.  It can also refer to specific occurrences or 
entities, present or future, as in robber ch’á nesjer {r. against 1IPFV:fear} ‘I’m afraid 
of robbers’ and łį bech’á nesjer bejeré ɂá {dog 3.against 1IPFV:fear 3IPFV:be.mean 
because} ‘I am afraid of that dog because he is mean’.  A scary monster in a science 
fiction movie was described as bech'á nejer ahonet'į  {3.against 3IPFV:ind.fear 
3IPFV:looks.like} ‘one is frightened by it’.  Ne...ljer can also indicate more diﬀuse or 
constant fears, as in theni nądher dé, neba nesjer {alone 2IPFV:stay when, 2:for 
1IPFV:fear} ‘I am afraid for you when you stay alone’.  Ne..ljer is also the proper word 
to describe irrational fears and phobias, such as dlúne ch’á nesjer {mice against 
1IPFV:fear} ‘I am afraid of mice (musophobia)’ tenesłe ch’á nesjer 
{1IPFV:go.into.water against 1IPFV:fear} ‘I’m afraid to go into the water’.   
The verb k'éne..tą2  is quite distinct from any English word as well as from its 
Dene quasi-synonyms.  It denotes a strong feeling of worry that comes on suddenly 
after a relatively extended period of time in which the experiencer had not been 
worried, so it can only be used in reference to someone whom the experiencer 
assumed was safe but later felt to be in danger.  A typical example might be someone 
who suddenly realizes that a relative who had gone hunting should have returned and 
begins to worry about him, as in dení kálzé ha téya, thá hule, dųhų bek'énitą  
                                                                                                                                      140 
{moose 3IPFV:hunt.for for INCEP:3PFV:sg.walk, long.time 3IPFV:be.absent, now 
3OB:1IPFV:worry} ‘he went moose hunting, he's been gone a long time, now I'm worried 
about him’.  If the experiencer had been worried about the person from the beginning, 
the sentence neghą k’énirésha íle {2:about 1IPFV:feel.calm NEG} ‘I was worried about 
you’ might be used instead.  
Te...łgheth and ne...ljer denote a more primordial, animal fear.  Te...łgheth is 
used to indicate a sudden fear at a direct stimulus, such as thunder, or a loud bang: 
ɂełk’édhi ɂá náthestła, tesgheth {bang because 1PFV:startle 1IPFV:get.scared} ‘I got 
scared because of the loud bang’.  In this case it is similar in meaning to startle in 
English.  The exact translation of startle is na...ltła, as in the example above.  Unlike 
to be startled, te...łgheth can indicate the fear resulting from a situation which, while 
sudden, has some buildup, for example as a sudden dangerous storm on the lake 
while the experiencer is fishing (?I was startled by the growing storm).  It also 
cannot be used for situations which, while physiologically startling, are not 
frightening: *phone deltsér, tesgheth {phone 3IPFV:ring 1IPFV:get.scared} *‘I was 
scared by the phone ringing’.   
Far different is the meaning of hháhore..łi (condensed to hhóre..łi, for most 
speakers). Hhóre...łi denotes a rational fear of a situation which is likely or at least 
conceivable.  Sometimes the meaning is close to that of 'caution' in English.  A typical 
example would be dechąłdáni tł’úle ɂá holį nassa ha bóresłi {bridge string with 
AR:3IPFV:be 1IPFV:go FUT 3OB:1IPFV:fear.for} ‘I'm scared to cross that bridge made of 
string (because it looks like it might collapse)’, or seyaze bóresłi taltth'i ha/ch'á  
{1PO:son 3OB:1IPFV:fear.for 3IPFV:fall.into.water FUT / against} ‘I'm scared that my son 
will fall into the water (while playing on the edge of the bridge)’.  It cannot be used 
with irrational fears that cannot be realized, such as phobias.  
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Bįní łą is an ongoing feeling of unease related usually to a series of intractable 
problems which pose a persistent threat to the well-being of the experiencer.  The 
cause of the fear is therefore an ongoing and important factor in X’s life. Dene 
speakers typically translate bįní łą as ‘he is worried’, but it has a more restricted 
range of application than worried. In response to the question edlt’į gha nįní łą?  
{what for 2PO:mind it.is.much} ‘what are you worried about?’, speakers give answers 
such as economic problems or trouble with romantic relationships, i.e. tsąba dódí, t’a 
awasne k’oshą íle {money there.is.none REL 1OPT:do 1IPFV:know NEG} ‘I have no 
money, I don’t know what to do (with my life)’, betsųaze yech’ázį náłja ɂá, bįní łą 
{3PO:girlfriend 3D:away.from 3PFV:walk because 3PO:mind it.is.much} ‘ he is worried 
because his girlfriend left him’.  It is not used with short-term worries brought on by a 
momentary situation, i.e. ?seskéné thá hule dé, sįní łą {1PO:children long.time 
3IPFV:be.absent when 1PO:mind it.is.much} ?‘I worry when my children are gone a long 
time’.  In such situations, k’éniresha íle ‘I am anxious’ is more appropriate. The nature 
of the feeling denoted by k'eniré...lya íle is a temporary sense of worry induced by a 
specific cause.  Typical causes for this worry include for example a child’s absence or  
a car breakdown, as in seyaze yuwé tabíł ka nákį, beghą k’énirésha íle {1PO:son 
over.there fishnets for 3PFV:paddle, still 3IPFV:be.absent, 3.about 1IPFV:be.calm NEG} 
‘my son paddled far out to set nets; he's still gone, I'm worried about him’.  However, it 
is not obligatory to specify the reason.  
The phraseme X bedzié natser íle, “X’s heart is weak”, is similar to dread in 
English, a sense of negative anticipation at an unpleasant situation, usually one that 
the experiencer is likely to witness.  For example, when one speaker mentioned that 
she was going to pick up her son who she heard had been drinking, she said sedzíé 
natser íle ekozį hessa ha {1PO:heart 3IPFV:be.strong NEG there 1IPFV:sg.go FUT} ‘I’m 
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afraid to go there’, specifying “I am afraid of what I will see”.   The speaker knows that 
the situation is happening or will happen soon.  The situation will have bad 
consequences for the actant X who then dreads it.  This idiom has a connotation of 
discouragement and intractibility of the situation the speaker cannot aﬀect but is 
unpleasant to face.  Another sense of the same phraseme is something close to 
‘devastated’ or ‘depressed’.  
2.  Presence of reason in X: because the fear of ne...ljer is instinctive, it does not 
require rationality in the experiencer: łį sech’á neljer {dog 1SG:against 3IPFV:fear} 
‘the dog is afraid of me’.  The worry of k'énirélya íle requires reason, because the 
experiencer cannot be an animal or a baby: *łį  / *bebí k'énirélya íle {dog / baby 
3IPFV:be.calm NEG} *‘the dog / the baby is worried’. Te...łgheth does not require 
reason: ɂełk’édhi ɂá łįchogh téłgheth {bang because horse 3PFV:get.scared} ‘the horse 
got scared / is scared because of the bang’. K'éne...tą2 denotes a rational fear that can 
only be experienced by humans.  The object of k'éne...tą2 must also be human, 
usually a loved one of the experiencer.  Because X bįní łą denotes an ongoing worry 
based on a rational assessment of one’s life, the experiencer must be rational and 
human: *bebíaze bįní łą {baby:DIM 3PO.mind it.is.much} ‘the baby is worried’; *sets’į 
łį bįní łą  {3PO:mind it.is.much} *‘my dog is worried’. To explain this incompatibility, 
one speaker oﬀered the explanation “dogs don’t think”.  The feeling of X bedzíé 
nátser íle “X’s heart is weak” involves foresight and dread and requires reason, of 
course, so the experiencer must be human: *łį bedzíé natser íle beskár ha {dog 
3PO:heart 3IPFV:be.strong NEG 3OB:1IPFV:slap FUT} *‘The dog is dreading that I’m 
going to hit him’.     
3.  Duration: The fear denoted by ne..ljer may be  fleeting, as in sets’éni segha 
nįya eyerots’į nesjer íle {1PO:friend 1SG:by 3PFV:arrive therefore 1IPFV:fear NEG} ‘my 
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friend came so I stopped being afraid / my fear abated’, or general and ongoing, as in 
the case of the phobias and statements like theni nądher dé, neba nesjer  {alone 
2IPFV:stay when 2SG:for 1IPFV:fear} ‘I am afraid for you when you stay alone’ above. 
Because the situation denoted by necessarily lasts over a certain duration, this 
phraseme is incompatible with attenuative adverbs, as in the sentence *ełótselé bįní 
łą {little.time 3PO:mind it.was.much} *‘she was worried for a little while’ or *dųhų 
dzįné k’é sįní łą {this day on 1PO:mind it.is.much} *‘today I am worried’.  Also here 
k’éniré..lya íle is used. The feeling is necessarily temporary, so k'eniré..lya cannot be 
used with adverbs of long duration such as hok’étl’á ‘always’.  In fact, some speakers 
even add adverbial phrases denoting a short duration, such as hotsélé ‘for a little 
while’, in their own spontaneous English translations of sentences with k'eniré..lya 
and without any temporal adverbs.   Because of the nature of the stimulus of 
te...lgheth, the emotion is quite fleeting and refers only to the entry into the state of 
fear or the heightened period of acute fear immediately afterward.  This emotion 
usually has gives the experiencer an impulse to flee the danger or seek to defend 
himself. K'éne..tą2 can only be used after actant X has not had contact with actant Y 
for an extended period, far beyond a day.  For example, it would be incorrect in the 
case of gah bíł nánełɂį ha téya, ął hule, beghą k’énirésha íle / *bek’énitą {rabbit 
snares 3IPFV:verify for INCEP:3PFV:sg.walk, still 3IPFV:be.absent, 3:about 
1IPFV:be.calm NEG / *1ipfv:worry} ‘he went to check his rabbit snares, but he’s been 
gone a long time, so I’m worried / *I’m suddenly very worried’.  Checking rabbit 
snares is a task that one accomplishes in a couple of hours or half a day, but to use 
k'éne..tą2  “would mean you didn’t see him for a long time”, according to one 
speaker; “for weeks at least”, specified another. 
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4.  Intensity: While the feeling of k’énirelya ile temporary, the feeling is intense.  
It is incompatible with attenuative adverbs, as in ?yáazį k’énirésha íle ?‘I’m a little 
worried’ –– less intense quasi-synonyms are used instead.  One is a separate sense of 
the vocable whose primary sense means ‘to think’, i.e. beghą nánesther {3:about 
1IPFV:think} ‘I’m thinking about him (with concern)’.  There is also a sense of the 
vocable whose main sense is ‘to remember’, i.e. benasní ‘I remember him (with 
concern)’. K'éne..tą2 is a very intense emotion incompatible with attenuative adverbs, 
although it may often be used with exclamations such as esjí ‘wow!’ or ‘oh!’, as in esjí 
nek’énitą {wow 2OB:1IPFV:worry} ‘oh, how I was worried about you! [people said you 
were dead]’, or hule hule esjí sįyeze bek’énitą {3IPFV:be.absent 3IPFV:be.absent oh 
1PO:son 3OB:1IPFV:worry } ‘he’s been gone so long, oh I am so worried about my 
son’. 
5.  Eﬀect on the experiencer: because ne...ljer has such a wide range of 
application, the effect on the experiencer and whether the fear would drive him to a 
certain action is contingent on the context.  It may or may not have a physical effect. 
Te..łgheth is associated with physical responses such as sedzíé náłtth’er {1PO:heart 
3PFV:stop.running} ‘my heart stopped’, sedzíé deltth’er {1PO:heart 3IPFV:run.fast} ‘my 
heart is pounding’, setth’í nįk’ath {1PO:skin INCH:3PFV:be.cold} ‘my skin grew cold’.  
Because of its intractable, ongoing nature, X OBJ.AGRX–įní łą is not associated with 
direct physical effects on and responses of the experiencer. K’éneta2 is not associated 
with a physical eﬀect but it typically drives the speaker to seek help and search for 
the missing person.  
   
3.1.1.4.  The ‘X is sad’ Series.  ‘Sadness’ in English denotes a ‘negative 
emotional state because of situation Y’ which is distinct from ‘anger’, ‘fear’, etc. Like 
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these, ‘sad’ references a situation where ‘something bad happened’ The result is (3) the 
emotion itself, X’s unpleasant sensation (ahhe nóretth’er íle {good 3PFV:happen NEG} 
'something bad happened', or ełtth’í nódher íle {right 3PFV:happen NEG} ‘something 
bad happened’, for some speakers).  Unlike ‘anger’, or ‘fear’ terms, however, ‘sad’ 
terms do not have the component of ‘X wants to do something to change situation Y’ 
because X feels that X cannot do anything to change it.  To be ‘sad’, X must (1) 
perceive or at least imagine a certain situation Y.  (2) X apprises Y as dangerous to X or 
to something or someone X cares about, a situation which X knows X can do nothing to 
change (t’a awasne íle {REL 1OPT.do NEG} 'I can't do anything [about it]').   evoked by 
(1) and (2).  This sensation may manifest itself (4) X’s characteristic physiological 
reactions: feeling low in energy, impulse to be quiet, do less activity (ɂasí hełtsi íle 
{thing 3IPFV:do NEG} 's/he won't do anything'), crying (hetsagh {3IPFV:cry} ‘s/he cries’) 
etc., over which X has limited control, and/or (5) in X’s wishes such as the wish to 
withdraw from social contact (theni nádher horelɂį {alone 3IPFV:stay 3IPFV:want} 's/he 
wants to be alone'), to do less activity, and so forth which may lead X in turn to (6) X’s 
deliberate actions following up on (5) or (7) to speech (este ɂá yałti {sadness with 
3IPFV:speak} 's/he speaks of/with sadness, despondency')  The range of feelings denoted 
by this whole schema includes processes such as ‘regret’, ‘nostalgia’, ‘to miss 
[someone, something]’, ‘depression’, which all have additional differentia to distinguish 
them from the core ‘sadness’ terms.   
The Dene vocabulary for sadness is rich and varied, containing at least 14 lexical 
units that fit the above definition.  The series is: X ha dúé2, X ha horé...lyą íle, 
ane...ɂá1, ane...ɂá2, kane..ɂá, k’é...lį, k'éne...tą1, estene...dhen, dá...ɂá2, dá...ɂá3,  
hasne...dhen, X bįní nettheth,  X ba ehhúle indiﬀerent and X bįní nátser íle.  X ha 
dúé2, lit. “for X it is hard”, X ha horé...lyą íle, lit. “for X it is not pleasant”, X bįní 
nettheth “X’s mind is extinguished”, X ba ehhúle, “for X it.means.nothing” and X 
bįní nátser íle, lit. “X’s mind is weak” are phrasemes, and the rest are verbs. In two 
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cases, there are two distinct lexemes within the same vocable.  The definitions are the 
following:  
1.  X ha dúé2    <øSG X ha dúé Y ɂá:  person X feels very sad because of situation 
Y>; colloquial English translation: to be sad, to suffer [psychologically]. 
2.  X ha horé...lyą íle   < øSG X ha horélyą íle:  person X feels intense sadness 
and does not feel good towards all of the things that X often feels good towards>; 
colloquial English translation: to be sad, to be having a bad time. 
3.  ane...ɂá1  <X aneɂá: person X feels sad because X does not have anyone to 
talk to>; colloquial English translation: to be sad, to be lonely, to be down. 
4.  ane...ɂá2  <X aneɂá:  person X feels sad because of X no longer is in contact 
with situation or entity [Y]>; colloquial English translation: to be nostalgic, wistful. 
5.  kane...ɂá <X Y kaneɂá: living being X feels sad because X is no longer in 
contact with situation or entity Y>; colloquial English translation: to miss 
someone/something.  
6.  hok’é...lį1 <Y, X hok’élį: person X feels sad because X is sorry for situation Y 
that X caused and wishes X had not caused>; colloquial English translation: to regret. 
7.  k'éne...tą1  <X Y k’énetą:  person X feels very sad because X suddenly wants 
to be in contact with person Y intensely a long time after X has lost Y>; colloquial 
English translation: to be suddenly overcome with nostalgia. 
8.  estene...dhen <X Y ɂá estenįdhen:  person X feels very sad because of 
situation Y and does not want to do things that X should do>; colloquial English 
translation: to be sad, to be devastated, to languish, to be self-pitying. 
9.   dá...ɂá2  <X Y ɂá dáįɂá: person X feels something bad because of bad 
situation Y that has existed for a long time>; colloquial English translation: to suffer 
(mentally), to undergo hardship. 
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10.  dá...ɂá3  <X Y  ts’én dáįɂá: person X feels very sad because X intensely 
wants to be in contact with Y which X can’t be in contact with>; colloquial English 
translation: to pine, to yearn, to crave. 
11.  hasne...dhen  <Y Z, X hasnįdhen: person X feels bad because person Y did 
action Z that X didn’t want Z to cause>; colloquial English translation: to be 
disappointed (in someone who is shirking his/her responsibility to share). 
12.  X PO.AGRX-i ̨ní nettheth <X bįní nettheth: X feels very bad because situation 
Y that X wanted to happen did not happen>; colloquial English translation: to be very 
disappointed, to be crushed. 
13.  X ba ehhúle <X ba ehhúle: X has a physical and mental problem that 
causes that X feels very sad and does not want to do anything>; colloquial English 
translation: to be clinically depressed, to be in a torpor, to no longer care about life. 
14.  X PO.AGRX-įní nátser íle <X bįní nátser íle: X feels very sad because many 
bad things have happened or many good things that X wanted to happen did not 
happen>; colloquial English translation: to be dejected, to be depressed. 
 The parameters by which they differ include: 
 1. The cause and nature of the feeling: the most abstract and versatile are the 
phrasemes X ha dúé2, lit. “it is hard for X” and X ha horé...l-yą íle, lit. “it is 
unpleasant for X”.  There is considerable semantic overlap between the two quasi-
synonyms. X ha dúé2 and X ha horé...lyą íle can both be used to describe someone’s 
emotional state after severe emotional trauma, and speakers regard them as closely 
synonymous. X ha horé...lyą íle can refer to intense sadness and emotional devastation: 
łegháįdher tł’ dé, bą esteydher, beba horélyą íle {he.died after when, 3PO:mother 
3PFV:get.sad 3.for 3IPFV:be.pleasant NEG} ‘after he died, his mother fell into a 
depression, she was having a bad time’;  X ha dúé2 can also be used here.  However, X 
ha horé...lyą íle has a wider range of application than X ha dúé2.  X ha dúé2 can only 
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indicate severe emotional pain, X ha horé...lyą íle can also refer simply to a lighter 
form of sadness, even a bad day: dųhų dzįné k’é sa horélyą íle / ?sa dúé {this day on 
1SG:for 3IPFV:be.pleasant NEG / 1SG:for it.is.bad} ‘today I am sad / ?I am sad’. Its range 
extends to specific events (while suggesting a general negative outlook as a result of 
that event): ahhe nódher íle, beba horélyą íle {beautifully 3PFV:happen NEG 3:for 
3IPFV:be.pleasant NEG} ‘something bad happened, (so) he’s sad’. While X ha dúé2 
implies a specific cause for the experiencer’s sadness, X ha horé...lyą íle strongly 
suggests that the speaker has a general negative outlook and derives little pleasure from 
other areas of his or her life, i.e. edini Dillon beba horélyą íle  {he D. 3:for 
3IPFV:be.pleasant NEG} ‘he’s not happy in Dillon’. 
The intransitive verb ane...ɂá1 has various senses, the first of which can be 
rendered as melancholy or lonely in English.  Examples would be dene ch’ázį nidhá 
nasther, aniɂá  {people away.from far 1IPFV:stay 1IPFV:be.lonely} ‘I’m staying far 
from people, I feel lonely’ and dene seghąnetą íle, aniɂá {people 1OB:3IPFV:love NEG 
1IPFV:be.lonely} ‘people don’t love me, [and] I feel lonely’.  This melancholy is 
distinct from nostalgia and from loneliness, as in hhait’ázį dé aniɂá {fall when 
1IPFV:be.sad} ‘I (always) feel sad in the fall time’.  It implies both a lack of contact and 
a subdued, irrational sadness. Ane...ɂá2 is closer to nostalgia, thinking about pleasant 
past experiences, as in nálzé ghą nánidhį, benasní sugha dághída, aniɂá {hunting 
about 1IPFV:think 3OB:1IPFV:remember well 1PL.IPFV:live 1IPFV:be.sad} ‘I’m thinking 
about hunting, how we lived happily, and I feel nostalgic’. It is especially challenging 
to separate the various senses from English equivalents and from each other because 
Dene speakers, whose English is generally native-like, tend to use the English words 
sad, lonely and miss interchangeably and for a wider range of situations than is 
standard for those English words.  Closely related morphologically and semantically 
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is the transitive kane...ɂá which is the direct equivalent of the English verb to miss 
(someone, something), as in nekaniɂá ‘I miss you’, or horely kaniɂá, t’ąt’u dághída 
yanísį {all 1IPFV:miss REL:how 1PL.IPFV:live in.past} ‘I miss everything about how 
used to live, in the past’. The English emotion of regret is usually translated as k’é...lį:  
A person feels sadness because he has committed an action or made a decision that 
he later comes to view as wrong, or omitted an action that he later feels he should 
have done, as in Ęnę ghesɂį íle ú besdółe, hok’ésłį  {Mother 1PFV:see NEG and 
3PFV:die 1IPFV:regret} ‘I regret not seeing my mother before she died’.  The Dene verb 
always refers to one’s regrets over one’s own behavior rather than feeling sorry for 
events beyond one’s control, e.g. I regret the loss of our home in the hurricane.  
This meaning is not possible with k’é...lį; ba dúé theda {3:for it.is.hard 3IPFV:sg.sit} 
‘he sits in sadness’ would be used instead.  The meaning of the transitive verb 
k'éne...tą1  is uniquely Dene.  This verb is in the same vocable as the sense k'éne...tą2 
discussed above, indicating a sudden, intense worry about the safety of someone the 
experiencer has not been in contact with for a while.  The object of the verb must be a 
person whom X loves: *t’ąt’u dághída bek’énitą {REL:how 1PL.IPFV:live 
3OB:1IPFV:miss} *‘I suddenly terribly miss how we used to live’.  It is not necessary 
for the object of the feeling k'éne...tą1 to have died: betsaze yech’ázį náłja, 
bezíritł’ízé hųłɂą, yek’énetą {3PO:girlfriend 3D:away.from 3PFV:sg.walk 3PO:photo 
3PFV:find 3D:3IPFV:miss} ‘he found a picture of his girlfriend who had left him, and he 
suddenly missed her’.  This verb is typically used when someone hears a story about or 
finds an item from a lost relative, and is suddenly overcome with nostalgia. 
Estene...dhen  <X Y ɂá estenįdhen:  person X feels very sad because of situation Y> 
is also commonly translated by the Dene as sad in English, but its use is much more 
restricted than the above two quasi-synonyms.  This is a sort of emotional devastation 
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brought on by a traumatic event, such as the death of a relative, the end of a marriage, 
etc.  One speaker described it as an "internally-focused feeling", i.e. a 
compartmentalized sadness one feels with respect to a specific personal tragedy, in 
contrast with X ha horé...lyą íle which is more "seeing everything black", being 
unhappy in every aspect of one’s life, even in response to a specific tragedy.  The two 
meanings are suﬃciently diﬀerent in Dene that some speakers will allow a direct 
contrast such as beba horelya íle kúlú estenîdhen íle {2:for 3IPFV:be.pleasant NEG but 
3IPFV:be.sad NEG} ‘he is sad but not grief-stricken’.  It carries a strong connotation of 
a debilitation, similar to grief-stricken, or abattu in French.  By contrast, dá...ɂá2 
refers to an ongoing deprivation or disruption in one’s emotional needs, as in ts’ékwi 
ɂá / tsąba ɂá / bedzíé náté ɂá daįɂá  ‘he is suﬀering because of a woman / for money 
/ because his heart is broken’; another sense refers to suﬀering due to deprivation of 
one’s physical needs.   Still another sense, dá...ɂá3, refers to a sadness or suﬀering 
resulting from an intense desire for someone or something that the experiencer 
knows he cannot have because of some external obstacle.  Some examples are 
ts’élt’úi ts’én dáiɂá {cigarettes to 1IPFV:suffer} ‘I’m pining for cigarettes (but the 
doctor forbade me to smoke them)’ and eyi ts’ékwi ts’én daįɂá {that women to 
3IPFV:suffer} ‘he’s yearning for that woman (but he can’t have her)’. dá...ɂá3 is 
distinct from dá...ɂá2 because in the latter case the desire can be fulfilled, unlike the 
former. The focus of dá...ɂá3 is on the experiencer’s suﬀering rather than on his or her 
desire, so the word is best viewed as a type of sadness.  
Quite unlike the above quasi-synonyms is hasne...dhen , which denotes a sort of 
disappointment that someone else has refused aid or a service that was owed the 
experiencer, as someone who returns from the hunt with plenty of meat but then fails 
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to engage in the normal practice of sharing it with others, contrary to their 
expectations: ber ghą danuthesni kúlú seghąłchúth íle, hasnidhį  {meat of 
1PFV:wish.to.have but 1OB.3.gave NEG, 1PFV:be.disappointed} ‘I wanted meat but 
they didn't give me any, so I was disappointed’.  It has a connotation of deliberate 
selfishness or cruelty on the part of the other party. “There has to be a story behind 
it” said one speaker as in the example above.  X bįní nettheth describes X’s bitter 
disappointment, and it is strongly implied that this is the result of an action or speech 
that another person directed at X; it is a quasi-conversive of X Y bįní łeghá...łdhi    
(‘for X to devastate Y’, lit. “for X to kill the mind of Y”).  X ba ehhúle denotes a 
sadness accompanied by an extreme torpor, close to what we would call “clinical 
depression” in English (one speaker called people who experience this “suicide 
people”).  
2.  Presence or absence or reason in X: almost all of these quasi-synonyms require 
the presence of reason in the experiencer, as they frequently involve memory, 
anticipation or foresight. Several of them, such as the feeling of estene...dhen, are 
brought on by a traumatic situation that the experiencer remembers and broods over.  
For this reason, most are limited to human experiencers, i.e. *łį estenįdhen {dog 
3IPFV:be.sad}*‘the dog is devastated’.   Only kane...ɂá and possibly X ha dúé2 can be 
applied to animal experiencers.   
3.  Intensity:  X ha dúé2 and X ha horé...lyą íle  are variable. K'éne...tą1 is an 
intense sadness, so attenuative adverbs cannot be used with this verb.  Estene...dhen is 
very an intense emotion, so it can be combined with adverbs indicating intensity, as 
in hųtł’édhé estenįdhen {very 3IPFV:be.sad} ‘she is very sad’ and estenįdhen ts’étthle 
{3IPFV:be.sad gently:neg} ‘she is very sad’, but not attenuation: ?yáazį estenįdhen  
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{a.little 3IPFV:be.sad} ?‘she’s a little sad’.  One speaker said that estene...dhen is a 
such a strong emotion that she found it strange to add intensifiers.  Other speakers 
found the intensifiers acceptable. Both senses of da...ɂá are intense, so it is strange to 
add attenuative adverbs: ?yáazį dáįɂá {a.little 3IPFV:suﬀer}.   
4.  Duration: X ha dúé2 and X ha horelya íle are flexible in their duration. 
However, for very long durations or general statements of fact X ha dúé2 is more 
appropriate than X ha horé...lyą íle: yanísį dene ba dúé ‹? horélyą íle› hodánįdhen  
íle {in.past people 3.for it.was.bad ‹?it.was.pleasant neg› DIST:3IPFV:think NEG} ‘people 
in the past didn’t feel that they were suffering 〈?that they were sad〉’. As a specific 
cause is necessary; estene...dhen cannot be an episode of depression or seasonal 
sadness, i.e. *?hhait’ázį dé estenesthen {fall when 1IPFV:be.sad} ?‘I feel sad in the 
fall’.  The feeling must have a certain duration: ?dųhų dzįné k’é estenįdhen {this day 
on 3IPFV:be.sad} ?‘she’s sad today’.  Both senses of dá...ɂá  involve prolonged 
suffering.   
5.  The suddenness of the feeling: the feeling of k'éne...tą1 strikes the 
experiencer suddenly after a period in which he had not been thinking of the person 
he had lost: *thá hots’į bek’enitą {long.time AR:from 3OB:1IPFV:miss} *I’ve missed 
him (suddenly) for a long time.  The time lapse between the death and the feeling can 
range from weeks to years. 
6.  Impact on X’s social interactions: estene...dhen and X ba ehhúle imply that 
the experiencer has withdrawn from his or her social interactions and duties, in a way 
which is socially unacceptable even given his or her suﬀering.  
Pragmatic and Extralinguistic Factors:  Unlike any of the European-language 
equivalents, estene...dhen also has a negative connotation, suggesting an undignified 
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self-pity.  Because of this connotation, it is considered to be a voluntary process.  As 
such, it can be used in the negative imperative: kut’a ú estenįdhen íle kúlú  {that’s.it 
and 3IPFV:be.sad NEG EMPH} ‘don’t engage in self-pity’.  Also due to the negative 
connotation, some speakers find it pragmatically odd to use in the first person, i.e. 
?estenesthen ?‘I am sad (in a debilitated, self-pitying way)’.  The feeling may push 
the experiencer to speak in a self-pitying way, considered bad in Dene culture, 
prompting the advice este ɂá yanełti íle kúlu ́ {sadness with 3IPFV:speak NEG EMPH} 
‘don’t talk in a self-pitying way’. 
 
3.1.1.5.  The ‘X is happy’ Series.  According to Wierzbicka (1988: 53), languages 
have far fewer words for when ‘something good happened’ than for negative emotional 
states.  Interruptions and challenges in one’s health, social life f providing for one’s 
needs become nameworthy instances of negative emotions.  Often ‘happiness’ is 
conceived of as a state in which there is simply an absence of affliction and obstacles: 
the absence of sickness, interpersonal conflict and material burdens.  The Dene 
language has relatively few words that refer directly to the emotional states of happiness 
and contentment.  To describe one’s enjoyment of an evening with friends eating 
bannock and dried meat and playing bingo might be simply narrated, followed by an 
impersonal third-person verb such as (seba) horélyą {(for me) 3IPFV:be.pleasant} ‘for 
me it is pleasant’.  There are, however, a few lexical units that can be directly translated 
as ‘happy’ or ‘glad’. A basic component is ‘something good happened’ (ahhe nóretth'er 
{well 3PFV:happen}, or ełtth’i nódher {right 3PFV:happen})  or perhaps ‘X feels good 
(as if) something good happened’, or ‘X thinks that something good can happen’.  ‘X 
feels something good’ is more difficult to verbalize in Dene as there is not a precise 
equivalent of ‘feel’.  We can therefore say that the dominant cannot be verbalized in 
Dene.    
To experience a ‘positive emotional state’ X must (1) perceive a certain situation 
and (2) apprise it as good for X or for something or someone X cares about, a situation 
                                                                                                                                      154 
which is better than other situations that were possible.  The result of this evaluation is 
(3) X’s feeling of happiness itself, a pleasant sensation evoked by (2).  This sensation 
may manifest itself in (4) X’s characteristic physiological reactions such as X’s smiling 
and light laughing (hesch’úł ‘I smile’; násdlogh ‘I laugh’) X’s feeling a sense of 
freedom or increased energy (sek’é ɂasí hule ląt’e {1:on thing 3IPFV:be.absent 
like:3IPFV:be} ‘it feels like there’s no burden on me’).   Unlike a negative emotional 
state, a positive emotional state does not result in X’s specific wishes because X does 
not want to alter this state but rather wants to allow it to continue.  It may remain a 
private feeling, or it may result in (5) X’s actions or (6) X’s speech and mental images 
which simply convey X’s state of joy (ɂasí horely nádlogh la sa hųt’e seba {things 
all 3IPFV:laugh like 1:for AR:3IPFV:be 1:for} ‘it’s like everything is smiling for me’).  
For (5), there do not appear to be physical expressions comparable to the English 
“jumping for joy” and others.   
The series is binié1, hene...lį, X ha asone...t’į íle, X ha sugha and X OBJ.AGRX–
įní ná...tser.  The definitions are the following: 
1. OBJ.AGRX–inié1 <X OBJ.AGRX–inié: person X feels something good for a short 
time>; free English translation: to feel happy, to feel glad. 
2. hene...lį2 <X henęlį: living being X feels something good for a long time>; 
free English translation: to feel happy. 
3. X ha asone...t’į íle <person X feels that nothing bad is happening>; free 
English translation: to feel okay, to feel fine. 
4. X ha sugha <person X feels something good>; free English translation: to feel 
good, to feel well. 
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5. X PO.AGRX–įní nátser, lit. “X’s mind is strong” <person X feels something 
good because X thinks that something difficult will happen in a way that will be good 
for X>; free English translation: to feel confident. 
Only two of the LUs are lexemes: binié1 and hene...lį2; the others are phrasemes: 
X ha asone...t’į íle, {X for there.be.problem NEG} lit. “for X there is no problem”; X ha 
sugha {X for it.is.good}; X OBJ.AGRX–įní nátser{X POX:mind 3IPFV:be.strong3} lit. 
“X’s mind is strong”.    
The parameters by which the quasi-synonyms differ are the following: 
1.  Cause and nature of the feeling: English has a contrast between words like 
glad, merry and joyful, which are all usually associated with a short-term experience of 
pleasure or delight through some immediate cause, with happy, which suggests a 
subdued and ongoing sense of well-being and satisfaction.  Many European languages 
have a similar contrasting pair, as between content and heureux in French or contento 
and felice in Italian, or alegre and feliz in Spanish.  Dene seems to have a somewhat 
similar contrast between binié1 and hene...lį2, although this pair also has some features 
unique to Dene. OBJ.AGRX–inié1 ‘to be glad’ or ‘to be happy’ is part of the same vocable 
as OBJ.AGRX–inié2 ‘to like (it)’.  This is the word used to refer to a fleeting merriness or 
joy at a specific situation.  For example, some speakers use sinié ‘I am glad’ in a way 
similar to ‘thank you’ upon receiving a gift.  In response to someone discussing a party 
he or she attended, a Dene speaker might ask ninié ú? {2:happy Q} ‘were you happy 
(there)?’ or ‘did you have fun?’.  The negation of OBJ.AGRX–inié1 is often translated as 
angry or upset.  The sentence ‘I am happy because I won at bingo’ is rendered as bingo 
honésną dé sinié {b. 1PFV:win when 1:be.happy}; using hene...lį2 in the same context 
is unacceptable: ?bingo honésną dé henesłį  {b. 1PFV:win when 1:be.happy } ?‘I am 
happy because I won at bingo’.  Because OBJ.AGRX–inié1 is tied to a specific moment 
and situation, it cannot be used to denote general satisfaction with life: *benekwé heł 
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binié {3PO:husband:CONS with 3:be.happy} ‘she was happy (living) with her husband’.  
One can be OBJ.AGRX–inié1 while being entirely unhappy in one’s general life.  A 
traditional legend about a Dene woman kidnapped and raped by Eskimos and suddenly 
rescued by a wolf walking on water contains the line nųníe yenįłɂį ú binié hojá eyi 
ts’ékwi  {wolf 3D:3IPFV:see when 3:be.happy AR:3PFV:begin that woman} ‘at the 
moment when she saw the wolf, the woman became happy’.  
Hene...lį2 has, of course, the contrasting values of the same parameters.  Unlike 
OBJ.AGRX–inié1, hene...lį2 is used to denote the experiencer’s contentment with his 
general circumstances in life rather than for a transitory feeling of joy or mirth at an 
immediate cause.  This happiness can be felt in the mind as well: sįní henęlį  
{1PO:mind 3IPFV:be.happy} ‘my mind is happy, relaxed’.    Dillon elders commonly 
use this lexeme when they contrast the mental well-being of the older generation who 
lived oﬀ the land with the more complex 21st century social context, saying for 
example yanísį hedánęlį, dųhų hedánęlį íle {in.past DIST:3IPFV:be.happy now 
DIST:3IPFV:be.happy NEG} ‘back then, people were happy, now they are not happy’ and 
dene ba dúé k’élá honįdhen íle nį... dene ba horélyą, dene hedánęlį ú {people 3:for 
it.was.hard INF AR:3IPFV:think NEG PAST people 3:for 3IPFV:be.pleasant people 
DIST:3IPFV:be.happy and} ‘I guess they didn’t find their life hard... people enjoyed life, 
and were happy’.   “It’s about your attitude”, said one Elder.  It is incorrect to use 
OBJ.AGRX–inié1 in the same context: *dene dábinié yanísį {people DIST:3IPFV:be.happy 
in.past} *‘people were happy back then’.  Conversely, it is incorrect to say *henesłį  *‘I 
am happy’ when the feeling of joy is caused by a specific action such as receiving a 
gift. The idiom X PO.AGRX–įní ná...tser is used when one is about to face a difficult 
change with calmness and satisfaction of one’s success, similar to confident or satisfied 
in English.  
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2.  Presence of reason in X: Like ‘glad’ in English, OBJ.AGRX–inié1 also requires 
the presence of reason, and cannot be used with animal experiencers: *łį binié {dog 
3:be.happy} *‘the dog is happy’.  A distinct sense of hene...lį2 is used to describe 
animal joy, perhaps because also in this case the feeling is deduced from the subject’s 
attitude.      
3.  Intensity: for humans, hene...lį2 indicates a general, subdued feeling of 
satisfaction with one’s circumstances, so it rarely takes intensifiers.  Only OBJ.AGRX–
inié1 has a highly variable intensity and can comfortably take intensifiers: binié ɂá binié 
‘he’s really very happy’.  The others are standard expressions of low-intensity 
contentment or absence of problems, so their intensity does not vary and it is strange to 
add intensifiers to them, much as really fine is strange in English.     
4.  Duration: Because of the fleeting nature of OBJ.AGRX–inié1, it is incompatible 
with temporal adverbs denoting an ongoing duration, such as *dene dábinié hok’étł’á 
{people DIST:3OB:happy always} ‘people were always happy’.  When binié is used with 
ongoing contexts, adverbs or particles, it has a repetitive reading: kųt’i dórełtth’a˛la 
kųt’u dábinié {this DIST:3IPFV:listen ASSERT like.this DIST:3OB:happy} ‘they listen to 
these (stories) and they are happy’; dene ghįɂį dé binié hoyį  {person 2IPFV:see if 
3:happy REP} ‘if you ran into someone, he would be happy’, in reference to people’s 
greater friendliness in the culture of decades ago; senekwé nįja dé thá hule dé sinié nį 
{1PO:husband:CONS 3PFV:arrive when long.time 3IPFV:be.absent when 1OB:happy PAST} 
‘when my husband would arrive after a long absence, I was happy’.  As a fleeting 
emotional state OBJ.AGRX–inié1 is not to be confused with the sense OBJ.AGRX–inié2, 
translated as ‘to like’, as in honás binié eyi t’ąt’u nálze k’énáts’édé {also 3:like that 
REL:how hunting DS:3IPFV:do} ‘they (Dene people in the past) were also satisfied with 
the way they hunted’.  This sense is frequent, but being generally happy with or satisfied 
with a state of affairs is conceptually quite different from joy or gladness as a feeling, 
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and the two senses also have different government patterns: OBJ.AGRX–inié2 requires a 
subordinate clause.  Conversely, hene...lį2 is incompatible with a fleeting, contextual 
feeling of contentment.   
5.  Human organ versus whole subject: Unlike its quasi-synonyms, hene...lį2 can 
be ascribed specifically the mind (considered in the Dene naive-linguistic view of the 
world as the locus of emotion) rather than to the whole person, i.e. sįní henęlį  
{1PO:mind 3IPFV:be.happy} ‘my mind is happy’.   
 
3.1.1.6.  The ‘X likes/loves Y’ Series.  The primitive is ‘X feels something good 
toward Y’, expressed by the dominant hene...lį1.  The series consists of six lexemes: 
chá...di2, ghąne...tą, hene...lį1, sąne...dhen, sahore...lni and –łneth; OBJ.AGRX–inié2.  
The definitions of the quasi-synonyms are the following:  
1. chá...di2  <X Y hení ch’ádi: living being X likes living being Y unusually 
intensely and craves Y’s affection> ; free English translation: to be attached to, to be 
clingy to, to really like [someone] now.   
2.  ghąne...tą  <X Y ghąnetą:  singular living being X loves singular living being 
Y>; free English translation: to love. 
3. hene...lį1   <X Y henelį: person X likes entity or X’s activity Y>; free English 
translation: to like.  
4.  sąne...dhen  <X Y sąnįdhen:  person X loves living being Y>; free English 
translation: to feel aﬀection for [Y]. 
5.  sahóre...lni or sóre...lni   <X Y ghą sahórelni:  person X intensely loves 
divine being Y>; free English translation: to adore. 
6.  –łneth  <X Y hełneth: living being X loves entity Y and depends on Y emotion-
ally>; free English translation: to depend on [Y] emotionally. 
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7. OBJ.AGRX–inié2 <X Y prosubj agr-X–inié: living being X likes situation Y>; free 
English translation: to like [activity Y].   
These quasi-synonyms differ by the following parameters: 
1.  The nature of X’s liking or love for Y: chá...di2  is purely platonic; X aims to 
receive the affection and attention of the living being Y. Unlike most of its quasi-
synonyms, chá...di2  expresses a temporary surge in affection and emotional clinginess 
toward Y.  Because of the component ‘X craves Y’s affection’, chá...di2 pushes Y to 
interact with Y.  Normally in Dene culture this is expressed by wanting to be near or 
with the living being, but in a modern context it is possible to use this word to refer to a 
friend or relative who lives at a distance, for example, but whom one calls often: sąk'íe 
Arizona nadher kúlú bení ch'ásdi {1PO:maternal.aunt Arizona 3ipfv:live but 
3:depending.on 1IPFV:like} ‘My aunt lives in Arizona but she is my favorite’.  It 
implies seeking contact with Y but does not require for this feeling to be reciprocal: 
sedézé bení ch’ásdi kúlú eyi sení ch’ádi íle {1PO:older.sister 3:depending.on 
1IPFV:like but she 1:depending.on 3IPFV:like NEG} ‘I feel such aﬀection toward my 
sister but she doesn’t feel it toward  me’.  Because of the component ‘X seeks affection 
of Y’, however, Y must know, or X must want Y to know about X’s feelings.  One 
cannot ch'ádi a deceased relative or a movie star: ?setsuné nį bení ch’ásdi 
{1po:grandmother late 3:depending.on 1IPFV:like} ‘I feel such affection for my late 
grandmother (now)’.  The feeling chá...di2  depends on X’s emotional need of affection 
or attention from Y rather than on Y’s positive qualities: dene nezle kúlú bení ch’ásdi  
{person 3IPFV:be.good:NEG but 3:depending.on 1IPFV:like} ‘he’s not a good person, 
but I feel affection for him and seek his attention’.   
The feeling expressed by ghąne...tą is a general love that can be used in both 
platonic or romantic contexts: setsuné ghąnitą {1PO:grandmother 1IPFV:love} ‘I love 
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my grandmother’, James betsuaze ghąnetą {James 3PO:girlfriend 3IPFV:love}‘James 
loves his girlfriend’, Yedáriye ghąnetą {Creator 3IPFV:love}‘she loves the Creator’. 
The object of ghąne..tą  can be any living being: sechízaze ghąnitą {1PO:cat 
1IPFV:love } ‘I love my cat’ is acceptable as well. It cannot however be applied to non-
living entities: *diri yoh ghąnitą {this house 1IPFV:love} *‘I love this house’, or 
activities: *eneåkâ ghąnetą {3IPFV:sew 3IPFV:love} *‘she loves sewing’.  For these 
hene...lį1 could be used in both cases, or alternatively OBJ.AGRX–inié2 for activities 
and situations.  Hene...lį1, like OBJ.AGRX–inié2, has a much wider range of application 
than its quasi-synonyms.  In the case of hene...lį1, X involves a very general enjoyment 
that X derives from situation or entity Y, be it sensory, aesthetic, emotional or 
intellectual pleasure.  Consequently, Y can be any living being, as in benesłį, betí ɂá, 
dene nezǫ ɂá {3OB:1IPFV:like 3:friendly because person 3IPFV:be.good because} ‘I like 
him because he is kind, because he is a good person’ or inanimate entity: diri 
bek’éshélyi 〈ɂeyághe〉 benesłį {this table 〈marrow〉 3OB:1IPFV:like} ‘I like this table 
〈moose bone marrow〉’.  It may also refer to any activity or situation: ełídlįné 
eghálasna benesłį íle {F.M. 1IPFV:work 3OB:1IPFV:like NEG}‘I don’t like working in 
Fort McMurray’.  Hene...lį1 is really the only option in this series for use with an 
inanimate Y, and in spontaneous speech speakers commonly use this word to describe 
their favorite foods.  Sąne...dhen1  can refer to friendship or to romantic love.  It is 
often used in the reciprocal ełghą sąnįdhen {REC:of 3IPFV:love} ‘they love each other’ 
to describe couples or true friends. The object of sąne...dhen1 does not have to be 
human: łį ghą sąnįdhen {dog of 3IPFV:love}  ‘she loves the dog’, although it does have 
to be animate: *diri erihtł’ís ghą sąnesthen {this book of 1IPFV:love}‘I love this book’.   
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The intransitive verb sahore...lni  or sóre...lni is a relatively rare word.  It is 
considered by at least one speaker as belonging to the (Catholic) religious lexicon, 
which is heavily influenced by French second-language speakers.  Some speakers 
translate this word into English variously as “respect”, “worship” and “love”, and 
consider the term to be appropriate for describing love of God, as in Agnes Nihołtsini 
ghą sahorelni {A. God of 3IPFV:adore} Agnes is adoring the Creator.  As such, the 
range of X and Y actants is limited Y can only be a divine being.  It can’t be used with 
people as Y *dene ghą sóresni {people of 1IPFV:adore } because, in the words of one 
speaker, “we don’t treat people that way”.  Other speakers use this word with a 
diﬀerent sense, meaning ‘having fun with (someone)’.  Disagreement between 
speakers indicates multiple senses, some of which are more commonly used by 
diﬀerent people.  The latter sense probably denotes more an attitude or activity than 
an emotion. The transitive verb –łneth is the rarest word of the series — some speakers 
deny its existence entirely.  Among speakers who do use it, there is a very strong 
preference to use it in the reciprocal, i.e.  Agnes ú Robert ú ełehełneth {A. and R. and 
REC.:3IPFV:depend.on} ‘Agnes and Robert are emotionally dependent on each other’, 
or in a derived form.  A few speakers do, however, use it in its underived form. The 
word refers to an emotional need or reliance rather than any other type, such as 
economic: *tsąba ha ełehełneth {money for REC.:3IPFV:depend.on} *‘they depend on 
each other for money’. The object of –lneth must be an entity rather than an activity 
(*yasti hesneth {1IPFV:pray 1IPFV:depend.on} *‘I depend on praying emotionally’), 
but it can be animal, as in chíze hesneth ‘I am attached to the cat emotionally’ or an 
inanimate object of emotional significance, as in the sentence įłásį diri erihtł’ís 
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hesneth {always this book 1IPFV:depend.on} ‘I always depend on this book 
emotionally’. 
In contrast, OBJ.AGRX–inié2 is used with a wider of situations than the other quasi-
synonyms, with the exception of hene...łį1.  It is used for situations in which X derives 
happiness, amusement or satisfaction from a situation. Binié2 and hene...łį1  are the only 
lexemes that can be used with situations as Ys; the Y actant of OBJ.AGRX–inié2 must be 
a situation: *erihtł’ís  / *chíze sinié {c *‘I am happy (about) the book / the cat’.  This 
word is often used for activities carried out by X, such as hháł ɂá sénásther sinié  
{cards with 1IPFV:play 1:like} ‘I like playing with cards’, but unlike the case with 
hene...łį1, it is also possible for Y to be a situation totally extraneous to X, as in eyi 
ts’ékwi t’ąt’u beskéné néshą sinié {that woman REL.how 3PO.children 3IPFV:raise 
1IPFV:like} ‘I like the way that woman raised her children’, Dene ɂá erestł’ís k’oshą 
sinié ‘I like knowing how to write Dene’; k’i tué hesdą sinié {birch water:CONS 
1IPFV:drink 1:happy}‘I like drinking birch syrup’.   
2.  Presence of reason in X: rationality is not required of the experiencer of 
ch’a...di2.  A pet dog, for example, can be X: diri łį sení ch’ádi {this dog 
1:depending.on 3IPFV:like} ‘this dog is clingy to me’. The experiencer of ghąne...tą  
does not have to be rational: sełįchoghé seghąnetą {1PO:horse:CONS 1OB:3IPFV:love} 
‘my horse loves me’. Unlike binié2, hene...lį2 involves a rational actant: dene sedánelį 
{1OB:DIST:3IPFV:like} ‘people like me, I am well-liked’, ?łįchogh senelį ?‘the horse 
likes me’. Unlike several quasi-synonyms, sąne...dhen1  requires reason: *chize eåghâ 
sąnįdhen {cats REC.of 3IPFV:love} *‘the cats love each other’.  As it is a religious word, 
the experiencer of sahore...lni can only be human. The verb –łneth can take rational or 
non-rational actants as X: diri sekwi 〈sets’į łį〉 sełneth {this child 〈1:to dog〉 
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1OB:3IPFV:love} ‘This child 〈my dog〉  needs me emotionally’. Binie2 does not require 
reason, and can be used with human and non-human Xs: neł yasti sinié {2.with 
1IPFV:speak 1:like} ‘I like talking with you’, łį dzoł ɂá sénádher binié {dog ball with 
3IPFV:play 3:like} ‘the dog likes playing with the ball’.   
3.  Duration: unlike –łneth, ba...dhi ch’á...di2 and ghąne...tą necessarily involve 
an ongoing state of affairs.  Not surprisingly, it is odd to use temporary adverbs such as 
diri sa k’é huli ‘only this month’ with this verb.  Sąne...dhen cannot be used for a 
fleeting emotion, i.e. *dųhų dzįné k’é hułi yeghą sąnįdhen {this day on only 3D:of 
3IPFV:love} *‘s/he loves him (just) for today’. Sahore...lni appears to be flexible in 
duration, referring to a moment of worship or to a general feeling.  The verb –łneth  
is also flexible in terms of duration, and may be used for an ongoing feeling of 
emotional reliance and attachment, or for a fleeting feeling in a time of particular 
emotional need: dųhų dzįné k'é sets’éni hesneth {this day on my.friend 1IPFV:want} ‘I 
am really depending on my friend (only) today’. Binié2 is also flexible with regards to 
the duration of the feeling.  It can be used for general preferences as in many of the 
above examples, or for a temporary feeling: nak’é beł nasther benesłį íle kúlú dųhų 
dziné k’é hųłį beł nasther sinié {sometimes 3.with 1IPFV:stay 3OB:1IPFV:like NEG but 
this day on only 3.with 1IPFV:stay 1:happy} ‘I sometimes don’t like staying with him, 
today I am glad to be with him’. Sąne...dhen1 refers to an ongoing feeling that X has 
towards Y. 
4.   Intensity: Unlike most of its quasi-synonyms, ch’á...di expresses a temporary 
surge in affection and emotional clinginess toward Y.  Even if X generally likes and 
expresses affection to Y, the state of ch’á...di indicates a particular increase.  Because of 
this component, this verb is particularly incompatible with attenuative adverbs such as 
yáazį ‘a little’ and hųtlł’édhé íle ‘very ... not’.  Sąne...dhen is, however, subject to 
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variation in its degree, and combines with both emphatic and attenuative adverbs: hotíé  
/ degháre lį ghą sąnįdhen {really / barely dog of 3IPFV:love}‘she loves the dog a lot / a 
little’. Similarly, the emotion of ghane...ta must be intense. Attenuative adverbs are 
particularly odd with this emotion: ?yáazį 〈?degháre〉 yeghąnetą ?‘she loves him a 
little 〈? a lot〉’. Sahore...lni has a fixed intensity, and cannot be used with attenuative 
adverbs or with intensifiers such as hotíé ‘really’.  The verb –åneth has a variable 
intensity, as it can be combined with intensifiers, as in hotié ełehełneth {really 
REC:3IPFV:need} ‘they really need each other’, although attenuants are odd: ?yáazi 
ełehełneth {a.little REC:3IPFV:need} ?‘they need each other a little’. Binie2 has some 
flexibility in terms of intensifiers: senasther sinié ɂá sinié sį {1IPFV:play 1:like REP 
1:like EMPH} ‘I really like playing’.  
5.  Eﬀect on the experiencer: hene...łį1 could potentially have as many Reals as it 
does Y actants, but this emotion does not really push X to carry out any action in an 
immediate sense, as seen by its frequent use to express general, permanent preferences.   
 Pragmatic and Extralinguistic Notes: speakers also report that, unlike the typical 
translations ‘clingy’ or ‘needy’, ch’á...di2 as an emotion is not viewed negatively.  
Unlike clingy or even cuddly in English, a Dene speaker will gladly use ch’á...di2 in the 
first person: bech’ásdi ‘I am clingy to him/her’, ‘I really like him/her now’.   
 
3.1.1.7.  The ‘X wants Y’ Series.  Desires are wishes, which is a larger category 
than “emotions”.  Because this study is cross-cultural, it is not confined to the 
culturally-specific category of “emotions” (see the introduction to this section), which 
are artificially divorced from “feelings” such as ‘hunger’ in English.  The category of 
desires encompasses items from both groups, and so “emotion” should be taken loosely 
to reflect this.  The semantic primitive of this field is ‘X wants Y’.   The dominant is 
hore...lɂį, which has a similar range and versatility as the English meaning ‘want’ and 
which appears to be a common meaning underlying that of every verb in the series (in 
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place of which it can almost always be used).  This series contains the following eight 
verb stems: hore...lɂį, ba...dhi1, ba...dhi2, bane...tal, hoba...dhi, danu...lni, 
ne...dhen2, kane...dhen, as well as the phraseme nį dé.   
The definitions are the following:  
1.  hore...lɂį  <X Y horelɂį:  living being X feels a desire for Y>; English free 
translation: to want. 
2. ba...dhi1 <X Y badhi: living being X feels a desire to ingest Y>; English free 
translation: to want to eat, to hunger for. 
3. ba...dhi2  <X Y badhi: living being X feels a desire to have sex with living being 
Y>; English free translation: to want (sexually). 
4. bane...tal  <X Y banetal: living being X wants to ingest Y>; English free 
translation: to want to eat, to hunger for. 
5.  hoba...dhi  <X hobádhi: living being X feels a desire to have sex>; English 
free translation: to have sexual desire, to be horny. 
6.  danú...lni  <X Y ghą danulni:  person X feels a desire to own object Y>; 
English free translation: to want to own [Y]. 
7.  ne...dhen2 <X Y nįdhen:  person X feels a desire that event Y takes place in 
the future and is planning for Y>; English free translation: to wish, to intend. 
8.  kane...dhen <X Y kanįdhen: person X feels a desire to obtain inanimate 
object Y that X needs>; English free translation: to be on the lookout for [Y], to be 
looking for [Y] 
9.  nį dé, lit “PAST if”  <[X[ Y nį dé:  person [X], who is the Speaker, feels a 
desire that situation Y were happening / had happened / would happen>; English free 
translation: to wish.  
The following parameters distinguish these quasi-synonyms: 
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1.  The nature (and consequently object) of the desire: the transitive verb 
hore...lɂį is the most general and closest to the dominant of all of the quasi-synonyms 
of this series.  It can be used with a wide range of rational and irrational X actants, i.e. 
eghálana horelɂį  {3IPFV:work 3IPFV:want} ‘he wants to work’ as well as łį tu horelɂį  
{dog water 3IPFV:want} ‘the dog wants water’.  The object of the desire can be virtually 
any living being, inanimate object or situation.  Using a human as a direct object of the 
verb would usually imply a sexual desire, much like to want somebody in English, i.e. 
ts’ékwi norelɂį ahunedi {woman 2OB:3IPFV:want 3IPFV:seem} ‘it seems the woman 
wants you (sexually)’.  With an inedible object it would imply a desire of ownership and 
with food or drink it would imply consumption, but these are all pragmatic factors 
rather than components of the definition.  This is the verb most commonly used to 
describe speakers’ desires for immediate future preferences, such as hotié Edmonton 
ts'én naheda ha horelɂį   {really Edmonton to REV:3IPFV:sg.go FUT 3IPFV:want} ‘she 
really wants to go back to Edmonton’.  The above example shows that this verb also has 
a variable intensity, as shown by its ability to be used with intensifiers such as hotíé 
‘really’.  There is no absolute link between wish and intent in the meaning of this verb, 
and hore...lɂį can be used for impossible or impractical situations: Edmonton ts'ésa 
horesɂį kúlú dúé {Edmonton to:1IPFV:sg.go 1IPFV:want but it.is.impossible} ‘I want to 
go to Edmonton but it’s impossible’ or siné ha horesɂį kúlú hhait’ázį ɂa {summer FUT 
1IPFV:want but fall ASSERT} ‘I want it to be summer but it is fall’. These uses do reflect 
situations that, while temporarily impossible or implausible, are at some point plausible 
or likely to happen.  For an entirely imaginary and impossible situation, such as ‘I want 
to be young again’, ni dé rather than hore...lɂį would be used (see below); ?chelekwaz 
nawasdle horesɂį {young.man 1OPT:be.again 1IPFV:want} ‘I want to be a young man 
again’.  This sentence may be less acceptable than the hypothetical sentences about the 
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seasons above since, while the desire for each season can certainly be fulfilled within 
coming year, the desire to be young again is entirely imaginary and unrealizable.   
For ba...dhi1 the object of the desire is an entity, specifically food or drink.  This 
word is used when the subject desires food or drink in general entity rather than a 
specific kind of food or drink among choices: lidí basthi {tea 1IPFV:want} ‘I want tea’ 
and egané basthi {dried.meat 1IPFV:want} ‘I want dried meat’ are perfectly acceptable 
but pragmatically more marked than tu basthi {water 1IPFV:want}‘I am thirsty’, lit. “I 
want water”; lidí  〈egané , tu〉 horesɂį {tea 〈dried meat, water〉 1IPFV:want} ‘I want tea 
〈dried meat, water〉’ would be a more common choice.  This is the also used for general 
hunger in the quasi-idiom ber basthi {food 1ipfv:want}‘I want food’ or ‘I am hungry’.  
Tu basthi {water 1IPFV:want} must be considered an idiom because while ber can have 
the sense of ‘food’, tu refers specifically to water and not to ‘drink’.  Ba...dhi1 denotes 
desire of variable intensity, and can be intensified through repetition: ber basthi t’á ber 
basthi {food 1IPFV:want REP food 1IPFV:want} ‘I am really very hungry’.  It seems to be 
slightly more intense than hore...lɂį because ba...dhi1 suggests a physiological need in 
addition to a simple desire.  Unlike the others, it is used only for temporary situations.  
Long-term hunger or starvation is inferred from a reference to circumstances: yanísį 
ɂená estunet’įné, ber bets’į ɂá {long.ago Cree 3IPFV:be.poor, food 3.to NEG because} 
‘long ago the Cree were very poor, they had no food’, cf. *yanísį ɂená ber badhi 
{long.ago Cree food 3IPFV:want.eat} *‘long ago the Cree wanted food’.  This word 
involves a physiological need rather than a rational desire, so non-rational entities can 
be X: łį ber badhi {dog food 3IPFV:want} ‘the dog wants food, is hungry’. As with 
ba...dhi1, the object of bane...tal is food and drink.  
Dene has at least three or four words that refer specifically to eros in addition to 
the general ‘want’ verb which is compatible with that meaning.  The first is the most 
direct, ba...dhi2.  It is transitive: nebadhi  ‘she wants you’.  Some speakers consider this 
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to be an innovation, a modern extension of ba...dhi1  above, but all speakers accepted 
this sense as possible.  The object of the desire here is an entity, but speakers rejected 
the use of an inanimate object Y for pragmatic reasons.  Like ba...dhi1 it denotes a 
desire of variable intensity and temporary duration.  It is more intense than its quasi-
synonym ederé...lye ‘to be enticed’: ts’ékwaze bets’én ederesłe {girl 3.to 
1IPFV:be.enticed}‘I am enticed by her’, lit. “to her”.  The verb hore...lɂį which has a 
very general meaning can also be used: ts’ékwaze norelɂį ahunedi {girl 
2OB:3IPFV:want 3IPFV:seem} ‘it seems the girl desires you’.  A long-term desire is 
designated with synonyms for ‘love’ and ‘like’.  Like ba...dhi1  it denotes a real-world 
desire that can be satisfied.  
A close quasi-synonym is the intransitive hoba...dhi, which differs formally from 
ba...dhi2 only in the presence of the areal prefix, referring to a situation or area.  It is 
used to refer to general, diffuse desire to have sex and it cannot be used with a specific 
Y: *setsúaze (ha) hobasthi {1PO.girlfriend (for) 1IPFV:be.horny} *‘I am horny for my 
girlfriend’.  Like its English equivalent ‘horny’, hoba...dhi is dispreferred in contexts 
where the discourse indicates a specific or probable Y: ts’ékwaze ahhenet’į, bets’én 
ederesłe {girl 3IPFV:be.beautiful 3:to 1IPFV:be.enticed} ‘the girl is beautiful, I am 
enticed by her’, versus  ?ts’ékwaze ahhenet’i, hobasthi {girl 3IPFV:be.beautiful 
1IPFV:desire} ‘the girl is beautiful, I am horny’. Hoba...dhi is a state that pushes the 
experiencer toward an action, as shown by the numerous Real possibilities in the 
following section, but it can also be used when the realisation of the desire is impossible 
or impractical, for example for someone alone in the bush.   
The intransitive verb danú...lni  differs slightly from the other ‘want’ verbs in 
many parameters.  The Y actant can only be an object or animal that X wishes to 
possess, such as in neɂihé ghą danúsni  {2PO:jacket of 1IPFV:want.own}‘I want your 
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jacket’.  The general ‘want’ verb hore...lɂį  can alternatively be used in most or all of 
these sentences.  It is compatible with intensifiers but the attenuative adverb yáazi ‘a 
little’ with this verb was rejected by speakers (and tends to be slightly pragmatically 
odd for all emotional states). Danú...lni differs from its quasi-synonyms however in 
that it refers to a specific Y that the person X wishes to acquire.  If the person X simply 
searches for a generic Y it is slightly odd to use danú...lni; speakers tend to use the verb 
ɂane...dhen, as in truck godhé nasni ha hųtł’édhé ɂanesthen {truck new 1IPFV:buy 
FUT really 1IPFV:want} ‘I really want to buy a new truck’.  
The transitive verb kane...dhen is similar in object, intensity and duration as its 
quasi-synonym danú...lni in that unlike the latter kane...dhen implies that X is 
somehow deficient for not having Y.  It suggests a Y that the subject X regularly comes 
into contact with.  It is used to refer to necessities that X is hoping to stock or is looking 
for, such as hhaye hohha nalbadhé kánesthen {winter for tires 1IPFV:want} ‘I'm 
looking for winter tires for the winter’.  It does not imply ownership, but simply 
obtaining something, even temporarily, to consume: łue kanįdhen ú? {fish 2IPFV:want 
QUESTION}‘are you hoping to get fish?’.  It can also be used for wanting [to find] one’s 
own possession that one has lost: neké kanįdhen {2PO.shoes 2IPFV:want} ‘you’re 
looking for your shoes’.  
The transitive verb ne.. dhen2 is quite different within this series.  This verb is the 
second sense within the same vocable as the sense ‘to think’.  The only acceptable Y is 
a situation expressed by a verb; an entity cannot be the second actant: *ber 〈*tu; *ɂih〉 
nesthen {food 〈water; coat〉 1IPFV:want} * ‘I want food 〈*water; *a coat〉’.  The 
situation Y must be future situation with respect to narrated situation rather than the 
moment of speech: an old woman recalled not wanting her marriage with a stranger 
arranged by a priest when she was eighteen years old with kú si sa dúé la hanúwasja 
nesthen íle ɂá {but I 1.for it.was.hard ASSERT 1OPT:marry 1IPFV:want NEG because} ‘it 
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was so hard for me because I didn’t want to get married’.  It can refer to an immediate 
possibility that is desired or not desired while being debated: yałti tth’i bek’éch’á 
yawasti íle nesthen ɂá, sa dúé kúlú {priest also 3.against 1OPT:speak NEG 1IPFV:want 
ASSERT, 1:for it.was.hard but}‘I didn’t want to go against the priest, even though I felt 
terrible’, also from the same narrative.   However, the same verb can be used for a more 
tentative or distant future as well as an immediate one: yanádhé dé sekų dustsi 
nesthen {future when 1PO.house 1OPT:build 1IPFV:want}‘I want to build a house for 
myself one day in the future’.  This is one of the few contexts where the general want 
verb is unacceptable, because the latter suggests a more immediate fulfillment of the 
desire: ?yanádhé dé sekų dustsi horesɂį nesthen {future when 1PO:house 1OPT:build  
1IPFV:want} ?‘I want to build a house for myself one day’.  
2.  Intensity of the desire:  The most general and flexible in its intensity is 
hore...lɂį.  Speakers accept, to an extent, adverbs of degree with verbs of hunger: 
yáazį ber badhi 〈banetal; horelɂį〉 {a.little meat 3IPFV:want.eat 〈3IPFV:want.eat; 
3IPFV:want〉} ‘he’s a little hungry’, although they find it a bit pragmatically odd to 
quantify hunger.  The other quasi-synonyms are less acceptable with adverbs of 
degree. Speakers find it odd to add intensifiers to bane...tal, as in ?hųtł’édhé jíé 
banetal {really berries  3IPFV:want.eat} ‘he really wants (to eat) berries’, although 
hųtł’édhé jíé banetal íle {really berries 3IPFV:want NEG}‘he really doesn’t want (to eat) 
berries’ is fine.  This is probably due to the fact that Dene lacks many negative 
antonyms and uses negation polysemously, with an attenuative or antonymic meaning 
depending on the context.  The negation likely has an antonymic meaning here.  As with 
ba...dhi, bane...tal involves a temporary desire.  The other parameters seem to be 
identical with the quasi-synonym ba...dhi.  Hoba...dhi denotes by definition an intense 
feeling, and attenuative adverbs like yáazi ‘a little’ are pragmatically quite odd (even 
stranger than with the quasi-synonyms). In cases where desire can more logically vary, 
such as danú...lni  ‘to want to own [Y]’, a slight or attenuated desire is expressed by 
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speakers with the optative form of a verb such as ‘to buy’ followed by an excuse or 
explanation or why the desire is only tentative: nusni15 kúlú... ‘I would buy it but...’. 
3.  Duration of the desire: hoba...dhi  implies an ongoing desire;  ba...dhi1, 
bane...tal, and ba...dhi2 are limited in duration; if, for example,  the desire in ba...dhi2 
were extended as permanent tendency of a person, one would say edlélé ba naster 
{sexuality 3:for 3IPFV:be.strong} ‘sexuality is strong for him’ instead.  The others are 
more flexible and their duration can vary depending on the context.  In particular, 
danú...lni is compatible with a long-term duration and with a past reading thá hots’į 
truck danúsni {long.time since truck 1IPFV:want.own}‘I’ve wanted a truck for a long 
time’. 
4.  Relation between desire and intent: ne...dhen2 requires both desire and intent. 
Because intent and a future context are necessary, the desire must be realizable: ?bingo 
nedhé honesní nesthen {bingo big:ADJ 1IPFV:win 1IPFV:want} ?‘I want to win the big 
bingo’ is strange because it sounds too much like intent.  It can however be used for 
situations that are, while plausible, currently impossible: Edmonton nawassa nesthen 
kúlú dúé {Edmonton REV:1OPT:sg.go  1IPFV:want but it.is.impossible}‘I want to go to 
Edmonton but it’s impossible (the road conditions are too bad). Ne...dhen2 suggests a 
noncommital or tentative desire based on rationally weighing possibilities.  This 
component is why the negative nesthen íle as in the examples above particularly suggest 
a lack of consent or compatibility with the subject’s intentions.  Speakers reject 
sentences such as ?tu wasdą nesthen {water 1OPT:drink  1IPFV:want} ‘I want to drink 
water’ and ?ber ghą shéwasti nesthen {food 1OPT:eat  1IPFV:want} ?‘I want to eat 
meat’ as odd, one speaker saying “it sounds like you’re debating it”. Because 
kane...dhen implies intention and a future situation, it can only be used for situations 
                                                
15 Many speakers find it somewhat rude or inappropriate to use the verb “buy” directly to refer to an 
unmarked situation of acquiring something.  The Dene have a very long tradition of sharing and 
exchanging items and only in recent times have come to really acquire most items in a cash economy.  
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that are both plausible and future with respect to the main narrated event.  Danu...lni is 
clearly linked to an intent to acquire the Y, as shown by the numerous Reals 
(expressions of buying).  Danu...lni is, however, compatible with unrealizable desires 
to own a specific Y: beghą danúsni kúlú bena sets’į íle {3:of 1IPFV:want.own but 
3:in.exchange.for 1:to NEG} ‘I want [to own] it but I have nothing in exchange for it’. 
In the case of nį dé, there is a much weaker link between desire and intent: it can be 
used with actions one has no intntion or ability of carrying out: chelekwaz nawasdle 
nî dé nesthen {young.man 1OPT:be.again PAST if 1IPFV:think} ‘I am thinking, I wish I 
were a young man again’. 
5.  Presence or absence of reason in X: danú...lni, ne...dhen2, and kane...dhen 
require rationality and planning, and so cannot be used with animal or infant Xs.  There 
is resistance to attributing desire and intention to animal agents:  *sas dene łegháwałthi 
nįdhen {bear man 3OPT:kill 3IPFV:want} *‘the bear wants to kill the man’; one speaker 
explained “we can’t say what an animal is thinking”.   Speakers find it strange to use 
hoba...dhi with animal subjects because it implies an ongoing desire, which they find 
odd to apply to nonrational subjects.   Similarly, nį dé and ba...dhi2 are limited to 
humans.  Only hore...lɂį, ba...dhi1, and bane...tal, are non-rational and can be applied 
to animal experiencers.  
6.  Hypothetical or real-world nature of the desired situation: the phraseme nį dé 
is the only non-verb from the series.  Structurally it is formed from the quasi-morphs nį, 
the past-tense marker, and the conjunction dé ‘if’.  It comes just after the sentence it 
has semantic scope over.  It can refer to past, present or future situations, as in neba 
horelyą nį dé  I hope you have a good time (in the future) or  deníe thiłk'édh nį dé 
{moose 1PFV:shoot PAST if} ‘I wish I would shoot / had shot a moose’.  
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7.  Whether the desire is possible to realize: unlike the others, nį dé  can also be 
used with entirely imaginary and unrealizeable situations: chelekwaz nawasdle nî dé 
nesthen { young.man 1OPT:be.again PAST if 1IPFV:think} ‘I am thinking, I wish I were 
a young man again’. 
8.  Restrictions on speech act participants: unlike its quasi-synonyms,  nį dé is 
used to express hypothetical, imaginary desires of the Speaker only, similar to ojalá in 
Spanish.    It can never be interpreted as referring to wishes of the X actant of the 
subordinate sentence, so added to a third-person subject sentence such as edini deníe 
thelk'édh {he moose 3PFV:shoot} ‘he shot a moose’ would mean  ‘I think it should be 
him to shoot the moose’ rather than *‘he would like to shoot the moose’, or lį besąyúé 
hułɂą nį dé {dog 3PO:toys 3PFV:find PAST if} 'I wish the dog would find his toys'. 
Pragmatic and Extralinguistic Notes: Because ne...dhen2 concerns intentions, it is 
pragmatically most compatible with the first person, because in the Dene language one 
hesitates to claim intimate knowledge of other peoples’ intentions.  There is a tendency, 
therefore, to add ahunedi ‘it seems’ with after verbs of volition and desire with non-
first-person subjects.   
 
3.1.1.8.  Other Emotion Terms.  There are a few words which denote ‘surprise’.  
The basic explication for this emotion is ‘X feels something because X starts to know 
something that X thought would not be true or happen’.  Although the various 
‘surprise’ words in English may have positive connotations (such as surprise or 
unusual) or negative ones (such as shock), the notion of ‘surprise’ cannot itself be 
evaluated as negative or positive.  To experience  ‘surprise’ one must (1) perceive a 
certain situation or start to know something and (2) apprise it as something very 
different from what one thought would happen or be true of that situation or of the 
participants involved in it.  As a result of this evaluation, one feels a strong sensation (3) 
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evoked by (1) and (2).  This sensation may manifest itself (4) in certain physiological 
reactions such as the eyes widening (bená dárgai ‘his eyes turned white (wide)’ — 
no ‘jaw dropping’ in Dene) over which one has only partial control. It may remain a 
private feeling (if no one noticed the physiological response), or it may result in (5) 
actions such as turning to and touching or shaking other people from disbelief (ełenílɂį 
we look at each other, dene benathiłna ‘I touched someone’, sets’éni sethełní ‘my 
friend grabbed me’) and (6) speech (esji! ‘wow’, húúlí ! ‘wow, really!’) that expresses 
one’s state of surprise.   
The series is yenorí...ya, k'é and ɂórí.  The definitions are the following: 
1.  yenorí...ya or norí...ya  <X Y ghą yenoríya: person X feels surprise at entity 
or situation Y>. 
2.  k'é  <[X] Y k'é: person [X], who is the Speaker, feels surprise when X that 
situation Y is happening / happened>     
3.  ɂórí  <[X] Y ɂórí: person [X], who is the Speaker, feels surprise when X sees 
that situation Y is happening / happened>      
 Only the first is a verb; k'é and ɂórí  are postverbal particles with scope over 
the entire clause.  They diﬀer by the following parameters:  
1.  Kind of stimulus: because k'é and ɂórí indicate surprise at situations the 
Speaker or protagonist has directly experienced through sensory perception, they are 
limited to situations for which there might (usually) visual or auditory evidence.   
2.  Whether one has directly observed evidence for something: k'é and ɂórí 
indicate surprise at something one has directly preceived through sensory means, 
while norí...ya can be used for intellectual surprise: yanísį honí beghą sudi ląt’e, 
kúlú nak’é tth’i beghą noríya ląt’e {in.past story 3:of funny assert, but sometimes also 
3:of 3IPFV:be.surprised ASSERT} ‘Stories from long ago are funny but sometimes 
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surprising’, lit. “sometimes old stories are funny but sometimes one is surprised at 
them”, kúlú įłásį ts’én tth’i beghą noríya {but one.side at also 3:of 3IPFV:be.surprised} 
‘However one aspect [of the situation] is surprising’ 
3.  Evidentiality: ɂórí implies visual evidence: tedhe tsíł ghejer órí  {night 
falling.snow 3PFV:fall MIR} ‘wow! [look!], it snowed last night’; implies but does not 
entail visual evidence: beghá nóreshálé dene dįtth’ah k’é {3:about 3IPFV:be.surprised 
people 3PFV:hear MIR} ‘people were very surprised to hear that’.  Yenorí...ya has no 
evidentiality restrictions.  
4.  Duration: only yenorí...ya can express a long-term or general feeling, as in 
(yanísį honí beghą sudi ląt’e, kúlú nak’é tth’i beghą noríya ląt’e  ‘Stories from long 
ago are funny but sometimes surprising’).  The others express surprise only concerning 
the moment in which one discovered something, and no more.   
5.  Restrictions on speech act participants: unlike its quasi-synonyms, k'é and ɂórí, 
as postverbal particles, can express the surprise of the Speaker only; if there is any 
other subject, it is understood that the particles indicate that the Speaker is surprised by 
what that other subject is doing.   
 
3.1.2.  Emotion Terms: Syntax.  In each case whenever an actant is a situation, in 
principle this can be expressed in the surface syntax as a verb or as a noun.  The latter 
can happen when the verb is expressed a noun derivatives (i.e. N = S0(V), where V is an 
action of another DSyntA). However, S0(V) derivations are very rare in Dene, one 
example being be–eghena–i {3PO–live–NMLZ} ‘his/her life’.  It should therefore be 
kept in mind for every Government Pattern where a noun (N) is listed as a possible 
surface realization of a situation, while this is technically an option it is not 
productive.  
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Like its English quasi-equivalent 'angry', the first verb in the ‘X is angry’ series 
may have three semantic actants in some cases ('X is angry at Y for doing Z') and two in 
other contexts: ('X is angry at [agentless] situation Y'). This LU therefore has two 
Government Patterns:  
 1.  í...lch’é <X Y ts’én hílch’é Z ɂá: person X starts to feel anger at living being Y 
because Y caused situation Z> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II Z ⇔ III 
1. N!human 
 
1. Nliving  ts’én 
 
1.  V ɂá 
2.  N ɂá 
 
 
C1.1 + C2.1:  sets’lch’é  [sets’én hlch’é] {1OB:at 3PFV:get.mad} ‘she got mad at me’, 
‘she is mad at me’  
C1.1 + C2.1 + C3.1: Eva beskéné ts’lch’é sąt’a dáyałti íle ɂá  {Eva 3PO:children 
at:3.PFV:get.mad quietly DIST:3:speak NEG because} ‘Eva got mad at her children 
because they were talking loudly’.   
 2.  í...lch’é <X hílch’é Y ɂá: person X starts to feel anger at situation Y>: 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. CLAUSE ɂá 
C1.1 + C2.1: hlch’é chą ɂá {3PFV:get.mad it.rains because} ‘he was mad at it raining’.  
3.  ná...lch’ogh <Y, X nálch’ogh: person X feels intense anger at situation Y> 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. CLAUSE  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: edini yebeschené hesdółtsi, nálch’ogh {he 3D.PO:car:CONS 3PFV:destroy, 
3IPFV:be.angry} 'hei's furious that hej destroyed hisi car'.   
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C3.1 : V must be an action of Y, which is not expressed but is understood in the 
discourse.  
4.  X OBJ.AGRX-įní k'éch'á, lit. “X’s mind against”  <Y, X bįni k’éch’á́: person X 
feels angry because at situation Y that X does not want>  
 
X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II 
1.  N!human  1.  CLAUSE 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: The keyword is technically intransitive; Y is realized as another clause 
understood pragmatically as the cause of the situation: seyaze kontúé hedą, sįní 
k'éch'á kúlú asolesį íle {1PO:son whiskey 3IPFV:drink, 1PO:mind against but 
1.IPFV:say.something NEG} ‘my son is drinking whiskey, I'm upset [at that] but I don't 
say anything’. 
5.  OBJ.AGRX-hene...łkon <Y, øSG X benełkon: person X feels angry at situation Y 
that some people sometimes cause that many people feel is bad> 
X ⇔ II Y ⇔ III 
1.  N!human  1.  CLAUSE 
 
 C1.1 + C2.1: ɂasí ha íle ghą yanełti, senełkon {thing for NEG about 2IPFV:speak, 
1OB:3IPFV:offend} 'you are speaking disrespectfully, and it offends me'.  
 hune...lch’ogh <X hunelch’ogh: person X feels very angry many times because 
of situations that people do> 
X ⇔ I 
1.  N!human 
 
C1.1 :  Sam hunelch’ogh ‘Sam always gets angry at people’  
6.  dzíre...lch’ogh <Y, X dzírelch’ogh gha ná...dher Z: because person X is very 
angry at situation {Y}, X moves to many places within area Z>.  
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X ⇔ I Y⇔ II Z ⇔ III 
1. N!human 1.  CLAUSE  1. gha ná...dher Nplace 
C1.1  + C3.1 (by far the most frequent GP): James dzírelch’ogh gha nághįdher 
Banįch'eri {James 3IPFV:PERM:be.angry PP 3PFV:stay P.} ‘James stormed angrily 
around Patuanak’, ‘James went around Patuanak angry’. 
C2 : rarely expressed; usually understood from the discourse.  
The items in the ‘X dislikes Y’ series also have varying Government Patterns: 
 1.  hene...lį íle <X Y henęli íle Z ɂá: living being X feels something bad towards 
situation or entity Y because of situation  Z>  
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II Z ⇔ III 
1. N!living.being 1. N! 
2. V! 
1.  V ɂá 
2.  N  ɂá 
 
C1.1  + C2.1  + C3.1:  diri kafí benesłi íle suga deɂzé natser ɂá {this coffee 
3OB:IPFV:like NEG sugar too.much 3IPFV:be.strong because} ‘I dislike this coffee 
because the sugar (in it) is too strong’.  
C1.1  + C2.2 : tųlú k’é hojéré benesłi íle{road on AR:messy 1IPFV:like NEG} ‘I hate it 
when the road is muddy and torn up’. 
 2.  ch’á...di íle <X Y ch’ádi íle Z ɂá: person X feels something bad towards 
situation or entity Y because of a bad situation or quality Z that Y did or is like> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II Z ⇔ III 
1. N!human 
 
1. N! 
 
1.  V ɂá 
2.  N  ɂá 
 
C1.1  + C2.2 : tųlú k’é hojéré benesłi íle{road on AR:messy 1IPFV:like NEG}  
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 3.  ch’áre...t’e <Y X ha ch’árįt’e Z ɂá: person X feels something bad towards 
person Y because of a bad situation Z that Y did>  
 
X ⇔ II Y⇔ I Z ⇔ III 
1. N!human 
 
1. N!human  1.  V ɂá 
2.  N  ɂá 
 
C1.1  + C2.2  + C3.1: Jean sa ch'árįt'e ch'erelɂį ɂá, dene {J. 1:for 3IPFV:be.hated 
3IPFV:be.rude because person} ‘I hate Jean because he's antisocial, that guy’ 
C1.1  + C2.2: Jean sa ch'árįt'e {J. 1:for 3IPFV:be.hated} ‘I hate Jean’ 
 4.  dakure...la <X Y Z-i dakurela: person X feels something bad toward 
situation or entity Y that continues to make a sound that X does not like>  
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II Z ⇔ III 
1. N!human 1. N!human 
2. N!inanimate 
1.  Vsubj.agrY–i 
 
 
C1.1  + C2.1 + C3.1: nerakuresła eyi shen ch'elé horįłtth'ąi  {2OB:1IPFV:dislike that 
music worthless 2SG.listen:REL} ‘I am fed up with you listening to that damned music’ 
C1.1  + C2.2 + C3.1: impossible 
C1.1  + C2.2 : eyi shen ch'elé berakuresła { that music damned:ADJ 3OB:1IPFV.dislike} ‘I 
am fed up with that damned music’ 
The  ‘X feels fear / anxiety’ series: 
1.   ne...ljer <X Y ch’á neljer: living being X feels afraid of entity or situation Y 
because of Y’s characteristic Z, or X feels afraid because something bad might 
happen to Y because of situation Z>  
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X ⇔ I Y⇔ II Z ⇔ III 
1. N!animate 1. N ch’á 
2. Nanimate ba 
3. V ch’á 
1.  V ɂá 
2.  V dé 
3.  N  ɂá 
 
C2.2: must be a living being X is afraid for, i.e. whom X cares about and who could be in 
danger: theni nądher dé, neba nesjer {alone 2IPFV:stay when, 2:for 1IPFV:fear} ‘I am 
afraid for you when you stay alone’. 
C2.3 + C3.3: odd; very rare 
C1.1 + C2.2: often with C3.2 with VSUBJ.AGRY (i.e.Y’s action Z), or else C3: is omitted 
C1.1 + C2.3: often a general fear, with Z omitted: tenesłe ch’á nesjer 
{1IPFV:go.into.water against 1IPFV:fear} ‘I’m afraid to go into the water’ 
C1.1 + C2.1: dlúne ch’á nesjer {mice against 1IPFV:fear} ‘I am afraid of mice 
(musophobia)’  
C1.1 + C2.1 + C3.1: łį bech’á nesjer bejeré ɂá {dog 3.against 1IPFV:fear 3:mean because} 
‘I am afraid of that dog because he is mean’ 
C1.1 : alone, often an expression of a general or abstract fear without a contextual 
stimulus, e.g. yanadhé dé tsąba dódí dé, nesjer ląt’e {future when money 
there.is.none if 1IPFV:fear EMPH} ‘I’m kind of afraid that I’ll have no money in the 
years to come’. 
 2.   k'éne...tą2 <X Y k'énetą:  person X suddenly feels intensely afraid that 
some-thing bad might happen or have happened to person Y after X has not been in 
contact with Y for a long time> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. N!human 
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C1.1 + C2.1: dení kálzé ha  téya, thá hule, dųhų bek'énitą  {moose for:3IPFV:hunt for 
INCEP:3PFV:sg.go, long.time 3IPFV:be.absent, now 3OB:1IPFV:worry} ‘he went moose 
hunting, he's been gone a long time, now I'm worried about him’. 
 3.  te...łgheth <X tełgheth Y ɂá: living being X suddenly feels intensely afraid 
because X saw or heard Y that X thinks could do something bad to X>  
 
X ⇔ II Y⇔ I 
1. N!human 1. N 
2. V 
 
C1.1 : ɂełk’édhi ɂá náthestła, tesgheth {bang because 1PFV:startle 1IPFV:get.scared} ‘I 
got scared because of the loud bang’ 
  4.  hhahore...łi has two Government Patterns: 
 1. X Y OBJ.AGRY–hhórełi: <person X is afraid that to do action Y which would 
be bad for X>. 
 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. V! SUBJ.AGRX ha 
 
C1.1 + C2.1 : object agreement will be 3rd person be–, in reference to the situation Y 
expressed by V that X is afraid of doing, even if this situation would be carried out by X 
rather than by a third person:  dechąłdáni tł’úle ɂá holį nassa ha bóresłi   {bridge 
string with AR:3IPFV:be REV:1IPFV:sg.go FUT 3OB:1IPFV:fear} ‘I'm scared to cross that 
bridge made of string (because it looks like it might collapse)’ 
 2. hhórełi <X Y OB.AGRY–hhórełi ZSUBJ.AGRY ha: person X is afraid that person Y 
may cause situation Z which would be bad for X>: 
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X ⇔ II Y⇔ II Z ⇔ III 
1. N!human 1. N! 
 
1.  Vsubj.agrY ha  
2.  Vsubj.agrY ch'á 
C1.1 + C2.1  + C3.1: C3 obligatory with the combination C1.1 and C2.1.  Object agreement 
will be with N(C2.1), the agent of V(Z) in this case: seyaze bóresłi taltth'i ha/ch'á  
{1PO.son 3OB:1IPFV:fear 3IPFV:fall.into.water FUT/against} ‘I'm scared that my son will 
fall into the water (while playing on the edge of the bridge)’. 
 5.  X OBJ.AGRX-įní łą <X bįní łą Y ɂá: X feels afraid for a long time because of 
continued situation(s) Y>  
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. V 
2. N 
 
Y rarely used because the keyword often refers to a general angst at several situations. 
C1.1 + C2.1: betsųaze yech’ázį náłja ɂá, bįní łą {3PO:girlfriend 3D:away.from 
3PFV:walk because 3PO:mind it.is.many} ‘he is worried because his girlfriend left him’. 
C2.2 : especially rarely used; would be S1(V) describing a situation, which is a rare 
derivation in Dene.   
 6.  X PO.AGR–dzié natser íle, lit. “X’s heart is weak”.  <Z, X bedzié natser íle Y 
ha:  person X feels afraid to do Y because knows that X will be in contact with 
situation Z which may be bad for X> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II Z⇔ III 
1. N!human  1. VSUBJ.AGRX ha 1. CLAUSE 
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C1.1 + C2.1: seyaze kontúé hedą, sedzíé natser íle ekozį hessa ha {1PO:son 
3IPFV:drink, 1PO:heart 3IPFV:be.strong NEG there 1IPFV:sg.go FUT} ‘My son is drinking 
whiskey, I’m afraid to go there (home)’.  
 7.  X k'eniré...lya íle <X Y ghą k'énirélya: person X feels afraid because X 
thinks that something bad is happening or might happen to entity Y> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1.  N!human 1. N 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: seyaze yuwé tabíł ka nákį, beghą k’énirésha íle {1PO:son over.there 
fishnets for 3IPFV:paddle, still 3IPFV:be.absent, 3.about 1IPFV:be.calm NEG} ‘my son 
paddled far out to set nets; he's still gone, I'm worried about him’ 
 The  ‘X feels sad’ series: 
 1.  X ha dúé2    <ø-SG X ha dúé Y ɂá:  person X feels very sad because of 
situation Y> 
 
X ⇔ II Y⇔ III 
1. N!human ha 
2. N!human ba  
1.  V ɂá 
2.  N  ɂá 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: sa dúé sets’į chízaz łegháįdher ɂá {1:for it.is.hard 1:to cat:DIM 3PFV:die 
because} ‘I feel sad because my cat died’.   
 2.  X ha horé...lyą íle   <Y, ø-SG X ha horélyą íle:  person X feels intense 
sadness and does not feel good towards all of the things that X often feels good 
towards because of situation Y> 
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X ⇔ II Y⇔ III 
1. N!human ha 
2. N!human ba 
1.  CLAUSE 
1. V ɂá 
 
C1.2 + C2.1: la dódí, beba horélyą íle {work there.is.none 3.for 3IPFV:be.pleasant NEG} 
‘he’s sad, depressed because there is no work’. 
C1.2 + C2.2: beba horélyą íle la dódí ɂá {3.for 3IPFV:be.pleasant NEG work there.is.none 
because} ‘he’s sad, depressed because there is no work’. 
 3.  ane..ɂá1  <X aneɂá: person X feels sad because X does not have anyone to 
talk to>  
 
X ⇔ I 
1. N!human 
 
C1.1: dene ch’ázį nidhá nasther, aniɂá  {people away.from far 1IPFV:stay 
1IPFV:feel.lonely} ‘I’m staying far from people, I feel lonely’ 
 4. ane..ɂá2  <X aneɂá:  person X feels sad because of X no longer is in contact 
with situation or entity [Y]>   
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 
 
1. V 
2. N 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: nálzé ghą nánidhį, benasní sugha dághída, aniɂá {hunting about 
1PFV:think 1IPFV:remember well 1PL.IPFV:live 1IPFV:be.sad} ‘I’m thinking about 
hunting, how we lived happily, and I feel nostalgic’ 
 5.  kane..ɂá <X Y kaneɂá: living being X feels sad because X is no longer in 
contact with situation or entity Y>  
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X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 
 
1. N!  
2. V! 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: nekaniɂá {2OB:1IPFV:miss} ‘I miss you’  
C1.1 + C2.2: horely kaniɂá, t’ąt’u dághída yanísį {all 3OB:1IPFV:miss REL:how 
1PL.IPFV:live in.past} ‘I miss it all, how used to live in the past’ 
 6.  hok’é...lį1 <Y, X hok’élį: person X feels sad because X is sorry for situation 
Y that X caused and wishes X had not caused>   
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. CLAUSE  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: Ęnę ghesɂį íle ú besdółe, hok’ésłį  {Mother 3OB:1IPFV:see NEG and 
3PFV:die AR.OB:1IPFV:regret} ‘I regret not seeing my mother before she died’ 
 7.  k'éne...tą1  <X Y k’énetą:  person X feels very sad because X suddenly wants 
to be in contact with person Y intensely a long time after X has lost Y>      
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. N!human  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: betsaze yech’ázį náłja, bezíritł’ízé hųłɂą, yek’énetą {3PO.girlfriend 
3D.away.from 3PFV:go 3PO.photo 3PFV:find 3D:3IPFV:miss} ‘he found a picture of his 
girlfriend who had left him, and he suddenly missed her’. 
 8.  estene...dhen <X Y ɂá estenįdhen:  person X feels very sad because of 
situation Y and does not want to do things that X should do> 
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X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 
 
1.  V ɂá 
2.  N  ɂá 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: estenįdhen bela łegháįdher ɂá {3IPFV:be.sad 3PO:cousin 3PFV:die because} 
‘she is sad because her cousin died’. 
 9.  dá..ɂá2  <X Y ɂá dáįɂá: person X feels something bad because of bad 
situation Y that has existed for a long time>   
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 
 
1.  V ɂá 
2.  N  ɂá 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: bedzíé náté ɂá daįɂá ‘he is suﬀering because his heart is broken’ 
C1.1 + C2.2: very common, and not limited to S1(V): ts’ékwi ɂá / tsąba ɂá daįɂá ‘he is 
suﬀering because of a woman / for money’.   
 10.  dá..ɂá3  <X Y  ts’én dáįɂá: person X feels very sad because X intensely 
wants to be in contact with Y which X can’t be in contact with>  
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. N ts’én 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: ts’élt’úi ts’én dáiɂá {cigarettes towards 1IPFV:suﬀer} ‘I’m pining for  
cigarettes (but the doctor forbade me to smoke them)’ 
 11.  hasne...dhen  <Y Z, X hasnįdhen: person X feels bad because person Y 
caused situation Z that X did not want Z to cause>   
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X ⇔ I Y⇔ II Z ⇔ III 
1. N!human 1. Nhuman  1. CLAUSEsubj.agrY  
 
C1.1 + C2.1 + C3.1: ber ghą danuthesni kúlú edini seghąłchuth íle, hasnidhį  {meat of 
1IPFV:desire but he 1OB:3PFV:fabriclike NEG 1IPFV:be.disappointed} ‘I wanted (dried) 
meat but they didn't give me any (lit. “didn’t transfer it as a fabriclike sheet to me”), I 
was disappointed’.   
 12.  X PO.AGRX–įní nettheth <Y, X bįní nettheth: X feels very bad because 
situation Y that X wanted to happen did not happen>  
 
X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. CLAUSE 
 
 13.  X AGRX–ha ehhúle <∅–sg X ba ehhúle: X has a physical and mental 
problem that causes that X feels very sad and does not want to do anything>  
 
X ⇔ II 
1. N!human  ba 
 
C3.1: edini ba ehhúle {he 3:for it.is.indiﬀerent} 
 14.  X PO.AGRX–įní nátser íle <X bįní nátser íle: X feels very sad because 
many bad things have happened or many good things that X wanted to happen did 
not happen>  
 
 
 
X ⇔ I 
1. N!human 
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 The  ‘X is happy’ series: 
 1. OBJ.AGRX–inié1 <X binié: person X feels something good for a short time> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 
 
1.  V ɂá 
2.  V dé 
3.  N  ɂá 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: bingo honésną  ɂá sinié {b. 1PFV:win when 1IPFV:be.happy} ’I am happy 
because I won at bingo’  
C1.1 + C2.2: bingo honésną dé sinié {b. 1PFV:win when 1IPFV:be.happy} ’I am happy 
because I won at bingo’  
 2.  hene...lį2 <X henęlį:  living being X feels something good for a long time> 
 
X ⇔ I 
1. N!human 
 
 3. X ha asone...t’e íle <ø-sg X ha asone...t’e íle: person X feels that nothing bad 
is happening> 
X ⇔ II   Y⇔ III 
1. N!human 
 
1.  V 
2.  V dé   
3.  N   
 
4. X ha sugha <ø-sg X ha sugha:  person X feels something good> 
 
X ⇔ II Y⇔ III 
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1. N!human 
 
1.  V ɂá 
2.  N  ɂá 
 
 5. X PO.AGRX–įní natser <person X feels something good because X thinks that 
something difficult will happen in a way that will be good for X> 
 
X ⇔ I 
1. N!human 
 
 The  ‘X likes/loves Y’ series: 
 1.  chá...di2 <X Y hení ch’ádi: living being X likes living being Y unusually 
intensely and craves Y’s affection>   
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!living 1. N!living hení 
 
C1.1 + C2.2:  sąk'íe bení ch'ásdi {1PO.maternal.aunt 3OB:depending.on 1IPFV:like} ‘My 
maternal aunt is my favorite’, ‘I like and depend on my maternal aunt’. 
 2.  ghąne...tą <X Y ghąnetą:  singular living being X loves singular living being 
Y>   
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!living-SG 1. N!living-SG  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: setsuné ghąnitą {1PO.grandmother 3OB:1IPFV:love} ‘I love my 
grandmother’ 
 3.  hene...lį1 <X Y henelį: person X likes entity Y or X’s activity Y because of 
Y’s quality Z>  
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X ⇔ I Y⇔ II Z⇔ III 
1. N!human 
 
1. N! 
2. V!  
1. V ɂá 
 
C1.1 + C2.1 + C3.1: benesłį, betí ɂá, dene nezǫ ɂá {3OB:1IPFV:like 3:nice because, person 
3IPFV:be.good because} ‘I like him because he is kind, because he is a good person’ 
C1.1 + C2.2: ełídlįné eghálasna benesłį íle {F.M. 1IPFV:work 3OB:1IPFV:like NEG} ‘I 
don’t like working in Fort McMurray’. 
 4. sąne...dhen  VI <X Y ghą  sąnįdhen:  person X loves living being Y> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. N!living ghą 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: ełghą sąnįdhen {REC.of 3IPFV:love} ‘they love each other’, ‘they have true 
aﬀection for one another’ 
 5. sahóre...lni/sóre...lni  <X Y ghą sahórelni:  person X intensely loves divine 
being Y> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. N!divine  ghą  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: Agnes Nihołtsini ghą sahorelni {A. God of 3IPFV:love} ‘Agnes adores the 
Creator’ 
 6. –łneth  <X Y hełneth: living being X loves entity Y and depends on Y 
emotionally> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!living 1. N!  
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C1.1 + C2.1: įłásį diri erihtł’ís hesneth {always this book 1IPFV:rely.on} ‘I always 
depend on this this book emotionally’ 
 7. OBJ.AGRX–inié2 <X Y binié: living being X likes situation Y> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!living 1. V!  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: hháł ɂá sénásther sinié  {cards with 1IPFV:play 1IPFV:like} ‘I like playing 
cards’ 
 
 The  ‘X wants Y’ series: 
 1.  hore...lɂį <X Y horelɂį:  living being X feels a desire for situation or entity Y>  
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 
 
1. N!  
1. V! 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: łį tu horelɂį  {dog water 3OB:3IPFV:want} ‘the dog wants water’. 
C1.1 + C2.2: eghálana horelɂį  {3IPFV:work 3OB:3IPFV:want } ‘he wants to work’.  
 2.  ba...dhi1  <X Y badhi: living being X feels a desire to ingest Y>   
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!living 1. N!  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: lidí basthi {tea 3OB:1IPFV:want} ‘I want tea’ 
 3.  ba...dhi2  <X Y badhi: living being X feels a desire to have sex with living being 
Y>  
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. N!human  
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C1.1 + C2.1: nebadhi  {2OB:3IPFV:want} ‘s/he wants you’ 
 4.  bane...tal <X Y banetal: living being X wants to ingest Y>   
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!living 1. N!  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: hųtł’édhé jíé banetal íle {really berries 3OB:3IPFV:want NEG} ‘he really 
doesn’t want (to eat) berries’ 
 5.  hoba...dhi  <X hobádhi: living being X feels a desire to have sex>   
 
X ⇔ I 
1. N!human 
 
C1.1: hobadhi {3IPFV:desire.sex} ‘s/he is horny’  
 6.  danú...lni  <X Y ghą danulni:  person X feels a desire to own object Y> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. N! ghą 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: neɂihé ghą danúsni {2PO.jacket of 1IPFV:want}‘I want (to own) your 
jacket’ 
 7.  ne...dhen2 <X Y nįdhen:  person X feels a desire that event Y takes place in 
the future and is planning for Y>   
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. V!subj.agrX  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: yałti tth’i bek’éch’á yawasti íle nesthen ɂá, sa dúé kúlú {priest also 
3:against 1OPT:speak NEG 1IPFV:want ASSERT, 1:for it.was.hard but}‘I didn’t want to go 
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against the priest, even though I felt terrible’, lit. “I wanted that I not speak against the 
priest...”  
 8.  kane...dhen <X Y kanįdhen: person X feels a desire to obtain inanimate object 
Y that X needs> 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. N!  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: neké kanįdhen {2PO.shoes 3OB:2IPFV:want} ‘you’re looking for, hoping to 
find your shoes’. 
 9.  nį dé, lit “PAST if”  <[X] YPFV nį dé:  person X, who is the Speaker, feels a 
desire that situation S were happening / had happened / would happen> 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
–– 1. CLAUSE  
C1.1 + C2.1: deníe thiłk'édh nį dé {moose 3OB:1PFV:shoot PAST if} ‘I wish I would 
shoot / had shot a moose’ 
 Other emotion LUs: 
 1.  yenorí...ya / norí...ya <X Y ghą yenoríya:  person X feels very surprised 
because X observed situation or entity Y which was very diﬀerent from how X 
thought Y would be>   
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 
 
1. N! ghą 
1. V! ghą 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: yanísį honí beghą sudi ląt’e, kúlú nak’é tth’i beghą noríya ląt’e {in.past 
story 3:of funny ASSERT, but sometimes also 3:of 3IM:be.surprised ASSERT} ‘Stories 
from long ago are funny but sometimes surprising’ 
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C1.1 + C2.2: nárádlogh beghą norésha {DIST:3IPFV:laugh 3OB:of 1IPFV:be.surprised} ‘I 
was surprised at their laughing’ 
 2.  k’é <[X] Y k’é:  person X, who is the Speaker, feels surprised that situation S is 
happening / happened> 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
–– 1. CLAUSE  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: plane ghet’ał k’é {plane PROG:3IPFV:fly:PROG MIR} 'there was a plane 
flying overhead!' 
 3.  ɂórí  <[X] Y ɂóri ́:  person X, who is the Speaker, feels surprised that situation 
S is happening / happened> 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
–– 1. CLAUSE  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: tedhe tsíl ghejer ɂórí {night falling.snow 3PFV:fall MIR} 'wow, it snowed 
last night!' 
 
 
3.2.  Character Terms.   We saw in Section 2.4 that Apresjan (2000) identified a 
number of “main lexical systems” which are significant for semanticists because they 
correspond to “main human systems” such as physical perception, speech, thought, 
emotions and manipulation of objects.   So central to human experience are these 
systems that speech communities have coined an especially rich and subtle range of 
vocabulary to refer to them.  Although character and personality terms are not included 
in Apresjan’s list, the stable traits of people’s personalities are often characterized in 
terms of these main human systems and therefore character terms share semantic 
components with words from the other domains.  For example, many character terms 
refer to ways of speaking (aggressive, talkative, sweet); ways of thinking (curious, 
creative, imaginative); ways of feeling emotions (brave, short-tempered, cowardly); 
one’s effect on other people’s emotions (affectionate, creepy, friendly); ways of 
working (productive, lazy, meticulous), and interacting in human society (independent, 
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trustworthy, sociable). These traits reveal themselves through the subject’s habitual 
actions, and can be considered not as qualities of the subject X but as generalizations 
others make over many instances of X’s behavior.   
Character trait meanings are defined by specific behaviors.  For some terms, 
only one behavior is diagnostic of the trait.  Someone is talkative or chatty if he or she 
talks more than is considered customary.  For other traits, such as ‘X is kind’ or ‘X is 
nice’, there may be multiple prototypical manifestations expected, such as ‘X helps 
people’, ‘X speaks with others in a friendly way’, and ‘X shares resources’.  Crucially, 
character terms require not just certain behaviors to apply, but X’s propensity to behave 
in that way in the face of other choices.  In this work, the component ‘tends to’ will 
stand for the propensity to carry out certain behaviors, and will constitute the common 
element of all character terms’ meanings.  The meanings of character verbs thus follow 
a pattern where ‘tend’ is the dominant node and nonassertional (often ‘good’ or ‘bad’) 
are added to the action that ‘X’ characteristically tends to carry out, as in the SemS 
below for the verb here...łt’e2 ‘to be hard-working’:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the English version of the SemS, the communicatively dominant node is ‘tend’, 
because character terms are primarily descriptions of X’s tendency to perform certain 
actions characteristic of the trait.  This SemS represents most of the semantemes that 
must be present in the meanings of all character terms (replacing ‘do’ and ‘work’ in the 
above example with whatever behavior the character verb denotes).  In a Dene-language 
version of this SemS, however, it would not be possible to decompose the meaning of a 
character verb in precisely this way.  First of all, in Dene all character traits are 
⇔ 
 HERE...ŁT’E2  
  
     I(‘X’)  
I 
Preferably Unitary 
 ‘tend’   ‘good’ 
    ‘work’ 
‘more.than’ 
2 1 1 2 1 
    ‘average Xi’  ‘X’ 
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expressed as intransitive verbs16 or as phrasemes or free clauses.  The component ‘tend’ 
cannot be expressed independently of other meanings as a Dene verb.  The most similar 
LUs are adverbs such as hok’étł’á ‘always’. Also, ‘do’ is not usually expressed 
independently of a specific action verb in Dene.  Morally ‘good’ and ‘bad’ actions are 
also expressed with the adverbs ełtth’í ‘well’ and ełtth’í ... íle ‘well ... not’ on the verb 
k’éná...dher ‘do1’ and its (quasi-)synonyms, or with the (deverbal) adverbs nezǫ ‘good’ 
and nezǫ .. íle ‘good ... not’ on the verb a...t’į2 ‘do1’.  Because these are 
presuppositions, they are usually expressed as background knowledge when describing 
someone’s character.  A speaker might start by saying [X] ełtth’í ɂasí k’énádher {[X] 
well things 3IPFV:do} {right things 3IPFV:do1}, before going on to list a specific set of 
positive character traits, such as here...łt’e2  ‘to be hard-working’.  The latter verb can 
be decomposed then either as hok’étł’á eghálana {always 3IPFV:work} ‘he always 
works’ or as dene ɂzé eghálana {people more.than 3IPFV:work} ‘he works more than 
(other) people’.  Speakers find it pragmatically odd to specify all of this in a single 
sentence, i.e. as ?heręłt’e hok’étł’á dene ɂzé eghálana ɂá {3IPFV:be.hardworking 
always people more.than 3IPFV:work because} ‘he is hardworking because he always 
works more than (other) people’.  It would be a more natural Dene style to express these 
ideas as several sentences in a discourse.  The MTT methodology simply seeks to 
establish the denotational equivalence of the definiens and the definiendum 
independently of stylistic considerations. (The latter are explored in great detail in the 
MTT literature, but there is no space to address them in this work.)  It seems therefore 
that the Dene-language SemS of these character terms would have the same components 
and presuppositions as its English equivalent.   
                                                
16 A few of the verbs could be interpreted as emotion or action terms because they are  derived from a 
base with the habitual prefix hune–, giving the pairs (yałti ‘s/he speaks’ ~ yahunełti ‘s/he is talkative’) 
and (híl’ché ‘s/he gets angry’ ~ hunelch’ogh ‘s/he has an explosive temper’).  Most of the character LUs 
are not derived verbs, however. 
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As indicated by the SemS in the above lexicalization rule, some actions that 
people do are presupposed to be positive or negative according to the values and 
priorities of the culture, and their meanings may include ‘good’ or ‘bad’ as  
presuppositional components.  This is referred to by Apresjan (2000: 14) as a culture’s 
“naive-linguistic ethics”, of which he cites several examples of Russian quasi-synonym 
pairs:  
 
From the analysis of pairs of the type khvalit’ [to praise] and l’stit’ [to flatter], khvalit’ 
and khvalit’sia [to boast], obeshchat’ [to promise] and sulit’ [to promise the earth] ... and 
others like them it is possible to form an idea of the underlying commandments of 
Russian naive-linguistic ethics. ... Of course all these commandments are the merest 
truisms, but it is curious that they have been fixed in the meanings of words.  Certain 
positive commandments of naive ethics are also reflected in language”.   
 
In the above examples there may be an evaluative component or connotation, but 
‘good’/’bad’ is by no means the dominant semanteme.  ‘To flatter’ is best characterized 
as a way of talking which may have bad consequences or motivations, not as a way of 
being bad per se.  ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ are much more central to the meanings of other 
action verbs.   
There are at least two ways of approaching ethical concepts, including naive-
linguistic ethics.  In Western philosophy, situation ethics is a domain covering the 
analysis of intrinsically right and wrong actions independently of the character of the 
agent, while virtue ethics puts the focus on the qualities a person should possess in order 
to have the propensity to carry out right or wrong actions in concrete situations.  The 
two types of ethics are naturally interrelated.  If a person consistently performs good 
and bad actions, we tend to make a judgement about his or her personality.  Still, action 
and character terms remain quite distinct angles from which to describe people’s 
behavior.  In turn, ethical words in natural languages can usually be divided into two 
groups, those describing the ethics of actions — as in Apresjan’s examples — and those 
that directly evaluate the character of a person in terms of virtues and vices.  
The term ethics is related to ethos, the distinguishing habits and attitudes of a 
group.  The qualities viewed as virtues and vices are widely variant across cultures and 
between time periods within a culture, and this is reflected in their lexica.  Much as the 
Natural Semantic Metalanguage school claims that empirically all languages have 
“emotion talk”, or words describing some emotional situations, one can posit that all 
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cultures will also have “virtue talk” or “ethical talk”, a vocabulary to refer to people’s 
personalities in an evaluative way.  As with the emotions field, one can expect this field 
to contain both culture-specific and universal elements.  Often ethical values are 
reflected indirectly through negative words denoting people who were not considered 
virtuous because their behavior broke with community standards.  Because lexica 
change more slowly than cultures, in some cases the values may be mostly historical.  In 
traditional European culture, it was considered virtuous for women, but not for men, to 
be quiet and subservient in marriage and chaste outside of it, so the English language 
has preserved words like harpy, shrew, slut, and easy which refer to a woman who did 
not conform to such expectations, while we find no equivalent terms describing men 
with these tendencies.  In this way, character terms can provide insight into the 
historical or current mainstream values of a culture.  
Recalling the introduction to Chapter 3, MTT characterized two types of 
antonymic oppositions as gradient parameters with a neutral mean value (‘good’ ~ ‘bad’ 
oppositions and ‘more’ ~ ‘less’ ones).  In Western philosophy a similar concept of 
virtues and vices has been profoundly influential.  Arisotle’s ethical writings describe 
the virtues as middle values of gradient parameters, or “golden means”.  Deficiency or 
excess of the same quality is a vice, as in the cases of courage (cowardice, 
recklessness); modesty (bashfulness, shamelessness); generosity (meanness, 
prodigality); and friendliness (churlishness, rudeness).  Linguistically, too, it makes 
sense to view character traits as parameters with a socially correct range on the 
continuum.  There is not necessarily a word for excess in the positive direction, which is 
sometimes rendered by adverbial modifiers, as in the English phrases generous TO A 
FAULT  and being TOO kind.  However, there is usually a distinct word denoting the 
negative end of the continuum, e.g. a social transgression, as in words such as cowardly 
or stingy.  Negative words are therefore a good indication of culturally valued traits.  In 
Dene, adverbs such as deɂzé  ‘really’  can be used as intensifiers, as in deɂzé  betí 
‘he was so nice’, or in sense of ‘too much’, to denote the harmful excess of a trait, as in 
deɂzé nidhá! {really 3IPFV:be.far} ‘it’s really (too) far! (let’s not go there)’.   Dene 
character terms can sometimes be intensified in this way to denote excess of a positive 
quality, but there are usually distinct antonyms for the negative extreme.   
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The absence of certain character terms is therefore revelatory of Dene culture 
and social history.  In some cases, the range of meanings denoted by these verbs seems 
to echo documented cultural patterns in Dene societies.  Several anthropological studies 
of a Dene community in the Northwest Territories (see Rushforth 1992 and Rushforth & 
Chisholm 1991) have identified individual autonomy, self-sufficiency and resilience as 
highly valued traits in that culture.  This corresponds with the semantic content of Dene 
verbs for ‘to be courageous’ or ‘to be brave’, which differ from their English quasi-
equivalents in important ways, and to the plethora of critical words to denote ineptitude 
(i.e. as a hunter), laziness, cowardice and the propensity to complain (see below).   
3.2.1.  Disambiguating Senses.  Dene character terms were obtained through a 
combination of means: direct elicitation of equivalents of English terms, scanning of 
Dene texts and conversations recorded by the author looking for references to people’s 
personalities, and through more open-ended elicitation without any preconceived 
content, using questions like “Describe a good person for me”, “Why do you like your 
friend Mary so much?”, “Someone who is betí, what does he do?”.  In some cases, this 
can reveal characteristic Dene words that have no precise English equivalents.  In open-
ended elicitation, it is crucial to avoid imposing polysemy on a Dene LU that is used in 
contexts where different English LUs would be used.  If  one finds that the same 
signifier here...łt’e has multiple English translations such as ‘to be tough’, ‘to be 
persistent (in an endeavor)’ and ‘to be hard-working’, are there three distinct senses, 
each closely matching an English sense, or is there one vague overarching sense?  In 
such cases, caution must be exercised in positing polysemy.  Before approaching the 
series of Dene character terms, it is important to note how this class of words was 
delimited from other related areas of vocabulary, given that the two languages have 
different strategies for referring to people’s personalities.   Terms were selected only if 
they always referred to permanent or long-lasting personality traits.  Habitual readings 
of emotion or mental predicates such as ‘enthusiastic’ or ‘determined’ were excluded.  
Also left out were measures such as ‘cultivated’, ‘poised’, or ‘achiever’, and behavior 
categories like ‘trustworthy’, ‘progressive’, and cooperative’, all of which refer more to 
a person’s skills, accomplishments or social interactions than to his or her mental 
makeup.  Also excluded were words denoting attitudes toward the world, such as 
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‘optimistic’, which refer more directly to beliefs than to personality.  These LUs may be 
linked to certain traits or virtues, but the latter are not necessary components of their 
definitions.   Thirty-two LUs were chosen based on these criteria, and divided into five 
series, with a small remainder of unclassified LUs.   
 
3.2.2.  Other Means of Characterization.  Dene and English differ not only in 
the selection of character terms expressed but also in the extent to which character terms 
are used at all instead of free phrases.  There are essentially four cases of English 
character words that have no easy equivalents in Dene.  
Actions instead of Character Terms.  Dene has many emotion and character 
terms, but in comparison with European languages they are much less frequently used 
in narratives and in daily speech.  Generally the Dene style employs less analysis of 
people’s character and emotions than one finds in equivalent European genres.  Often 
the same idea can be rendered in Dene in a more “objective” way.  The most 
appropriate rendering of the English sentence I was ashamed I had said that would be 
Eyi t’a aresį ełtth’i aresį íle k’é {that REL 1PFV:say right 1PFV:say NEG MIR} lit. “What I 
said, I really spoke in a wrong way”.  The sentence makes an indirect reference to the 
speaker’s general negative feeling with regard to what he had said, but it is not as 
specific as the meaning ‘ashamed’.  There is a word meaning “to feel ashamed”, 
horíne...ja1, and it would be possible to render this English sentence more literally, as 
eyi t’a aresį nį eyi beghą horínesją  {that REL 1PFV:say PAST that 3:of 
1IPFV:be.ashamed}, but this is a slightly odd and overly explicit way of saying it, 
according to the consultants interviewed.  Dene speakers might describe a ‘kind’ or 
‘caring’ person as dene ts’éni {people 3IPFV:help} ‘s/he helps people’ rather than using 
a character term.  Describing people’s emotions and personalities indirectly through 
their actions is characteristic of the Dene style.           
Absence of an equivalent meaning.  The second case concerns English semantic 
units that are so foreign to Dene that they cannot easily be rendered even with a 
paraphrase.  When asked to translate these words and several example sentences 
containing them, and after considerable reflection, speakers concluded that they 
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“couldn’t think of it” or that “we don’t talk that way”.  This happened with brave and 
cunning, among others.  Speakers found it odd to describe someone who faces danger, 
such as a hunter encountering a bear, as ‘brave’ or ‘courageous’ because these words 
impose a European optic on Dene culture.  A former chief explained to me that 
traditional Dene life always involved risks and hardships, and facing such challenges 
bravely was not considered nameworthy but was assumed.   The closest approximation 
of ‘brave’, as in the situation of the hunter facing the bear, could be heręłt’e, rendered 
variously as “he is capable”, “he is hard-working” and “he is tough” in English, or 
yentł’édh ‘he is determined to stay strong (in a situation)’, a term also said of an 
elderly woman facing painful surgery.  Being ‘brave’ was traditionally a normal 
requirement of Dene life, unworthy of special mention.   Instead, Dene possesses a 
series of words denoting cowardice, such as benatíe (very approximately, ‘s/he is faint-
hearted’) or bek’élait’įne ́, rendered as “s/he is not a survivor”, or perhaps more 
precisely ‘s/he is incompetent because of cowardice’.   
Habitual reading of a free phrase.  In some cases, Dene speakers seem to 
identify and refer to very similar meanings as one finds in English character terms, but 
there is no established Dene LU to express them.  In such cases, speakers coin a free 
phrase on the spot.  There are essentially two ways in which this happens.  The first is 
the construction of a phrase which is quite similar to a definition.  Two examples of this 
are the English character terms able and imaginative.  The sentence My son is very able 
at building was rendered as Sįyeze t’a hołtsi wali k’asjene hołtsi wali {1PO:son REL 
3IPFV:make POSS almost 3IPFV:make POSS} ‘My son can make almost anything that is 
possible to make’.  The sentence My son is imaginative is rendered as Sįyeze t’ąt’ú ɂasí 
holį wali ghą nánedher {1PO:son REL:how things AR:3IPFV:be5 POSS about 
3IPFV:think} ‘My son thinks about how things could exist’.  The second way is to use a 
habitual reading of a situational thinking or feeling verb, perhaps with the addition an 
adverb meaning ‘always’ or ‘each time’.  The phrase intellectually curious in the 
sentence You are intellectually curious was rendered as Horely k’oshą nį dé nįdhen 
{all 1IPFV:know PAST if 2IPFV:want} ‘you would like to know everything’.  Determined 
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as a character trait could be rendered as hok’étl’á yenį́tł’édh {always 
3IPFV:be.determined} ‘s/he is always determined to stay strong (in a situation)’.   
Partial Equivalence of meaning/lexical unit, minus intensifier or attenuative 
components.  In some cases two LUs are nearly equivalent, but often the English SU 
contains the components ‘intensely’ or ‘not intensely’ which are missing from the Dene 
equivalent.  In Dene, it is usually preferred to add such components through free 
adverbs, if at all, rather than as fused meanings.  Adjectives such as a brilliant person or 
a gorgeous woman are translated in Dene simply as dene hųyą {person 
3IPFV:be.intelligent} ‘an intelligent person’ and ts’ékwi ahhenet’į  {woman 
3IPFV:be.beautiful} ‘a beautiful woman’.  Intensifying adverbs or reduplication are in 
some cases permissible, but they are seldom used in the spare Dene style.  Indeed, to 
many Dene people it sounds strange to try to rank or quantify qualities like ‘beauty’ or 
‘intelligence’.  Someone is simply called ‘intelligent’ or ‘beautiful’, or not, based on the 
overall impression he or she makes on others.   
When discussing positive character traits, it is important to distinguish ethical and 
moral character from mere amicability or pleasantness in interpersonal relations.  
Someone can exercise high-minded virtue and behave properly without being overly 
friendly to others.  To describe a ‘good person’ in this sense, one could use dene nezǫ 
{person 3IPFV:be.good}, but according to this verb carries a connotation of amicability 
and affection.  An honorable or virtuous person could be described either in terms of his 
or her thought patterns (dene hozų ɂá nįdhen {person AR:good with 3IPFV:think}, lit. “a 
person who thinks with the good”), or in terms actions: ełtth’i ɂasí k’énádher {right 
things 3IPFV:do} ‘s/he does the right things’.   
What is a good person like, and how does this person behave?  It was mentioned 
above that the standards of morality and goodness are diﬀerent across cultures.  In 
Dene we find a lack of precise equivalents of English terms denoting many of the 
cardinal virtues in Western culture such as ‘generosity’, ‘courage’, ‘honesty’, 
‘charity’, and so forth.  If these qualities are so essential in traditional Dene culture, 
one would expect to find a rich variety of verbs to refer to them.  However, often 
what is what is normal is not nameworthy, and instead words are coined to denote 
203  
stigmatized behavior or infractions of the social code.  As in the above example of 
‘bravery’, where courage was simply assumed and undeserving of explicit mention, 
one found instead a variety of words for cowardice or failure rather than for bravery.  
Similarly, the English words generous and charitable reflect an assumption which is 
true of most Western societies but not of traditional Dene cultures, namely that 
everyone has his own property and resources that  he then may choose to share with 
others or not.  The latter case is not necessarily reproachable, and the first is 
admirable, deserving of positive words to describe it.  In Dene culture, in contrast, 
people lived oﬀ the land and needed to constantly cooperate and share resources.  As 
one elderly hunter put it:  
 
Ją kųk’é hots’į dení łeghłdher dé ją hogaié k’é ełąta nálzé yuwé, dení łegháįłther dé, 
dene horely kozį hedéł łí.  Nádárelye ɂa, horely ɂasí, t’ahu losí, dene ełghąredeł łí 
nįɂ  Kųt’u dene dághena... Yanísį dene ełts’édi ú dághena nį ɂa, ełdháredi ú, t’ahi sí.  
Dene ɂasí bets’į íle dé, ɂasí horeké dé, beghąlchu, t’ąt’į sí, łes húto, lidí húto, sugá 
húto, ts’élt’úi húto.  Dene horely ɂasí bets’į íle nį, tsąba dódí ú la, yanísį.  Dene 
eghálana íle ųt’e.   
 
‘If someone from here in this clearing would kill a moose out there, everyone went 
there.  They would all take everything, they would share it.  That is how people 
lived... In the past, people lived by helping each other, and feeding each other, 
anything.  If someone had nothing, if he asked for something, it was given to him, 
anything: flour, tea, sugar, or tobacco.  People didn’t have much because there was no 
money back then.  People didn’t work [for cash]’ 
 
An woman in her late 80s described the constant collaboration in household tasks:  
K’i ts’į tth’i hołé, eyi tth’i kųt’į hoyį, eyi tth’i hedzégh.  Ts’ékwi dáyełtsi, dáyenełką.  
Ts’ékwi łą yeghą dełtth’i łí, dádloyáłti ú, sudi kádáyałti ú.  “Sets’érúłni” dádi íle nį 
dódí. Ełta así hełtsi dé, dene heł dáįghą, dene ts’éni hoyį.   
 
‘People made birch bark canoes, too, and seal them with spruce gum too.  Women 
would make them, sewing them together.  A lot of women would sit by one while 
laughing and joking.  People never asked others to help them.  If someone was making 
something, people would make it that person, people always helped that person’ 
 
Consequently, generosity and thoughtfulness are not particularly salient virtues in 
traditional Dene culture, but simply the natural and expected way of behaving in a 
society where people have to constantly collaborate to survive, and where survival on 
one’s own is impossible.  In contrast, Dene has a variety of words to describe vicious 
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people who fail to meet this standard because they are lazy or selfish — they do not 
carry their weight and do their share of the work.   
 
3.2.3.  Definitions.  As with the emotion lexical units, many character terms fall 
into a few natural synonym series.  However, a number of them are not directly 
comparable to any other words in the class and so are discussed as distinct entries.   
 
3.2.3.1.  The ‘X is good to others’ series.  Because the traditional Aboriginal 
lifestyle required so much mutual cooperation and living for extended periods in the 
same small group, maintaining cordial relations was essential for survival.  Kindness 
and friendliness were therefore not only valued traits but essential social skills.  The 
English notions of ‘kind’ and ‘friendly’ are usually rendered by one of the words in the 
synonym series below, or by paragraph-long descriptions of the specific behaviors of 
someone who is betí  or ne...zǫ3.  Also similar is the transitive verb hene...lį3 ‘to be 
kind to [Y]’. Typical behaviors of people who are betí ‘nice’ or ne...zǫ3 ‘[morally] 
good’ include tendencies like ɂasí ghąnetą íle {things 3IPFV:love NEG} ‘s/he is not 
miserly’, lit. “s/he does not love things”, cf. así ghąnetą  {things 3IPFV:love} ‘s/he is 
mean, stingy’, lit. “s/he loves things”.  As already discussed, it is the lack rather than the 
presence of generosity and kindness that is nameworthy in Dene.  Other traits and 
behaviors include speaking in a kind way (hotíé yati nezǫ haįɂą {really words 
3IPFV:be.good 3PFV:place} ‘she said some very kind things’); good manners and 
behavior to others (bech’álanié nezǫ {3PO:customs 3IPFV:be.good} ‘s/he (habitually) 
behaves well with others’); helping people (hotíé dene ts’éni {really people 3IPFV:help} 
‘s/he helps people’); using humor, which is highly valued in Dene culture (sudi k’ółther 
{funny 3IPFV:master} ‘s/he is funny’, lit. “s/he masters humor”).  
 There are three genuine character terms for rendering the idea of ‘kind’ or ‘nice’.  
The above verb is excluded because as a transitive verb with a referential direct object, 
it cannot be classified as a character term, which must be a general statement without 
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reference to a specific direct object.  The series is OBJ.AGRX–ti ́, OBJ.AGRX–hederédlįne, 
and ne...zǫ3, and the definitions are the following: 
 1. OBJ.AGRX–tí  <X betí: living being X tends to interact with others in a way that 
makes Y feel good, more than Y normally feels in interactions with others  > 
 2. OBJ.AGRX–hederédlįne  <X bederédlįne: people think that most people will 
behave like this | X tends to behave with other people in a way that makes other people 
feel good > 
 3. ne...zǫ3 <X nezǫ: living being X tends to interact with others in a way that 
makes Y feel good, more than Y normally feels in interactions with others> 
 They differ by the following parameters:  
 1.  The nature of the quality: OBJ.AGRX–tí seems to describe someone who is kind 
and friendly, with less emphasis on X’s services to others than on X’s sweet demeanor 
and, pleasantness in verbal interaction with others, as well as X’s restraint in conflictual 
situations: eyi deneyu betí, bįní k’éch’á dé, hųłch’ogh íle {that man 3:nice, 3PO:mind 
against when, 3IPFV:be.habitually.angry NEG} ‘he’s a kind-hearted man, when he’s 
upset he doesn’t explode’.  [X] OBJ.AGRX–hederédlįne describes someone who 
behaves according to social conventions and does not behave in a way that offends 
others.  Its negation, bederédlįne íle, implies insanity in a way similar to bįní hule 
{3PO:mind 3IPFV:be.absent} ‘his mind is gone’.  It suggests deliberate behavior beyond 
a simple natural disposition: edini dene heł dé, bederédlįne  {3PO:he people with 
when, 3IPFV:be.good} ‘he behaves well around people’; sets’éni bįní nezǫ, hųlch’ogh 
íle {my.friend 3PO:mind 3IPFV:be.good, 3IPFV:be.habitually.angry NEG} ‘my friend has 
a good heart and never blows up in anger’. 
 2.  Presence of reason in X: of this series, only OBJ.AGRX–tí can be used with Xs 
that do not have rationality, e.g. łį betí {dog 3:nice}.  The others require rational Xs. 
For instance, because bederédlįne implies knowing social codes and behaving 
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accordingly, requires rationality: *sets’į łį bederédlįne {1:of dog 3IPFV:be.normal} 
*‘my dog is good’.  Instead, one would use sets’į łį bejeré íle {1:of dog 3:mean NEG} 
‘my dog is sweet-tempered’, lit, “not mean”.   
 3. Intensity: bederédlįne seems to be an all-or-nothing trait with which it is 
strange to add intensifiers.  The others can take it, although it is generally pragmatically 
odd to quantify character verbs in Dene.  One exception is betí, which is frequently 
intensified through repitition: betí ɂá betí {3:friendly REP 3:friendly} ‘s/he’s really 
friendly, sweet’.   
 4.  Whole person or mind: the experiencer of  ne...zǫ3  can be X himself or X’s 
mind, e.g.  [X] bįní nezǫ {X 3PO:mind 3IPFV:be.good}. 
 
3.2.3.2.  The ‘X tends to do bad things’ Series.  The dominant of this series, ‘X 
tends to do bad things’, can be expressed as ełtth’i ɂasí k’énádher íle {right things 
3IPFV:do NEG} or as nezǫ at’į íle {3IPFV:be.good 3IPFV:do NEG}.  In some sense, any 
negative character trait is perceived as such through its negative effect on others, 
offense in the least of cases.  The following simply denote negative character traits 
which are simply reflections of someone’s unconscious character.   X’s deliberate will 
to do harm to others is not focused by these words; any such harm or offense is 
incidental.  These words are primarily an analysis of X’s character.  The series is: 
eyne, słini, ts’úre...díe, huneH...ldai, k’ése...lni/k’ésde...lni , bejeré, X bį̨ní słini.   
The definitions are the following: 
1.  eyne <‘X eyne hęlį: X is very mentally ill’>; possible English rendering: 
crazy, insane. 
2.  dlogh <‘X dlogh hęlį: X does bad things that children usually do’>; possible 
English rendering: childish. 
3.  słini <‘X dene słini hęlį: X tends to intentionally do unjustified things that are 
very bad for other people’>; possible English rendering: evil, mean, nasty. 
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4.  ts’úre...díe <X ts’úredíe: living being X tends not to make a normal effort to 
do work [Y]>; possible English rendering: to be lazy. 
4.  huneH...ldai <X Y ha huníldai: person X tends to have tantrums because of 
repeated situation {Y}>; possible English rendering: to throw tantrums, to be a brat. 
5.  k’ése...lni <X k’éselni: person X tends to be more worried about physical pain 
or the possibility of pain than is normal>; possible English rendering: to be overly 
sensitive to pain. 
6.  –jeré <X OBJ.AGRX–jeré:  living being X tends to say and do bad things to 
living beings {Y} whom X has contact with>; possible English rendering: to be mean, 
disagreeable. 
7.  X OBJ.AGRX–įní słini <X bįní słini: person X tends to say bad things to living 
beings {Y} whom X has contact with>; possible English rendering: to be grumpy, 
cantankerous . 
These seven lexical items include three adjectives, four verbs and a phraseme.  
They differ by the following parameters: 
 1.  Type of negative trait: eyne describes a mental illness, or as a term of insult 
behavior that the speaker deems to contrary to social norms that it is similar to a mental 
illness (the opposite is hederédlįne ‘he is (socially) normal, rational’. Słini denotes an 
evil character of X, who deliberately does cruel things to other people (nezǫ at’į íle 
{good 3IPFV:do1 NEG} ‘he does bad things’), such as fighting, killing, or stealing 
essential resources (dene k’énádher {people 3IPFV:fight};  dene łeghłdé {people 
3IPFV:kill}; ɂasí hárílye {things 3IPFV:take.away}).  Słini is the standard word for ‘evil’ 
in English, i.e. Hitler dene słini ąt’e {H. person evil 3IPFV:be} ‘Hitler was an evil 
person’. Ts’úre...díe ‘to be lazy’ indicates a person or animal that does not want to do 
his share of the work expected. huneH...ldai is the tendency to have intense irrational 
outbursts or tantrums, said of children or of people who behave like children, e.g. 
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huníldai sekwi hęlį ú {3IPFV:throw.tantrum child 3IPFV:be when} ‘he used to throw 
tantrums as a child’. K’ése...lni describes the defect whereby someone is emotionally 
unable to handle the regular pain of daily life, or complains about it too much, rather 
like the expressions being a baby or wimp in English.  The bound stem –jeré ‘mean and 
nasty’ denotes a living being which tends to be aggressive to others because of its 
very unpleasant character, e.g. dene bejeré ‘a mean person’ or lį  bejeré  ’a mean 
dog’.  Its opposite is betí friendly’.  Unlike mean or grumpy, –jeré seems to also denote, 
for humans, a uniformly negative intellectual attitude (bejeré, ɂasí hule ba ełtth’í wale  
{3:mean thing 3IPFV:be.absent 3:for correct POSS} ‘nothing can be good in his/her 
view’) manifested in deliberately mean-spirited behavior, e.g. yati nezǫ dene hoɂa íle  
{word 3IPFV:be.good people 3IPFV:give NEG} ‘s/he gives false advice to people’.   The 
phraseme X bįní słini  ‘X is mean and grumpy’ lit. “X’s mind is evil”, is etymologically 
related to słini ‘evil’, but the meaning is much milder than słini or –jeré, denoting 
instead someone who is customarily unfriendly and easily annoyed, but lacking the 
connotation of premeditated cruelty to others.   
2.  Presence of rationality in X: eyne, ts’úre...díe and –jeré can all be applied to 
animals as well as people, e.g. łį eyne 〈ts’úredíe; bejeré〉 ‘a crazy 〈lazy; mean〉 dog’.  
The others apply only to people and imply a tendency towards premeditated negative 
actions.  
3.  Whole subject or organ: słini ‘evil’ can be applied to the whole person (dene 
słini hęlį {person evil 3IPFV:be1} ‘he is an evil person’) or to the person’s heart (bedzíé 
słini {3PO:heart evil} ‘his heart is evil’).  The others cannot have an organ as the locus 
of the trait — bįní słini  ‘X is mean and grumpy’ lit. “his/her mind is evil” has the 
mild and idiomatic meaning of ‘grumpy’ or ‘cantankerous’.  
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 4.  Intensity of negative trait: most of the traits in this series are variable 
enough to take intensifiers such as hųtł’édhé ‘very’, even słini ‘evil’ (hųtł’édhé słini).  
As can be imagined, though, this is pragmatically odder with very strong adjectives like 
słini ‘evil’ and less strange with milder traits like –jeré ‘mean’ and ts’úre...díe ‘to be 
lazy’.   
 Pragmatic and extralinguistic notes: słini ‘evil’ tends to be reserved for non-
Dene people, regardless of the actions of the person.  This connotation of foreignness 
seems to be related to an older, archaic sense of słini of ‘belonging to an enemy tribe’, 
which used to applied to outsiders in an era of intertribal warfare, e.g. ɂená (słini) ‘the 
(bad) Cree’. Eyne ‘crazy’ is a pejorative term, and Dene people use bįní hule 
{3PO:mind 3IPFV:be.absent}‘his mind is gone’ to refer to the mentally ill in a neutral 
way. 
 
3.2.3.3.  The ‘X is not good to others’ Series.  This series denotes negative 
character traits are criticized for their negative eﬀect on others.  The series contains 
four intransitive verbs, ch’ére...lɂį, nabá...dhi, ts’óne...dher, and edere...lchá, and 
three phrasemes: ahhe hereH...t’į, ahhe dóhe...lɂį, X dene ch’á nethe...łɂá.  None of 
the LUs could be the dominant. The common semanteme is ‘X tends to do something 
bad to people’, which could be expressed as dene heł nezǫ at’į íle {people with 
3IPFV:be.good 3IPFV:do NEG}. 
1.  ch’ére...lɂį <X Y heł ch’érelɂį: person X tends to do things without a reason 
that make other people {Y} feel very bad>; possible English renderings: to be 
aggressively rude. 
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2.  nabá...dhi  <X Y Z nabádhi: person X tends to watch people [Y] do actions [Z] 
that X does not need to know because X wants to know that [Y] is doing something 
bad>; Possible English renderings: to be nosy, to be dirt-digging. 
3.  ts’óne...dher <X Y ghą ts’ónįdher: person X gives other people less of X’s 
resources Y than people normally give each other>; possible English renderings: to be 
mean2, to be stingy. 
4.  edere...lchá1 <X ederelchá: person X tends behave like X thinks X is better 
than other people>; possible English renderings: to be arrogant, to be bossy. 
5.  ahhe hereH...t’į <X ahhe herít’į: person X tends to want other people [Y] to 
think that X is better than them>; possible English renderings: to be a show-off, to be 
vain. 
6. X ahhe dóhe...lɂį <Y ɂá X ahhe dóhelɂį: person X tends to want other people to 
think that X is more attractive than them in activity {Y}>; possible English renderings: 
to be narcissistic, to be vain. 
7.  X dene ch’á nethe...łɂá  <X dene ch’á nethełɂa ́: person X tends not to want to 
be with other people because X loves other people less than normal>; possible English 
renderings: to be antisocial, to be a loner.  They differ by the following parameters: 
 1.  Type of offensive tendency: ch’ére...lɂį is translated by Dene people as 
‘rude’, but is considerably stronger and more negative than rude in English.  It cannot 
be applied to minor or unwitting violations of etiquette such as chewing with one’s 
mouth open — typical examples include aggressively rude or malicious behavior such 
as destroying other people’s things (ɂasí hesdołtsi {things 3IPFV:destroy) or saying 
profane or nasty insults to other people (bedhá dúé {3PO:mouth it.is.bad}).  A quasi-
synonym is ɂasí k’ólyą íle {things 3IPFV:know NEG} ‘s/he is ignorant’, “s/he doesn’t 
know things”, i.e. has no manners, but ch’ére...lɂį is stronger.  Nabá...dhi  describes 
someone who oﬀends other people by observing them closely to search for bad 
behaviors, somewhat similar to nosy in English.  Unlike nosy, nabá...dhi specifically 
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implies watching people (as opposed to listening in on phone conversations, looking at 
mail, etc.), as in sekų kųta nágha eyer t’ahį nádher sí ghą nabádhi {1PO:house visit 
3IPFV:come there REL (HUM) 3IPFV:stay REL about 3IPFV:be.nosy} ‘she comes to visit 
because she is curious to observe who is staying with me’.  It is different from snooping 
because it does not imply that X rummages through Y’s personal items, but simply that 
X observes Y’s behavior with other people.  Unlike gossipy in English, nabá...dhi does 
not entail that X wants to talk with others about Y’s bad activities.  Ts’óne...dher is a 
tendency to be stingy (dene ɂasí ghanetą {person things 3IPFV:love}) and to withhold 
sharing sufficient quantities of resources such as food and clothing (ber 〈yú〉 ɂóhełshi 
íle {food 〈clothes〉 away:3IPFV:give NEG}) that are traditionally expected to be shared 
according to need in Dene culture. Whenever someone comes upon a great amount of 
some resource, he or she is supposed to give away equal amount of it to the others; in 
the case ts’óne...dher of this rule has been violated.   Unlike ‘stingy’ or ‘mean’ in 
English, can also describe someone who doesn’t take turns in conversation or give 
others equal opportunities in an activity (ts’ónįdher dene hha nųɂa íle {3IPFV:be.selfish 
people for 3IPFV:give.space NEG} ‘he’s selfish, he doesn’t give a chance to others’.  
Edere...lchá describes someone who offends others because of his excessively high 
opinion of himself (ederelchá horely ɂasí k’ólyą nįdhen ɂá {3IPFV:be.arrogant all 
things 3IPFV:know 3IPFV:think because} ‘he is arrogant because he thinks he knows 
everything’.  Edere...lchá simultaneously implies arrogance and pride (bejeré  ‘s/he is 
mean’, deɂzé hodi  {too.much 3IPFV:be.proud}), an unapproachable person (dene 
yórełker dé, hílch’é {people 3D:3IPFV:ask if 3IPFV:get.mad} ‘if people ask her 
something, she gets mad’) who is aggressive, bossy attitude toward others  (dene ts’én 
k’ádoreldher {people to 3IPFV:boss}).  X ahhe hereH...t’į and X ahhe dóhe...lɂį are 
very similar and imply an arrogant attitude, but more in a boastful or narcissistic way 
than in an aggressive or bossy manner.  The both are used for someone who cares 
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excessively about being fashionable (yú nezǫ yendher hotíé t’ą nadheri at’į sí 
{clothes 3IPFV:be.good 3PFV:think.of really REL last 3IPFV:be.made REL} ‘s/he really 
wants the latest fashion’) and the latter is used particularly for someone who wants to 
show off his or her beauty (ahhe dóelɂį, dene ɂzé ahhenet'į nįdhen  {beautiful 
3IPFV:pretend people more.than 3IPFV:be.beautiful 3IPFV:think}‘she is narcissistic, she 
thinks she is more beautiful than [other] people’), or in activities such as dancing (datłi 
ɂá hedóelɂį {3IPFV:dance with 3IPFV:be.vain} ’she is vain, a show-off about her 
dancing’).  Finally, X dene ch’á nethe...łɂá refers to an offensive trait by which X is 
asocial and uninterested in other people in the community, because of X’s negative 
attitude.      
 2.  Active disrespect or withholding: ts’óne...dher is offensive for actions that X 
refrains from doing (sharing or giving away extra resources); the others indicate a 
tendency for X to actively engage in emotional or physical harm to others.   
 3.  Intensity of offense: the least intense lexical items seem to be ahhe 
hereH...t’į,  ahhe dóhe...lɂį and nabá...dhi, which describe an offense which is both 
relatively mild in its effect on others, and are also more acceptable with intensifiers.   X 
dene ch’á nethe...łɂá and particularly ch’ére...lɂį, ts’óne...dher, and edere...lchá seem 
to be the more intensely negative of the series, which is supported by the fact that 
they are less acceptable with intensifiers.   
 4.  Severity and type of negative effect for others: ch’ére...lɂį, ts’óne...dher and 
edere...lchá indicate the most emotionally and perhaps physically destructive effect on 
other people.  Nabá...dhi is intermediate in that it only implies a social transgression 
and emotional harm; X dene ch’á nethe...łɂá, ahhehereH...t’į, and ahhe dóhe...lɂį do 
not imply direct harm to others but more a light emotional offense.    
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 Related words:  ho...ní ‘to be proud’ can sometimes be used, with intensifiers, to 
indicate a self-important or arrogant person (deɂzé honí ‘s/he is too proud’).  It is not 
clear that ho...ní can be used to describe a character trait or whether this results simply 
from a habitual reading of an emotion verb.    
 
3.2.3.4.  The ‘X is aggressive’ Series.  The Dene Sųłiné traditionally lived in 
isolated groups of several families or up to a few hundred people, in which everyone 
had to cooperate to survive.  Until the latter half of the 20th century, Canadian Dene 
peoples lived essentially independent of a state apparatus or system of criminal justice.  
When someone behaved aggressively, violently or criminally, there was no legal means 
of addressing this by calling in an external authority.  It is likely that people had to 
devise ways of defusing interpersonal tensions through public competitions, avoidance 
or public criticism by an Elder.  In more extreme cases, northern people often used 
ridicule and ostracism to correct or isolate aggressive and violent people.  Given the 
difficulty of surviving on one’s own, banishment or isolation was a serious punishment 
that means great danger and hardship for those cast off.  Perhaps because aggressivity 
could bring such trouble to northern Dene people, the language seems to have singled 
out aggressivity for analysis, with a variety of words describing different shades of this 
trait.  Four of them are hune...lch’ogh, X OBJ.AGRX–įni ́ OBJ.AGRX–k’éhoní...gis, 
nádene...lch’é, and X OBJ.AGRX–hóre...ni íle.  There is no verbalizable dominant or 
semantic primitive.  The definitions are the following: 
1. hune...lch’ogh <X hųlch’ogh: X tends to speak in a way that makes other 
people feel bad, and tends to suddenly become very angry as if X is going to attack 
other people>.   An English rendering might be to be disagreeable and explosive.   
2. X Y ha  OBJ.AGRX–k’éhoní...gis  <X bįní bek’éhonígis: X tends to suddenly 
become very angry with people over situation {Y} as if X is going to attack other 
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people>.  English free translations might be to be explosive, to be mercurial or to be 
moody.   
3. nádene...l ch’é <X nádenelch’é: X tends to suddenly become very angry with 
people, as if X is going to attack other people>. An English rendering could be to be 
moody, to be short-tempered or to be explosive.  
4. X OBJ.AGRX–hóre...ni íle  <X bóreni íle: X tends to want or try to hurt other 
people>. English equivalents could be to be fearsome, to be nasty, to be vicious.      
Hune...lch’ogh and nádene...lch’é are intransitive verbs; the rest are phrasemes.  
They differ by the following parameters: 
1.  Intensity: X OBJ.AGRX–įni ́ OBJ.AGRX–k’éhoní...gis is less intense than 
nádene...lch’é hune...lch’ogh, which are in turn less intense than X OBJ.AGRX–hóre...ni 
íle.   
2.  Presence of reason in X:  all of these quasi-synonyms apply only to adult 
human beings, except X OBJ.AGRX–hóre...ni íle, which can apply to children (eyi sekwi 
bóreni íle {that child 3IPFV:be.easy NEG}) and even (for some speakers) to domestic 
animals, although this may be another sense as it implies general uncontrollability rather 
than highlighting the physical danger of X.  
3.  Standard state of X’s behavior: hune...lch’ogh implies that X, in addition to 
being explosive, is also disagreeable in the ‘calm’ periods between X’s outbursts of 
anger; X OBJ.AGRX–įni ́ OBJ.AGRX–k’éhoní...gis and nádene...lch’é, by contrast, do not 
imply this, and can be used to describe someone who, while notable for being short-
tempered, is not disagreeable all of the time.  X OBJ.AGRX–hóre...ni íle implies someone 
who is uniformly aggressive and nasty.   
  4.  Presence and nature of resulting actions: in the case of hune...lch’ogh, X tends to 
do a variety of antisocial actions during X’s outbursts, not limited to attacking or 
harming others: ɂasí noreyez {things 3IPFV:smash} ‘s/he smashes things’;  dene kų 
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ch’ázį tnegha {person house:CONS away.from 3IPFV:exit}  ‘s/he runs out of the house’; 
dzírelch’ogh {3IPFV:exit}  ‘s/he storms around’.  The Reals of are more focused on X’s 
hurtful actions and speech to others: dene ts’én hílch’é {people at 3IPFV:get.mad}  ‘s/he 
gets mad at people’; bedhá dúé {3PO:mouth it.is.bad}  ‘s/he says nasty things to 
others’. X OBJ.AGRX–hóre...ni íle, on the other hand, implies actual violent behavior: 
dene k’énádher {people 3IPFV:fight}  ‘s/he fights people’; ɂasi hesdółtsi {things 
3IPFV:destroy}  ‘s/he destroys things’.   
Pragmatic and extralinguistic notes: X OBJ.AGRX–hóre...ni íle is viewed far 
more negatively than the others, as it implies that the person tends to be dangerous.  It is 
often used for people with serious behavioral problems or for foreign (enemy) tribes in 
traditional stories.   
 
3.2.4.  Character Terms: Syntax.  As indicated by the lexicalization rule 
above, most character terms express general tendencies in X's behavior with other 
people.  There are usually no other participants because the people affected by X's 
behavior are nor referential semantic actants.  Character verbs are usually intransitive 
with a simple Government Pattern:  
 
X ⇔ I 
 1. N!human 
 
For minority of character terms, however, some of the constant participants are 
expressible, sometimes if marked: 
1. huneH...ldai <X Y ha huníldai: person X tends to have tantrums in customary 
situation {Y}> 
 
X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II 
1. N!living 1. V 
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2. ch’ére...lɂį <X Y heł ch’érelɂį: person X tends to do things without a reason 
that make other people {Y} feel very bad> 
 
X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II 
1. N!living 1. Nliving heł 
C1.1 + C2.1: dene heł ch’érelɂį {people with 3ipfv:be.rude} 'he is rude and aggressive 
with other people'. 
3.  nabá...dhi  <X Y Z nabádhi: person X tends to watch people {Y} do actions 
{Z} that X does not need to know because X wants to know that {Y} is doing 
something bad> 
X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II Z ⇔ III 
1. N!living 1. Nliving  1. Vsubj.agrY   
 
C1.1 + C2.1 without C3.1:  impossible; all three participants are expressed, or only X.  
 3.  ts’óne...dher <X Y ghą ts’ónįdher: person X gives other people less of X’s 
resources Y than people normally give each other>; possible English renderings: mean2, 
stingy. 
X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II 
1. N!living 1. N  
 
6. X ahhe dóhe...lɂį <Y ɂá X ahhe dóhelɂį: person X tends to want other people 
to think that X is more attractive than them in activity {Y}> 
 
X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II 
1. N!living 1. Vsubj.agrX 
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2. X Y ha  OBJ.AGRX–k’éhoní...gis  <X bįní bek’éhonígis: X tends to suddenly 
become very angry with people over customary situation {Y} as if X is going to attack 
other people> 
X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II 
1. N!living 1. CLAUSE 
 
 
3.3.  Physical Description Terms.  Languages possess a very wide range of 
lexical units referring to the physical characteristics of people and objects, so it is not 
possible to treat this semantic class exhaustively.  To make a selection, one could begin 
by distinguishing temporary qualities or states such as ‘hot’, ‘cold’, ‘healthy’, ‘pale (in 
that moment)’ from words which describe the unchanging nature and features of 
something, such as ‘tall’, ‘short’, ‘fat’, ‘thin’, ‘heavy’, ‘brittle’, and so forth.  This 
section will therefore be limited to discussing permanent or semi-permanent physical 
qualities of people and objects.  We are also limiting the discussion to the description of 
an entity’s directly perceptible physical traits rather than to its value, age, beauty, etc.   
We use language to express our reality, and part of our reality as humans is 
experiencing the world through a body with an expected range of size, abilities, and so 
forth.  We therefore describe things in relation to these natural absolute parameters.  
Something is ‘big’ if it is much bigger than a person, and ‘small’ if it is much smaller 
than a person.  A task is ‘difficult’ if a single person cannot do it easily, and a place is 
‘big’ if a person cannot see or walk around all of it in a short time, a day for instance.   
Something is ‘heavy’ if a person cannot lift it, and so forth.  People don’t usually 
describe things like mountains and lakes as heavy because people never lift them.  
Wierzbicka (1996) relates color words to objects common to our human experience.  
‘Red’ refers to the color of blood, ‘yellow’ to the color of the sun, ‘green’ to the color of 
vegetation, and so forth.     
On the other hand, we describe objects in relation to an average abstracted from 
many instances of seeing them rather than in relation to human characteristics.  This 
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idea goes back at least as far as Aristotle’s Categories (Edgill & Pickard-Cambridge 
2006): 
 
A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' was the contrary of 'little', and 'great' of 'small'. 
But these are not quantitative, but relative; things are not great or small absolutely, they 
are so called rather as the result of an act of comparison. For instance, a mountain is 
called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of its 
kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an external standard, for if the 
terms 'great' and 'small' were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or 
a grain large. Again, we say that there are many people in a village, and few in Athens, 
although those in the city are many times as numerous as those in the village: or we say 
that a house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber 
those in the house. The terms 'two cubits long, "three cubits long,' and so on indicate 
quantity, the terms 'great' and 'small' indicate relation, for they have reference to an 
external standard. It is, therefore, plain that these are to be classed as relative. 
 
Some descriptive parameters like size and intensity are conceived of as relations in 
Dene.  For example common intensifiers include hoɂzé and dųɂzé are actually 
etymologically derived from a pronominal prefix and the postposition ɂzé, meaning 
‘more than’.    
 Wierzbicka (1996) has difficulty with this idea of meanings like ‘big’ and 
‘small’, noting that if ‘big’ is defined in terms of the comparative ‘bigger’ then it would 
be circular to explicate ‘bigger’ in terms of ‘big’, despite the fact that we feel that 
‘bigger’ is semantically more complex than ‘big’.   She posits that size should be 
described as a pure relation between instances of things rather than in relation to some 
average or prototypical size for a category.  There is support for this comparative 
concept of size in Dene as well.  Comparatives are often expressed as two conjoined 
clauses: ‘Peter is the biggest boy’ might be expressed naturally as Peter dene ɂzé 
nechá, benasí nechá íle  {Peter people more.than 3IPFV:be.big, 3.other.than 
3IPFV:be.big NEG} ‘Peter is bigger than the people, the others are not big’.   
  
3.3.1.  Definitions.  The MTT-based definitions of many physical description 
terms in the following section follow the Aristotelian conception of qualities as 
extremes on a gradient parameter with respect to a middle value.   This is similar to 
Mel’čuk’s (1995: 431-432) framework for antonymy already referred to.  Values like 
hot and big effectively mean ‘having a greater temperature’ or ‘having a greater size’ 
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than is average for the object being described rather than in absolute terms.  The 
positive extremes of the scale such ‘big’, ‘intense’, ‘good’, ‘far’ (big distance), etc., are 
semantically simpler than the negative extremes.  Following this understanding, we can 
use the following definitions for ‘fast’ and ‘slow’: X is fast: ‘X moves in a way that X or 
X’s parts are in more places in the same time than most other Xs could do’; X is slow: 
‘X moves in a way that X or X’s parts are in fewer places in the same time than most 
other Xs could do’ 
 Some qualities are better considered as values of a binary opposition.  For 
example, while we may be accustomed to considering the English adjectives ‘difficult’ 
and ‘easy’ as qualities inherent to an activity, upon reflection we can see them as 
conditions external to human or animal agents that can impede them in their desire to 
perform an action or bring about a certain state of affairs.  In this undertanding, ‘easy’ 
means ‘absence of an obstacle’ and is a negation of ‘difficult’ or ‘presence of an 
obstacle’.  We can formulate these definitions of ‘easy’ and ‘difficult’ as follows: X is 
difficult: ‘living beings have to do many things or do something so much for situation X 
to happen that maybe they can’t make X happen’; X is easy: ‘living beings do not have 
to do many things or do something so much for situation X to happen so they can make 
X happen’.  The ideas ‘fast’, ‘slow’, ‘difficult’ and ‘easy’ in the definitions in the 
following sections should be understood as referring to the explications above.   
 
3.3.1.1.  Texture of a Substance.  Textures refer to the way we perceive 
surfaces and materials when we touch, handle or squeeze them.  Some of the traits 
which affect perception of texture are weight, density, or the proportion of component 
substances.  When these qualities vary in items that people use, they have practical and 
aesthetic consequences.  A quality like ‘dense’ can be explicated, for example, as 
meaning ‘it is more difficult to move some of liquid X by touching it than for most Xs’ 
or as meaning ‘liquid X moves less fast than most liquids’.  Something that is dense, 
like a stew, is more difficult to stir, or thick sap is more difficult to gather.  A rough 
surface could be explicated as ‘parts of surface X are uneven with each other so that it is 
difficult to move other things over it’.  Unevenness produces friction, which is desirable 
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for some objects such as rope used to tie a knot, but undesriable in others, such as ice 
under the runners of a sled.    
 Often textures are really descriptions of how easily people can move the parts of 
a material away from or toward each other.  Rubber is elastic, meaning that the 
component parts of its structure can be manipulated to be nearer or farther from each 
other.  When the contracting force is removed from the elastic object, it returns to its 
former shape.  On the other hand, it is difficult or impossible to change the shape of a 
rock by moving its parts or sides closer or farther apart from each other.  The concept of 
‘light [weight]’ can be explicated as ‘it is less difficult to move X up from the ground 
than for most things the same size as X’.  ‘Soft’ could be explicated as ‘it is easy to 
move the X’s sides closer together by touching X’ thinking of squeezing, or ‘it is easy 
to move part of the surface of X toward the inside of X by touching it’ thinking of 
poking something.  All of these traits have practical consequences for how people can 
use objects with these qualities.  The Dene series for textures of a material is de...yer, 
de...dogh, de...dhí1, natser3, de...dhí2,  de...ch’er, de...nagh, de...dhul, de...ddher, 
ho...ltun, de...tłegh, naltłes, nedadh and neddha.   In their definitions below, 
components like ‘light’, ‘fast’, ‘difficult’ and ‘elastic’ should be understood as being 
shorthand references for the above explications.     
1.  de...yer <X deyer: it is very difficult to move X’s parts or sides closer or farther 
apart>; common English translations:  to be hard, firm; example Xs: tthe ‘rock’, łue 
‘fish’.  
2.  de...dogh <X dedogh:  it is more difficult to move liquid X than to move most 
liquids>; common English translation: to be thick, dense;  example Xs: techázį ‘soup’, 
‘stew’, lamelas ‘syrup’.   
3.  de...dhí1 <X dedhí:  it is less difficult to move liquid X than to move most 
liquids>; common English translation: 3. to be thin4, watery [i.e. batter];  example Xs: 
techázį ‘soup’, ‘stew’, lamelas ‘syrup’. 
4.  na...tser3 <X Y nátser: people know liquid X has Y in it || liquid X has more 
[Y] in it than most Xs>; common English translation: to be strong15, concentrated 
[liquid];  example Xs: lidi ‘tea’, kafi ‘coffee’. 
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5.  de...dhí2 <X dedhí: people know liquid X has [Y] in it || liquid X has less of 
[Y] in it than in most Xs because X has more water in it than is most Xs>; common 
English translation: to be weak10;  example Xs: lidi ‘tea’, kafi ‘coffee’. 
6.  de...ch'ér <X dech'ér:  X is hard and elastic in a way which people do not 
like>; common English translation: to be rubbery, chewy [meat];  example Xs: ber 
‘meat’, *‘rubber’, *‘tire’.   
7.  de...nagh2 <Y Zsubj.agrY øsg / X denágh: liquid X is dense so that for living 
thing Y  it is difficult to perform action Z>; common English translation: to be soupy 
and hazardous, quicksand-like;  example Xs: hotł’és ‘mud’.   
8.  de...dhul <X dedhul: large hard thing X has nothing inside it so that people 
can put things in X>; common English translation: to be empty, vacant, to have a lot 
space available in it;  example Xs: ts’i ‘boat’, tili ‘pail’.   
9.  de...ddhér <X deddhér:  granular X’s grains are smaller than for most Xs>; 
common English translation: to be fine7b;  example Xs: thai ‘sand’, tthe ‘rocks’, tthe 
ddhéré ‘gravel’. 
10.  ho...ltún  <øsg / X holtún ground X is very soft because there is a lot of water 
in every part of X>; common English translation: to be soaked, water-saturated 
[ground];  example Xs: nih ‘ground’. 
11.  de...tłegh <X detłegh:  X is soft and cannot to move>; common English 
translation: to be limp, flaccid;  example Xs:  gah ‘[freshly killed] rabbit’. 
12.  na...ltłés <X naltłés: thing X is very soft because X has a lot of liquid in it>; 
common English translation: to be mushy; example Xs: libadá naltles ‘mashed 
potatoes’.  
13.  ne...dádh  <X nedádh: it is more difficult to move X up from the ground 
than it is for most things the same size as X>; common English translation: to be heavy;  
example Xs: tthe ‘rock’, hhéł ‘pack [on back]’. 
14.  ne...ddhá  <X  neddhá: X moves toward the ground more slowly than most 
things because X is very light>; common English translation: to be very light, 
featherweight;  example Xs: t’á ‘feather’. 
All are intransitive verbs.  Deyer and deddhér have corresponding adjectival 
derivatives, yeré ‘hard’ and ddhéré ‘fine7b’ 
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The material texture words differ by the following parameters:  
1.  Thickness of a liquid: de...dogh, de...dhí1, de...dhí2 and de...nagh2 refer to 
liquids. de...dogh and de...dhí1 are antonyms describing the thickness of liquids of 
variable density. de...nagh2 is a quasi-synonym of de...dogh; they both to thick liquids 
and things of mudlike consistency.   
2.  Overall texture of a solid object: de...tłegh refers to something that should be 
firmer or even move of its own volition but which is completely limp and sags.  
Ho...ltún is used to describe the soil soaked after rain or the melting of snow. De...ch'ér 
and de...yer refer to very firm, solid objects, but de...yer describes something much 
harder than de...ch'ér.  They are not mutually exclusive: ber deyer ú, dech'er {meat 
3IPFV:be.hard and 3IPFV:be.rubbery} ‘the meat is hard and rubbery’. Na...ltłés refers to 
something which, while a solid, is so soft that if much liquid were added it would itself 
become a liquid.  De...dhul is used to refer to rigid containers such as canoes with a lot 
of space available in them, usually from the perspective of a person looking down at the 
container which is laid out horizonally so that its open side faces up.    Something that is 
not used as a container or which is closed on all sides (like a hollow tree, door or ball) 
would be described as beyé hoɂą {3:inside 3IPFV:be.space} ‘there is space inside it’.   
3.  Aesthetic evaluation: de...nagh2 and de...ch'ér both imply something that will 
be unpleasant for a living being to experience.  The others are more subjective.   
4.  Specification of consequences for the subject: de...nagh2 refers to something 
that will be difficult or even hazardous to experience. beschené dzą nįzį ghekodhi 
denágh {car mud immersed.in 3IPFV:run:REL 3IPFV:be.sinking} ‘the car is stuck in the 
soft mud, it is impossible for it to drive out’.   None of the others have such a 
component.   
5.  Difficulty to move or handle: de...dogh, de...nagh2, and ne...dádh all refer to 
objects that require  a lot of human effort to move or manipulate.   
6.  Specific cause for the texture.  Objects that ho...ltún have been permeated 
with water.  In contrast, a material which is naltles can naturally be very soft and may 
not be ‘diluted’ or contain any water.   
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7.  Temporary or permanent: ho...ltún describes something which is not naturally 
mushy.  It may be a state of long duration, but it is not permanent, i.e. yuwé nih holtun, 
nįtél ląt’e {over.there ground 3IPFV:be.mushy, mushkeg like:3IPFV:be} ‘over there the 
ground is mushy, almost like on the mushkeg’.  The others are usually intrinsic or 
general features of the objects they describe.    
Pragmatic and extralinguistic notes: de...dhul is a “high word” used by Elders 
who tend to have a larger and more traditional vocabulary.   The younger generation 
would tend not to use this word and to use the general expression beyé hoɂą ‘there is 
space in it’ or ‘it is hollow’ in place of de...dhul in modern Dene (the younger speakers).  
 
3.3.1.2.  Texture of a Surface. People constantly experience surfaces and 
materials by touch.  Some of our most frequent tactile experiences are with clothing, 
bedding, furniture, surfaces on which we sit or lie such a wooden, carpeted, marble or 
dirt floor, the ground, and our own and others’ skin and hair.  Some of the differences 
registered by our skin receptors include  
 1) The degree of friction against our skin, which corresponds to the difficulty with 
which one can drag an object of a given weight across our skin.  We experience 
something that generates a lot of friction against our skin as rough.  Something that 
generates little friction is interpreted as smooth or slippery.  
 2) Whether if it has sharp points or hooks that are angled in a way to catch our 
skin.  This is the case of objects such as thorns, burrs, or a cheese grater.  Although we 
recognize that the material is perhaps smooth, its surface shape is corrugated in a fine 
enough pattern that the objects may be interpreted as round, flat, etc. shapes with a 
particularly rough surface.  
 3)  Whether the surface is covered with some other substance that affects our 
experience of it as slippery or rough and which leaves a residue on our skin, as 
something greasy or slimy.  
 4)  How much resistance we experience to pressing the surface towards the inner 
part of the object, i.e. its hardness.  In English, a ‘hard’ object can have a soft surface: a 
chair or bench may have a hard seat but which is covered with thin cushioning or 
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upholstery.  This supports the separation of softness of a surface from the parameter of 
softness of a whole object all the way to its center, as discussed above.   
  6)  The speed with which the object is dragged over our skin. 
5)  The temperature of the object. 
  The above factors are experienced simultaneously, and psychologists divide their 
interpretation into discriminatory touch and affective touch.  Discriminatory touch is the 
ability to know what sort of object we are touching, while affective touch has to do with 
whether people experience tactile contact with a surface as pleasurable or not.  We 
know that a pleasurable (i.e. soft, velvety) surface is not merely one that is not rough.  
Rather it is one which is uneven in some way,  covered with soft hairs for example, 
which stimulte receptors in the skin and cause a distinctly pleasurable tactile sensation 
quite independent of a mere lack of roughness.  On the other hand, pain receptors can be 
stimulated by spikes or hooks, causing us to experience contact with an object as 
unpleasant.  There is therefore a secondary emotional component to many texture 
words.  Our experience of contact with a surface as pleasurable or not is also affected by 
the pressure with which the surface is applied to our skin, i.e. if someone is pressing 
down on it, where it touches (our faces, under our wrists are more sensitive than our 
hands and feet), the speed with which the object is dragged over our skin, the 
temperature, etc.  
 At a same average pressure and speed, people usually experience some things as 
tactily pleasant, such as animal furs, feather and velvet.  Other sensations include: 
scratchy (wool, cat’s tongue, peach, stubble from shaved hair), abrasive (scouring pads, 
sandpaper, pineapple), spiky (thorns, cactus, porcupine, sea urchin), sharp (teeth, knife, 
pointy rocks), slimy (snail, slug, organs of killed animal), sticky (sap, dried syrup or 
soda), smooth (glass, plastic, some rock, hairless skin).  It should be noticed that a 
surface must be uneven to stimulate tactile pleasure, i.e. people usually find a rabbit fur 
more pleasurable to touch than smooth marble.   Others surfaces have enough hairs or 
bristles to notice but not enough to feel pleasant or painful, e.g. a peach. 
The following words are used in definitions of the series, and should be 
understood as abbreviations for the meanings listed below: 
X is soft: ‘it is easy to move the X’s sides closer together by touching X’  
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X is hard: ‘it is difficult to move the X’s sides closer together by touching X’   
X is rough: ‘parts of surface X are uneven with each other so that it is difficult 
to move other things over it’ 
The series is: de...nur, de...t’us, de...ker, de...ch’él, de...ch’ogh, dé...ni and 
de...lk’és and de...tł’ogh.  They are all intransitive verbs.  There is no expressible 
dominant or semantic primitive; if it existed it would be ‘to have a surface like’ or ‘to 
feel like’.  The LU with the closest meaning to ‘feel like’ in Dene is  laa...t’e, meaning 
‘to be like (in all ways)’, but this is more general.  The definitions are the following: 
1.  de...nur <X denur: X’s surface is made of or covered with something uneven 
and soft and feels good to touch>; common English translation: to be soft, silky, velvety. 
Typical Xs include: tsádhéth ‘animal hide’ gah dhéth ‘rabbit fur’. 
2.   de...t’us  <X det'us:  X’s surface is made of or covered with something that 
stays in contact with other things it touches>; common English translation: to be sticky, 
slimy. Typical Xs include: ųtúi ‘a snail’, dzégh ‘tree sap’. 
3.  de...ker <X deker: things move very easily over the surface of X so it is difficult 
for things to stay in contact with X>; common English translation: to be smooth, 
slippery. Typical Xs include: dechętél k’é ‘on the floor’, tthe ‘rocks (after rain)’. 
4.  de...ch’él  <X dech'él:  X’s surface is rough and feels bad to touch>; common 
English translation: to be rough, abrasive. Typical Xs include: chízaze betthú ‘a cat’s 
tongue’. 
5.  de...ch’ogh  <X dech'ogh:  X’s surface is covered with small sharp points>; 
common English translation: to be spiky, prickly. Typical Xs include: ts'í ‘porcupine’, 
cactus (English borrowing).   
6.   dé...ni1 <X déni:  X’s surface has a thin edge or point which can easily cut 
things>; common English translation: to be sharp. Typical Xs include: bes ‘knife’, tthe 
‘rocks’ 
7.   de...lk’és1  <X delk'es:  people know that the surfaces of most Xs have hair 
growing from them || X’s surface has no hair growing from it>; common English 
translation: to be bald. Typical Xs include: ełąta betthí ‘someone’s head’. 
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  8.  de...tł’ogh <X’s surface has hair growing from everywhere on it>; common 
English translation: to be furry, fur-covered, fuzzy. Typical Xs include: dení bedé 
‘moose antlers’, łį ‘dog’. 
The quasi-synonyms differ by the following parameters:   
 1.  The kind of surface: de...nur can describe a cloth or object which is entirely 
pliable, but it only entails a soft surface.  A hard chair with a soft cover can also 
de...nur. The verb de...t’us strictly speaking describes something sticky, something 
which adheres to other surfaces.  However most examples of this in the Dene traditional 
life are also of things which leave a slime or trace on another object (sap, snails, etc.), 
meaning that de...t’us is also used for many objects that in English would be called 
slimy.  It might be an object small enough for X to touch all of its surface at once; where 
it is an extended surface such as a floor it is more common to used the derived for 
horet’us.  De...ker can describe either smaller objects or surfaces such as the floor; in 
the latter case, however, the derived stem hore...ker is also used.  De...ch’él and 
de...ch’ogh most often describe living animals and animal parts.  Dé...ni describes an 
object with a sharp point that can cut easily.  De...lk’és refers to a surface which is 
hairless and which one would expect to have hair.  De...tł’ogh describes a surface 
covered with relatively short and uniform hairs, e.g. antlers or an animal hide.   
 2.  The size of points or bristles on a rough surface:  De...ch’él describes a 
surface covered with very bristles or points which are so small that they are not 
immediately remarkable to the naked eye, so that the whole surface can be felt as 
uniformly rough, i.e. chízaze betthú dech'él 〈*dech’ogh〉 {cat 3PO:tongue 3IPFV:be.rough 
〈*3IPFV:be.rough〉} ‘a cat's tongue is rough’.  By contrast, dech’ogh indicates a surface 
covered with larger spikes, thorns or bristles which stick out farther from the surface 
and are larger, so that they may be noticed more easily by the naked eye: ts'í  〈cactus〉 
dech'ogh  ‘a porcupine 〈cactus〉 is prickly’; nedaghá dech'ogh 〈?dech’él〉  ‘your chin 
(stubble) is prickly’  
 3.  Whether the surface is covered with something that is not part of it:  In the 
case of de...t’us, it is strongly implied that the sticky surface is also slimy or will at least 
leave some residue on an object it touches, i.e. dzé det'us tree sap is sticky, ût'úi det'us  
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snails are slimy.  De...ker simply describes something that is slippery, be it because of 
its natural smoothness, or because it is covered with water or with oil.  Practically, there 
are more situations in which a slippery surface is so because it is covered with a liquid).  
None of the other words imply that they are covered with something not naturally part 
of them.  
 4.  Whether the texture is unusual for this object: de...lk’és, meaning ‘bald’, 
describes a body part which has no hair but which one would normally expect to have 
hair, i.e. the head.  The other quasi-synonyms do not imply that their subjects are in any 
way unusual for their class of objects.   
 5.  The aesthetic evaluation:  de...nur includes as a secondary component the idea 
of sensory pleasure stimulated by touch, and de...nur is usually considered a positive 
quality.  It is often used as a compliment referring to cloth or to an animal hide.  
De...ch’él and de...ch’ogh refer to items which are abrasive to human skin and are 
therefore usually considered negative qualities where human handling is concerned.  
De...ker ‘it is slippery’ describes objects that are difficult or even hazardous to hold or 
stand on, which is usually negative as well.   
 6.  Derivational possibilities:  de...ker and de...t’us have the areal derivations 
hore...ker and hore...t’us, describing an area.   
Related words: These include de...lk'és2 ‘to have no leaves’: k'i delk'es hhayé dé 
not a texture, but obviously closely related to de...lk’és1 ‘to be bald’.   
 
3.3.1.3  Color Terms.  Despite the universal biological basis of color perception, 
there is a dazzling variety of ways in which the languages of the world encode color 
concepts.  Some language have only two or three color terms, others have the full range 
of pure spectrum colors and others described above.  In some specialized societies, 
experts such as painters or weavers may know an almost limitless range of color terms.  
There is a huge linguistics literature, mostly related to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, that 
investigates the relationship between this linguistic variation with human biological 
perception.  The modern consensus is that linguistic variation does not correspond to 
conceptual categorization to the extent that all people see colors in the same way.  The 
interlinguistic variation in color terms seems therefore to be simply an artifact of 
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cultural differences concerning the salience of various color concepts. Wierzbicka 
(1996) relates colors to prototypes related to objects that almost all human groups 
encounter in their daily lives.  For example, red = blood, yellow = sun, blue = sky (and 
the sea for some people), white = bright light, clouds (and snow for some people), black 
= darkness, brown = earth, dirt, green = plants, vegetation. Other terms, such as gray, 
dark blue, pink, etc. show more intercultural variation. Wierzbicka’s idea is supported 
by considerable linguistic evidence from languages in which in which colors are 
etymologically related to object terms, for example ‘brown’ and ‘earth’.  Similar results 
obtain for several Dene colors, shown below. 
 The meaning ‘color’ is easy to isolate in Dene.  It may well be a sense distinct 
from LAHO...T’I1 ‘to resemble’, ‘to look like’ but belonging to the same vocable.  Or 
the fact that it is understood to refer specifically to the color of an object in some 
contexts may be pragmatic knowledge.  The question edlá láhót’į ɂá {what 
like:3IPFV:look4 Q} can be translated and interpreted as ‘what does it look like?’ or as 
‘what color is it?’.   Its color is rendered by the relative clause t’a láhót’į {REL 
like:3IPFV:look4} which can mean ‘what it looks like’ or ‘what its color is’.  Eleven 
colors are encoded as lexical units in Dene, and they all seem to correspond closely with 
the range of shades indicated by their English translations (perhaps through centuries of 
cultural contact also).  
The definitions are: 
1.  de...lzen <X : X is of a color similar to the color of darkness> 
2.  de...lgai <X : X is of a color similar to the color of snow> 
3.  de...lk’os <X : X is of a color similar to the color of blood> 
4.  dé...tł’és <X : X is of a color similar to color of the sky without clouds>  
5.  de...ltthogh <X  : X is of a color similar to the color of the sun> 
6.  de...ltses <‘X : X is of a color similar to the color of dirt> 
7.  de...lba <X : X is of a color similar to the sky in twilight> 
8.  tąch’ai láhót’į <X : X is of a color similar to the color of vegetation>  
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9.  jíetué láhót’į  <X : X is of a color similar to the color of purple grapes> 
10.  jíe tthoghé láhót’į  <X : X is of a color similar to the color of oranges>   
11.  dzę k’ozé láhót’į or dzę láhót’į  <X : X is of a color similar to the color of 
pink spruce gum> 
Seven color words are intransitive verbs: de...lzen ‘to be black’, de...lgai ‘to be 
white’, de...lk’os ‘to be red’, dé...tł’és ‘to be blue’, de...ltthogh ‘to be yellow’, 
de...ltses ‘to be brown’ and de...lba ‘to be gray’.  Four colors are expressed with 
phrasemes comparing the color of the direct object with that of a salient object from 
Dene culture: tąch’ai láhót’į ‘it is green’, lit. “it looks like leaves”, jíetué láhót’į ‘it is 
purple’, lit. “it looks like wine’, jíe tthoghé láhót’į ‘it is orange’, lit. “it looks like an 
orange”, and dzę k’ozé láhót’į ‘it is pink’, lit. “it looks like red (spruce) gum” or dzę 
láhót’į ‘it is pink’, lit. “it looks like (spruce) gum”.  Color terms are unusual in that six 
of them have corresponding adjectives, which are a small closed class in Dene: tthoghé 
‘yellow’, zené ‘black’, gaié ‘white’, tsezé ‘brown’, baé ‘gray’, and tł’ezé ‘blue’. 
De...lzen is used for objects which appear black, not for dark places or for the 
absence of light.  For darkness one can use instead hóret’ íle {it.is.visible NEG}’it is 
dark’, e.g.  yz hóret’ íle {indoors 3IPFV:be.visible NEG} ‘the house is dark’, or sąłt’é́s 
(láhót’į) {pitch.dark like:3IPFV:look4} ‘it is pitch dark (outside, in that place)’.  For 
some speakers, sąłt’é́s ‘pitch dark’ is extended to another sense to describe objects as 
dark as pitch darkness, i.e. coal, as sąłt’é́s láhót’į {pitch.dark 3IPFV:look.like} ‘it is 
pitch black’.   
 Color luminescence can be modified to denote dark light shades by adding kúlú 
delzen láhót’į  {but 3IPFV:be.black like:3IPFV:look4} ‘but it looks black’.  For light 
shades, one can add the intensified hotíé ‘really’ or ‘bright’ before the color term, 
together with kúlú bą hít’į láhót’ {but 3:by 3IPFV:shine like:3IPFV:look4} ‘but it looks 
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shiny’ after it.  For example, delk’os kúlú delzen láhót’į {3IPFV:be.red but 
3IPFV:be.black like:3IPFV:look4} ‘it is dark red’; hotíé delk’os {really 3IPFV:be.red} ‘it 
is bright red’; hotíé delk’os kúlú bą hít’į láhót’ {really 3IPFV:be.red but 3:by 
3IPFV:shine like:3IPFV:look4} ‘it is light red’, or maybe ‘it is light red and a bit 
transparent’.   
Related words include de...lk’al1 ‘to be clear (transparent)’.  This is not a color 
term, but is closely related, used for transparent objects like water and glass. Delzen2 is 
a sense meaning ‘dark’, as in ‘dark eyes’ or ‘dark clouds’, e.g. bená dárelzen{3PO:eyes 
DIST:3IPFV:be.red}.  This sense has the corresponding adjective zené2 ‘dark’, as in 
yák’odh zené {clouds dark:ADJ} ‘dark clouds’ 
 
3.3.2.  Physical Description Terms: Syntax.  As these terms describe permanent 
features of an object, they are usually intransitive verbs, having no other obligatory 
participants, but realizing X as a noun: 
 
X ⇔ I 
1. N! 
 
There are exceptions, however. Ho...ltún usually refers to the ground, so X can be 
omitted:  
ho...ltún  <X holtún: X is very soft because there is a lot of water in every part of X>: 
 
X ⇔ I 
1. øSG 
2. N! 
 
C1.1 : holtún '[the ground] is mushy because it is saturated with water' 
C1.1 : nį holtún 'the ground is mushy because it is saturated with water' 
2.  na...tser3 <X Y nátser: people know liquid X has Y in it || liquid X has more [Y] 
in it than most Xs>;  
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X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II 
1. N! 2. N! 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: kafí sugá nátser {coffee sugar 3IPFV:be.strong5} 'the coffee is strong with 
sugar'  
 
3.  de...nágh2 <Y Z-i X denágh: liquid X is dense so that for living being Y it is 
difficult to do action Z>; common English translation: to be soupy and hazardous, 
quicksand-like;  example Xs: hotł’és ‘mud’.   
 
X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II Z ⇔ III 
1. N! 
2. øSG 
1. N 1. Vsubj.agrY–i 
 
C1.2 + C2.1 + C3.1: beschené dzá nįzį ghekodhi denágh {car mud in 3ipfv:drive 
3IPFV:be.thick} '(the mud) is (too) thick for the car to drive in'   
 
 
3.4.  Motion Terms.  Motion verbs describe situations in which a living being 
propels itself with its own energy over a surface, through a liquid or through the air.  
The meanings of these verbs are in some cases extended to inanimate subjects, whether 
machines such as beschene ‘car’ or dzíret’ai ‘plane’, which appear to drive themselves 
forward much like a living being, or to disembodied phenomena such as tada 
‘epidemic’ and yohtsane ‘storm’, which are described linguistically as moving if they 
were living agents with a body.   We will exclude from the class of motion verbs those 
that refer to involuntary motion, even of a living being, such as sliding or falling 
(discussed separately below), as well as those verbs such as ‘drive’, ‘ride’ and ‘fly’ in 
the sense of ‘travel by vehicle’ or ‘to operate a vehicle’, which describe a subject 
moving a second entity rather than X’s own body.  We will also limit our investigation 
to verbs that can describe standard means of travel of the subject over long distances, 
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while excluding those which describe a localized movement, e.g. –gal ‘sg bipedal 
walks’ but not de...dɂeth ‘to take some steps’.   
Athabaskanists divide the verb stems of Dene languages into classes called “verb 
theme categories” (Kari 1979).  A verb theme category is a group of verb stems (“verb 
themes” in Athabaskan literature) which share a certain semantic and morphological 
features, including their range of possible derivational forms.  Because verb themes are 
called “verb stems” in this work, verb theme categories will be called “verb stem 
classes”.  The motion class accepts an exceptionally wide range of derivatemes: ne– 
‘momentaneous’, na– ‘reversive’, na– ‘durative’, te– ‘inceptive’, hu– ‘transitional’, 
ghe–...–ł ‘progressive’ and dzíre– ‘perambulative’. Motion verb stems (though not only 
them) also feature significant and semi-regular suppletive alternations between 
imperfective, perfective and optative forms, and also between various derived forms.  
Apresjan (2000) defines the lexicographic type, also using a range of semantic, 
morphological and combinatorial criteria.  Given its unique semantic and morphological 
properties, it seems that the motion verb class in Athabaskan languages fits Apresjan’s 
definition of a lexicographic type.    
 
3.4.1.  Definitions.  The motion  terms discussed in this section fall into two series 
of quasi-synonyms.  The first describes an animate X’s movement across a surface.  The  
second series describes a variety of ‘fall’ verbs that take both animate and inanimate Xs 
and that describe X’s movement toward the ground from the air or from a position with 
one of X’s smaller surfaces in contact with the ground.   
 
3.4.1.1.  The ‘X travels’ Series.  There is no abstract, generic verb similar to ‘go’ 
or ‘move’ in Dene.  As in Russian (see the discussion in Apresjan 2000: 216), the 
speaker must specify the means by which X moves, even if this information is utterly 
irrelevant to the linguistic situation being described.  The dominant meaning for all of 
the verbs in the motion class is ‘travel’, which shall stand for the components ‘X 
causes2 self to move from place Y to place Z’.  This meaning is always expressed in a 
unitary way, often with one or more presuppositions about the nature of X, such as X’s 
number of limbs or posture, as in (28).  
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 (28)  –lgol <X Y k'é helgol: living being X moves1 [from point Z to point W] on 
surface Y by placing one of X’s limbs, which are  four or more, in front of the 
others> 
 
The SemS of a motion verb like that in (28) can be drawn with the common ‘travel’ 
semanteme, accompanied by the verb’s nonassertional components in grey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nonassertional components are distinct from assertions because they cannot be negated 
or modified externally, i.e. X Y k’é helgol íle {X Y on 3IPFV:walk NEG} cannot mean ‘X 
does not walk on all fours on Y’. 
The ten ‘travel’ verbs considered here can in principle take any of the seven 
derivatemes for the motion class mentioned above, giving 70 possible stems.  However, 
some combinations are excluded for pragmatic reasons.  It is very difficult to elicit the 
underived forms –dhi, –bi ̨, –lį and –lɂul; there is a very strong tendency to use these 
stems with the transitional or perambulative derivatemes, and to use ‘fly’ with the 
progressive marker.  Some instances of the progressive derivation with motion verbs 
are likely morphological phrasemes because their nonderived bases are no longer 
extant words.  Because this section discusses the meanings of ‘travel’ verbs, we will 
consider the most commonly used form of each of them, simple or derived.  The 
components ‘through an area’, ‘around an area’, and ‘is ...–ing’, corresponding to the 
Unitary 
 ‘X’ 
‘autocause’ 
    ‘move1’ 
    ‘pointZ’     ‘pointW’ 
    ‘manner’ 
    ‘placeV’ 
2 1 
1 
2 5 3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
    ‘other  
     limbsX’     ‘limbs’ 
    ‘4 or more’      ‘Y’ 
    ‘surface’ 
1 
4 
     –LGOL  
‘X’ ‘Y’  
I II ⇔ 
                                                                                                                                      234 
transitional, perambulative and progressive derivatemes, should therefore be 
disregarded as parameters in the following definitions.  The travel series is includes 
the stems –gal, –lgol, –lkath, –lgos, –duth, ghe...t’ał, hu...dhi, dzíre...bį, dzíre...lį and 
dzi ́re...lɂul.  There is no verbalizable dominant.  In modern Dene an innovative sense of 
the ‘biped walk’ verbs meaning simply ‘to go’ (by any means of transport) is becoming 
more common, and one often hears utterances like Arizona nathiya {A. 
REV:1PFV:sg.go} ‘I went to Arizona’ (meaning by airplane).  This cannot be considered 
the dominant, however, because it refers only to human travelling; it cannot be used for 
fish or animal movements.  The definitions are the following:: 
1. –gal  <X ghegal Y k'é: X travels on surface Y by putting one of X’s two feet in 
front of the other>.  A free English translation would be walk1.  X must be human or a 
moose (it was explained by a speaker that even though moose have four legs, the human 
‘walking’ verb is applied to them as an honorific, because the moose is so crucial to the 
survival of the southern Dene). 
2. –lgol <X Y k'é helgol: X travels on surface Y by placing one of X’s four or more 
limbs in front of the others> Free English translations would include walk1 (said of an 
animal), crawl, scurry and sidle.  Any X is possible which has four or more limbs, as 
long as X is walking or crawling on a hard surface (even of an object, or the wall or 
ceiling).  Some of the many possible X’s are: łį ‘dog’, chíze ‘cat’, gu ‘insect’, ts’úze 
‘fly’, ųt’ui betth’éné łą ‘octopus (crawling on the ocean floor in film)’, etthén 
‘caribou’, dene ‘person (on all fours)’  
3. –lkath <X Y k'é helkath: X travels on surface Y by putting one of X’s four feet 
in front of the others at a regular rhythm without all X's feet leaving the ground at the 
same time> The best English translation is trot.  This verb is used usually only with łį 
‘dog’ and łįchogh ‘horse’ as subjects.  
4.  –lgos <X Y k'é helgos: X travels on surface Y by by placing two of  X's four 
feet in front of the others at a regular rhythm so quickly that all of X’s feet leave the 
ground at the same time between movements> The best English translation is gallop.  
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This word is used for łįchogh ‘horses’ and for fast-moving ungulates such as yáhto 
‘deer’.   
5. –duth <X Y k'é heduth: X travels on surface Y by twisting X's body against Y> 
The best English translation is slither, and the typical X is nadúdhe ‘snake’, although a 
person can do this movement (as a joke, for example).  
7. ghe...t’ał <X ghet’ał:  X is travelling quickly through the air> This verb 
corresponds closely to fly in English, but also glide. Xs can be animate or inanimate, 
including įyeze ‘(smaller) bird’, det’áni  ‘(larger) bird’, dzíret’ai ‘plane’.   
8. hu...dhi <X Y hudhi:  disembodied entity X moves through area Y> Free English 
translations include drift by, come through, and sweep through. Xs can be from a range 
of phenomena or diffuse objects, including: yohtsané  ‘thunderstorm’, łér  ‘smoke’, and 
tada  ‘epidemic’.   
9. –bį <X Y k'é/yaghe hebi ̨:  living being X travels on/in liquid Y by pushing Y 
back with X's limbs>  The best English translations are SWIM1and TREAD5, but –bį  
is more restricted than SWIM1. Typical Xs include dene  ‘person, tsá  ‘beaver’, łue 
‘fish (fluttering with fins)’, cheth  ‘duck (treading water)’. 
10. dzíre...lį <X Y yághe hulé: X travels around in liquid Y by pushing through Y 
using X's gills or propeller> A free English translation might be dart around 
(underwater).  Typical Xs include łue ‘fish’, and łuechogh ‘whale (if not moving fins)’.   
11. dzíre...lɂul <X Y k'é dzi ́relɂul: X travels around the surface of liquid Y partly 
by pushing Y back with X's limbs and partly by floating on surface of liquid Y> A free 
English translation would be swim1 or possibly glide (on water), but swim1 is more 
general.  Typical Xs include cheth ‘ducks’ and łįchogh ‘horses (swimming while being 
pulled by a person across a river, used more often with prefix na- ‘across’ than with the 
perambulative dzíre–).   
 These quasi-synonyms differ by the following parameters:  
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 1.  Kind of movement: –gal is long-distance bipedal walking; for this reason it 
cannot be applied to other bipedal walking such as birds walking on the beach, for 
which nare...t’eth ‘to take steps’ would be used: įyeze naret’eth {bird 
around:3IPFV:take.steps}. So –gal is restricted to humans because there is no other 
bipedal animal that walks long distances in the Dene language area.  This verb is also 
used to speak of the moose (dení ghegal).  One speaker remarked that the moose is 
“tall” and “lanky” rather like a human, but this verb cannot be used for other animals 
whose legs are longer than their trunks are tall, such as other ungulates or even lanky 
daddy long legs (with tiny bodies and verb long legs), which –lgol instead.  Another 
speaker remarked that because moose were the basis of the livelihood in the southern 
Dene region and were so important to the culture, the human term was used as a sign of 
respect.  By contrast,  –lgol describes any other kind of animal walking on more than 
two legs, or a human on all fours (dene bąłch’a yérlgé {person fence 
under:3PFV:sg.walk} ‘the person crawled under the fence’; nálzé dené nálgol dení ch’á 
nádenelɂį ɂá {hunting person:CONS DUR:3IPFV:sg.walk moose against 3.hides.self 
because} ‘the hunter crawled on all fours to hide himself from the moose’).  It covers 
animals and insects (horádzi 〈dlúne, tthełkailé, sas, etthén〉 helgol {the spider 〈mouse, 
weasel, bear, caribou〉 is walking}), also on the ceiling or wall (ts’úze yotthít’á k’é 
helgol {fly ceiling on 3IPFV:walk} ‘the fly is crawling on the ceiling’), and octopi 
underwater (ųt’ui betth’éné łą té helgol {ųt’ui17 3PO:legs they.are.many} ‘the octopus 
(on the ocean floor) is walking underwater’, and many others.  The verb –lkath, roughly 
meaning ‘to trot’, refers to a rhythmic, four legged walking-running, characteristic of 
dogs and horses.  It is faster than walking and more sharply rhythmic, but it is not 
running because not all of X’s feet leave the ground at the same time.  By contrast, –
lgos is much like ‘galloping’, because it implies a fast rhythmic running whereby all of 
                                                
17 ųt’ui is a Dene natural kind term referring to a set of soft-bodied invertebrates with a sticky surface, 
including snails, slugs, mussels, clams, octopi; it has no easy translation in English.   
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X’s feet leave the ground at the same time. The verb –duth ‘to slither’ is said mostly of 
snakes, and denotes a movement X makes by twisting the underside of X’s whole 
body against a hard surface; –zús translates roughly as ‘to slide’ and refers to 
something that moves by sliding one of X’s large surfaces in continuous contact with Y: 
hodánaszus sheth k’é {down:DUR:1IPFV:slide hill on} ‘I was sliding (on a sled) down 
the hill’.  Ghe...t’ał ‘to fly’ refers to a self-propelled movement through the air.  X can 
be an animal such as a bird (įyeze ht’ak {bird INCH:3PFV:fly} ‘the bird started flying’) 
or it can be an inanimate subject like a plane: nidhóz niya ú plane ghet’ał k’é {far:DIM 
1.walked when plane 3.flies MIR} ‘I had walked pretty far away when suddenly there 
was a plane flying overhead’.  Hu...dhi denotes the movement of a nonsolid entity such 
as smoke, a cloud or a storm (yohtsené hudhi ha {storm TRANS:3IPFV:go FUT} ‘the 
storm will come through’), or even extended to a phenomenon such as an epidemic 
(táda ją húdher {epidemic TRANS:3PFV:go} ‘the epidemic tore through here’), perhaps 
considered a putative or metaphorical cloud.   Finally, Dene has at least three different 
‘swim’ verbs denoting distinct physical movements. Dzíre...bį describes a movement by 
which the subject (usually but not necessarily a person or a land animal) swims by 
visibly moving its body parts, especially by pushing the liquid back with its limbs, as in 
tsá 〈sas, cheth, dene〉 dzírebį {beaver 〈bear, duck, person〉 PERM:3IPFV:swim} ‘the 
beaver 〈bear, duck, person〉 is swimming around’.  As indicated by its use with cheth 
‘duck’, this verb does not require X to be totally submerged in the liquid, only that X 
pushes back on liquid Y.  While this sort of swimming by moving the body parts in a 
way clearly visible to an observer is usually done with limbs, a limbless animal such as 
a snake can also dzíre...bį  if it is undulating its body against the liquid: nadúdhe 
dzírebį {snake  3:PERM:swim} ‘the (sea) snake is swimming around’.  Fish can also do 
this, if they are “fluttering” in place by moving their side fins.   Dzíre...lį is distinct 
from its quasi-synonym dzíre...bį  in that the former indicates a fluid darting forward, as 
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when fish move forward in a way that the movement of its body parts is imperceptible. 
The subject is “not forcing” and “doesn’t show he’s using his fins” according to one 
speaker.  This verb is also applied to submarines.  Whales and fish can either dzíre...lį 
or dzíre...bį , depending on their movement; snakes, however, can only do the latter: 
nadúdhe dzírebį 〈?dzírelį〉 {snake PERM:3IPFV:swim} ‘the snake is swimming around’.  
Lastly, dzíre...lɂul indicates a sort of combination of the two, whereby the subject X 
does partly move its limbs to go forward, but at the same time relies on its inertia or on 
an external force pulling or pushing X to help X along.  Examples include ducks 
paddling while gliding on a pond (chethaze dzírelɂul {duck:DIM PERM:3:swim} ‘the 
little ducks are swimming/gliding around’) and horses swimming scross a river while 
being helped or pulled on a rope by someone at the shore: łįchogh nalɂel {horse 
DUR:3:swim} ‘the horse swims/glides across’.  
 2.  Number of Xs:  Interestingly, most of these verbs, including –lkath, –lgos, –
duth, hu...dhi, dzíre...bį, dzíre...lį and, dzi ́re...lɂul, differ according to the number of Xs.  
Those in the list are all for singular Xs; for all animal motion verbs, if X is greater or 
equal to two, the stem –łɂás is used: 
 
 X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 or more 
'singular biped walk' –gal –ɂás –déł 
'moose walk' –gal –łɂás –łɂás 
'quadruped walk' –lgol –łɂás –łɂás 
'fly’ ghe...t’ał ghe...t’ał –déł 
 
Table III-II.  ‘Travel’ Verbs by Number of the Actants. 
      
 3.  Degree of self-propelled movement: the ‘travel’ series includes verbs whose 
experiencer X displaces his/its body using X’s own bodily energy.  However, the 
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movement described by dzi ́re...lɂul differs from those described by the other quasi-
synonyms in that this verb describes a combination of X’s self-propelled movement and 
X’s uncontrolled gliding, either from inertia or because X is at the same time being 
pulled or pushed by another entity.   
Related words: excluded from the ‘travel’ series are te...t ł’á ‘(caribou) start to 
travel’ which denotes their specific season migration rather than simply the meaning 
‘travel’; and ttheba...gal ‘person runs’, which describes a special way of local 
movement rather than X’s standard way of travel.  These verbs also do not follow the 
standard derivation pattern of the ‘travel’ series.   
 
3.4.1.2.  The ‘X falls’ Series.  Verbs meaning ‘fall’ constitute another class of 
movement verbs with its own semantic and morphological patterns.  ‘Fall’ verbs do not 
take the same range of derivational meanings as ‘travel’ verbs –– they take the inceptive 
te–, as well as directionals, particularly ná– ‘down’.  Some ‘fall’ verbs are difficult to 
elicit without one of these prefixes.  Like the ‘travel’ verbs and like position verbs, f the 
‘fall’ series features presuppositions about X’s physical shape, texture and number.  
Again, the negation of the verb does not negate the presupposition, e.g. [X] nákedh íle 
{[X] 3PFV:fall NEG} ‘X (sticklike object) did not fall’ does not mean ‘X is not stick-
shaped’, etc.  Below is the SemS for te...kar ‘(wide thin) X falls’ (nonassertional 
components in grey). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TE...KAR 
‘X’ ‘Y’  
I II ⇔ 
  ‘X’  ‘height’ 
‘bigger.than’ 
  ‘width’ 
  β 
  α 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
'move1' 
‘point’ ‘point’ 
1 
2 
3 
'on' 
1 
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‘above’ 
1 
2 2 
Unitary 
1 
     ‘upper.parts’ 
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The series is ná...kedh, ná...łkedh, ná...ltth’i, ná...ghez, eke...ltth’i, te...kar, –jer, 
í...ltth’e, í...kar, and ná...tł’í2. We will consider í...ltth’e and í...kar to be derivational 
morphological phrasemes rather than derived forms, because the í–/H– is not a 
derivational marker that makes sense in this context or that can be used with other ‘fall’ 
verbs (it would have to be the semelfactive or inchoative marker).   
1.  ná...kedh  <X nákedh: X, which is sticklike, moves toward the ground>. 
Example Xs include tutíli (beyé dódí) {bottle (3:in there.is.nothing)} ‘an (empty) 
bottle); dechen ‘stick’, tł’íschené ‘pencil’. 
2.  ná...łkedh  <X náłkedh: X, which is, a full container, moves toward the 
ground>. Example Xs include tutíli (beyé tu detą) {bottle (3:in water 3.stands} ‘a 
bottle (full of water)’; erihtł’ís dhéth nałcheth{paper hide:CONS bag} ‘an envelope’.   
3.  ná...ltth’i  <X náltth’i:  X, which is heavy, round or animate, moves toward the 
ground> Example Xs include dene ‘person (falling from roof)’ , bekáh ‘his scab’, dzoł 
‘ball’.   
4.  ná...ghez   <X nághez:  X, which is a standing sticklike object, moves toward 
the ground> Example Xs include gani ‘pine tree’, dechen (náįɂa) {tree (3.stands)} ‘a 
(standing) tree’.   
6.  eke...ltth’i  <X ekéltth’i: X, who is a standing person, moves toward the 
ground>  X seems to be restricted to humans.  
7.  te...kar  <X tekar: X, which has a wide surface, moves toward the ground so 
that all of X’s wide surface is in contact with the ground> Example Xs include nįbále 
‘tipi’, tél ‘tarp’, yoh ‘house’.     
8.  –jer  <X hejér: X, which is a flaked substance, moves from the sky toward the 
ground>.  X is restricted to tsíł ‘snow’.   
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9.  í...ltth’e  <X híltth’e: X, which is a granular substance, moves from the sky 
toward the ground>.  X is restricted to tsíł ‘snow’.   
10.  í...kar  <X híkar: X, which is a large-flaked substance, moves from the sky 
toward the ground>>.  X is restricted to tsíł ‘snow’.   
11. ná...tł’í2  <X natł’i: X, which is plural, moves toward the ground>.  X is any 
plural set of objects.   
 These quasi-synonyms diﬀer by the following parameters: 
 1.  Shape and texture of X: ná...kedh denotes the falling of a sticklike object or 
empty container from a height, i.e. whose base was not in contact with the ground 
before the motion started.  Ná...łkedh describes the fall of a full container, as in tutíli 
beyé tu detą náłkedh {bottle 3:in water 3IPFV:stand 3:PFV.fall} ‘the bottle, full of 
water, fell’.  Interestingly, the range of this verb does not correspond with that of the 
classificatory verbs indicating a full container with liquid contents; it can be extended 
even to other types of containers such as envelopes: erihtł’ís dhéth nałchéth náłkedh 
{paper hide:CONS bag:CONS 3.PFV.fall} ‘the envelope fell’.   Ná...ghez refers to a 
sticklike object whose base is resting on the ground or which is planted in the ground 
and which falls over, so that its long side is in contact with the ground: gani 〈dechen, 
nįbál chené〉 nághez {pine.tree 〈tree, tent pole〉 3PFV:fall} ‘the pine tree  〈tree, tent 
pole〉 fell down’.  When a standing or upright person falls over, one must use the verb 
eké...ltth’i, as in ekestth’i ha húto {1:fall.over FUT POSS} ‘I might fall down’ (said by a 
dizzy person).  By contrast, a person falling from a height or a heavy or round object 
falling to the ground must be expressed with ná...ltth’i, e.g. nastth’er ‘I fell (from the 
roof)’.  Te...kar is often glossed as ‘to collapse’ and it can be used when X is an object 
with a large surface or side which, when the structure or object falls or collapses, rests 
spread out over the ground.  Often X is a clothlike structure, as in nįbále 〈tél〉 tékar 
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{tipi 〈tarp〉 house 3PFV:fall} ‘the tipi 〈the tarp〉 fell down’.  X can also be a structure, 
but it has to be shaped so that the roof is wider and bigger than the sides so that the 
overall eﬀect is one of collapsing or flattening and not falling over: yoh 〈*tsąkų〉 
tékar {house 〈*outhouse〉 3PFV:fall} ‘the house 〈*the outhouse〉 fell down’.  There are 
three different verbs to describe snow falling; where an English speaker would use 
adjective like fluffy or powdery to describe falling snow, Dene distinguishes them by 
using different verbs, with the same subject, tsíł ‘falling snow’, which can also be used 
as a verb.  The most generic verb is –jér, which seems to be synonymous with simply 
tsíł {snow.is.falling}.  If the snow is a bit fine, í...tth’e can be used (tsíł hítth’e), a verb 
whose root is can be used with other derivatemes to describe sand falling from a dune.  
Finally, if the snow is falling in particularly large, fluffy flakes, one can use í...kar (tsíł 
híkar).  Ná...tł’í2 describes the falling of any plural objects, including people, but 
excluding atmospheric phenomena like snow.   
 2.  Contact between X and the ground before X falls: The verbs ná...ghez, 
eké...ltth’i and te...kar all denote Xs which were standing on the ground and then fell 
over so that their longest side was resting on the surface, e.g. a tent pole in the first case, 
a standing person who fell over in the second, and a tall thin structure like an outhouse 
in the third.  The other quasi-synonyms imply falling a height, where X was not 
touching the surface before the start of the situation.    
 3.  Final position of X: te...kar describes a motion of falling, rather like collapse, 
which suggests that the cloth structure or building ended up completely flat on the 
ground.  Interestingly, it shares the same root with í...kar ‘to fall in large flakes’.   
 4.  Number of X: Excluding the atmospheric terms, these quasi-synonyms all 
denote singular Xs; a fall involving two or more of any of them, including people, 
would be expressed with ná...tł’í2: t’ąchaghe 〈nádene, bíł〉 nátł’í {leaves 〈two.people, 
snares〉 3PFV:plural.fall} ‘the leaves 〈two people, the snares〉 fell’.   
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3.4.2.  Motion Terms: Syntax.   
 
The  ‘X travels’ series:  Most of these lexemes describe X's movement over surface 
Y, e.g. 'dzíre...lɂul  'X swims/glides over surface of body of water Y': they therefore 
have the same actants, X and Y: 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!human 1. N k’é 
 
 
 Exceptions include ghe...t’ał 'to fly': <X ghet’ał:  X is travelling quickly through 
the air {Y}>  
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N! 1. N yághe 
 
2.  hu...dhi <X Y hudhi:  disembodied entity X moves through area Y>  
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!disembodied 1. N  
 
C1.1 + C2.1: táda ją húdher {epidemic here TRANS:3PFV:go} ‘the epidemic went through 
here’ 
3.  –bį <X Y k'é/yaghe hebi ̨:  living being X travels on/in liquid Y by pushing Y 
back with X's limbs>   
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N!limbed 1. N yághe 
2. N k’é 
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C1.1 + C2.1: dadzené tanįlé ú té hebį {loon 3PFV:dive.in.water and underwater 
3IPFV:swim} ‘the loon dived down and swam underwater’ 
C1.1 + C2.2: edini tuchogh k’é dzírebį {he ocean on PERM:3IPFV:swim} ‘he swims in the 
ocean’, lit. “on the ocean”.     
4.  dzíre...lį <X Y yághe hulé: X travels around in liquid Y by pushing through Y 
using X's gills or propellar>  
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N! 1. N yághe 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5.  Physical Position Terms.  “It is there” or “he/she is there” is one of the most 
difficult meanings for foreign people to express in Dene, because there are so many 
choices according to the shape, texture, number and animacy of the subject which “is 
there”.   These can be divided into three series: the classificatory verbs, a group of 
existential verbs used for very large entities, and human position verbs.   
 
3.5.1.  Definitions.   The inventory of physical position verbs discussed in this 
section can be easily divided into three series of quasi-synonyms.  The first describes 
the position of (mostly inanimate) Xs according to their shape and texture.  The second 
series contains several other position verbs describing larger entities or portions of 
entities.  Finally, a third series is dedicated to human posture verbs.   
 
3.5.1.1.  Classificatory Verbs.  Where an English speaker can refer to any object 
using the abstract existential expression “it is over there”, the Dene speaker is forced to 
choose between these classificatory verb stems which differ according to their 
presuppositions about X’s shape, texture, contents (if X is a container) animacy and 
number.  For example, to say that a ball, a round object, “is over there”, one must say 
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dzoł yuwé theɂą {ball over.there 3IPFV:be} ‘a ball sits over there (as a compact object)’.  
To refer to a blanket in the same position however, one must say ts’éré yuwé thełchuth 
{blanket over.there 3IPFV:be} ‘a blanket is (spread out) over there’. These stems are 
referred to as “classificatory verb stems” by Athabaskanists because they classify 
objects based on their physical characteristics, while they can all be translated roughly 
as “X is there” or “there is an X”.  While there are several sets of handling stems, with 
meanings like ‘throw’, ‘pick up’, and so forth, which differ in precisely the same way, 
these are not suppletive forms referring to fixed noun classes.  Crucially, the same noun 
can be used with different classificatory stems if its shape is changeable: compare ts’éré 
yuwé thełchuth {blanket over.there 3IPFV:be} ‘a blanket is (spread out) over there’ with 
ts’éré yuwé theɂą {blanket over.there 3IPFV:be} ‘a (tightly rolled) blanket is over there 
(as a compact object)’.  For some objects which cannot be easily classified according to 
the divisions between the presuppositions of the verbs, the choice of stem may be 
lexicalized and may differ between communities.  For example, “a corpse is there” is 
rendered as dene lú theɂą {person frozen:ADJ 3IPFV:comp.be} ‘a corpse is there (as a 
compact object)’ in some Dene communities, but as dene lú thetą {person frozen:ADJ 
3IPFV:stick.be} ‘a corpse is there (as a sticklike object)’ in others.  Concepts like ‘a cup 
of tea’ or ‘a lake’ are not rendered in Dene as nouns, but as verbs denoting ways of 
sitting, i.e. as lidí theką {tea 3IPFV:sm.cont.be} ‘a cup of tea is there’, more literally 
“tea is there as a small full container”, or tu theɂą {water 3IPFV:comp.be} ‘a lake is 
there’, literally “water sits there as a heavy object”.  The best way to link the 
presupposition with the assertion in the English translation is with the preposition as, 
because the stems are vague enough to work with two types of Xs: containers which 
hold some unspecified content in the shape specified by the stem (tth’ái theką {cup 
3IPFV:be}  ‘a (full) cup is there [with Y contextually understood]’ or another substance 
X which is held in the shape specified by the stem by an otherwise unspecified 
container, e.g. lidí theką ‘tea is there (in a small full container)’.  One of the stems 
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describes plural objects without specifying X’s shape, texture or contents, and one is 
animate and also used as a human position verb.  This section will discuss eight of the 
classificatory verbs, excluding the animate stem, which will be discussed in Section 
3.9.3.  The language forces the speaker to assign a shape and texture to an object — 
there is no verbalizable dominant or primitive meaning simply ‘to be there’ as in 
English.   
More than for many of the verb stems discussed in this thesis, there is an extensive 
literature about classificatory verbs.  Specifically for Dene Sųłiné, Carter (1976) 
produced a description of their meaning and use.  This is the version used in Dillon, 
Saskatchewan, and may show some slight phonetic differences in the signifiers with 
respect to versions in other communities.   
The series is –ɂą, –ta ̨1, –ta ̨2, –łtą, –ką, –łchuth, –dzai, –tłé, and –la, and the 
definitions are the following:  
1.  –ɂą  <X Y k’é theɂą: X, which has a compact shape, is supported by surface 
Y>.  Example Xs include ‘ball’, ‘rock’, ‘spool of thread’, ‘oven’, and ‘lightbulb’ 
2.  –tą1   <X Y k’é thetą: X, which has a sticklike shape, is supported by surface 
Y>.  Example Xs include ‘stick’, ‘pencil’, ‘televison’ (in some communities) 
3.  –tą2   <X Y k’é thetą: X, which is a rigid empty container, is supported by 
surface Y>.  Example Xs include ‘(empty) pail’, ‘(empty) bottle’, ‘(empty) matchbox’, 
but excluding bags.   
4. –łtą   <X Y k’é thełtą: X, which is a full large container, is supported by surface 
Y>.  Example Xs include ‘(full) pail’, ‘(full) bottle’.   
5.  –ką   <X Y k’é theką: X, which is a full small container, is supported by surface 
Y>.  Example Xs include ‘(full) cup’ and ‘(full) plate’.   
6. –łchuth  <X Y k’é thełchuth: X, which has a fabriclike shape, is supported by 
surface Y>.  Example Xs include ‘blanket’, ‘shingle’, and ‘tarp’.   
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7.  –dzai  <X Y k’é thedzai: substance X, which has a loose granular shape, is 
supported by surface Y>.  Example Xs include ‘gravel’, ‘sand’, ‘(loose) tobacco’, 
‘(loose) tea’, and ‘(loose) sugar’.   
8.  –tłé   <X Y k’é thetłé: X, which has a mushy texture, is supported by surface 
Y>.  Example Xs include ‘mud’ and ‘mashed potatoes’.   
9.  –la  <X Y k’é thela: X, which is plural, is supported by surface Y>.  Example 
Xs include any plural X, regardless of shape or texture.   
 The classificatory verbs differ by the following parameters: 
1.  X’s shape:  –ɂą  seems to be used for Xs which are ’compact’, meaning 
roughly round or square, i.e. whose length is not more than twice their width, as in 
tsąk’áni 〈t’łdedhi, k’ąk’áni〉 yuwé theɂą {oven 〈spool.of.thread, light.bulb〉 over.there 
3IPFV:be} ‘an oven 〈a spool of thread, a light bulb〉 is (sitting) over there’.  Round 
objects always –ɂą, but roughly square containers are usually excluded even if a block 
of wood the same length and width would be considered ‘compact’: tíli ‘box’ 〈tutíli 
‘bottle’〉 thetą 〈?theɂą〉 ‘the box 〈bottle〉 is there’.  As with all the stems in this series, X 
must be resting on surface Y; the same objects hanging from a string would have to be 
described as nábel ‘it is hanging down’ or dáthela ‘they are up there’.  X can 
sometimes be a permanent feature of Y, described as if it were an object lying on Y, as 
with certain highly localized topographical features such as nu 〈tu〉 theɂą  {island 
〈water〉 3IPFV:be} ‘an island 〈a lake〉 is there’.  However, some speakers avoid using 
theɂą for topographical features, preferring the alternative hóret’į ‘it is visible’ or ‘it is 
seen’.  The stem –tą1 is used for ‘sticklike’ objects, a class which includes most long, 
thin objects including non-containers whose length is more than twice their width.  
Examples include néni 〈remote, tł’íschené〉 yuwé thetą  {fallen.tree 〈remote.control, 
pencil〉 over.there 3IPFV:be} ‘a fallen tree 〈the remote control, the pencil〉 is over there’.  
They must be lying with their long side against the surface Y rather than planted or 
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standing upright on the surface, in which case náįɂa ‘it (sticklike) stands’ would be 
used.  Another sense, –tą2, is used for empty containers regardless of shape.  Even a 
roughly square box or a long, thin container standing upright with its smaller side in 
contact with surface Y: tíli ‘box’ 〈tutíli ‘bottle’〉 thetą ‘the box 〈bottle〉 is there’, the 
latter said of an upright bottle.  Any full container which is not tall and thin and which is 
smaller than a pail is described with –ką, e.g. tth’ái ‘cup’ 〈tth’áíkálé ‘plate’〉 theką ‘the 
cup 〈the plate〉 is there (with something in it)’.   The stem –łchuth is used with flexible 
Xs with a large surface which covers a portion of the surface Y: beyé dódí yuwé thetą 
〈*thełtą〉 {bottle 〈cup〉  3:in there.is.none over.there 3IPFV:be} ‘an empty bottle 〈cup〉  is 
over there’.  By contrast, –dzai denotes a roughly granular substance, even rather 
coarse: suga 〈lidí, ts’elt’úi, tthe ddhére ́〉 yuwé thedzai {sugar 〈tea, tobacco, rocks 
fine:ADJ〉 over.there 3IPFV:be} ‘(loose) sugar 〈tea, tobacco, gravel〉  is over there’. The 
stem –la is used for plural objects of any shape.   
2.  Texture: The stem –tłé is used with a mushy, lifeless substance as X, 
regardless of shape.  X can be animate or inanimate but containing some liquid, such as 
mud (hotł’és thetłé ‘mud is (sitting) there’) or something of a similar texture, but 
excluding dry shapeless things: *ts’éré thetłé {blanket 3IPFV:be}.  This stem can also 
be used with humor to describe a drunk, exhausted or lethargic person, roughly like 
plopped down in English: edini nį k’é thetłé {he ground on 3IPFV:be} ‘he’s lying 
(collapsed) on the floor’.  The other stems are focused more on shape than on the 
texture of X per se.   
3.  Size:  Full containers can take different stems based solely on size.  If X is a 
full container the size of a cup, –ką must be used e.g. tth’ái ‘cup’ 〈tth’áíkálé ‘plate’〉 
theką ‘the cup 〈the plate〉 is there (with something in it)’.  a container of the same shape 
but as large as a bucket or larger would be described using –łtą. The other stems are 
flexible as to size, and vary depending on shape and texture.   
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4.  Presence or absence of container: –dzai must denote substances without a 
container suga 〈lidí, ts’elt’úi〉 yuwé thedzai {sugar 〈tea, tobacco〉 over.there 3IPFV:be} 
‘(loose) sugar 〈tea, tobacco〉  is over there’.  These sentences could denote small piles of 
loose tea, coffee and tobacco, but the same small pile in the same configuration on a 
paper plate would be described as suga 〈lidí, ts’elt’úi〉 yuwé theką {sugar 〈tea, tobacco〉 
over.there 3IPFV:be} ‘(loose) sugar 〈tea, tobacco〉  is over there (on a plate)’.   
5.  Container X has contents or not: –tą2 is used for empty containers regardless 
of shape: tíli ‘box’ 〈tutíli ‘bottle’, tth’ái ‘cup’, tth’áíkálé ‘plate’〉 thetą ‘the (empty) box 
〈bottle, cup, plate〉 is there’.  If the container is full, however, there is a division between 
pail-sized and larger containers and tall, thin containers such as bottles on one hand, and 
short or small full containers on the other.  Any full container smaller than a pail is 
described with –ką: tth’ái ‘cup’ 〈tth’áíkálé ‘plate’〉 theką ‘the cup 〈the plate〉 is there 
(with something in it)’. A tall full like a bottle on one hand, or square or round but pail-
sized or larger container with contents is denoed by –łtą.  This gives minimal pairs like 
tutíli beyé tu detą yuwé thełtą 〈*thetą〉 {bottle 3:in water 3IPFV:be over.there 
3IPFV:be} ‘a bottle with water in it is over there’ and tutíli beyé dódí yuwé thetą 
〈*thełtą〉 {bottle 3:in there.is.none over.there 3IPFV:be} ‘an empty bottle  is over there’. 
6.  Number: –la is used for plural Xs of any shape or texture, and all of the other 
quasi-synonyms denote singular Xs and cannot be pluralized with the distributive 
marker dá–; tth’ái (‘cup’) dátheką would be interpreted as a directional ‘the full cup is 
sitting up there’ rather than as a plural *‘there are several full cups there’.   
 
3.5.1.2.  Other Existential Position Verbs.  These verbs are the Func0 verbs 
for large topographical features.  All of these verbs translate to ‘X is there’, but unlike 
the classificatory verbs they only refer to objects which cannot change their shape and 
texture.  For this reason, most of Xs must always take a given existential position verb.  
There is no true expressible dominant with the meaning ‘to be there’, but one can use 
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the generic hore...dɂį ‘to be visible’ to avoid using one of these verbs. The forms of the 
stems should be considered highly speculative, they are only observed in their third 
person propositional form.  Because they are only speculative, I will use the verified 
propositional form rather than the stem in the discussion below.   
1.  ho...ɂą   <X Y (k’é) hoɂą:  X, which is a compact object larger than a person 
but small enough to be seen at once, is on surface Y or in area Y> 
2.  níni...ɂa   <X Y nɂa:  X, which is a geographical feature too long to be seen 
at once, goes through area Y> 
3.  náni...ɂa   <X Y (k’é)  náįɂa:  X, which is an upright sticklike object of any 
size, stands on surface Y or in area Y> 
4.  hu...lį   <X Y hųlį:  X, which is a portion of an entity or substance X, is in 
area Y> 
5.  ná...dher3  <X Y nádher:  X, who is a living being, is in area Y> 
All are intransitive verbs.  They differ by the following parameters: 
1.  Shape: hoɂą is used for something relatively compact and localized.  There 
seem to be few other shape restrictions though: eyer sekų hoɂą {there 1PO:house 
AR:3IPFV:sit}; yųnathé tu theɂąi eyer sheth goze bets'én horílger hoɂą, hehedi  ‘at 
the lake which lies ahead there is a steep place between hills, they said’  (Li & 
Scollon 1976); hogaié hoɂą k’é {clearing 3IPFV:be MIR} ‘wow, there’s a clearing’; 
hoyé chogh hoɂą {hole big 3IPFV:be} ‘there’s a big hole’. Interestingly, its use seems 
to be extended (perhaps as a new sense) to items which do not have a physical 
existence: hubeyatié hoɂą nuhets’į website k’é {3PL.PO:report 3IPFV:be 1PL:to website 
on} ‘their report is on our Web site’. Náįɂa refers to a sticklike object: e.g. dechen 
náįɂa ‘a tree is there [standing]’.  X is conceived of as a long, thin feature which 
stretches off into the distance away from the Speaker or the protagonist of the text, and 
is therefore too long to be viewed entirely by a stationary person: tųlú 〈hotéth; des〉 
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nɂa ‘a road 〈portage; river〉 is there’18, cf. *des 〈*tųlu〉 hoɂą  *‘a river 〈*road〉 is there’.  
One speaker said that these last sentences cannot be used “because it’s long”.  
2.  Position with respect to the surface:  náįɂa describes something planted in the 
ground or standing with its small surface on the ground, e.g. gani náįɂa ‘a pine tree is 
there [standing]’, cf. gani thetą  ‘a [fallen] pine tree is there’.  Nɂa is describes 
topographical feature that is part of, or in constant contact with, the ground.   
3.  Quantity: hųl refers to the existence of a quantity of a substance that is also in 
other places, e.g. k’í 〈náídi; tł’ogh〉 hųlį {birch 〈medicine; grass〉 3IPFV:be} ‘there are 
birch trees 〈medicine; grass〉 there’; tu nedhel hųlį {water 3IPFV:be.hot 3IPFV:be} 
‘there’s hot water (available at the faucet)’.  The plural of ná...dher3, ná...dé3, can be 
interpreted as having a definite or indefinite subject: ‘the people were there’ or ‘some 
people were there’.  The others describe only the entire X or set of Xs being present.   
4.  Existence of natural endpoint: nɂa  is used with Xs which are long thin 
geographical features.  Nɂa suggests a dynamic or gestalt view in which X has a 
natural endpoint, such as a road, a river or a portage.   
5.  Permanence: hoɂą suggests impermanence, not a permanent feature of area, 
although there is variation between speakers and communities on this point.  For 
some speakers, there is a contrast between hoɂą and theɂą, with the latter 
presupposes permanence: tu nu theɂą 〈?hoɂą〉 {lake island 3IPFV:be} ‘there is an 
island on the lake, cf. tu k’é hoɂą 〈?theɂą〉 sį  {water place 3IPFV:be} ‘there is a water 
hole (cut in the ice)’.  For these speakers, using hoɂą with geographical features is odd 
because “it sounds like you can move it”, as one consultant explained.  Other speakers 
                                                
18 For some speakers, nįɂa is blocked with des ‘river’ by the existence of a more specific verb, télį ‘it 
flows’.    
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would accept hoɂą with permanent geographical features. Interestingly, hoɂą, not 
theɂą, is used to describe the location of cities: Saskatoon / New York háyorįla 
nechá hoɂą 〈*theɂą〉     
6.  Animacy: ná...dher3 is the only word used to describe the presence of 
animate Xs: dlúne nádé ú? {mice 3IPFV:pl.be Q} ‘are there mice (in your apartment)?  
Jesse nádher ú? {J. 3IPFV:sg.be Q} ‘Is Jesse there (at your house)?; ę, nádher ’yes, 
she’s here’.  The others cannot be used with animate subjects, e.g.  *dene hųlį *‘there 
are some people there’.  In the words of one speaker, this would be wrong “because 
they move”.  ˊ 
 
3.5.1.3.  Human Posture Verbs.  There are the standard position verbs meaning 
‘sit’, ‘stand’ and ‘lie’.  In Dene, these differ based on the number of the subject, with 
unrelated stems for singular, dual and plural subjects: 
 
            X=1     X=2   X=3 or more  
(37)   ‘to lie’     –tį1    –tes1   –tes1 
‘to stand’   –yį     –yį     nareH...łya 
‘to sit’     –da    –ké    de...łtthi 
Human posture verbs form a class with distinctive grammatical features as well: like the 
classificatory verbs, they take the the– imperfective allomorph.  This section will 
consider only the singular-subject stems, which do not differ from the dual- and plural-
subject stems in any component other than the number of Xs.  These verbs are best 
described as individual entries rather than as a series of quasi-synonyms. 
1. –tį1 <X Y k’é thetį: Often living beings need to be in this position || X is in a 
position with X’s body flat on surface Y>.   
This verb describes the position of ‘lying’ with X’s body flat and supported by 
a surface.  The condition ‘often living beings need to be in this position’ is necessary to 
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distinguish –tį1 from –łtį, which is used for an animate being lying injured or collapsed: 
dene yuwé thełtį 〈*thetį〉 ‘a person is lying (injured) over there’, cf. dene yuwé thetį 
〈*thełtį〉 ‘a person is lying (resting, sleeping) over there’.  It is not restricted to a 
human body: łį yuwé thetį {dog over.there 3IPFV:lie} ‘the dog is lying over there’.   
2.  –yį  <X Y k’é theyį: X is in a position with X’s body upright supported by 
X’s feet on surface Y>. 
This describes ‘standing’ —  a living being X is supporting X’s own body on 
X’s legs.  The only difference apparent between the meaning of –yį and ‘to lie’ in 
English is that –yį is a bit odd with four-legged animals and insects: łį yuwé theda 
〈*theyį〉  {dog over.there 3IPFV:sg.sit} ‘the dog is standing over there’, lit. “sitting”; 
ts’úze yozí k’é theda 〈*theyį〉 {fly wall on 3IPFV:sg.sit} ‘the fly is standing on the wall’, 
lit. “sitting”.   
3. –da  <X Y k’é theda: X is in a position with X’s body upright but folded and 
close to the ground on surface Y>. 
It is unclear whether there is one or two senses here: this verb can be used to 
describe a range of positions.  A person’s body can be folded so that that the top half 
of X’s body is upright and X’s weight resting on X’s buttocks, which are supported 
by surface Y: dachene k’e thida {chair on 1IPFV:sg.sit} ‘I’m sitting on the chair’.  Or it 
can describe a position where X’s body is folded into a shape rather similar to ‘sitting’, 
but where X’s weight is still supported by X’s feet.  So the meanings of –da and ‘to 
crouch’ are not mutually exclusive: heyįs ú theda {3IPFV:crouch when 3IPFV:sg.sit} ‘he 
is crouching’, lit. “he is sitting crouching”.  As described in the previous entry, this is 
also the standard verb to describe animals in a stationary position, e.g. ts’úze yozí k’é 
theda 〈*theyį〉 {fly wall on 3IPFV:sg.sit} ‘the fly is standing on the wall’, lit. “sitting”.  
If there is one sense that subsumes crouching, sitting, and standing (for a living being 
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with short legs), then it must depend on whether the distance between X and the ground 
is greater than the height of X’s trunk, so that X’s body gives a general impression of 
being near the ground versus tall and upright.  In fact, –da is not used to describe 
stationary animals that are very tall or lanky: łįchogh yuwé theyį 〈*theda〉 {horse 
over.there 3IPFV:sg.stand} ’the horse is standing over there’.   
 
 
3.5.2.  Position Terms: Syntax.  As these verbs describe the position of entity 
X on surface Y, most of them have the same Government Pattern: 
 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N! 1. N k’é 
 
 Some of the existential position verbs to describe the location and position of 
topographical features, however, have different GPs: 
 
 
 
 
 
níni...ɂa   <X Y nɂa:  X, which is a geographical feature too long to be seen at 
once, goes through area Y>: 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N! 1. N  
 
náni...ɂa   <X Y (k’é) náįɂa :  X, which is an upright sticklike object of any size, 
stands on surface Y or in area Y>: 
 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N! 1. N  
2. N k’é 
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hu...lį   <X Y hųlį:  X, which is a portion of entities or substance X, is in area 
Y>: 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N! 1. N  
 
ná...dher3  <X Y nádher:  X, who is a living being, is in area Y> 
X ⇔ I Y⇔ II 
1. N! 1. N  
 
 
 
 
3.6.  Atmospheric Terms.  “Atmospheric” will serve as a label for a variety of 
verbs that denote not only atmospheric weather phenomena but also lake phenomena 
such as ‘waves’ as well as the movement of the sun.  The inflectional paradigm of these 
lexical units is restricted in several ways.  Most of the verbs have no perfective or 
optative form, so a past situation would have to be indicated with the past tense marker 
nį, or by the discourse context.  For pragmatic reasons they exist only in the third 
person singular, even though they seem to have the normal structure of Dene verbs.  
Two of these verbs, however, chą and tsíł, part of a very small unique class of verbs 
which are monomophermic and unconjugated, and take none of the regular Dene verb 
morphology outlined in Section III-1.2.2.  These verbs also have have distinct semantic 
and lexical combinatorial properties.  Usually the Dene Sųłiné language seems to avoid 
explicitly marking the beginnings and ends of states (see Chapter IV) as well as adverbs 
of degree.  Atmospheric verbs, however, are particularly acceptable with both kinds of 
phasal lexical relations.  This section does not aim to present an exhaustive list of Dene 
atmospheric and solar verbs, but only the most frequent.  
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3.6.1.  Definitions.  The verbs in this section are best described as a series of 
stand-alone entries rather than as synonym series.  They are simply divided according to 
semantic field.  The first concerns precipitation and wind terms, the second the 
movement of the sun, and the third lake weather.   
 
3.6.1.1.  Precipitation and Wind.  Verbs for precipitation and wind do not seem 
to constitute a synonym series, as they are not directly comparable.   It is therefore more 
advantageous to present these LUs as stand-alone, ECD-type entries.   
1. –łts’i <øSG niłts’i:  air moves in a current>.    
This is the most generic word for ‘wind’, or more accurately ‘the wind blows’, in 
Dene.  By itself it does not take other actants.  To say ‘the wind blew against me’ one 
would have to add a second verb, meaning ‘to strike’, e.g. Involv(–łts’i) = náne...ltth’i 
‘[formless entity] strikes’, e.g. niłts’i senánéltth’er {3IPFV:wind.blow 
1OB:3PFV:drift.strike} ‘the wind hit me’.  This sentence, however, implies the wind 
hitting as a unitary gust rather than as a constant flow of air.  The wind denoted by this 
verb19 is expected to be of a certain intensity or speed, as shown by its acceptability 
with a variety of Magn intensifiers: Magn(–łts’i) = ~ chogh ‘big’; ~ naltła ‘it is fast’; 
i.e. ~ nįtł’édh ‘it hits hard’; ~ nátser ‘it is strong’; AntiMagn(–łts’i) = // niłts'iaze ‘a 
slight wind’. 
2.  chą <øSG chą:  drops of water fall from the sky>.   
This is the most generic verb for ‘rain’ or ‘it rains’.  It expected to be of a certain 
intensity; drizzling or misting is not describes as chą: chą hederédlįne íle, hotetsíł 
{rain 3IPFV:be.normal NEG, 3IPFV:drizzle} ‘it’s not really raining, it’s just drizzling’.  If 
it is above a certain duration, intensity, quantity or size (of raindrops) it is modified with 
a rich array of Magn adverbs which magnify one or all of its components: 
Magnsize(chą) = ~ ná...tł’i ‘plural fall’, i.e. ‘rain falls in big drops’; Magnquantity(chą) = 
                                                
19 It is debatable whether niłts’i in sentences like niłts’i senánélth’er {3IPFV:wind.blow  
1OB:3PFV:formless.hit} ‘the wind hit me as a big gust’ is a verb rather than a S0 syntactic derivative and 
subject of the Func0 verb.  Both constructions would be possible. 
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~ łą ‘it is abundant’; Magnintensity(chą) = ~ ts’étthįle ‘strongly’; Magntemp(chą) = thá 
hots’én ~ ‘for a long time’.  It usually has the syntactic position of a verb, taking tense 
markers (chą ha k’ábį {it.rains FUT tomorrow} ‘it will rain tomorrow’) although in the 
case of chą nátł’i {rain down:3IPFV:pl.fall} ‘rain falls in big drops’ it could also be 
interpreted as a deverbal noun which is the subject of the second verb.   
3.  tsíł <øSG tsíł:  flakes of frozen water fall from the sky>.   
This is the standard word for ‘[falling] snow’ or ‘snowing’; it cannot be used for 
snow on the ground: Sres(tsíł) = // yath ‘snow [on ground]’.  If tsíł is above a certain 
expected intensity or size (of snowflakes), a variety of Magn adverbs are added: 
Magnsize (tsíł) = ~ káraze ná...tł’i ‘~ flakes plural fall’; Magnquantity(tsíł) = ~ łą ‘it is 
abundant’.  There are also a variety of Func0 verbs which describe its falling, and in 
some cases its way of falling: Func0(tsíł) = ~ í...tth’e ‘granular falls’; 
Func0Magnsize(tsíł) = ~ í...kár ‘it falls in big flakes’.   
4.  hote...ts'íł <øSG hotéts'íł: tiny water drops fall from clouds in sky>  
This could be colloquially translated as ‘it is drizzling/misting’.  It describes a 
situation of percipitation where the droplets are too small to be seen distinctly and 
which are not felt to hit the skin separately.  As mentioned previously, hote...ts'íł is 
not a kind of chą ‘it rains’: chą hederédlįne íle, hotetsíł {rain 3IPFV:be.normal NEG, 
3IPFV:drizzle} ‘it’s not really raining, it’s just drizzling’. 
5.  ere...lyel <øSG erelyel : a loud noise happens in the sky that usually happens 
after lightning during rainstorms>.   
This describes thunder clapping but not lightning or a whole storm.   
6.  dzagothe...łt’į  <øSG dzagothełt’į  : a flash of light happens in the sky that 
usually happens before thunder during rainstorms>.  This verb translates to 
“lightning strikes”.  It might be at least etymologically a phraseme dzagoth hełt’į 
                                                                                                                                      258 
because some speakers seem to place a pause between the syllables –goth– and –he–, 
although dzagoth is not a extant word. 
 
3.6.1.2.  Solar Verbs.  These verbs describe the movement and brightness of the 
sun.  They also do not form a synonym series, and are best described as stand-alone, 
ECD-type entries. 
1.  ho...ba  <øSG hoba:  there is very little light in the sky>.   
This is similar to “it is twilight” in English, except that can refer to the very 
beginning or the very end of the day, as long as there is only a trace of light in the 
sky.  Etymologically it comes from the combination of the areal prefix ho–, which 
indicates agreement with a situation or place, and –ba ‘to be grey’.  At the very 
beginning of dawn, before yá...łką would be appropriate, one can use ho...ba: hoba 
hedheł {3IPFV:faint.light PROG:3IPFV:formless.come:PROG} ‘the faint beginning of the 
morning light is arriving now’; hoba hegai {3IPFV:faint.light INCEP:3IPFV:be.white} 
‘[the sky] is starting to lighten with the earliest rays of dawn’.   One speaker said that 
this means “the horizon is just getting to be visible”.  One can use it to describe the 
last fading light of dusk: ął hoba hóret’į  {still  3IPFV:faint.light 3IPFV:be.visible} ‘the 
twilight can still be seen’.   
2.  yá...łką  <øSG yáłka ̨:  most daylight appears at the beginning of the day>.   
This refers to the period where dawn has begun more fully and most of the light 
of day has appeared in the sky, i.e. after hoba.  It suggests, however, that the sun has 
not fully emerged from the horizon, as evidenced by sentences like  yáłką kú sa 
hhaįɂą {3IPFV:dawn then sun 3PFV:come.out } ‘it was dawn and then the sun came 
(fully) out’.   
3.  ts'éne...ɂa  <øSG/X Y yá hots’į ts'énįɂa: the sun comes out from behind Y>.   
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This is used for when the sun comes out from behind something that obscures it, 
such as clouds: yak’ódh yá hots’į sa ts’énįɂa {clouds in AR:from sun 3PFV:come.out} 
‘the sun came out from behind the clouds’.  Another verb, hhá...ɂa, is used for when the 
sun comes out in the morning: k’abį įghá sa hháįɂą 〈*ts’énįɂa〉 dé {morning early sun 
3PFV:come.out when} ‘early in the morning (just) after the sun came up’.    
4.  ts'é...ɂal  <øSG/{X} ts'éɂal: the sun is clearly visible>.   
Colloquially this verb could be translated as “the sun is shining”.  As a constant 
participant, it is possible to add sa ‘the sun’, but it is marked; more commonly it is 
not mentioned unless one wants to place a specific emphasis on it.   
5.  náhe...ɂą <øSG / X náheɂą: the sun goes down>.   
This refers to the period when the sun is going down until there is complete 
darkness, after which tedhe ‘night’ begins.  This verb is also the standard word for 
‘evening’ as it refers to the time period of the whole sunset, as in náheɂą ú  seghą 
nįya {3IPFV:sun.sets when 1:by MOM:3PFV:sg.walk} ‘he came to my place in the 
evening’.  It does, however, refer literally to the sun going down in the sky: náheɂą sį 
{3IPFV:sun.sets EMPH} ‘the sun is going down’; náheɂą horélya {3IPFV:sun.sets 
3IPFV:be.pleasant} ‘the sunset is pretty’.  A quasi-synonym is the phraseme sa noyįɂą 
{sun earth:into 3IPFV:move.round} lit. “the sun went into the earth”. 
6.  yéts  <øSG yéts: there is bright red light at the end of the sunset>.   
This lexeme has an unusual structure in that it is diﬃcult to determine its lexical 
class.   Etymologically it resembles the combination of ya ‘sky’ and the possessed 
noun –ts ‘bits of’; –ts  would also be a phonologically unusual (for its high tone nasal 
vowel in an open syllable) and otherwise unattested verb root.  Yéts  could be 
interpreted a noun in many syntactic contexts:  náheɂą horélyą, yéts heł  
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{3IPFV:sun.sets 3IPFV:be.pleasant  red.sunset with} ‘the sunset is beautiful, with a red 
ending’; náheɂą kúlú yéts dódí {3IPFV:sun.sets but red.sunset there.is.none} ‘the sun is 
setting, but there is no red ending’.  In other cases, though, it appears to be a stand-alone 
verb: náhaɂą tł' dé, yéts  {3PFV:sun.set at.end when 3IPFV:red.sunset}  ‘at the end of 
the sunset, there is the last red shimmer’.  In this case, if it were a noun one would 
expect a Func0 verb such as horet’į  ‘it is visible’.   
 
3.6.1.3.  Lake Weather Terms.  These verbs describe the movement of the lake 
itself as a consequence of wind and precipitation.  These also do not constitute a 
synonym series, and are best presented as ECD-type entries. 
1.  tare...tį   <øSG taretį: there are lines of raised water moving across the surface 
of the body of water against the foot of land Y / into container Y>.  This verb is usually 
used with no other object, simply to state weather conditions, i.e. taretį {3IPFV:wave} 
‘there are waves (on the lake)’.  It is rarely used with a direct object but it can be: nųt’a 
taretį {earth:at.foot.of 3IPFV:wave} ‘waves are striking against the land’; nuhets'įé yé 
tarįtį ch’á, ts'į húlt'į {1PL.PO:boats:CONS into 3IPFV:wave against, boats 1PL.OPT:pull} 
‘let’s pull up out boats so that the waves don’t go into them’.  
2. tadene...chá  <øSG tarįchá : tall lines of raised water move across the surface of 
that body of water>.   This means “the waves are big” in colloquial English. 
Tadene...chá does not seem to denote a situation in which other participants are 
involved but is simply an assessof weather conditions.  
3.  tare...dyath  <øSG tarejath: there are white crests on the tall lines of raised 
water move across the surface of the body of water>.  An English rendering could be 
“there are whitecaps”.  This verb, too is used to simply describe lake conditions with no 
other obligatory participants.   
4.  í...lben <øSG hílben: the level of water of the body of water rises to an unusual 
level>.  The subject can be any body of water, whether a river or a lake.  It refers to any 
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situation in which the water suddenly rises to an unusually high level, e.g. as the result 
of a flood, or high tide.  
5.  de...ghel2  <øSG/X deghel: there are no lines of raised water moving across the 
surface of the body of water>.  This is a very reduced AntiMagn or Anti of tare...tį  
‘there are waves’ and indicates that the lake is at rest without large or visible waves.  
The first sense of the vocable de...ghel1, means ‘[area] is calm’ in a more general 
sense without referring to the water.   
 
3.6.2.  Atmospheric Terms: Syntax.  Mostly GPs for the atmospheric and solar 
LUs in the same are similar.  They all take an empty dummy subject: 
X ⇔ I 
1. øSG! 
 
C1.1: yáłką ts'én tth'ú  { øSG  3IPFV:dawn before} ‘before it is dawn’  
Exceptions are náhe...ɂą ‘[the sun] goes down’, ts'éne...ɂa ‘[the sun] comes 
out’ and de...ghel2 ‘[the lake] is calm’, which can optionally take a referential noun 
subject (sa ‘sun’ and tu ‘lake’ respectively):  
 
X ⇔ I 
1. N! 
2. øSG! 
 
C1.1: tu deghel dé {lake 3IPFV:be.calm when} ‘when the lake is calm’  
C1.2: : (tu k’é) deghel dé {(lake on) 3IPFV:be.calm when} ‘when it is calm (on the 
lake)’  
 
3.7.  Topographical Terms.  To outsiders, one of the most striking features of 
Northern Athabaskan cultures in the Aboriginal era was the extent to which people 
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travelled.  Without maps or compasses, Dene people traversed great distances of 
perhaps hundreds of kilometers on foot or by dogsled to harness the various seasonal 
resources, from fish and berries to large ungulates, as part of their traditional land use 
cycle.  More strikingly, Dene would return to precisely the same locations each year and 
were able to locate other Dene communities spread out over a territory the size of 
France.  Athabaskan people knew their land in such intimate detail that they could cover 
long distances without getting lost, which could be fatal in the northern Canadian 
wilderness.  To organize and transmit such knowledge, the Dene language uses a very 
extensive array of place names as well as subtle range of topographical terms.  As one 
elder described it:  
 
[Sųnághe] seghą nagha łí la ɂa, dechen yá nághidher dé, beł hosni ha.  Edlíni ɂasí 
łegháįłther ú, edlásį nathįya, edlólye nį eyi tu, eyi des séłni.  Beba hothizį dé, t’a nįh, 
k’uta k’ólyą hoyį.  Nuhni t’a dechen yághe t’ahuk’é náráílzé ú, t’ahuk’é dzírídel łí, 
horely bezí dáít’į ɂá nih.  Horely bezí hųlį nuhba, eyi gháré k’órelyą. Dechen tth’i 
t’ąt’u deɂą, beł koresį dé, beba ɂasí núníni dé, yułɂá ha. Dechen t’a hųt’e nį eyer ɂasí 
neba nila helesį dé eyi gháré yułɂá hoha.  Kųt’u dághída nuhni dene.  
 
‘[My older brother] will come to visit me, after I have been in the bush, so that I may tell 
him about it.  “What spot did you hunt something? What direction did you go?  What is 
the name of that river?” he asks me.  If I name the place to him, he knows it.  We have 
made a name for every place in the bush where we hunted and where we travelled.  Each 
[place] has a name for us, by that he knows it.  Also the way the trees stand, the kind of 
bush it is, if I bring something back from it for him he will recognize it.  That is how we 
Dene lived.’ 
 
Topographical terms, while a particularly important area of vocabulary historically, 
seem to be among the most endangered parts of the lexicon, as a sedentary way of life 
has now been adopted for some time.  Many are these terms are compounds, e.g. gani 
hochéla  {jackpine promontory} ‘promontory with jackpines’ or k’es néné {poplar 
land:CONS} ‘bush made up primarily of poplars’.  From a crosslinguistic perspective, 
however, it is interesting that many of the Dene terms for topographical features are 
verbs rather than nouns.  
 Like other areas of vocabulary, topographical features are based on a human 
perspective.  Linguistically significant differences include their size with respect to a 
human: taller/shorter than a person, etc., too tall for a person to climb, etc.  Among 
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those features that are larger than person, there are those that can be viewed in their 
entirety by a person in one moment.  Among larger features, there are those that can be 
explored by a person in several hours or a day versus much larger landforms.  This 
selection will only consider those features that are larger than a person but small enough 
to be fully viewed by a stationary human being.  This class includes a selection terms 
for slopes and cliffs; terms for arrangements of trees and terms for waterways or 
subsections thereof.   
Because most of these lexical items are intransitive verbs, when people interact 
with them, their actions must be described as a some clause in some cases, particularly 
if they have a second actant, e.g. tabąghe ts’én ts’énįt’į, kozį dene natheya {shore to 
3IPFV:ridge.trees.be, there person REV:3PFV:sg.go} ‘there is a ridge of trees going down 
to the shore, someone went down there (and came back)’.  In other cases, it is more 
acceptable to integrate the whole verb phrase into a sentence, perhaps as a desentential 
noun: dene erét’į yá húya {person 3IPFV:be.ridge.trees in TRANS:3PFV:sg.go} ‘the 
person walked through the ridge of trees’; dene hhátaįlį ts’į tu hką  {person spring 
from water 3PFV:take.small.container}.  It is not really obvious which part of speech 
these LUs belong to in these cases, nouns or verb phrases, as both could be possible in 
this context.   
  
3.7.1.  Definitions.  As with the semantic field of atmospheric and solar terms, 
many lexical units describing topographical formations are best described as stand-
alone entries.  However, the first set of LUs in this section, denoting pattens of sloping 
ground, is best illustrated as a series of quasi-synonyms.   
 
3.7.1.1.  Slopes.  All of these verbs translate to “there is a slope there”.  They can 
be applied to any slope which is too high for a person to reach the top with his hands 
while standing at the bottom of it; in principle there is no upper limit to their size. 
Because these verbs, for pragmatic reasons, exist only in the third person and cannot be 
conjugated, the stems are speculative.  Unlike the previous atmospheric terms, these 
lexemes are sufficiently similar to be described in a synonym series.  
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The series is: hodeH...lger, hokáde...dhá, hodáhohe...ɂá, hokáhohe...ɂá, 
thaidáhohe...ɂá, hodáhohe...gai.  The definitions are the following:  
1.  hodeH...lger  <øSG/X Y ts’én  horílger:  viewed from above, there is / land X 
forms a steep slope> 
2. hokáde...dhá <øSG/X  hokáredhá: viewed from below, there is / land X forms a 
steep slope> 
3.  hodáhohe...ɂá  <øSG/X  hodóheɂá: viewed from above, there is / land X forms 
a gentle slope> 
4. hokáhohe...ɂá <øSG /X  hokóheɂá: viewed from below, there is / land X forms a 
gentle slope> 
5. thaidáhohe...ɂá  <øSG thaidóheɂá: viewed from above, there is a sandy / the 
sand forms a gentle slope> 
6. hodáhohe...gai  <øSG /X  hodóhegai: viewed from above, there is / land X 
forms a gentle slope much lighter in color than the surrounding land> 
All of the stems contain former prefixes like hoká– ‘up’ and hodá– ‘down’.  But 
the lexemes in this series are morphological phrasemes rather than derived stems 
because the remainder, if one removes the prefixes, i.e. *deH...lger and *hohe...ɂá, are 
not extant verb stems.  Most of them take a dummy subject or alternatively nih ‘land’ as 
the subject (nih hodárílger ts’étthle des daé  {land  3IPFV:slope.down gently river 
above} ‘the land slopes down gently above the river’); when there is a second 
obligatory participant with the dummy subject, there is no agreement with a distal third 
person, as one normally finds when both the subject and the direct object are in the third 
person: bets'én horílger {3:to 3IPFV:slope.down}, not *yets'én horílger {3D:to 
3IPFV:slope.down}.   
Parameters by which they differ: 
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1. Viewpoint: hodeH...lger, hodáhohe...ɂá, thaidáhohe...ɂá and hodáhohe...gai 
are viewed from above looking down; hokáde...dhá and hokáhohe...ɂá are viewed 
from below looking up.   
2.  Inclination: hodeH...lger and hokáde...dhá are steep, perhaps between 45 and 
90 degrees.  It does not describe an actual “cliﬀ” in the English sense, a completely 
vertical dropoﬀ.  This may be for pragmatic reasons: speakers, when confronted with 
a photo of such a cliﬀ, will simply say “we don’t have land like that” rather than 
applying a Dene name to it.  Hodáhohe...ɂá and hokáhohe...ɂá describe more gentle 
slopes, less than about 45 degrees.   These can take diﬀerent modifiers such as 
‘gently’ or ‘steeply’:  ts’étthe 〈hárehhą〉 hodóheɂá {gently 〈steeply〉 
3IPFV:slope.down} ‘there is a gentle 〈steep〉 slope going downward’.  In the ‘steep’ 
case speakers imagined that there could not be a trail going up and down it. 
Thaidáhohe...ɂá and hodáhohe...gai are also very gentle, perhaps even more so than 
hodáhohe...ɂá and hokáhohe...ɂá.   The sets are not completely symmetrical: 
hokáde...dhá can be used as a general term (with modifiers) for slopes of a variety of 
inclinations, while hodeH...lger is confined to a narrower range of very steep slopes.   
3.  Whether the slope is climbable: speakers cosider that hodeH...lger and 
hokáde...dhá denote slopes which are too steep to be climbable, or which are 
climbable only with great diﬃculty: hodárílger, kozį nassa horésɂį íle 
{3IPFV:slope.down there 1IPFV:REV:go 1IPFV:want NEG} ‘there is a steep slope, I 
wouldn’t want to try to climb it’; hodárílger, dene hokágha wali íle 
{3IPFV:slope.down person up:3IPFV:sg.walk POSS NEG} ‘a person couldn’t walk up it’.    
Hodáhohe...ɂá, hokáhohe...ɂá, thaidáhohe...ɂá, hodáhohe...gai should be climbable 
for a person, although their diﬃculty may vary.    
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4.  The composition of soil:  hodeH...lger, hokáde...dhá, hodáhohe...ɂá, 
hokáhohe...ɂá can be made of anything, from rock to earth covered with vegetation; 
hodáhohe...gai is usually but not necessarily interpreted as being made of sand, and 
thaidáhohe...ɂá must describe sand, e.g. a sand dune (thai chogh)  
5.  The color of the land:  hodáhohe...gai is white or pale;  the others are 
unspecified in their color.   
6.  Focus on the destination or endpoint: hodeH...lger is conceived of as a gestalt 
situation with a viewpoint that travels from the summit to whatever it at the foot of 
the slope, which must be mentioned as a second obligatory participant, as these 
examples from Li & Scollon (1976): názé nauhdéłi t'así sheth goze tu ts'én horílgeri 
ghuhɂį hús  {hunt REV:2PL.IPFV:pl.go REL hill between lake to 3IPFV:slope.down–
REL 2PL.PFV:see Q} ‘Did you who were hunting see a place that goes down to a lake 
between hills?’; yųnathé tu theɂąi eyer sheth goze bets'én horílger hoɂą, hehedi  
{ahead lake 3IPFV:sit.heavy–REL there hill between 3:to 3IPFV:slope.down 
AR:3IPFV:sit.heavy 3DU.IPFV:say} ‘At the lake which lies ahead there is a steep place 
between hills, they said’.   
   
3.7.1.2.  Other Land Features.  The remainder of the topographical features are 
not quasi-synonymous and so are best not described as a series but as individual ECD-
type entries.  The segmentations are quite tentative as, for pragmatic reasons, they only 
appear in the third-person singular.  The definitions are the following: 
1.  hote...ɂa1  <øSG/X  hotéɂa:  there is / land X forms a long narrow strip of empty 
regular land>.  A colloquial translation might be ‘it (land) extends, stetches out’.  This 
can describe any narrow, relatively empty and flat (walkable) land feature such as a pass 
between mountains, a portage, or the flat top of a chain of hills.  In the case of ‘portage’ 
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it is the standard Func0 verb which takes ‘portage’ as its subject: portage hotéth hotéɂa 
{portage 3IPFV:extend} ‘there is a portage there’, ‘a portage extends [from there]’; in 
the other cases the subject is usually zero marked.  It suggests a gestalt scene starting 
from the perspective of the speaker or a feature that the land extends out from.  This is 
often the case, but not always: the feature can be described “neutrally” in its entirety, 
e.g. hok’édhé k’é hoteɂa {AR:between on 3IPFV:extend} ‘there is a valley between [the 
hills]’.   
2.  hháráhone...ɂá  <øSG/X  hharɂá:  there is an area / the land X in an area  goes 
down in places>.  This is difficult to translate into English.  It means that, viewed from 
the perspective of someone walking along a relatively elevated expanse of land, there 
are different relatively small spots where the land slopes down suddenly to a lower area.  
It could also be interpreted as describing various depressions surrounding a 
comparatively elevated and flat area which is the vantage point of the speaker.   
3. hodá-H-ne...ɂá  <øSG/X  hodáįɂá: there is an area that / the land X goes down 
in a place>.  This is somewhat similar to hháráhone...ɂá but it describes a depression 
or lower area, small enough to be viewed in its entirety by a stationary person.  Unlike 
hháráhone...ɂá, it implies that the land goes up again on the other side.    
 
3.7.1.3.  Tree Formations.  There are a variety of nouns to refer to trees and 
tree species, but it is interesting that many of the formations thereof are realized as 
verbs.  The lexical units are ereH...t’į; ts’ne...t’į  and hlɂa, and their definitions are: 
1.  ereH...t’į  <øSG/X  erét’į:  there is an area  of trees that / trees X extend as as a 
long narrow area>.  This refers to a ridge of trees set off from the forest and extending 
in a line through an area more or less devoid of trees, such as a narrow promontory 
extending into the water.  It can have the species of tree as the subject — ɂelaz erét’į  
{spruce:DIM 3IPFV:be.tree.ridge} ‘there is a ridge of little spruce trees’ — or an empty 
dummy subject: erét’į yuwé {3IPFV:be.tree.ridge over.there} ‘there is a ridge of trees 
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over there’.  It can also be seeminly converted to a noun, with a Func0 verb: erét’į yuwé 
hųlį {tree.ridge over.there 3ipfv:exist} ‘there is a ridge of trees over there’.   
2. ts’ne...t’į  <øSG/X Y (ts’én) ts’nįt’į: there is an area  of trees that / trees X 
extend as as a long narrow area to area Y>.  This indicates a ridge of trees, but it 
describes a gestalt view of the tree ridge, starting from one point and travelling to the 
endpoint.  As such, it has a second obligatory participant, the endpoint of the tree ridge.  
It has a morphoid of the incorporated postposition ts’én ‘to’.  This verb is often used to 
describe ridges of trees that extend downward to a lakeshore, a common feature in the 
Dene language area: ɂelaz tu ts’nįt’į {spruce:DIM lake to:3IPFV:tree.ridge.extend} 
‘there is a ridge of little sprice trees going down into the lake’.   
3.  hlɂa <øSG hlɂa: there is a permanently watery area of land>.  This 
describes a place which is similar to mushkeg, but with less water.  There is usually not 
enough water to be visible, but enough that trees cannot grow there.  It is also much 
smaller than a mushkeg (ni ̨téli) or even than a little mushkeg (nįtélaz).  It is a verb that 
takes a dummy subject: hlɂa yuwé {3IPFV:watery.land over.there} ‘there is a watery 
spot of land over there’; yuwé hlɂa nathiya {over.there 3IPFV:watery.land 
REV:1PFV:sg.walk} ‘I went to that watery place over there’  
 
3.7.1.4.  Waterways.  Rivers, streams and other waterways are of vital 
importance to the Dene.  Athabaskan languages are quite rich in these terms (see Kari 
1996a and 1996b for a discussion of hydronyms in Alaskan Athabaskan languges from 
a linguistic and historical perspective).  Traditionally waterways have served as sources 
of fish, which are also used as food for dogteams, the major form of transportation.  
Also, once rivers are frozen they can be used as “ice roads” which facilitate travel over 
long distances that would be arduous to cross over rough terrain.  Finally rivers and 
their features serve as landmarks.  Many riverine terms are nouns: des ‘river’, detthíe 
‘source of river’, deschághe ‘mouth of river’, ‘narrows’, ttheba ‘rapids’, des taga 
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‘riverbank’, etc.   In addition to these, however, many words indicating the direction, 
source, division or union of waterways are intransitive verbs.  Some of these are 
ełhhone...dlį, ełeí...dlį, hhátane...lį and hhąná...dlį.  At least etymologically, these 
verbs are all derived from a common stem, —lį,  meaning ‘flow’.  These are best 
described not a series, but as stand-alone ECD-type entries.  The segmentations are 
hypothetical as the verbs always appear in the third person singular.  The definitions are 
the following: 
1.  ełhhone...dlį  <øSG/X  ełhhonedlį:  the river (X) turns sharply>.  This 
describes a sharp bend in the river, towards one direction: (des) naálni ts’én ełhhonedlį 
{(river) left to 3IPFV:river.turn} ‘the river bends sharply to the left’.   
2.  ełeí...dlį  <øSG ełídlį: two rivers flow together>.  This describes the opposite 
of a fork in the river, a place where two rivers (any two) unite.  There appears to be 
resistance to actually naming the rivers as a subject X, e.g. *[river A] chu [river B] chu 
ełídlį{[river A] and [river B] and 3IPFV:flow.together}, but this may be for pragmatic 
reasons.  It can only refer to the permanent topographical feature of two rivers flowing 
together, not two streams of liquid or any other context.  Several of these formations are 
found in the Dene language area, and the nearest settlement at this feature is usually 
named this.  In the Dillon area, ełídlį (or ełídlį néné {3IPFV:flow.together land:CONS} 
as a proper name refers to Fort MacMurray.   
3.  hhátane...lį <øSG hhátaįlį:  water permanently flows out of the ground>.  
This verb describes a natural spring.  This is a morphological phraseme, hhá–ta–ne...lį  
{out–water–VCN...CL4–flow} lit. “water flowing out”.  Hhátane...lį cannot refer to 
any situation of water flowing out of some surface or object; it can only describe the 
permanent topographical feature of a spring.  It cannot describe a geyser or water 
flowing out of the ground on one occasion such as a broken water pipe, which would 
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be described with nųyé tu hháhįłį {earth:out.of water out:3IPFV:flow} ‘water is flowing 
out of the earth’.   
4.  hhąná...dlį <øSG hhąnádlį: water permanently flows from a height to the 
ground>. This refers to a waterfall.  This is also a morphological phraseme, hhá–ná–
...dlį  {suddenly–down–...CL3–flow} lit. “it suddenly flows down”.  This verb must 
refer to a permanent waterfall; any other situation of water flowing down, e.g. water 
flowing from the rooftop, could be described with tu dánelez {water 
down:VCD:3IPFV:run} ‘water is running down’ or tu dánitł’i {water down:3IPFV:pl.fall} 
‘water is dripping down’, but not as *hhąnádlį.   
 
 
3.7.2.  Topographical Terms: Syntax.  The standard GP for the majority of 
topographical verbs contains simply one actant which is an empty dummy subject X:  
X ⇔ I 
1. øSG! 
 
This is valid for thaidáhohe...ɂá, hlɂa, ełhhone...dlį, ełeí...dlį, hhátane...lį and 
hhąná...dlį.   
C1.1: hhátaįlį ‘there is a spring there’.   
 For hokáde...dhá, hodáhohe...ɂá, hokáhohe...ɂá, hodáhohe...gai, hote...ɂa, 
hháráhone...ɂá, hodá-H-ne...ɂá and ereH...t’į, the empty subject can alternate with an 
actual noun, virtually always nih ‘land’, or the name of a tree species in the case of 
tree formations.   
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X ⇔ I 
1. N! 
2. øSG! 
 
C1.1: nih hharɂá ‘the land goes down here and there’ 
C1.2: hharɂá ‘it [the land] goes down here and there’  
HodeH...lger has a second participant, realized as an oblique:  
 
 
X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II 
1. N! 
2. øSG! 
1. N ts’én 
 
 
C1.1: nih hodárílger ts’étthle des daé  {land  3IPFV:slope.down gently river above} 
‘the land slopes down gently above the river’ 
C1.2: hodárílger, dene hokágha wali íle {3IPFV:slope person up:3IPFV:sg.walk POSS 
NEG} ‘there is a sharp slope down, a person couldn’t walk up it’  
C1.1 + C2.1: nih tu ts'én hodárílger {land lake to 3IPFV:slope.down } ‘the land slopes 
down to the lake’ 
C1.2 + C2.1: bets'én horílger {3:to 3IPFV:slope.down} ‘there is a sharp slope down to it’  
Note: C1.1 + C2.1 and C1.2 + C2.1: no distal third person prefix on Y=II=N.   
Ts’ne...t’į has an obligatory second participant, realized as a direct object:  
 
X ⇔ I Y ⇔ II 
1. N! 1. N! 
 
 
C1.1 + C2.1: ɂelaz tu ts’nįt’į {spruce:DIM lake to:3IPFV:tree.ridge.extend} ‘there is a 
ridge of little spruce trees going down into the lake’.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
The Lexical Combinatorial Zone 
 
 
 The third and final zone of a lexical entry in the MTT framework is the lexical 
combinatorics zone, which describes how the keyword is related to other LUs.  The 
lexicon is not a formless mass but is structured by crisscrossing relations between sets 
of words whose semantic components vary in some regular way.  This systematic 
variation is referred to as lexical relations in most schools of lexical semantics.  As 
mentioned in the introduction, in MTT, lexical relations are described as lexical 
functions.  Paraphrasing the definition in Mel’čuk (1998), a lexical function (LF) is a 
regular correspondence between pairs of words, not unlike a mathematical function.  An 
LF has the form f(L) = {L`i}, where f is the function or relation itself linking an LU L 
with a set of f’s values L`i, which need not be perfectly synonymous but which must be 
quasi-syonyms.  The input L and the values L`i must be of the same lexical class.  An 
example LF is Anti, the relation of antonymy or opposites.  Anti(goodA) = badA, and 
Anti(openV) = closeV.  To qualify as an LF, a relation must have the following 
characteristics:  
1.  Homogeneity of the LF: the inputs are linked to their values by a common 
relation, such as antonymy, synonymy, intensification, and so forth.  Observe the 
following examples of the LF Magn (from the Latin Magnus, indicating intensification): 
Magn(contrast) = sharp;  Magn(applause) = thunderous, heavy; Magn(armed) = 
heavily, ~ to the teeth; Magn(beautiful) = // gorgeous  (// indicates a fused value).  All 
of these inputs and values share the common relation of lower to higher intensity.  
2.  Maximality of the LF: the LF must link all possible values with the keyword.  
In the examples of Magn above, any acceptable intensifier of the keyword must be 
listed as a value.   
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3.  Phraseological character of the LFs: each value of a keyword must 
phraseologically bound or unpredictable.  One of the defining characteristics about the 
LFs is that they specify links between keywords and outputs which are imposed by the 
language.  When an English speaker wants to add the idea ‘intensely’ to armed, he or she 
does not think even remotely of ‘teeth’ or ‘heavy’.  Rather to the teeth and heavily are 
simply the means the English language provides for adding the semanteme ‘intensely’ to 
that adjective.     
Lexical functions are called standard when they satisfy two conditions: 1) the LF 
is sufficiently abstract to be applicable to a large number of keyword-output pairs; and 
2) there is some diversity of expression of the outputs.  In the case of Magn above, if 
English had one adverb or derivation marker that could productively and regularly add 
the semantic component ‘intensely’ to all the above keywords, then this would not be a 
value of the LF Magn.  Lexical functions, usually language-specific, which do not meet 
both of these criteria, especially because they involve a very small set of LUs.   
The lexical relations of antonymy, synonymy, hyperonymy and hyponymy are 
widely accepted and discussed by semanticists.  In MTT, however, lexical functions 
cover a much more diverse range of lexical relations than these, many unique to our 
framework.  In the current version of LFs (Mel’čuk 1996) there are currently 60 
standard lexical functions posited to be frequent in various languages, and an open-
ended number of language-specific, nonstandard lexical functions involving smaller 
numbers of lexical items.  
To date, large-scale descriptions of lexical functions have been described for a 
typologically restricted and culturally similar European languages such as Russian, 
French and English.  Examining lexical relations in an oral Athabaskan language like Dene 
is therefore of theoretical interest.  We will begin by examining the presence and 
prevalence of the 60 established standard lexical functions in Dene, before looking at 
Dene texts in an open-ended search for any language-specific nonstandard functions.  
Follow the list in Mel’čuk (1998), LFs will be divided first into paradigmatic and 
sytagmatic categories, and within those into small subgroups quantification, phasal 
derivatives, and so forth.  This chapter has the following sections: 
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1. Standard Lexical Functions  
2.  Nonstandard Lexical Functions   
3.  Complex Standard Lexical Functions 
 
1.   STANDARD LEXICAL FUNCTIONS IN DENE SŲŁINÉ  
 
1.1.  Paradigmatic Lexical Relations.  Lexical Functions 1-3 are the standard 
paradigmatic functions are Syn (synonyms), Anti (antonyms) and Conv (conversives).  
These are not restricted to one part of speech, but their products are of the same part of 
as the keyword.  Examples in English are Syn(puma) = mountain lion,  Anti(good) = 
bad, Conv(husband) = wife and Conv(send) = (receive).   Dene synonym series were 
amply discussed and presented in Chapter III; it is important to note that many Syn 
pairs in Dene do not differ based on the same semantemes as their equivalents in 
English, e.g. Syn(yath ‘snow (on ground)’ = tsíł ‘(falling) snow’, and the multitude of 
position verbs that vary based on the shape, texture, number and animacy of X.  
Antonymy comprises four relations   
 As discussed in detail in Section III-2.2, antonymy in MTT semantics actually covers 
four different semantic relations: negation of an internal component; more/less 
oppositions; positive/negative oppositions and deictic oppositions.  More/less 
oppositions involve gradient parameters where there is some sort of “middle ground” 
between the two antonymic values, e.g. (hot/cold), (near/far).  Good/bad oppositions 
are also gradients of subjective value such as (good/bad) and (beautiful/ugly).  In both 
cases, the positive or higher extreme is semantically simpler than the negative extreme. 
Dene often expresses the negative value of this parameter simply by adding the negation 
marker íle to the positive value, which is consequently ambiguous between attenuation 
and antonymy:  
Anti(nárédhá ‘it is high (from ground)’) = nárédhá íle  ‘it is low (from ground)’  
Anti(diłtį́ ‘it is expensive’) = diłt íle  ‘it is cheap’  
There are, of course, many “genuine” antonym pairs in Dene.   
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 While conversives do exist in Dene they are unlikely to be found for the LUs in this 
sample. Of the seven fields considered, Character, Quality, Position, Atmospheric and 
Topographical LUs usually have only one actant; Emotion and Motion verbs may have 
multiple SemAs. For motion verbs there are no conversives; it would mean something 
like ‘surface X gets walked on by Y’ or ‘liquid X gets swum through by Y’.  
Conversives are not prominent in our sample.  Of the emotion words in the sample, 
there is only one possible example: Conv(hasne...dhen ‘to be disappointed’) = [Y] 
OBJ.AGRY–įní ne...ttheth ‘to disappoint [Y]’, lit. “to put out [Y’s] mind”.    
LFs 4-5:  Gener and Figur.  These take nouns as keywords and values.  Gener is 
a category hyperonym, e.g. Gener(republic) = state.  This is easily available in Dene, 
following a Dene-specific ontology of artifacts and natural kinds.  Examples include:   
Gener(ech’ére ‘wild fur animal’) = sas ‘bear’, tthełkailé ‘weasel’  
Gener(layúé ’tool’) = bes ‘knife’, elk’édhi ‘gun’, and so forth. 
Figur links the keyword with a noun which serves as a conventional metaphor for 
an instance of that noun, as in: 
Figur(fog) = wall of ~  Figur(hunger) = pangs of ~  
This sort of relation between nouns is virtually nonexistent in Dene.  Nouns represent 
artifacts and natural kinds, not figurative concepts.  He felt pangs of hunger might be 
rendered with a construction like ‘for:him it.was.painful, he.desired.food because’.  If a 
speaker wishes to represent a phenomenon metaphorically, it is usually through overt 
comparison; there was a wall of fog could be rendered with ‘fog it.was.abundant almost 
wall it.looked.like’, where the metaphorical comparison was drawn freely rather than 
phraseologically bound.   But even this is uncharacteristic of most Dene texts, as more 
literal terms tend to be used to describe objects.  Overall in the corpus and data collected 
for this study, there was less figurative language than would be found in English.  (It is 
important to note that this could indicate a particularity of English rather than of Dene, 
as it is the author’s impression that English uses figurative language copiously in 
comparison with even many other European languages such as French and Italian.)   
LFs 6-9:  S0, A0, V0 and Adv0.  These are structural derivatives, or semantic 
derivations involving only a change lexical class, such as deverbal nouns like S0(live) = 
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life or adverbial derivations like Adv0(gusto) = with ~.  In an Athabaskan language, S0 
derivatives are virtually non-existent because the noun class is restricted to natural kinds 
and artifacts, and almost never encompasses abstract concepts, situations or qualities.  
There are, however a handful of deverbal nouns, such as:  
S0(ghe...na ‘sg lives’) = eghenai ‘life’ 
S0(ná...lzé ‘to hunt’) = názé, nálzé ‘the hunt’ 
S0(ya...łti ‘to speak’) = yati ‘speech’, ‘words’.   
A0 are also rare because adjectives constitute a small closed class of perhaps 30 or 
so members.  The adjectives available are, however, usually deverbal, referring to 
colors and textures, as  
A0(de...lzen ‘to be black’) = zené ’black’  
A0(de...ddher ‘to be fine’ = ddheré ‘fine (granular substance)’.   
V0 derivatives are correspondingly rare, as descriptive words and abstract concepts 
are already represented as situations or verbs rather than as adjectives or nouns.   
Apart from verbs, adverbs are another large, open class in Dene.  Many of these 
adverbs, such as th ‘in vain’, įgh ‘early’, and ełtth’í ‘correctly’, have no obvious 
relation to verbs.  On the other hand, some adverbs strongly resemble verbs with ú 
‘when’/‘and’ added to them.  Compare the verb phrase dzi ̨ dónelt’e {day 
DIST:AR:3IPFV:number} ‘the days number’, or ‘there are [...] many days’, and dzį 
dónelt’ú, a contraction of dzį dónelt’e ú ‘every day’, lit. “during all the days that there 
are”.  It may be problematic even to consider these as adverbs and ú as a suﬃx, 
because coordination or manner are be indicated by adding an embedded clause headed 
by ú ‘when’, as in: 
1. dájen ú dáts’édíł {dist:3IPFV:sing when DS:3IPFV:pl.dance} ‘they sang and 
danced’, ‘they sang while dancing’ 
2. heręłt’e1 ú eghálana {3IPFV:be.hardworking when 3IPFV:work} ‘he works  
hard’, lit. “he works while he is hard-working”.  
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Sometimes genuine Adv0 derivatives are obtained through conversion.  The third-
person imperfective form is used.  Compare:  náltła {3IPFV:be.fast} ‘s/he is fast’ and 
náltła ghegał {fast 3IPFV:SG.walk} ‘she was walking fast’ or nezǫ {3IPFV:be.good} ‘it 
is good’ and nezǫ thetsen{good 3IPFV:smell} ‘it smells good’.  The preverbal position 
is consistent with adverbials, and syntactic conversion makes more sense pragmatically 
than positing a cleaved construction, such as “it-was-fast that she-walked”.  Even 
accepting these cases as genuine adverbs, however, we cannot consider Adv0 a standard 
lexical function in Dene because it lacks a diversity of expression: it is always done by 
conversion and a change in word order.   
 LF 10: Si.  These noun derivatives provide the names of the deep syntactic 
actants of the (verbal) keyword: S1 is usually the agent (X ⇔ I), S2 the patient (Y ⇔ II), 
S3 an oblique object (Z ⇔ III).  For example, for the verb teach ‘X, having the full 
knowledge of subject Y, causes that person Z knows Y’, S1(teach) = teacher; S2(teach) 
= subject, and S3(teach) = student, pupil, disciple.   
 In Dene, there are a few morphological and syntactic means of coining a S1 
derivative.  The first is by adding the nominalizer –i to an active third-person verb, 
sometimes dropping the classifier prefix, as in: 
S1 (hone...łten ‘to teach’ (IPFV)) = honełteni [3IPFV:teach + –i] ‘teacher’, sekwi 
honełteni ‘child-teacher’ 
 S1 (k’ó...ldher ‘to rule’) = k’ódheri [3ipfv:rule + –i] ‘chief’, ‘ruler’ 
 For a few culturally salient roles, Dene has borrowed a foreign word in place of 
or in addition to these nominalized verbs, e.g. Syn(k’ódheri ‘chief’) = okímahgan 
‘chief’ (a Cree borrowing, monomorphemic to the Dene).   
 The second means of coining a noun is though the syntactic conversion of a 
clause into a noun.  Compare: [ber kałt’éth]S {food for:3IPFV:cook} ‘s/he cooks [for 
people]’ and  S1(ber ka...łt’éth ‘to cooks [for people]’) = [ber kałt’éth]N ‘a cook’, as in 
[ber kałt’éth]N hęlį nį {cook 3IPFV:be PAST} ‘she was a cook’.  This may be 
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phonologically reduced to bekałt’éth.  Declausal nouns are quite rare and tend to exist 
in competition with overtly nominalized forms such as bekałt’édhi.   
 The final major means of coining Si derivatives is through compounding 
following the pattern S3IPFV + dene ‘person’ + –é possessed suffix.  For example: 
S1(ná...lzé ‘to hunt’) = nálzé dené {3IPFV:hunt person:CONS} ‘hunter’  
S1(dene ná...łtsi ‘to catch people’) = dene náłtsi dené {people 3IPFV:catch 
person:CONS} ‘police officer’, lit. “a person-catching person”.   
The above derivatives are available for a few socially salient roles for important 
activities such as leading the tribe, teaching and hunting.  But for the vast majority of 
verbs, such as łeghá...łdhi ‘to kill’ (SG, IPFV), there is no agentive S1 derivative.  ‘The 
killer’ could be rendered with a relative clause using an active verb, i.e. as t’ahi ̨ 
dene/ɂasí łegháįłther {REL.HUM people/game.animals 3PFV:kill (SG, PFV)} ‘one who 
killed the person(s)/the animal(s)’.  Even such constructions are used sparingly, though; 
people are not usually identified by their actions but by name.  Someone who habitually 
fulfills a certain agentive role may be indicated using a habitual reading of an active 
verb clause, i.e. not ‘those women are moosehide makers’ or ‘those men are hunters’ 
but as ‘those women (habitually) make moose hide’, or ‘those men (habitually) hunt’.  
No examples of S2 or S3 nouns can be found in the corpora or have been elicited; people 
in DSyntA-II roles such as ‘the students’ might be designated as t’ahi ̨ school nádé 
{REL.HUM school 3IPFV:stay (PL)} ‘those who go to school’ or t’ahi ̨ dene háhonelten 
{REL.HUM Dene  3IPFV:be.taught} ‘those who are being taught Dene’.  We can conclude 
that S2 and S3 are not present and that S1 is not a standard lexical function in Dene.  
Although we do find a diversity of expression of agentive nouns, S1 lacks the wide 
applicability we expect of standard LFs.     
  LFs 11-15:  the derivatives Sinstr, Smed, Smod, Sloc, Sres.  These represent the 
names of circumstantials of a linguistic situation: the instrument, medium, and mode 
with which the action was carried out, and the location and result of the situation.  For 
example:  
Sinstr(shoot) = firearm   Smed (shoot) = ammunition 
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Smod(cook) = fry   Sloc(camp) = // campsite  
Sloc(war) = theater of ~  Sres(wound) = scar 
Crucially, these semantic derivations have analytical meanings, which entails 
that the value of the function must have as one of its semantic components the meaning 
of the keyword.  The value is related to the keyword through its linguistic meaning, not 
using the speakers’ extralinguistic knowledge. Sinstr means ‘object used to do L’, so 
Sinstr(murder) is murder weapon, not gun or knife.  While it is part of our encyclopedic 
knowledge that murders are frequently carried out using guns and knives, ‘used to 
murder people’ is not a component of the meaning of ‘gun’ or ‘knife’.  Any innocuous 
object such as shoelace, fish or marshmallow could be labeled a murder weapon in 
English if a forensic investigator explained to us how they had been used as such.  
Sloc(hunt) would be hunting grounds, not forest, tundra or the proper name of a place 
where the speakers know hunting occurs.  Labels like hunting grounds, murder weapon, 
like student and teacher described as values of LF 10, are useful in mass societies such 
as ours in which speakers need to inform each other about the roles people, objects and 
places play in events.  Dene people traditionally lived in small kinship-based bands and 
regional groups based on face-to-face contact, intermarriage and cooperation in carrying 
out complex hunting and gathering tasks.  Dene speakers rarely had need of abstract 
terms like hunting grounds or murder weapon because they shared so much tacit 
knowledge about their land and the people who lived on it.  Everyone knew in subtle 
detail the spots where each type of game was hunted in each season, and what tools 
were used for, and which individuals had done what to whom.  Even today, many Dene 
speakers bristle when asked to translate uninformative sentences like “knives are a 
cutting tool” or “X is a good place to hunt moose”, reacting with sentences like “why 
would you say something that everyone knows”, or “our language is not nonsense like 
English”.  Similar reactions obtain when labeling people with words like victim or 
recipient; in a society with no anonymity, people would be referred to by their names.  
Today, if someone must identify an unknown person or object according to their roles in 
a situation, one can use a relative clause, such as t’a ɂá łegháyįłtheri {REL with 
3D:3PFV:kill:REL} ‘that [thing] with which he killed him’, or eyi dene t’ahi ̨ 
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leghldheri {that person REL:HUM 3PFV:get.killed:REL} ‘that person who got killed’, 
i.e. ‘the victim’, t’ahuk’é dene ełelgháli {REL:where people REC:3PFV:club:REL} ‘where 
people clubbed each other’, i.e. ‘the theater of war’.  But these are all free phrases, not 
values of lexical functions.  
 There are a few exceptions, particularly for a few places that needed to be 
defined analytically because they could be used for a time but not permanently for a 
particular activity, or items that might have a few different uses.  Examples include:  
Sloc(ber –tsa ‘to cache meat’) = etsa k’é {cache place} ‘a meat cache’. 
Sloc(gah –lú ‘to snare rabbits’) = gah bíł k’é {rabbit snare:CONS place} ‘rabbit 
snaring place’ 
Sinstr(eghála...na ‘to work’) = la yúé {work tools:CONS} ‘work tools’  
The words k’é ‘place’ and yúé ‘items’ or ‘tools’ the examples above cannot be used as 
an unbound words (*diri k’é *‘this place’; *yúé as simply ‘tools’ or ‘things’). The 
bound word k’é describes a culturally nameworthy place.   
 LFs 16-17:  Ablei and Quali describe qualities of DsyntAs I and I.   Able1 means 
‘it can L easily’ and Able2 ‘it can be L-ed easily’; Qual1 means ‘it is likely to L’ and 
Qual2 ‘it is likely to be L-ed’, as in:  
  Able1(cryV) = tearful    Able2(trustV) = trustworthy 
 Qual1(cryV) = sad     Qual2(cryV) = heartbreaking, tragic 
Abilities and qualities in the above sense are conveyed in Dene through free 
grammatical constructions.  The relation Able1 exists between a situation and a state 
which indicates that the situation can easily take place.  This sort of state proximal to an 
action would be described with a variety of free means in Dene.  Among them are: 
a.  X [V] (ha) wale {X [V] (FUT) PROB} ‘X should likely [V]’ 
 Able1 (build) = capable, able [at building] = ‘X can easily make new things’    
 ⇒ sįyeze t’a hołtsi wali k’asjene hołtsi wali ‘my son can make almost anything 
that is possible to make’ 
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   Able1 (imagine) = creative = ‘can easily think of new ideas’ 
⇒ sįyeze t’ąt’ú ɂasí holį wali ghą nánedher  
b.  X [V] ha ahunedi {X [V] FUT 3IPFV:seem} ‘it seems that X will [V]’ 
 Able1 (cry) = tearful = ‘in a state where X can easily cry’  
 ⇒   hetsagh ha ahunedi ‘it seems that s/he will cry’  
Such constructions lack the traits of the LF Able1 because they are not phraseologically 
bound.  Even further from Dene stylistics is the case of Able2 and Qual2.   A moment of 
reflection will suffice to show us how odd it is that European languages conceive of 
concepts like ‘edible’ and ‘tragic’ as properties of objects and events.  Ontologically, 
‘edible’ and ‘visible’ are not a properties of berries or cooked fish, but statements about 
humans’ probable interaction with those entities given people’s capacities.  It therefore 
seems more logical that such descriptions should be predicated of the human subject 
common to the keyword and the output of Able2 and Qual2.  This is exactly how such 
abilities and propensities are described in Dene.   
Able2(eat) = edible = ‘can easily be eaten by people’  
⇒  beghą shélyi ‘one eats it’  
Able2(use) = useful, usable = ‘X can easily be used by people to do Y’ 
In the traditional aboriginal life in which hunger was a danger, Dene people used almost 
every resource available to them, and never wasted food, so statements like ‘people eat 
it (sometimes)’ or ‘it is (sometimes) used’ were equivalent in denotational range to 
edible and useful.  In a 21st century context, if one must define a foreign object as edible 
or useful it is possible to say beghą shélyi asųt’e i ́le /  ha dúé íle {3:of 3IPFV:pl.eat 
3IPFV:has.problem NEG / FUT it.is.impossible NEG} ‘it is not a problem / not 
impossible to eat it’. What are values of Qual2 in European languages are also 
rendered as active verbs predicated of the subject X, even if X is impersonal:  
BonQual2(imagine) = brilliant [idea] (quality as adverbial of clause):  
  ⇒    eyi t’a nįdheni ha dé ełtth’í ɂá nįdhen 
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{that REL 3IPFV:think as.for correctly with 3IPFV:think} 
    ‘As for what he thinks, he thinks correctly’ 
Active clause with an impersonal subject verb:  
Qual1(surprise) = surprising  
⇒   honi beghą noríya  
  {story 3:of 3IPFV:be.surprised} 
‘one is surprised’  
Able2(understand) = comprehensible, intelligible, understandable  
⇒  hotíe ́ beyatié ditth’ak  
 {well 3PO:words:CONS 3IPFV:understand} 
‘his words are understood well’ 
Impersonal verb + areal (subject?) agreement:  
Qual2(fearV) = scary, frightening  
⇒   bech’á honejer {3:against AR:3IPFV:imp.fear} ‘it is scary’  
Qual2(loveV) = lovable, adorable  
⇒   seghąnotą {1OB:AR:3IPFV:love} ‘I am lovable’  
Often these Dene constructions are more precise by virtue of their being free.  While the 
English semantic derivations Able and Qual allow some flexibility in determining to 
what degree L is possible or easy to realize,  the choice of the matrix verb in Dene 
forces the speaker to distinguish, for example, between actions that are possible in 
principle, actions that are actually performed and those that are easy to carry out, as in:   
BonQual2(sit) = comfortable, e.g. this chair is comfortable 
⇒   daschené bek’é ts’da nezǫ {seat 3:on DS:sit.down 3IPFV:be.good} 
  ‘it is good [that] one sits on this chair’  
Able2(shoot) = in range, shootable, e.g. the moose was in range.   
 ⇒       bóreni dení hílk’edh {3IPFV:be.easy moose SEM:3IPFV:shoot} 
      ‘it is easy [that] one shoots the moose’ 
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AntiAble2(carry) = [not transportable], e.g. the whole moose is not transportable 
 ⇒     Įłáh dení náltį ha dúé ɂa   
   {once moose 3IPFV:imp.carry.anim FUT it.is.impossible ASSERT} 
  ‘It is impossible [that] one carries the moose all at once’  
AntiMagnAble2(find) = [hard to locate / find / trace] 
⇒    bórenį íle ɂa bulɂá 
  {3IPFV:be.easy NEG ASSERT 3OB:3IPFV:imp.find} 
  ‘It is not easy [that] one finds it’  
Often what are considered “qualities” of DSyntA-II in linguistic situations in European 
languages are in fact quite abstract.  To cite just one example, the descriptor in an 
attractive offer refers not to the beauty or eloquence of the offer but to the quantity or 
money or resources that X offers to Y.  This would be rendered in Dene literally, i.e. 
sebeschené ha tsąba łą sets’énįla {1PO:vehicle for money it.is.much 
1OB:to:3PFV:bring.plural} ‘he made an attractive oﬀer for my truck’, lit. “he oﬀered 
me a lot of money for my vehicle”.  Conversely, qualities of objects can be described 
abstractly, e.g. not as ‘interesting’, ‘useful’ or ‘fun’ on one hand or ‘dull’, ‘ugly’ or 
‘cheap’ on the other, but simply as ‘of good quality’ or ‘of bad quality’.   
 
Qual1(bore) = boring = ‘can easily make people feel bored’  
  ⇒    eyi ts’ékwi behonié benúnį íle  
{that woman 3PO:story:CONS 3OB:be.good NEG} 
‘That woman’s story is boring’, lit. “it is no good” 
AntiBonQual2(buy) = cheap2 = ‘X can be purchased with little money because 
X is of low quality’, e.g. his car is cheap. 
  ⇒  bebeschené benúnį íle ahunedi   
{3PO:car:CONS 3OB:be.good NEG 3IPFV:seem} 
‘it seems that his car is no good’ 
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It is part of our encyclopedic knowledge that goodness, for a story, is equivalent to 
‘entertaining’ or ‘informative’, while for a knife it involves the ability to cut, so words 
used to denote these DSyntAs do not have to explicitly include L as a component of 
their definitions, and Ablei and Quali are not found as lexical relations.     
 LF 18-19:  Ai and Advi derivatives.  These are the adjectival and adverbial 
phrases coined from the keyword, such as: 
 A1(anger) = in [anger], // angry  Adv1(anger) = with [anger], // angrily 
As described above for LFs A0 nor Adv0, in Dene qualities are usually denoted by 
intransitive verb which embedded as clauses headed by ú ‘when’ in the main clause to 
denote a modifier relation to that clause, adverbial or adjectival according to the 
context.  This construction is free, so neither Ai nor Advi are standard lexical functions 
in Dene.   realized as embedded clause headed by ú / t’ú ‘when’.  
 LFs 20-21:  Imper and Result fulfill similar functions as inflectional meanings in  
some languages; their outputs may be used instead of a particular grammeme of the 
keyword, as in the following cases:  
 Imper(shoot) = fire!   Imper(be quiet) = sssh!, hush!   
 Result(learn) = know. 
The only Imper which occurs in our sample or in the corpus concerns motion verbs.  It 
can be the Imper derivative for dene ba núne...ɂá ‘to make room for a person’ or of 
edíne...gha ‘to move elsewhere (SG, HUM, IPFV)’  
 Imper(dene ba núne...ɂá ‘to make room for a person’) = nųzį!; k’éré! ‘move!’,  
‘make way!’.   
 Result is also an available LF in Dene: 
 Result(hahone...lten ‘to be taught’) = k’ó...lya[ ‘to know’ 
 Result(–ldél ‘to eat a lot’) = hháshíre...ldhi ‘to be stuffed full’  
Sometimes, however, results are simply indicated by a resultive perfective rather than 
by a new LU:  
 Result(ageV) = to be old  
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  ⇒  núnįłther {3PFV:get.old} ‘s/he is old’, lit. “s/he has gotten old”  
 Result(get angry) = be angry 
  ⇒  hį́lch’é {3PFV:get.angry} ‘s/he is angry’, lit. “s/he has gotten angry” 
Table IV-1 summarizes the standard syntagmatic lexical functions from Mel’čuk 
(1998) which do and do not occur in Dene.  Some combinations are shaded in gray to 
indicate semantic incompatibility: the example, there is no antonymic value for 
motion verbs, or conversive for those semantic fields whose verbs have only one 
semantic actant.   
 
 
 Em Char PhysDesc Mot Pos Atm Top 
Syn ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  
Anti ✔  ✔  ✔     ✔ 
Conv R*       
Gener ✘  ✘  ✔  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✔  
Figur ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
S0 ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
A0 ✘  ✘  R ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
V0        
Adv0 ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
Si ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘    
Sinst-res    R    
Ablei ✘    ✘     
Quali ✘    ✘     
Ai / Advi ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
Imper    R R   
Result ✔    ✔   ✔   
      * R = the LF exists in Dene but is restrictedly expressed [few phraseologized instances] 
 
Table IV-I.  Standard Paradigmatic Lexical Functions in Dene. 
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1.2.  Syntagmatic Lexical Relations.  LFs 22-46 involve constructing a phrase 
based on the keyword, either as a means of changing its lexical class or because it is 
simply a common phrase in the language.  This includes Centr, a conventional phrase 
for the culminating part of a situation, e.g. Centr(crisis) = the peak [of the ~], and 
modifier relations such as Magn, described above.  Centr does not appear to be an LF 
in Dene because there are no situation nouns.  
 Magn, on the other hand simply adds the component ‘intense’ or ‘intensely’ to the 
keyword.  This is certainly a lexical function in Dene, although it is much less common 
than in European languages, in which one can find a very rich array of Magn semantic 
derivations in all semantic fields, from emotions (sad ~ miserable; surprised ~ shocked, 
flabbergasted); character (mean ~ vicious; kind ~ saintly, etc.), physical description 
(small ~ tiny; beautiful ~ gorgeous; tall ~ a giant), weather (rain ~ pour; snow ~ 
blizzard), and almost any other semantic field one can think of.  European languages 
also have a repertoire of free modifiers and adverbs equivalent to very, really, a lot, etc., 
in English.  These are not values of lexical functions, because they are not 
phraseologized.  In Dene, one finds a similar repertoire of free intensifying adverbs, 
such as hųt’édhé, hotíé, ts’étthle, deɂzé and hoɂzé, which can all be glossed roughly 
as ‘very’ or ‘really’.  One can also emphasize a verb through reduplication, e.g. nezǫ 
{3IPFV:be.good} ‘it is good’ ⇒ nezǫ ɂá nezǫ {3IPFV:be.good REDUP 3IPFV:be.good } ‘it 
is excellent’.  These intesifiers are not wholly interchangeable but the semantic 
diﬀerences between them are regular and their use is not phraseologized.   
 Of the verbs in the semantic fields chosen for this study (emotion, character, 
physical description, motion, position, atmospheric and topographical terms), not all 
are equally compatible for pragmatic reasons with the free intensifying adverbs.  
Intensifiers can be used most naturally with physical description and atmospheric verbs. 
They do not apply to motion and position verbs.  Also, ‘really’ and ‘a little’ adverbs are 
not used with topographical features, and are pragmatically odd with emotion and 
character verbs.  It sounds odd to Dene people in many cases to try to rank or quantify 
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character traits or emotions. Indeed, even where intensifying adverbs or verb 
reduplication are permitted, they are seldom used in the spare Dene style.  As 
mentioned earlier, adjectives such as a brilliant person or a gorgeous woman are 
translated in Dene simply as dene hųyą {person 3.is.intelligent} ‘an intelligent person’ 
and ts’ékwi ahhenet’į  {woman 3.is.beautiful} ‘a beautiful woman’. Someone is simply 
called ‘intelligent’ or ‘beautiful’ based on the overall impression he or she makes on 
other people — quantifying this with adverbs is not a frequent Dene way of speaking, 
even if it is not technically incorrect. 
In some cases within each semantic field there are lexical pairs which differ only 
or mostly in the presence or absence of the component ‘intense’/’intensely’, as with the 
pairs X ba horelya ile ~ estenedhen; bejere ~ beslini, hodohe/a ~ hodarilger .  Such 
cases are rare, however.  
 LFs 24-25:  Ver and Bon are adjectival, indicating that an action was done in a 
way fully characteristic of the situation in the case of Ver, or according to community 
expectations of quality with Bon.   
 Ver(surprise) = genuine, sincere   Bon(cut) = neatly, cleanly 
Ver does not seem to be a function relevant to Dene; it is simply realized by the adverb 
hotie ‘really’.   Bon is also not relevant to Dene as it is realized by free adverbs such as 
nezo ‘good’ and eltth’i ‘properly’.  
 LFs 26-28:  Locin, Locad, Locab are the adpositions specifying location in, 
movement into and out of a place or object.     
 Locin(tth’ái ́ ‘cup’) = yághe, yé2 ‘in’ Locad(tth’áí ‘cup’) = yé1 ‘into’ 
 Locin(dechen ‘forest’) = yághe ‘in’ Locad(dechen ‘forest’) = (ho)ts’én ‘to’ 
 Locab(tth’áí ‘cup’) = yé3 ‘from’  Locab(dechen ‘forest’) = hots’į ‘from’ 
 Locin(Ejéresché ‘Dillon’) = --  Locin(nih ‘ground’) = k’é ‘on’ 
 LFs 29-30: Inst and Propt indicate the prepositions used  
 Inst(bes ‘knife’) = ɂá1 ‘using’  Propt(este ‘sadness’) = ɂá2 ‘in’ 
 Propt(este ‘sadness’) = ɂá1 ‘because of’ 
 LFs 31-33 are support verbs which are extremely important in European 
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languages because they are phraseologized meanings used to form a verbal phrase from 
a noun.  The function Operi (from the Latin operari ‘to perform’) denotes the support 
verb meaning ‘to perform X’, where X is an action or situation that can be carried out, 
as the verbs in take A STEP, throw A PARTY, lodge or make A COMPLAINT: 
 Oper1(step) = take    Oper1(party) = throw 
 Oper2(support) = receive   Oper1(nasué ‘party’) = –łtsi ‘to make’
 Funci is similar, but has the unit of action as the subject; Laborij is similar to 
Operi but allowing multiple actants.   The following examples are also from Mel’čuk 
(1998):  
 Func0(rumors) = circulate   Func1(blowN) = comes [from N] 
 Func2(blowN) = falls [upon N]  Labor12(question) = [to] pepper  
 Labor32(leaseN) = [to] grant [N to N on ~] 
While there are a few examples of support and realization verbs, notably some instances 
of Oper1 as indicated above, there is little evidence for considering any of the LFs 31-
33 as standard lexical functions in Dene.  Most nouns denote natural and cultural kinds 
or proper names, while situations are already expressed with verbs, so there is no need 
for support verbs to collocate them into a verb phrase.    
 LFs 34-36: Incep, Fin and Cont are relations between the keyword, linguistic 
situation, and phasal verbs that express the entry into, exit from or continuation of the 
situation denoted by the keyword: 
 Incep(travel) = // set off   FinFunc0(offer) = expire 
 ContFunc0(offer) = stand   Fin(try) = // give up 
Taking Dene verbs a whole group, Incep and Fin do not appear as lexical functions 
relevant to Dene.  The beginning of a situation is denoted by the inceptive particle héjá, 
or its perfective allomorph20 ája ́: ją nasther héjá, Ejeresché {here 1IPFV:live INCEP 
Dillon}‘I started living here in Dillon’; skidoo t’adádorílɂá héjá n {skidoo 
DIST:1PL.IPFV:use INCEP PAST} ‘we all started using skidoos’.  Exit from a situation is 
                                                
20 These two forms of the inceptive postverbal particle are etymologically derived from the imperfective 
and perfective forms of the verb (a...)ja1 ‘to begin’, or (a...)ja2 ‘to become’, but the particle is different 
because its form is fixed and not conjugated; héjá is also sometimes used after perfective verbs.   
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expressed by the same means, but negating the verb with íle, placed before the inceptive 
particle: eghálana íle ájá {3IPFV:work NEG INCEP (PFV)} ‘he stopped working’, lit. “he 
began not working”.  The continuation of an action is rendered by the free adverb ął 
‘still’, e.g. ął eghálana {still 3IPFV:work} ‘he kept working’.  It is not obligatory to 
add the inceptive particle or the negation plus the inceptive to indicate entry and exit 
from the situation; Dene speakers often simply use the verbs and their negation by 
themselves, and the phasal meaning is understood in context: sǫlághe saritł’ízé kut’a 
eghálasna íle {five o’clock:CONS that’s.it 1IPFV:work NEG} ‘I stopped working at five 
o’clock’.  In fact, using the inceptive particle, as in kut’a eghálasna íle héjá {that’s.it 
1IPFV:work NEG INCEP} ‘I stopped working’ is felt to strongly imply that the person 
does not work there any more — the action used to be repeated and has now been 
stopped permanently, similar to kut’a eghálasna anast’e {that’s.it 1IPFV:work 
1PFV:stop} ‘I quit working there [for good]’.  Still, one has the option of adding the 
inceptive particle. 
 There are a number of exceptions.  From the sample in this study, Dene speakers 
find it unnatural to indicate entry into or exit from emotional states at all. Much as Dene 
speakers preferred not to quantify emotions, they find it odd to draw attention to the 
moment begins or stops feeling a certain way.  The beginning of an emotion is indicated 
(respectively) just with positive form of the verb itself, understood in the discourse to 
denote inception e.g. beł nasther, holą beł yasti ú kú ts’įnathé beghąnitą {3:with 
1IPFV:stay, many.times 3:with 1IPFV:speak and then finally 3OB:1IPFV:love} ‘I spent a 
lot of time with her and talked with her often, and in the end I fell in love with her’, lit. 
“after a long time I loved her”.  There are one or two exceptions, where there exists a 
verb whose meaning is ‘start feeling [X]’: 
 Incep(estenedhen ‘he is despondent’) = // esteyídher ‘he becomes despondent’ 
 Cessation of an emotion is expressed a bit differently from an exit from other 
situations.  Speakers find it pragmatically odd to indicate the end of an emotional state 
with the negated inceptive particle, e.g.  
                                                                                                                                      290 
 ?beghą danúsni 〈?beghąnitą; ?estenįdhen; ?sa dúé〉 íle héjá   
 {3:of  1IPFV:want.own 〈3OB:1IPFV:love; 1IPFV:sad; 1:for  it.is.bad〉 NEG INCEP}  
 ?‘I stopped wanting [to own] it 〈?loving him/her; ?being sad; ?feeling bad〉’ 
For most emotion words, one would rather indicate the cessation of the emotion by 
narrating the events or process which caused the person to move on, followed by 
ts’įnathé beghą nánesther íle {after.time 3:of 1IPFV:think NEG} ‘after a while, I didn’t 
think about it any more’.   It is possible to indicate with the inceptive particle or 
negation plus the inceptive particle, entry into and exit from almost any other type of 
situation, including the beginning of a pattern of repetitive action (skidoo t’adádorílɂá 
héjá nį {skidoo DIST:1PL.IPFV:use INCEP PAST} ‘we all started using skidoos’; ediri 
sekwi TV nełɂį héjá dé {these children TV 3IPFV:watch INCEP when} ‘when the 
children (in general) started watching TV’),  the beginning of isolated action (seghą 
nárádlogh héjá {1:of DIST:3IPFV:laugh INCEP} ‘they started laughing at me’; dení 
dhéth hołé héjá dé, t’atthé... {moose hide:CONS 3IPFV:be.made INCEP when, first} 
‘when one starts making moosehide, the first thing [you do]...’),  the beginning of an 
uncontrolled event (dene łeghąldé héjá {people 3IPFV:pl.die INCEP} ‘people started 
dying [the in the epidemic]’; del bedhé hhátł’i héjá {blood 3PO:mouth out:3IPFV:pl.fall 
INCEP} ‘blood started dripping out of their mouths’), and entry into a state (hhait’ázî 
deten héjá dé {autumn 3IPFV:freeze.up INCEP when} ‘when [the rivers] freeze’; lepadá 
dánechóz héjá dé {potatoes DIST:3IPFV:be.big INCEP when} ‘when the potatoes grow 
big’).  So the fact that it is not acceptable for speakers to speak of entry into and exit 
from emotional states is not a fact about Dene verbs or even about how states are 
structured in Dene, but a pragmatic restriction on this semantic field. 
 But Dene also has derivational prefixes to indicate the beginning of a situation.  
The inceptive prefix te/he– can be used, in principle, to indicate the beginning of 
actions, while the inchoative í– is indicates entry into a state: 
 Incep(tarįchá ‘the waves are big’) = // tarchá ‘the waves are getting big’ 
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 Incep(deghel ‘[the lake] is calm’) = // díghel ‘[the lake] is getting calm’  
 Incep(delk’os ‘it is red’) = // dík’os ‘it turns red’  
 Incep(honedhel ‘[area] is hot’) = // honídhil ‘[area] is heating up’  
 Incep(–gha ‘sg walks’) = // te...gha ‘sg sets off walking’ 
 Incep(honedhel ‘[area] is hot’) = // honídhil ‘[area] is heating up’ 
For motion verbs and a few others, one can use the inceptive derivation.  For most color 
words, a few texture and atmospheric terms, there is an inchoative derivation.  But for 
many other textures and other states there is no inchoative form:  one can use the 
inceptive or inchoative prefixes.  But for most situations these prefixes cannot be used:  
 *dídogh {INCH:3IPFV:be.thick} *‘[substance] is thickening’  
 *díker {INCH:3IPFV:be.slippery} *‘it is getting slippery’  
 *hík’a {INCH:3IPFV:be.fat} *‘he is getting fat’.   
For most activities, there is no inceptive derivation:  
 *eghálatena {INCEP:3IPFV:work} *‘he is starting to work’  
 *tthebahegal {INCEP:3IPFV:run} *‘he runs off’  
For a handful of verbs, there is a “derivation marker” ne–, known as the 
“momentaneous” in Cook (2004), which indicates entry into the state: 
 Incep(–da ‘sg sits’) = // ne...da ‘sg sits down’ 
For –yį  ‘sg stands’ the inchoative is used instead of ne–; for –tį ‘sg lies’, ná–, 
etymologically ‘down’, is used:  
 Incep(–yį  ‘sg stands’) = // í...yį   ‘sg [stops walking and] starts standing’ 
 Incep(–tį ‘sg lies’) = // ná...té1 ‘sg lies down’ 
The fact that these (formerly) derivational markers are used in unpredictable ways 
means that the possibility of adding inchoative and inceptive (or even “momentaneous”) 
must be specified as an output of the lexical function Incep for those lexemes that have 
the derivation.  
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 The difference between those verb stems which have an inchoative or inceptive 
derivation appears to be random: ‘waves are big’ and ‘[the lake] is calm’ have an 
inchoative  form, but most other atmospheric words do not; ‘the wind blows’ actually 
uses the inceptive prefix (or rather its quasi-morph) to indicate the beginning of the 
situation: Incep(niłts’i ‘the wind blows’) = // tełts’i.  The phraseme meaning ‘[the] sky 
becomes lighter [at dawn]’ also takes the “inceptive” (at least etymologically): 
Incep(yéłką ‘it is dawn’) = // hoba hegai {AR:3IPFV:grey INCEP:3IPFV:white } ‘it just 
starts to be light’.  The verb ‘to fly’ can even take either the inceptive or the inchoative: 
Incep(–t’a ‘to fly’) = // í...t’ak ‘[bird, plane] lifts off’; Incep(–t’a ‘to fly’) = // te...t’ak 
‘[bird, plane] takes off’: nuha edza sį kut’a dezį tuht’ak {1PL:for it.is.cold EMPH 
that’s.it here INCEP:2PL:fly} ‘we’re freezing, hurry up and take off  this way [to rescue 
us]’; tahhą ht’ak [INCH:3PFV:fly] ‘It [the plane] suddenly lifted off’.  One could 
surmise that the inchoative derivation refers to entry into a state of flight, while the 
inceptive puts the focus on the action of flying, but what is the difference when one uses 
both to refer to a bird taking off?  In light of these irregularities, it makes sense to 
consider many of these verbs as morphological phrasemes rather than as true examples 
of the inceptive or the inchoative.  Given the frequency of these phraseologized forms 
and the seemingly random presence or absence of an inchoative/inceptive derivation, it 
makes sense to describe the inceptive and inchoative as outputs of the lexical function 
Incep than as productive derivational morphemes.   
 Finally, even for those groups of verbs, such as colors and motion verbs, which do 
take the inchoative or inceptive rather productively, these derivations seem to add an 
unpredictable semantic component beyond indicating just the beginning of the situation.  
This is indicated by the semantic difference between indicating inception with the 
inceptive particle heja and using the prefix.  The semantic difference depends on the 
semantic field: for motion verbs it seems to be a contrast between ‘to [V] away’ or ‘to 
set off [V]-ing’ when the prefix is used, while the inceptive particle means ‘to start [V]-
ing (in general)’ or else ‘to suddenly start [V]-ing’ after being at rest: 
 tegha {INCEP:3IPFV:sg.walk} ‘he takes off walking’    
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 ghegal heja {3IPFV:sg.walk INCEP} ‘he [baby] starts walking (in general)’ 
For colors, the inchoative seems to indicate a more permanent or long-lasting change 
of color, while the inceptive particle implies a temporary change: 
 kafí łą ghesdą, senaghé delk’ós ájá 〈?dk’os〉 
 {coffee much 1PFV:drink, 1PO:eyes 3IPFV:be.red INCEP (PFV) 〈?INCH:3PFV:be.red〉}  
 ‘my eyes turned red from drinking too much coffee’  
  
 betthíghá dgai 〈?delgai ája ́〉 
 {3PO:hair INCH:3PFV:be.white  〈?3IPFV:be.white INCEP (PFV)〉}  
 ‘his hair turned white’  
This, too, supports the idea of treating these forms as outputs of Incep rather than as 
productive morphemes.  In cases, where output may actually be a quasi-idiom, i.e. 
/AB/ = ‘A’ + ‘B’ + ‘C’, the added or magnified component must be indicated in some 
way, such as by a subscript note on the LF, e.g.  
 Incepdepart(–gha ‘sg walks’) = // te...gha ‘sg sets off walking’ 
 LFs 37-39, Caus, Perm, Liqu, are verbs of causation, which also take verbs as 
their keywords if they are not combined with other meanings.   
 CausFunc0(attack) = incite   LiquFunc0(pain) = soothe   
 PermFunc0(attack) = condone  LiquFunc1(sadness) = cheer [N] up 
Causation is a regular meaning in Dene, and there is some diversity of expression.  The 
standard way of expressing causation is by adding the free verb a...lle1 ‘to cause’ after 
any verb, e.g. bech’ásdi, beghąnitą asįla {3OB:1IPFV:hate, 3OB:1IPFV:love 
1OB:3PFV:cause1} ‘I hated her, [but then] she made me love her’.  Caused or coerced 
actions are indicated with a...łdhen ‘to make3 [action]’, e.g. deneyu k’ezį eghálasna 
asįłthen setíkwi {man like 1IPFV:work 1OB:3PFV:cause.action 1PO:parents} ‘my parents 
made me work like a man’.  Also common is to use an embedded clause with the verb 
horel.../i[ ‘to want’, which is understood in context to apply force or near-coercion: 
tthot’îné æá dáyaílti ha nuhoret’î {English with DIST:1PL.IPFV:speak FUT 
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1PL.OB:3IPFV:want} ‘one wanted us to speak English’, ‘one made us speak English’.  
 A small and seemingly random set of verbs obtain causative derivatives by using 
the fossilized classifier prefixes, with a causative meaning: 
 Caus(łeghldé ‘they died’) = łeghłdé ‘he killed them’ 
 Caus(naghelna ‘he’s healing’) = naghełna ‘he’s healing him’ 
The (few) verbs which take this derivation must be learned. Caus may thus be 
considered to be restrictedly expressed in Dene.   Permission and stopping seem to be 
indicated by entirely free means.  Permission willfully allocated by an agent may be 
indicated simply by adding ‘it is not a problem’, i.e. ‘it is allowed’ after the verb.  For 
example, tełk’édhi dzírelye asųt’e íle {gun PERM:3IPFV:carry 3IPFV:have.problem NEG} 
‘people are allowed to carry guns around’.  In English, ‘allow’ also encompasses 
circumstances which, while not being conscious agents, render a second situation 
possible.  This would be indicated by two clauses linked by eyer de ‘therefore’.  For 
example ‘these moccasins allow people to walk without being heard (by moose)’ would 
be rendered as dechen yá dzíresa kekáłké heł eyer dé ditth’ah íle {bush in 
PERM:1IPFV:sg.walk moccasins with therefore 3IPFV:hear NEG}.  Prevention can be 
indicated simply by putting the prevented action in an embedded clause and adding 
the negated form of the verb hore...l]i ‘to want’ as the matrix verb: setíkwi dáts’édił 
nassa ha sorélɂį íle ɂa {1PO:parents dance REV:1IPFV:sg.walk FUT 1OB:3IPFV:want NEG 
ASSERT} ‘my parents didn’t want me to go / wouldn’t let me go to the dance’. 
 One can also use a verb like náne...ɂen ‘to prevent’: hubeyatié ɂá dayałti ch’á 
nanet’en {3PL.PO:language:CONS with DIST:3IPFV:speak against 3OB:3IPFV:prevent} 
‘they were prevented from speaking their (native) language’.  This means that Perm 
and Liqu are not LFs relevant to Dene.   
  LFs 40-42:  Fulfillment Verbs Reali, Fact0/i, Labrealij  These are fulfillment 
verbs which are extremely frequent and important phraseologized relations European 
languages. They take nouns as their keywords. 
 Real1(accusation) = prove   Real2(law) = abide by  
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 Fact0(tower) = stand    Labreal12(sawN) = sawV   
However, these are much less frequent in Dene because nouns are generally limited to 
artifacts, natural kinds, people, etc: 
 Real1(bes ‘knife’) = ɂasí –t’ath ‘to cut something’  
 Labreal1(konbes ‘saw’) = ɂasí na...t’ath ‘to chop up something’ 
 Real1(beschené ‘vehicle’) = k’é...lni ‘to drive’  
Dene is rich in Func0, especially for topographical features: 
 Func0(tųlú ‘road’) = nįɂá ‘it stretches out’; dzírąɂá ‘it winds’ 
 Func0(tu ‘lake’) = –ɂą ‘to be there (heavy)’  
 Func0(des ‘river’) = te...lį ‘to flow’, hóre...dɂį ‘to be visible’    
 Func0 (dechen1 ‘tree’) = náįɂá ‘it stands’ 
Occasionally the Func0 value is redundant and optional:  
 Func0 (tsíł ‘falling snow’) = í–kar; í–tth’e; –jer ‘to fall (as granular substance)’ 
Sometimes a topographical verb can be turned into a noun by conversion, and serves as 
its Func0, e.g. Func0(hhátaįlį ‘a spring’) = hhátaįlį ‘a spring is there’  
 LFs 43-45 (Involv, Manif, Degrad) are verbs which express external effects 
linked to causation.  Involv is the verb which determines the keyword’s effect on 
another actant Y; Manif is similar, but focusing less on the keyword’s physical effect 
on Y than on its sensory manifestation on or in Y:   
 Involv(snowstorm) = hit [Y]    Manif(star) = light up [the sky] 
Some examples with weather terms.  Manif No because keyword is N, and N are 
limited in Dene - horet’i ‘it is seen’, ‘it is visible’       
 QualResDegrad(yú ‘clothing’) = ch’élé ‘worn out’  
 Degrad(ber ‘meat’) = –łjer ‘to rot’ 
 Degrad(dene ‘person’) = núni...łdhi ‘to get old’   
The final standard lexical function from Mel’čuk (1998) is Son, which describes the 
characteristic sound of the keyword.  Son is a standard lexical function in Dene with 
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many examples and varied expression:  
 Son(dení ‘moose’) = de...lɂ  ‘bellow’  Son(łį ‘dog’) = de...lghus ‘bark’ 
 Son(ts’úze ‘fly’) = de...lz ‘buzz’   Son(ten ‘ice’) = de...lt’ál  ‘crunch 
Table IV-2 summarizes the standard syntagmatic lexical functions from Mel’čuk 
(1998) which do and do not occur in Dene.  
 
 Em Char PhysDesc Mot Pos Atm Top 
Centr ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘   ✘   
Magn R R R   ✔  ✔  
Ver ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘   ✘  ✘  
Bon    ✘     
Locin–ab*    ✘     
Instr* ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘     
Propt ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘   
Operi** ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
Funci ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
Func0      ✔  ✔  
Laborij ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
Incep R ✘  ✘  R ✘  R  
Fin ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘   
Cont ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘   
Caus R ✘  R ✘  ✘    
Perm ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
Liqu ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
Reali* ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
Fact0 ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
Involv ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  R ✘  
Manif ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  ✘  
Degrad*        
Son*    R    
      *Exist in Dene for relevant keywords (not in sample). 
      **Restrictedly expressed in Dene for relevant keywords (not in sample). 
Table IV-II.  Standard Syntagmatic Lexical Functions in Dene. 
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Those combinations shaded in gray are considered to be semantically incompatible: 
for example, Centr expresses the culmination of a dynamic situation, while position 
verbs denote a static situation. 
 
2   COMPLEX STANDARD LEXICAL FUNCTIONS IN DENE SŲŁINÉ  
 
 MTT’s framework of lexical functions an even more powerful tool for describing 
lexical relations than one would gather from simply surveying the list of standard LFs, 
because the standard LFs can be combined with each other to form a wide array of very 
specific lexical relations.  These are referred to as complex lexical functions.  In these 
cases, the leftmost LF has semantic scope over those to its right.  For example, 
AntiMagn means ‘not intensely [V]’ rather than ‘intensely un-[V]’.  Some examples of 
complex LFs in English include: 
 AntiMagn(rain) = // drizzle; lightly ~ IncepOper1(depression) = sink into ~ 
 CausOper2(joy) = fill with ~   AntiReal2(class) = fail a ~ 
Naturally, complex lexical functions can only be present if their constituent LFs exist in 
the language.  In Dene, at least the paradigmatic LFs Syn, Anti, Conv (restrictedly 
expressed), Gener (for some semantic fields), and Result occur.  The syntagmatic 
functions Magn (for some semantic fields), Operi (restrictedly expressed), Locin-ab, 
Incep (restrictedly expressed), Cause (restrictedly expressed), Reali, Func0 (for some 
semantic fields), Involv (restrictedly expressed), Degrad and Son also occur.  
Combinations of these LFs sometimes occur in the semantic fields in the sample.    
 The semantic field of atmospheric phenomena is particularly rich in Dene, with a 
variety of related words linked by idiosyncratic complex lexical relations.  This is 
particularly true of niłts’i ‘the wind blows’: 
 AntiBon(niłts’i ‘the wind blows’) = ~ déni  ‘it is sharp’ 
 Conv21Involv1(niłts’i ‘the wind blows’) = dáhíshal  ‘it flies away [in wind]’; 
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naríts’i  ‘it is blown away [by wind]’ 
 Those atmospheric terms, such as tsíł ‘falling snow’ or ‘snow falls’, which have a 
wide variety of Func0 derivations, also have complex function involving Func0 
meanings:   
 Magnsize Func0(tsíł ‘falling snow’) = ~ híkar  ‘it falls in big flakes’ 
 A number of atmospheric terms also have complex LFs involving phasal 
derivations: 
 IncepPlus(taretį ‘there are waves’) = // taríchá  ‘the waves are getting bigger’ 
 IncepMinus(taretį ‘there are waves’) = // díghel1 ‘[lake] calms down’ 
 IncepPlus(niłts’i ‘the wind blows’) = ~ chogh héja ́; // k’eɂné náłts’i 
 IncepMinus(niłts’i ‘the wind blows’) = // díghel2 ‘[wind] calms down’ 
 BonFin(náheɂą ‘sun goes down’) = // yéhts ‘[pretty] red end of sunset’ 
 SresFin Func0(tsíł ‘falling snow’) = yath  ‘snow [on ground]’ 
 Topographical features are also rich in Func0 derivations, as seen in Section IV-
1.2; in this semantic field one also finds SresFinFunc0 derivations for ‘remains of [X] 
that happened / existed’, and SlocFunc0 derivations for ‘the place where there [X] exists’ 
(limited to trees): 
 SresFinFunc0 (dechen ‘tree’)  = tses ‘[remains of] dead tree’  
 SresFunc0(horek’án ‘a [forest] fire burns’)  = hobaé ‘a burned clearing’ 
SlocFunc0([tree species]) =  k’es 〈gani; k’i〉 néné {poplar 〈pine; birch〉 land:CONS}, 
etc. 
 Configurations of lexical functions are cases in which more than 
one semantic change occurs in the keyword, but one of these relations does not clearly 
have semantic scope over the other.  Among the lexical items in our sample, combined 
LFs can be found for a few atmospheric terms: 
Motor + Func0(tsíł ‘falling snow’) = ~ dítth’e  ‘it falls while moving around’ 
Magn + AntiBon + Sing(niłts’i ‘the wind blows’) =   ~ słini  ‘tornado’   
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Magn + Involv1 + Sing(niłts’i ‘the wind blows’) =   [Y] náneltth'er  ‘it hits [Y] 
as a big gust’ 
The frequency of these configurations is, naturally, a function of the prominence of the 
component relations in the language .   
 
 
3   NONSTANDARD LEXICAL FUNCTIONS IN DENE SŲŁINÉ  
 
 Up to this point, we have searched for the standard lexical functions that are 
already well-established in Meaning-Text lexicography.  But looking at Dene texts in an 
open-ended way, one can search for language-specific nonstandard (or even standard) 
lexical functions that have not appeared in the current inventory, which is largely based 
on lexicographic studies of Indo-European languages.    In examining the texts and 
notes which constitute the corpus for this study, we do not find any new standard lexical 
functions; in general one is struck by the much lower frequency of phraseologized 
language with respect to what one finds in English or other European texts.  There are, 
however, several nonstandard lexical functions, meaning those that describe a semantic 
relation which appear regularly, though infrequently, but which have a certain diversity 
of expression.  Some of the standard lexical functions from the canonical list described 
above are found as nonstandard LFs in Dene.  However, a few more Dene-specific 
nonstandard LFs seem to be present.   
 The Dene lexicon regularly uses different verb stems to describe a similar 
situation, depending on the physical shape and texture of the main semantic actant X.  
This is particularly true of verbs describing motion, travel or position.  The most famous 
example of this phenomenon is the classificatory verbs, but it is not limited to them.   
The same differences in shape and texture are reflected in several unrelated sets of 
lexemes. 
One could therefore posit a series of nine nonstandard lexical functions, Comp, 
Fabr, Stick, Mud, Gran, LCont, SCont, ECont, and Anim, which express this regular 
relation.   
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Comp(‘fall’) = ná...ltth’i    Gran(‘throw’) =  –tsir 
Fabr(‘fall’) = nirí...łchuth    SCont(‘be there’) = –ką 
One could therefore posit a series of nine nonstandard lexical functions, Comp, Fabr, 
Stick, Mud, Gran, LCont, SCont, ECont, and Anim, which express this regular 
relation.   
One finds a similar relation between sets of verb stems, also mostly referring to 
positions and movement, which differ based on the number of the subject.  It would not 
be correct to view these stems as suppletive, because the dual number is not a 
grammeme of the category of number, nor does the third person systematically 
differentiate according to number. 
 
Direct Object Shape ‘throw’ (IPFV) ‘pick up’ (IPFV) ‘be there’ (IPFV) ‘fall’ (IPFV) 
Compact –shúł nirí...ɂá –ɂą ná...ltth’i 
Fabriclike –ɂer nirí...łchuth –łchuth te...kar 
Sticklike –hháł nirí...t –tą ná...té1 
Mudlike –tłé2 nirí...tłé –tłé1  
Granular –tsir nirí...dzai –dzai í...tth’e 
Large Full Container –hhes nirí...t –łtą  
Small Full Container –nił nirí...ká –ką  
Empty Container –hháł nirí...tį –tą  
Animate –ne nirí...tí –da / –y ná...ltth’i 
Plural –déł nirí...le –la ná...tł’i 
 
Table IV-III. Verb Stems Classified by Shape and Texture. 
 
One finds a similar relation between sets of verb stems, also mostly referring to 
positions and movement, which differ based on the number of the subject.  It would not 
be correct to view these stems as suppletive, because the dual number is not a 
grammeme of the category of number, nor does the third person systematically 
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differentiate according to number.  These are simply sets of unrelated stems which differ 
based on the regular different of subject number.  Table IV-IV lists some examples of 
this relation. It would therefore be useful to posit three more nonstandard Dene lexical 
functions, Singsubj, Dualsubj, and Pluralsubj which express this relation.   
Singsubj(ná...tes ‘pl lie down’) = ná... tį 
Pluralsubj(–da ’sg sits’) = –łtth’í 
 
Subject Number ‘sit’ ‘lie’ ‘biped walk’ (IPFV) ‘stay’ ‘fall’ (IPFV) 
X = 1 –da –tį –gha ná...dher ná...ltth’i 
X = 2 –ké –tes –ɂás ná...dher ná...tł’i 
X = 3 or more –łtth’í –tes –dél ná...dé ná...tł’i 
 
Table IV-IV.  Singular, Dual and Plural Subject Verb Stems. 
 
Finally, like many languages Dene regularly has different words to differentiate 
between male, female and young animals.  A few of these are listed in Table IV-V.  
 
 dení  ’moose’ sas ‘bear’ dih ‘spruce grouse’ 
Male yné deyeth etthéré // 
Female   ts’údai dets’íe dih // 
Young deníaze //; tats’éniaze // yíaze diaze // 
 
Table IV-V.  Terms for Male and Female Animals. 
 
We can posit two more nonstandard lexical functions, Masc, Fem to express this 
difference, e.g. Fem(dení  ‘moose’) = ts’údaí ‘cow [moose]’. 
It is important to note that there is disagreement between speakers about the 
restrictiveness of some of these terms, with some speakers using yné and dets’íe as 
default ‘male’ and ‘female’ terms respectively, with other cases being exceptions which 
must be listed in an ECD as outputs of lexical functions.   Most of these are adjectives, 
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but some are cumulatively expressed with the keyword.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
Linguistic Typology and the Lexicon 
 
 
 
So far, the focus of this study has been on two main topics within lexical 
semantics.   The first has been the description of individual word meanings.  This has 
been attempted by suggesting possible decompositions of these meanings into simpler 
and more universal ones.  The second subject has been the exploration of the Dene 
keywords’ lexical relations, the patterns by which groups of lexical units resemble and 
differ from each other. The results obtained from these two lines of inquiry correspond 
to the information the semantic and lexical combinatorial zones of the lexical entries.   
To accomplish both of these descriptive tasks, we have employed two empirically-
compiled inventories claimed to be cross-linguistically attested or possible. Semantic 
decomposition of lexical units has been represented by using a combination of 
Meaning-Text Theory’s lexicographic definitions and semantic network and meanings 
from the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM), adapted to Dene Sųłiné.  The list of 
lexical relations were those formalized as lexical functions (LFs).  Taken together, the 
NSM and lexical functions constitute a solid framework for single-language and 
crosslinguistic semantic description. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, sorting universal from language-
specific features is a core aim of linguistics.  Once comprehensive descriptions have 
been made of many natural languages, qualitative and quantitative linguistic typologies 
can be posited which provide valuable insight into the general tendencies in 
interlinguistic variation.  Up to this point, in our estimation, typological studies of 
language have usually focused on areas such as word order, morphology, or topics in 
grammatical relations such as nominative-accusative versus ergative systems.   
Comparatively less attention has been devoted to classifying word meanings and lexica 
in the same manner.  However, once lexical semantic studies such as this one have been 
carried out on more languages, such a semantic typology is imaginable.  “Typology” is 
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used here in an informal way, to refer to any and all patterns by which human languages 
systematically differ from each other as well as the possible reasons that could motivate 
such differences.  Just as one can compare lexica one can compare sociolinguistic 
contexts of languages based on factors such as oral versus written language and 
languages spoken by small groups with much shared knowledge versus those used by 
mass societies.   
This chapter aims to explore the possible typological implications of this survey of 
the Dene Sųłiné  lexicon by linking the differences found between the Dene and English 
lexical to wider linguistic tendencies including both structural and sociolinguistic 
factors.  We consider the crosslinguistic implications of two types of differences 
between Dene and English lexica, word meanings themselves and lexical relations.  
Contrasts between English and Dene word meanings run include divergences at the 
most basic level of semantic primitives as well as more complex word-specific 
meanings.  These will be discussed in order, followed by a survey of the relationship 
between word meanings and lexical classes from a comparative perspective.  Lastly, in 
Section 2, we will consider the distinct patterns of lexical relations in Dene and English 
and the factors which may have contributed to the divergences found. 
 
 
1   CROSSLINGUISTIC VARIATION OF WORD MEANINGS  
 
 
When one learns a new language, one is burdened most severely by the task of 
learning many thousands of new sound-meaning pairs as well as any language-specific 
features of their phonological and semantic poles.  One expects word meanings to often 
be unique, especially when the topics or culture of the target speech community are far 
removed from the realm of experience of the source language.  A language learner or 
linguist faces the issue of untranslatability when approaching complex and culturally 
specific lexical units such as NOSTALGIA, SAUDADE or K’ENE...TA2.  At the same 
time, there does not seem to be much of a basis for assuming a limitless diversity of 
word meanings.  If we ever manage to learn new word meanings we must ultimately be 
relying on translation and accessing some common conceptual framework.  Learning 
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the lexicon of a language involves learning the language-specific correspondences 
between non-linguistic conceptual representations and specifically linguistic meanings: 
 
(29)  {ConceptRh} ⇔ {SemRi}  |  0 < h, i  ≤  ∞ 
 
It is claimed in the Natural Semantic Metalanguage approach that there is not an infinite 
diversity in this mapping, but that there are certain basic, possibly innate, human 
concepts which map more or less directly onto conceptual representations and which 
would have translation equivalents in all languages.  These are the semantic primitives.  
However, there seem to be differences between Dene (and a set of other languages) and 
English (and other languages) even in terms of some NSM semantic primitives.    
 
1.1. Semantic Primitives.  In Section III-2.2, it was shown that no Dene 
translation equivalent could be found for several semantic primitives from the current 
NSM inventory (Goddard 2007), specifically BAD, MOMENT, CAN, FEEL, KIND, and 
PART.  (The meanings ‘bad’, ‘near’ and ‘small’ were considered quasi-complex and thus 
not genuine primitives in MTT’s antonymy framework.)   In the case of BAD, NEAR, 
SMALL, Dene preferred to express these concepts as their antonyms accompanied by the 
negation marker íle, despite the existence of low-frequency lexical items corresponding 
to NEAR and SMALL in Dene (although there was no verb for the latter).   
The status of MOMENT, however, could be questioned because a ‘moment’ is not 
really an entity at all, but is actually a kind of attenuative modifier for time concepts.  
The expressions this moment and for a moment really mean ‘exactly now’ and ‘for a 
very short time’, so there is no reason to expect other languages to have a lexical item 
common to all of these situations, much less a name for a small unit of time conceived 
as a putative “thing”.  Nor does CAN appear to be a coherent, let alone universal 
concept.  Its deontic and epistemic senses are expressed differently in Dene.  Not only 
are they realized as free phrases, but these are formed by the negation of a semantically 
simpler unit.   It appears that the conflation of these as ‘can’ verbs in European 
languages is both culturally specific and masks the semantic complexity of CAN which 
really means ‘absence or removal of an obstacle’ and is semantically more complex 
than CAN’T, which means ‘presence of an obstacle’. 
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Another traditional NSM primitive is FEEL in its sense ‘to experience an emotional 
state’.  The semantic primitive FEEL apparently does not exist in Dene; rather, specific 
emotions are expressed by their own verbs and phrasemes.  Also absent from Dene is a 
lexical item corresponding to KIND, which does not seem to be a universal human 
concept or necessary to express taxonomic relationships.  The final “absent” NSM 
primitive is PART, which denotes an array of different relations between two entities.  In 
Dene this is not rendered by a single lexeme denoting the relation.  Of course the part-
whole relations or kind-instance relations must be part of human conceptualization 
(otherwise Dene could not have naive-linguistic ontologies of animals, plants, materials 
and so forth).  But it does not follow that this must be expressed as a lexical item, or that 
the concepts of ‘kind’ and ‘part’ are linguistic meanings.   
Interestingly, Junker (2008) found that the NSM semantic primitives PART and 
KIND were absent from a variety of Cree, an Algonquian language which neighbors 
Dene:  “‘parts’ in East Cree are not viewed in an abstract way. [...] After several years 
of sustained attention to this question in East Cree, I have come to the conclusion that 
there is a fundamental difference in perspective between a language like East Cree and a 
language like English... The status of this prime must therefore be questioned”.  Not 
only are the same semantic primitives “missing” from Dene and East Cree, but the two 
languages seem to show similarities in how concepts like KIND and PART are rendered in 
as opposed to how they are expressed in many other languages.  At a minimum, these 
findings suggest that languages can be classified according to how they express part-
whole and kind-genus relations, and raise the question of the extent to which ‘kind’ and 
‘part’ are in fact unitary concepts.  Although Junker does not claim it, these findings 
could even suggest a typological or areal commonality how some boreal or indigenous 
Canadian languages conceptualize of taxonomy and partonomy relations.   
 
1.2.  Language-Specific Meanings. Even once one eliminates the contested 
semantic primitives from the list and works only with those common to English and 
Dene lexica, important differences emerge in the patterns in how these meanings are 
combined into more complex configurations.  One naturally expects to find a great deal 
of interlinguistic variation where more complex and specific word meanings are 
concerned.   In many cases concepts nameworthy enough to be adopted as specifically 
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linguistic meanings simply reflect the interests (at least historically) of their speakers.    
Wierzbicka (1997: 5) writes, “culture-specific words are conceptual tools that reflect a 
society’s past experience of doing and thinking about things in certain ways”. Fishman 
(1996) calls this the “indexical relationship” between language and culture:  “a language 
long associated with a culture is best able to express most easily, most exactly, most 
richly, with more appropriate overtones, the concerns, artifacts, values and interests of 
that culture”.  We saw this in the emotions and character terms and how, for example, 
notions of ‘bravery’ and ‘generosity’ did not have precise equivalents in Dene, for 
presumably cultural reasons.  
 In other cases, what is lexicalized may be random.  Some languages may 
lexicalize “non-salient” features.  Verbs may include as components of their meaning 
the number, shape or material of one of the actants, or even whether the subject had 
previously carried out the action denoted by the verb. 
While it may not be meaningful of any deeper difference, one of the most striking 
differences between the Dene and English lexica, based on the words in the sample, is 
precisely the former’s tendency to lexicalize presuppositions about the subject’s shape, 
number and texture.  The various position and motion verbs in our sample showed this.  
‘Fall’ verb, for example, varied according to their presuppositions about X’s shape, so 
te...kar meant ‘the upper part of X, whose width is greater than its height, moves from 
[a point] above ground toward the ground to [a point] in contact with the ground’, i.e. 
“X (wide or fabriclike object) falls flat’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TE...KAR 
‘X’ ‘Y’  
I II ⇔ 
  ‘X’  ‘height’ 
‘bigger.than’ 
  ‘width’ 
  β 
  α 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
'move1' 
‘point’ ‘point’ 
1 
2 
3 
'on' 
1 
‘ground’ 
‘above’ 
1 
2 2 
Unitary 
1 
     ‘upper.parts’ 
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This lexicalization of X’s physical features in position and motion verbs can be found in 
a few colloquial verbs in English such as plop down [on the couch].  But it is not such a 
pervasive feature of the English lexicon as it is in Dene.   
Talmy (2007) explores the typological patterns by which languages lexicalize 
semantic roles into the meanings of position and motion verbs.  Citing data from 
Atsugewi (Hokan family, California) and other languages, Talmy suggests a typological 
grouping of languages in which verbs expressing presuppositions about X’s shape, 
texture and so forth (“Motion + Figure verbs” in Talmy’s terminology) figure more 
prominently than in most Indo-European and other languages.  This and other research 
into lexicalization patterns or conflation patterns is an exciting beginning into this 
question of semantic typologies.  In Dene one also find, in the current sample, various 
position and motion verbs that have nonassertional semantic components about the 
number of the experiencer or agent X as part of their meanings, e.g. one verb meaning 
‘one person walks’ and another ‘two people walk’, and so forth.  This lexicalization of 
X’s number can frequently be found in Native American languages such as Hopi and 
Papago (Uto-Aztecan family) as well as in some Caucasian languages such as Georgian.  
It is important to note that these are not really cases of grammatical suppletion –– the 
alternation of the verb depends on the semantic number of the actants rather than the 
grammatical number.  This can be seen in various cases where there is a conflict 
between the grammatical and semantic multiplicity of the subject (see the discussion of 
Navajo, Hopi, Papago and Georgian in Mel’čuk 2006a: 423-424) 
 
1.3   Variation of Linguistic Ontologies.  The term “linguistic ontology” refers 
here to each natural language’s naive-linguistic classification of meanings as entities or 
situations, as evidenced by their expression as nouns or verbs.  This is, in Meaning-Text 
Theory, part of the semantic component, or the language-specific correspondence 
between semantic structures and deep syntactic structures:   
 
(30)  {SemSi} ⇔ {DSyntSj}  |  0 < i, j  ≤  ∞ 
 
Why, for example, are the meanings ‘grove of trees’ or ‘cliff’ conceived of as “things” 
in English, but as linguistic situations in Dene?   Differences in what is considered an 
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entity versus a situation, as evidenced by lexical classes, appears as one of the most 
significant typological differences between Dene and English in this study.  The 
majority of what are expressed as nouns in English (‘beauty’, ‘truth’, ‘sound’, ‘sake’, 
‘wind’, ‘wave’) and as adjectives (‘sad’, ‘happy’, ‘big’, ‘far’, ‘true’, ‘clever’, ‘shy’, 
‘purple’) are expressed as verbs in Dene: 
‘a cliff’, ‘a slope’   ⇒  hodárílger ‘it (land) goes down suddenly’ 
‘wind’         ⇒  niłts’i    ‘it (wind) blows’ 
‘waves’        ⇒  taretį     ‘the water is making waves’ 
‘a grove of trees’   ⇒   erét’į     ‘they (trees) form a line/group’ 
‘a wet place’      ⇒  hlɂa    ‘a wet place is there’  
‘a depression’     ⇒  hhárɂa    ‘it (land) does down in a spot’ 
‘a spring (of water)’ ⇒   hhátaįlį   ‘water flows out of the ground’ 
‘a waterfall’      ⇒  hhanádlį  ‘water flows out and down’  
 
This type of semantic content is often referred to as being prototypically nominal, i.e. 
expressed as nouns. On initial examination, we have no obvious reason to regard 
referents like cliffs or tree groves as less static, physical or “object-like” than individual 
trees, or dogs or people, which are all realized as nouns in Dene.  Indeed, if physical 
staticity is to be the criterion for such a division, one would sooner expect ‘dog’ or 
‘person’ to be conceptualized as a situation rather than ‘cliff’.  Presumably, any referent 
which is a rigid designator should be realized as a noun rather than as a verb.   
 Physical and moral traits are almost invariably realized as active verbs, and are 
thus conceived as being ways of the subject’s thinking and being rather than as object 
like ‘the soul’ (a noun in Dene) in some way separable from the subject.  
 
‘fairness’ ⇒ horely ɂasí ełk’ézį aldhen hoɂą 
{all things REC:like 3IPFV:cause it.must} 
‘each thing must be made the same as the others’  
‘creative’ ⇒ ɂasí łą thełtsi wali ghą nánedher 
{things are.many 3PFV:make POSS about 3IPFV:think} 
‘he thinks about many things he would make’ 
‘risk’ ⇒ t’á bet’á dué nódhí wale  
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{REL 3:because.of it.is.bad 3IPFV:happen POSS} 
‘that which because of it something awful may happen’ 
‘plan’ ⇒ t’ątú bek’énáts’édé ha 
{REL:how 3OB:DS:3IPFV:do FUT} 
‘how one will do it’ 
‘social effect’ ⇒ t’ąt’ú dene ch’álanié net’į ha 
{REL:how people actions:CONS 3IPFV:be.seen FUT}  
‘how people’s ways will be (seen to be)’ 
‘challenge’ ⇒ t’a bet’á ła nechá ha 
{REL 3:because.of work 3IPFV:be.big FUT} 
‘that which because of it the work will be great’ 
 
It should be stressed that the above Dene phrases are merely renderings of meanings 
corresponding to property concepts nouns in English in the left column; more literal 
Dene renderings would be ‘to be fair, ‘to be challenging’, and so forth.  In Dene, the 
noun class is virtually always limited to perceptible entities and, within these, a majority 
appear to be rigid designators, especially natural kind and artifact terms.  While Dene 
does have a means of converting verbs to nouns, either through the addition of the 
nominalization suffix –i or through (very rare) noun derivation –– such as S0(ghe...na 
‘to live’) = eghenai ‘life’ –– these means are very seldom used. 
Beck (2002) has examined the typology of parts of speech systems in detail, 
focusing on  the differences between Native American languages and “Standard 
Average European” ones.  Beck’s typology begins with certain “semantic classes” such 
as “property concepts”, “human characteristics”, “states”, “objects”, “actions”, 
“events”, and so forth, which are deemed to be universal.  These somewhat recall 
Apresjan’s (2000) “main human systems”, mentioned several times in this work.  There 
are simply some situations, mostly extralinguistic, which speakers from all cultures will 
want to express in words.  When languges divide up these semantic classes or human 
systems differently, one finds typological variation in the inventory of lexical classes, 
ranging from NAV languages with three distinct, large lexical classes of nouns, 
adjectives and verbs, to N[AV] languages, which express the semantic content of 
European adjectives using verbs, and possibly [NA]V languages as well. Beck (2002) 
suggests that this typology of lexical classes is based on an algorithm which takes into 
account both semantic and syntactic characteristics, but giving priority to the semantic 
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considerations, provides the best working definition of lexical classes which could have 
cross-linguistic validity: 
 
The first step in the algorithm would be the identification of those words which are to be 
classified as semantic predicates (verbs) and those words that are to be classified as 
NAMES (nouns)–that is, an N[AV] lexical inventory.  If no further (major class) 
distinctions are made in the lexicon, the process stops there with the class of semantic 
predicates being designated WFM21 syntactic predicates and the class of names as wfm 
actants... otherwise, the algorithm subdivides the lexicon, separating those semantic 
predicates which are WFM modifiers (i.e. adjectives) from those which are not [generating 
a full NAV inventory].   
 
Semantic definitions of nouns and verbs often assume that nouns are prototypically 
semantic names and verbs prototypically predicates.  In MTT, predicates are those 
meanings which describe situations — such as actions, activities, events, states, 
properties, and relations — which thus require the presence of others (semantic actants 
or obligatory participants) to be conceived of and uttered; semantic names have no such 
requirement.  However, the conflation name-noun and predicate-verb may be 
problematic: quasi-predicates are meanings describe entities which have arguments.  
These can be considered a special class whose actants actually express the actants of 
situation which links the keyword to its (and the verb’s) arguments.  For example 
PROFESSOR is part of the linguistic situation TEACH, and so PROFESSOR borrows 
the actant STUDENT from the verb.  If we consider the quasi-predicates as a kind of 
abbreviation for a larger situation, the general equation noun-name and verb-situation 
generally holds.  Nonetheless, it will not be clear that all entity names which are 
predicates are in some way derived from other predicates without more wide-ranging 
typological studies.   
 
2   CROSSLINGUISTIC VARIATION OF LEXICAL RELATIONS  
 
Beyond a crosslinguistic comparison of word meanings, one can also suggest a 
typology of lexica in terms of lexical relations.  While the semantic primitives of the 
Natural Semantic Metalanguage were claimed to be universal in the sense that each 
language would have some translation equivalent of each of them, Meaning-Text 
                                                
21 A reference to Hengeveld’s (1992) formula “without further measures” , which refers to the amount of 
“morphosyntactic machinery” required to use a lexical item in a (marked) syntactic context.   
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Theory’s inventory of lexical relations, formalized as lexical functions (LFs), is only 
claimed to represent a current list of attested lexical relations, a subset of which may be 
found in each language.  In fact, most of the examples of the 60 lexical relations current 
in MTT are described with examples from the lexica of major Indo-European languages 
such as English, Russian, French and Spanish.  While lexical functions as frequent, 
abstract semantic relations with a diversity of phraseologized expressions can in 
principle be looked for in any language, there has been little focus so far on testing the 
exent to which these lexical functions are in fact attested crosslinguistically. 
This study of the Dene lexicon suggests that only a small subset of the 60 
phraseologized lexical relations in the current inventory are in fact relevant to this 
language.  Conversely, when examining Dene corpora in an open-ended way, one does 
not find a competing list of  unmentioned lexical relations (aside from some 
nonstandard LFs).  The Dene texts and conversations analyzed for this study simply 
appear to be contain far fewer set phrases than their European counterparts.  It is 
important to note that many paradigmatic as well as syntagmatic lexical relations whose 
outputs must be lexically listed in European languages are realized by free means in 
Dene.  For example the various idiomatic Magn (intensifier of the keyword) semantic 
derivations mentioned in Section II-3.1.4 –– such as Magn(armed) = to the teeth and 
Magn(applause) = heavy, thunderous  –– were realized by free adverbs in Dene that 
meant ‘really’ or ‘very’.  Of the paradigmatic relations, only Syn (synonymy), Anti 
(antonymy) and Result (resulting states of events) appearing as relevant lexical 
functions for the lexical units in the sample.  Why is the expression of so many lexical 
relations heavily phraseologized  expressed in English and French, but with realized 
with free, non-phraseologized means in Dene?  Could this be indicative of a wider 
crosslinguistic tendency?  There are essentially two ways in which it might be, not 
mutually exclusive:   
•  The structural explanation: the polysynthetic structure of Athabaskan languages 
precludes many lexical relations common in English — the same meanings are added 
regularly via the richer morphology. 
•  The sociolinguistic explanation:  the widespread use of writing for European 
languages fixes much more language into set phrases, while oral languages have a 
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different relationship with phraseology, regardless of structural questions.  Similarly, a 
language spoken by a large mass society will require more semantic derivations than 
one spoken by a group with more shared knowledge.    
In the following sections, we will explore how these hypotheses could apply to 
Athabaskan languages.    
 
2.1.  Lexical Relations and Polysynthetic Structure.  “Polysynthesis” is not a 
rigorously defined term but an impressionistic statement about the comparatively high 
number of morphs in most wordforms of a given language.  Usually, a verb in a 
polysynthetic language, as many Native American languages are, has the same 
informational content as an entire clause in a European language. At least for some such 
languages, the prominence and centrality of the verb in the lexicon at the expense of 
other lexical classes such as adjectives and nouns, as one finds in Dene,  means that the 
language does not use the noun class to refer to semantic fields such as abstract ideas, 
qualities and phenomena,.  Consequently, all of the lexical relations which denote the 
standard phrasal metaphors (Centr, Ver), support verbs (Operi, Funci and Laborij) and 
adpositions (Propt) are absent or rare.  Indeed, the use of semantically light support 
verbs such as Operi serves to transform a noun which really indicates a linguistic 
situation, such as in a step towards me, back into a verb phrase, e.g. Oper1(step) = take. 
In a language like Dene, where such situations are always referred to by verbs, these 
semantic relations are unneccessary.  
For other sytagmatic relations, such as Incep (beginning of a situation) and Fin 
(end of a situation), these meanings are realized by free morphological means involving 
the inceptive derivation or the inceptive particle (see Chapter IV).  In contrast, English 
has many verbs, some phrasal, that are semantic derivations for starting and ending 
phases of the keyword, e.g. Incep(travel) = set off // or Fin(try) = give up //.   
The emergence of phrasal verbs such as these in European languages has been 
linked with the typological shift from a fusional to more analytical verb structure.  
Masini (2006) associates the emergence of phrasal verbs in Italian with internal 
structural pressures resulting from factors such as the loss of the Latin case system, the 
decreased transparency and productivity of Latin verbal prefixes, including locative 
derivation markers.  This shift has parallels in the historical development of Germanic 
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and other Indo-European languages.  In contrast, Athabaskan languages still retain a 
complex and productive system of locative, adverbial and directional prefixes as well as 
inceptive and inchoative markers.  At least considering the current sample and corpus, 
these prefixes are less likely to lose their transparency and result in morphological 
phrasemes than other left-side material such as Aktionsart prefixes and (former) 
incorporated nouns.  Athabaskan languages, therefore, would not have the same 
structural pressures to develop multi-word verb phrases, which could then form become 
phraseologized, due to the enduring transparency of some derivational prefixes.    
 
2.2.  Lexical Relations and Orality. Another factor possibly influencing 
phraseologized lexical relations, not mutually exclusive with the structural account 
above, stems from the fact that Athabaskan languages have traditionally been spoken by 
a very different kind of speech community with respect to European languages.  One 
major difference is that Dene has historically been an oral language, while standard 
written language has had great prestige in anglophone speech communities.   
Krauss (2000) posits a pre-contact sociolinguistic modus vivendi for Athabaskan 
peoples characterized by dialect continua in which mutually unintelligible Dene 
languages shaded into each other over a wide geographical area.  In spite of this, there 
would have been extensive language contact due to the particularly northern need to 
travel extensively to exploit various resources in the course of hunting and gathering 
land use cycles.  For Krauss, this means that an Old World model of the dialect 
continuum would not apply to Athabaskan societies becauses Dene speakers would 
have grown up with extensive multilingualism overlayed on the dialect continuum.  
The European dialect continua, such as the post-Latin dialect continuum before the 
advent of standard national languages such as Italian, French and Spanish, contrasted in 
some ways with this model.  These populations, relying on agriculture and living in 
villages, were less mobile than Athabaskan groups and there was less of a tradition  of 
multilingualism in other mutually unintelligible local varieties than what Krauss 
identified for Athabaskan.  In historical times, national languages were created by 
superimposing one local variety over the continuum of local dialects, which are not 
mutually intelligible with the national languages.  In theory this would result in a stark 
local-national diglossia, but in the 20th century there is more of a continuum between 
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the basilect and acrolect.  Iacobini (2009), for example, identifies four language levels 
for Italian speakers: the local dialect, the regional dialect, regional Italian and standard 
Italian.  According to Iacobini, the local Romance varieties would have had phrasal 
constructions for internal typological and structural reasons like those outlined in 
Masini (2006) but it may have been the process of written standardization spread such 
local spoken constructions outside of their original speech communities.  For the author, 
regional speakers of the national language would have acted as historical intermediaries 
who, while not proficient in the local language, would have adopted some local 
grammatical constructions such as phrasal verbs and introduced them into the standard 
national language.  In this way, Iacobini outlines a diachronic process involving written 
language and standardization which, while it did not create some of the phrasemes that 
feature prominently in sytagmatic lexical relations, made them much more prominent.   
This theory still does not explain why individual spoken varieties such as the Dene 
of a particular area would have a much lower frequency of phraseologized expressions 
of syntagmatic lexical relations, even taking into account morphological phrasemes.  
Other authors have associated cultural contrasts in literary poetics which may have 
resulted in a heightened relevance of some syntagmatic relations, such as 
phraseologized intensifiers, in European languages.  
Hans (1994), tracing the use of Magn intensifier outputs (“boosters”) in English 
from the 15th century to the present, found a gradual in diachronic change by which a 
concrete meaning becomes an abstract degree adverb, e.g. terribly.    Interpretation of 
such inventive metaphorical use of modifiers that requires more disambiguating effort 
on the part of the speaker and the hearer, which Hans associates with their use as 
prestige forms by prominent writers demonstrating their eloquence and creativity:  
 
 One reason for the ever-continuing change regarding boosters can be seen in a “taste for 
hyperbolic expression” in language: speakers desire to be “original”, to demonstrate their 
verbal skills, and to capture the attention of their audience.  The knowledge and use of a 
particular booster often signals in-group membership.  When the use of that booster 
spreads to other groups in the speech community, the word loses its function of group 
identification, and the linguistic “trend-setters” will then normally put a new group-
symbol into circulation.  
 
This literary taste, perhaps rooted in social class and literary specialization, may not 
transfer to an Athabaskan context.  Phraseologized intensifiers are markedly absent for 
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the keywords in several of the semantic fields in the current sample.  In the Dene 
corpora used, one aso rarely finds non-free Magn outputs of emotion, character or 
physical description terms.  While a place or person may be described as ‘beautiful’, 
‘intelligent’ or ‘large’, descriptions rarely go beyond that.  There is usually no 
equivalent of hyperbolic or intense adjectives like ‘gorgeous’, ‘brilliant’, or ‘huge’.  
Indeed many speakers bristle when asked to translate such adjectives into Dene, finding 
it strange and inappropriate to insist on degrees of beauty, speed, intelligence, smallness 
or other traits.  “If it’s beautiful it’s beautiful, we just say that.  We don’t go on and on 
like in English about the beauty of a sunset or a place”, said one consultant.  In Dene 
traditional narratives, we are rarely provided with a detailed physical description of a 
place or an explicit analysis emotions and character of the protagonists.  Murray & Rice 
(1996: 7-8), speaking of detail in storytelling, identify this as a specifically Athabaskan 
or Nothern linguistic aesthetic: 
 
In situations where we have versions of the same story by the same storyteller, one told in 
English to a younger fieldworker, the other in Haida or Tlingit to an older fieldworker, 
the Native-language version will be more implicit and laconic, the English version more 
explicit and detailed. [...] Outsiders tend to find the versions with the most explanation 
and detail to be most satisfying and coherent.  From an indigenous point of view, the best 
versions are the most laconic. [...] It is important to be aware of this tendency, and how it 
relates to cultural values regarding literary taste.  It is also very important to note that 
most ‘retellings’ of Native stories aimed at English-language readers tend to be overstated 
in style.  
 
A more authentic Dene style is to use descriptive words sparingly and to reveal the 
intensity of thoughts, emotions and character traits through the character’s actions –– 
the speakers consulted felt that high frequency and explicit of emotion and character 
terms using modifiers in Dene resulted in an articial and didactic tone unusual for Dene 
speech.  Such aesthetic differences between Dene and English (or between languages 
generally) may have an influence on the emergence of some phraseologized lexical 
relations over time.  
For other syntagmatic relations, the motivating differences may go beyond the 
mere orality of the Dene languages and extend into the general social history of 
Athabaskan peoples.  The best example of this is the absence of all the Si lexical 
functions, which provide the names for actants and circumstantials of verbs.  Among the 
actants, S1 is usually the agent (X ⇔ I), S2 the patient (Y ⇔ II), S3 an oblique object (Z 
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⇔ III), e.g. S1(teach) = teacher; S2(teach) = subject, and S3(teach) = student, pupil, 
disciple. Sinstr, Smed, Smod, Sloc, Sres refer to circumstantial participants such as the 
means, instrument, or place of the situation, e.g. Sinstr(murder) = murder weapon.  
Crucially, these names must have analytical definitions based on the linguistic situation.  
They must have that situation as part of their linguistic meaning, without relying on the 
speakers’ encyclopedic knowledge. Sinstr means ‘object used to do L’, so Sinstr(murder) 
is murder weapon, not gun or knife.  While it is part of our encyclopedic knowledge that 
murders are frequently carried out using guns and knives, ‘used to murder people’ is not 
a component of the meaning of ‘gun’ or ‘knife’.  Any innocuous object could be 
labelled a murder weapon in English if there were proof it had been used as such.  It is 
not part of our extralinguistic notions that victim and crime are related — ‘crime’ is part 
of the meaning of ‘victim’. Sloc(hunt) would be hunting grounds, not forest, tundra or 
the proper name of a place where the speakers know hunting occurs. 
In the Dene lexicon, this sort of name is rarely available.  S1 names exist for a  few 
socially salient roles for important activities such as leading the tribe, teaching and 
hunting.  But for the vast majority of verbs, such as łeghá...łdhi ‘to kill’ (SG, IPFV), there 
is no agentive S1 derivative, and there is virtually never an S2 or S3.  ‘The killer’ could 
be rendered with a relative clause using an active verb, i.e. as t’ahį dene/ɂasí 
łegháįłther {REL.HUM people/game.animals 3PFV:sg.kill (PFV)} ‘one who killed the 
person(s)/the animal(s)’.  Even such constructions are used sparingly, though; people 
are not usually identified by their actions but by name.  It would be conceivable for the 
Dene lexicon to have such names, as nouns are plentiful in Dene, if not for actants of 
verbs.  Their conspicous absence (from our perspective) therefore seems to be related to 
cultural and historical factors rather than to the language’s polysynthetic nature.  
Analytical labels like ‘hunting grounds’, ‘murder weapon’, ‘teacher’ and ‘victim’ are 
useful in mass societies in which speakers need to inform each other about the roles 
people, objects and places play in events.  Dene people traditionally lived in small 
kinship-based bands and regional groups based on face-to-face contact, intermarriage 
and cooperation in carrying out complex hunting and gathering tasks.  Dene speakers 
rarely had need of abstract terms like ‘hunting grounds’ or ‘murder weapon’ because 
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they shared so much tacit knowledge about their land and the people who lived on it.  
Everyone knew in subtle detail the spots where each type of game was hunted in each 
season, and what tools were used for, and which individuals had done what to whom.  
Even today, many Dene speakers bristle when asked to translate uninformative 
sentences like “knives are a cutting tool” or “X is a good place to hunt moose”, reacting 
with sentences like “why would you say something that everyone knows”, or “our 
language is not nonsense like English”.  Similar reactions obtain when labelling people 
with words like victim or recipient; in a society with no anonymity, people would be 
referred to by their names.  Today, if someone must identify an unknown person or 
object according to their roles in a situation, one can use a relative clause, such as t’a ɂá 
łegháyįłtheri {REL with 3D:3PFV:kill:REL} ‘that [thing] with which he killed him’, or 
eyi dene t’ahį leghldheri {that person REL:HUM 3PFV:get.killed:REL} ‘that person who 
got killed’, i.e. ‘the victim’, t’ahuk’é dene ełelgháli {REL:where people 
REC:3PFV:club:REL} ‘where people clubbed each other’, i.e. ‘the theater of war’.  But 
these are all free phrases, not values of lexical functions.  There are a few exceptions, 
particularly for a few places that needed to be defined analytically because they could 
be used for a time but not permanently for a particular activity, or items that might have 
a few different uses.  Examples include:  
Sloc(ber –tsa ‘to cache meat’) = etsa k’é {cache place} ‘a meat cache’ 
Sloc(gah –lú ‘to snare rabbits’) = gah bíł k’é {rabbit snare:CONS place} ‘rabbit 
snaring place’ 
Sinstr(eghála...na ‘to work’) = la yúé {work tools:CONS} ‘work tools’  
The words k’é ‘place’ and yúé ‘items’ or ‘tools’ the examples above cannot be used as 
an unbound words (*diri k’é *‘this place’, yúé  unacceptable as simply *‘tools’ or 
‘things’). The bound noun k’é describes a culturally nameworthy place.   
In summary, it seems likely that a combination of structural and sociolinguistic 
factors may have limited the relevance of phraseologized lexical relations in 
Athabsakan languages with respect to major standard European languages.  There may 
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be different explanations for the reduced frequency of different lexical relations.  For 
some derivations, e.g. phasal and locational ones, the richness of Athabaskan verb 
morphology means that more is done through free morphological means than through 
phraseology (although the language is replete with morphological phrasemes involving 
other types of prefixes).  Sociolinguistically, a number of factors may have influenced 
the lexicon in this respect.  First, it is at least possible that the exclusive use of oral over 
written channels would privilege the use of free rather than set phrases.   This could be 
due to historical reasons or to a certain cultural resistance to the use of hyperbole or the 
stating of redundant information, which may be the case for some syntagmatic lexical 
relations.   Finally, when the speech community shares a great deal of tacit knowledge 
and there is little anonymity, there seems to be less of a need to specify certian semantic 
derivatives when they can be referred to by proper names of people and places.  Taken 
together, these factors consitute a sociolinguistic framework with which typology of 
lexica could be constructed, in concordance with or independently of structural 
classification.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 In addition to an interest in the Dene language and culture, this research was 
motivated by a series of questions concerning the extent of diversity of natural 
languages.  It is presumed that languages must share some common core in order for 
language to have evolved and to be learned by all people in the same manner.  While in 
the latter 20th century the search for universals has focused primarily on grammar, there 
is also a long intellectual tradition of applying this optic to lexica, with the hypothesis 
that languages share some core meanings –– semantic primitives –– that correspond to 
basic conceptual categories.  From these, each speech community constructs an array of 
language-specific word meanings in accordance with the interests and priorities of that 
culture.  Comparing lexemes from the Dene lexicon with the corresponding English 
vocabulary was seen as a way of shedding light on such questions. 
As it is not a priori clear which meanings would be language-specific and which 
would be more universal, it was decided that an open-ended, systematic description of a 
sample of lexical units from the Dene language might best elucidate differences and 
similarities between the two languages.  Over 200 lexical units from seven semantic 
fields were chosen –– lexemes and idioms denoting emotions, human character, 
physical description, motion, position, atmospheric and topographical phenomena.  
Following Apresjan (2000), the aim of a systematic lexicographic study was not simply 
to compile a list of facts about individual lexical units, but to elucidate a more cohesive, 
language-specific picture of the world recorded in the language at hand.  Using a 
fieldwork and elicitation-based methodology, as well as relying on corpora to some 
exent, this study attempted to detail the core semantic and syntactic properties of the 
keywords as well as their lexical relations, arranging them into synonym series and 
making comparisons with similar English vocabulary where possible.   
This study presented a number of challenges, both intellectual and methodological.  
First there is the choice of defining Dene keyword using a semantic metalanguage based 
on English, so as to render the description accessible to readers.  This raises questions of 
semantic and translation equivalence that must be faced in bilingual lexicography. 
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Caution was used and every effort was made to include in the defining metalanguage 
only those English meanings for which corresponding semantic units existed in Dene  
(or at least corresponding semantic content such as the inexpressible common meaning 
of a set of Dene verbs).   Nonetheless, it is vital to elaborate more Dene-language 
definitions of these lexical units and to continue to verify their equivalence with 
English-based ones.    
In terms of the research methodology, this sort of study requires a deep knowledge 
of the language and the culture of the speech community, which is difficult for an 
outsider to obtain.  Most lexical semantic studies using the Meaning-Text  approach, 
particularly the Explanatory and Combinatorial Dictionary projects in course around the 
world, are carried out by teams of researchers working on their own (Indo-European) 
languages.  While extending this lexicographic approach to typologically diverse 
languages can be illuminating for linguistics and for language documentation, one must 
also recognize that the results obtained by non-native speakers for lesser-studied 
endangered languages may be much more challenging to obtain and more tentative.  
The intuitions of native speakers are therefore particularly vital for this sort of 
lexicographic project, which should be seen as a starting point rather than an endpoint, 
even for the semantic fields under study.   
Despite such challenges, interesting systemantic differences between the Dene and 
English lexica emerged.  Certain semantic primitives in the Natural Semantic 
Metalanguage ––such as KIND, PART and CAN –– apparently inexistant or inexpressible 
as lexical units in Dene.  Additionally, the two languages appeared to have highly 
language-specific vocabulary for the semantic content described by the sample.   At the 
same time, there was sufficient consistent partial equivalency between the two 
languages for Dene words to be described by some version of an English-based 
semantic metalanguage.  For example, the Dene vocabulary for emotions – while 
lacking lexemes translating to ‘feel’, or a generic ‘to feel sad’, ‘to feel happy’ and so 
forth, could at least be explicated in terms of schema or scripts set out by Wierzbicka 
and Apresjan.   
There was a weaker correspondence between English and Dene character terms, as 
the latter language tended to use more indirect means of describing people’s 
                                                                                                                                      322 
personalities.  Those character terms which could be found in Dene corresponded to 
nameworthy qualities or transgressions in the context of traditional Athabaskan society.  
Dene motion and and position verbs were very interesting in that their meanings often 
incorporated, mush more frequently than English, nonassertional information about the 
shape, material, texture and number of the semantic subject.  Topographical vocabulary 
was extremely rich and many meanings referred to specific layouts of the land or 
vegetation that can routinely be found on Dene lands.   
The lexical items also displayed important syntactic differences with respect to the 
corresponding English vocabulary.  One divergence with respect to English came in the 
addition of third and fourth deep-syntactic actants into the clause.  As one sees in the 
government patterns of the lexical units in the sample, when a linguistic situation 
involved more than two semantic actants, the third or fourth actants were expressed in a 
second clause rather than in embedded clauses.  For example, a meaning of the type ‘X 
is-afraid to do Y because Z is happening’ might instead be rendered syntactically as two 
clauses: ‘Z is happening, X is-afraid to do Y’.  This highlights some tendency of Dene 
to rely on “semantic recursion”, or the ability of the listener to infer the conditional or 
causal relationship between the two adjacent clauses in an utterance, where English 
would use more extensive syntactic recursion.   
Lexical relations in Dene also stood in stark contrast with their English 
counterparts.  While approximately 60 lexical relations had phraseologized expressions 
in English, formalized in Meaning-Text Theory as lexical functions, only a small subset 
of these were relevant to the Dene lexical items in the sample. Many lexical relations 
expressed by free derivational means or by adding a particle.  In many European 
languages, similar derivation markers had become semantically less transparent over the 
centuries, giving rise to morphological phrasemes and ultimately to multi-word idioms.  
In other cases, Dene prefixes had lost their transparency and the formerly derived form 
had to be listed in the lexical entry.  
The theoretical approach used was based on semantic decomposition.  In Meaning-
Text Theory (MTT), meanings are described by decomposing them into semantically 
simpler units.  The resulting definitions must be a paraphrases which are semantically 
equivalent, though perhaps not stylistically the same, as the keywords.  At the deepest 
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level of semantic decomposition one presumes to find semantic primitives.  These have 
been most strongly posited by the Natural Semantic Metalanguage approach, which 
makes an important claim of the universality of the semantic primitives.  Finally, the 
lexical combinatorial section of the entries described lexical relations in terms of MTT’s 
lexical functions, claimed to be a working inventory of possible phraseologized lexical 
relations found to date.   
The approach was most successful in the first and last aspects.   In general, the 
decompositional approach to systematic lexicography provided a successful framework 
for systematic empirical description of the Dene lexicon. Apresjan’s idea of focusing on 
vocabulary referring to “main human systems” uncovered a range of themes in the 
language that are deserving of future research.  Furthermore, Apresjan’s approach of 
organizing word meanings into series of quasi-synonyms seems to be highly effective in 
uncovering subtle semantic and pragmatic information about keywords that could be 
missed by an approach using only stand-alone lexical entries.  
It is more complex to analyze the success of the NSM semantic primitives.  The 
researchers working in the NSM project have together undertaken an admirable effort to 
describe universal semantic primitives, and they naturally invite empirical testing of the 
inventory in order to refine it.  As described in Section II-3.3.1, the NSM list has 
changed much over the years as the body of research has extended to a greater and 
greater number of geographically diverse and unrelated languages.  Over the course of 
these revisions, some semantic primitives have remained while others have vanished 
and new semantic primitives have been added to the list.  The Dene data from the 
present study suggest that further changes to the current (Goddard 2007) inventory may 
be necessary.  The NSM inventory may be too ample in that it contains elements that 
are not present in Dene languages.  
In other cases, the NSM inventory may be too restrictive.  The NSM literature, as 
outlined in Chapter II, is heavily tilted in favor of studying words for mental predicates 
such as emotions, and focuses less on other areas of vocabulary. If we recall Apresjan’s 
“main human systems”, while it is true that people’s feelings and mental life constitute 
two important semantic fields, other human systems — speech, physical manipulation 
of objects, physical description, and so forth —are equally deserving of attention.  Even 
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within the field of emotions, the NSM studies tend to provide analyses of the “negative” 
emotions such as ‘fear’, ‘sad’, and ‘anger’-type words. In this study, emotions such as 
‘humor’ were difficult to explicate using the NSM even though ‘humor’ seems to as 
basic and common to human experience as ‘fear’ or ‘anger’.  It was also particularly 
challenging to use the NSM primitives to adequately define motion, atmospheric and 
topographical verbs.  As Wierzbicka and Goddard have always made clear, the 
framework will be in continual evolution as more languages are analyzed.  While the 
NSM currently works best for describing the cross-linguistic variation in emotion 
meanings, greater focus should be placed on other human systems.  The more this is 
done, the closer semanticists will be to having an accurate the list of universal semantic 
primitives. 
The results of this study could be applied to at least four domains beyond 
semantics.  The first and most immediate application could be to endangered language 
documentation efforts.  In our era, the majority of natural languages (including, sadly, 
most Athabaskan languages) are endangered.  General large-scale descriptions of 
endangered languages aspects are urgently needed rather than just targeted investigation 
of specific phenomena.  Indeed, as we cannot know all aspects of languages that will 
eventually reveal themselves to be of scientific interest, future studies of specific 
questions about human language will be greatly hampered if we lack comprehensive 
descriptions of many language families.  Furthermore, it is particularly vital that the 
lexica be studied systematically.  Unfortunately, due perhaps in part to some of the 
difficulties in studying lexical semantics mentioned above, and partly to the 20th century 
disconnect between theoretical linguistics and lexicography, for many languages the 
lexicon remains the least understood or most haphazardly described area.  In this 
context, the Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary approach to systematic lexical 
semantic description could complement grammatical studies to yield the fullest possible 
documentation of disappearing languages.  
 The second area on which studies like this could shed light is linguistic typology, 
understood in a loose sense of systematic crosslinguistic comparison.  It seems that 
lexical semantic typologies, both focusing on patterns in word meaning and in lexical 
relations, can be posited in a similar way to morphological and syntactic typologies.  
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For instance, one finds in this study a great deal of variation underlying parts of speech 
systems, as exemplified by the opposing cases of Dene and English.  In the case of 
topographical formations, this sort of semantic content is typically realized as nominal 
in English but in Dene is conceived of as a situation.  For European languages, one can 
cite many examples of phrases or sayings in which qualities and human personality 
concepts are described as “things” that exist independently of a human participant, or 
even as agents affecting people, such as Misery loves company.  In artistic and literary it 
is pervasive to speak of representations of emotions and descriptive concepts as putative 
“objects” which one can possess, acquire or lose such as When forty winters shall 
beseige thy brow / And dig deep trenches in thy beauty’s field (Shakespeare, sonnett II) 
or Tu bella fosti e saggia, e in te ripose / Tutte le grazie sue cortese il cielo (“You were 
beautiful and wise, and in you placed / Heaven all her delicate graces” — A. Striggio, 
libretto for Monteverdi’s L’Orfeo).  In Athabaskan languages like Dene it is not 
possible to refer to qualities in this way.  In Dene, human characteristics are expressed 
as active verbs, as ways of the subject’s thinking and being, rather than as objects he or 
she possesses, such that people can discuss ‘beauty’, ‘truth’, ‘kindess’, or ‘sadness’ 
without ever using nouns or adjectives.  It is not necessary to adopt “Whorfian” position 
that sees thought and language as closely interrelated to want to explore the extent to 
which languages differ in translating meanings into lexical classes.  One wonders 
whether there is some invariant semantic content which languages always express as a 
particular lexical class, and if interlinguistic differences are related to morphological 
such as verb polysynthesis.  In addition, there are a number of sociolinguistic and 
historical factors that could shape word meanings and lexical relations.  Access to more 
general lexical semantic descriptions would make it easier to isolate such variables and 
to understand the role they play in shaping lexica.  
Thirdly, this study could yield theoretically interesting results for morphology and 
in particular questions of language change and grammaticalization. Most theoretical 
models of morphology describe the evolution of morphological systems as an 
irreversible process of grammaticalization: over time, “content” morphs become 
semantically more abstract and more regularized in their application as they come to be 
exploited as purely grammatical markers.  However, Chapter IV described cases where 
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the inceptive or inchoative were applied unpredictably or where the (formerly) iterative 
marker had become an intensifier.   This would suggest that sometimes, morphological 
material may come to be recycled and used in novel ways, not only as a new kind of 
grammatical marker but as a new “strong” content meaning, perhaps even more “full” 
than its preceding role.  Viewing complex wordforms and morphological phrasemes 
such as one finds in Dene through the prism of lexical relations rather than looking only 
at the surface morphological form could thus lead to interesting lines of inquiry in 
morphology itself. 
Finally, the Meaning-Text approach to semantic and lexicographic description 
could be highly valuable in the development of pedagogical materials aimed at language 
revitalization.  The Dene Sųłiné language, while endangered, is seen by most Dene 
people as an irreplaceable part of their identity and culture.  Currently, most Dene 
Sųłiné communities have implemented or are in the process of creating language 
retention programs aimed at teaching all areas of the language to children.  These efforts 
are hampered by a lack of teaching materials which can clearly explain to English-
dominant Dene children how Dene words should be used in various contexts context.  
Even those English-speaking children in Dene classes who learn Dene grammar 
correctly may utter sentences like *yath dedogh {snow.on.ground 3IPFV:be.thick5} 
instead of yath detan {snow.on.ground 3IPFV:be.thick1} to say ‘the snow is thick’.  The 
first word means ‘[liquid X] is so difficult to move that it is almost solid’, as in thick 
stew in English.  The second means ‘[layer of substance X] has a greater than normal 
distance between its two surfaces’, as thick snow or a thick blanket.  In English both 
meanings are expressed by lexemes in the same vocable in English, which leads to 
semantic interference.  While teachers sense the difference between the two 
vocabularies, it may be difficult to explain the difference concisely.  The Meaning-Text 
approach to lexicography, with its focus on such subtle mismatches between lexical 
units belonging to different languages and within a language, provides a linguistic 
framework that could easily be adapted to developing community-based dictionaries 
and other pedagogical materials to teach First Nations languages at a time when such 
resources are badly needed. 
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APPENDIX A 
Index of Dene Lexical Units and Definitions 
 
Below is an index of lexical units described in this work, listed in capital letters 
following Dene alphabetical order (see Appendix B).  The alphabetical order follows 
the initial part of the verb stem, traditionally known as the verb theme, rather than the 
root.  Phrasemes appear in the list in the order of the initial segment of their first 
component words. 
 
–ɂĄ  <X Y k’é theɂą: X, which is a compact object, is on surface Y>  
–BĮ <X Y k'é/yaghe hebį:  living being X travels on/in liquid Y by pushing Y back with X's 
limbs>   
–DA  <X Y k’é theda: X is in a position with X’s body upright but folded and close to the 
ground on surface Y> 
–DUTH <X Y k'é heduth: X travels on surface Y by twisting X's body against Y> 
–DZAI  <X Y k’é thedzai: X, which is a granular substance, is on surface Y>  
–GAL  <X ghegal Y k'é: X travels on surface Y by putting one of X’s two feet in front of the 
other> 
–JER  <X hejér: X, which is a flaked substance, moves from the sky toward the ground> 
–KĄ   <X Y k’é theką: X, which is a full small container, is on surface Y>  
–LA  <X Y k’é thela: multiple Xs are on surface Y>  
–TĄ1   <X Y k’é thetą: X, which is sticklike, is on surface Y> Example Xs include ‘stick’, 
‘pencil’, ‘televison’ (in some communities) 
–TĄ2   <X Y k’é thetą: X, which is an empty container, is on surface Y>  
–TĮ1 <X Y k’é thetį: Often living beings need to be in this position || X is in a position with 
X’s body flat on surface Y> 
–TŁÉ   <X Y k’é thetłé: X, which is a very soft shapeless substance, is on surface Y>  
–YĮ  <X Y k’é theyį: X is in a position with X’s body upright supported by X’s feet on surface 
Y> 
ANE...ɂÁ1  <X aneɂá: person X feels sad because X does not have anyone to talk to> 
ANE...ɂÁ2  <X aneɂá:  person X feels sad because of X no longer is in contact with situation 
or entity [Y]> 
BA...DHI1 <X Y badhi: living being X feels a desire to ingest Y> 
BA...DHI2  <X Y badhi: living being X feels a desire to have sex with living being Y> 
BANE...TAL  <X Y banetal: living being X wants to ingest Y> 
CH’Á...DI ÍLE <X Y ch’ádi íle Z ɂá: person X feels something bad towards situation or 
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entity Y because of a bad situation or quality Z that Y did or is like>  
CH’ÁRE...T’E <Y X ha ch’árįt’e Z ɂá: person X feels something bad towards person Y 
because of a bad situation Z that Y did>  
CH’ÉRE...LɂĮ <X Y heł ch’érelɂį: person X tends to do things without a reason that make 
other people {Y} feel very bad> 
CHĄ <øsg chą:  drops of water fall from the sky>.   
CHÁ...DI2  <X Y hení ch’ádi: living being X likes living being Y unusually intensely and 
craves Y’s aﬀection> 
DÁ...ɂÁ2  <X Y ɂá dáįɂá: person X feels something bad because of bad situation Y that has 
existed for a long time> 
DÁ...ɂÁ3  <X Y  ts’én dáįɂá: person X feels very sad because X intensely wants t be in 
contact with Y which X can’t be in contact with> 
DAKURE...LA <X Y Z-i dakurela: person X feels something bad toward situation or entity 
Y that continues to make a sound that X does not like or who continues to do action Z that 
makes a sound that Y does not like>  
DANÚ...LNI  <X Y ghą danulni:  person X feels a desire to own object Y> 
DE...TŁ’OGH <X’s surface has hair growing from everywhere on it> 
DE...LBA <X : X is of a color similar to the sky in twilight> 
DE...LGAI <X : X is of a color similar to the color of snow> 
DE...LK’ÉS1  <X delk'es:  people know that the surfaces of most Xs have hair growing from 
them || X’s surface has no hair growing from it> 
DE...LK’OS <X : X is of a color similar to the color of blood> 
DE...LTSES <‘X : X is of a color similar to the color of dirt> 
DE...LTTHOGH <X  : X is of a color similar to the color of the sun> 
DE...LZEN <X : X is of a color similar to the color of darkness> 
DE...CH’ÉL  <X dech'él:  X’s surface is rough and feels bad to touch> 
DE...CH’OGH  <X dech'ogh:  X’s surface is covered with small sharp points>  
DE...CH'ÉR <X dech'ér:  X is hard and elastic in a way which people do not like> 
DE...DDHÉR <X deddhér:  granular X’s grains are smaller than for most Xs> 
DE...DHÍ1 <X dedhí:  it is less diﬃcult to move liquid X than to move most liquids> 
DE...DHÍ2 <X dedhí: people know liquid X has [Y] in it || liquid X has less of [Y] in it than in 
most Xs because X has more water in it than is most Xs> 
DE...DHUL <X dedhul: large hard thing X has nothing inside it so that people can put things 
in X> 
DE...DOGH <X dedogh:  it is more diﬃcult to move liquid X than to move most liquids> 
DE...GHEL2  <øsg/X deghel: there are no lines of raised water moving across the surface of 
the body of water> 
DE...KER <X deker: things move very easily over the surface of X so it is diﬃcult for things 
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to stay in contact with X> 
DE...NAGH2 <X denágh: liquid X is dense so that when living things are in X it is diﬃcult 
for them to move> 
DÉ...NI1 <X déni:  X’s surface has a thin edge or point which can easily cut things> 
DE...NUR <X denur: X’s surface is made of or covered with something uneven and soft and 
feels good to touch> 
DE...T’US  <X det'us:  X’s surface is made of or covered with something that stays in contact 
with other things it touches> 
DÉ...TŁ’ÉS <X : X is of a color similar to color of the sky without clouds>  
DE...TŁEGH <X detłegh:  X is soft and cannot to move> 
DE...YER <X deyer: it is very diﬃcult to move X’s parts or sides closer or farther apart> 
DLOGH <‘X dlogh hęlį: X does bad things that children usually do> 
DZAGOTHE...ŁT’Į  <øsg dzagothełt’į  : a flash of light happens in the sky that usually 
happens before thunder during rainstorms> 
DZĘ K’OZÉ LÁHÓ...T’Į / DZĘ LÁHÓ...T’Į lit. “it looks like (pink) spruce gum”.  <X : X is 
of a color similar to the color of pink spruce gum> 
DZÍRE...LCH’OGH <X dzírelch’ogh gha nádher Y: person X is very angry and moves to 
many places within area Y>  
DZÍRE...LɂUL <X Y k'é dzírelɂul: X travels around the surface of liquid Y partly by pushing 
Y back with X's limbs and partly by floating on surface of liquid Y>  
DZÍRE...LĮ <X Y yághe hulé: X travels around in liquid Y by pushing through Y using X's 
gills or propellar>  
EDERE...LCHÁ1 <X ederelchá: person X tends behave like X thinks X is better than other 
people> 
EKE...LTTH’I  <X ekéltth’i: X, who is a standing person, moves toward the ground>   
EŁXONE...DLĮ  <øsg/X  ełhhonedlį: river {X} turns sharply> 
EŁEÍ...DLĮ  <øsg ełídlį: two rivers flow together> 
ERE...LYEL <øsg erelyel : a loud noise happens in the sky that usually happens after 
lightning during rainstorms> 
EREH...T’Į  <øsg/X  erét’į:  there is an area  of trees that / trees X extend as as a long narrow 
area> 
ESTENE...DHEN <X Y ɂá estenįdhen:  person X feels very sad because of situation Y and 
does not want to do things that X should do> 
EYNE <‘X eyne hęlį: X is very mentally ill’> 
GHĄNE...TĄ  <X Y ghąnetą:  singular living being X loves singular living being Y> 
GHE...T’AŁ <X ghet’ał:  X is travelling quickly through the air>  
HASNE...DHEN  <X Z Y ɂá hasnįdhen: person X feels bad because person Z did not cause 
situation Y that X wanted Z to cause> 
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HHĄNÁ...DLĮ <øsg hhąnádlį: water permanently flows from a height to the ground> 
HHÁTANE...LĮ <øsg hhátaįlį:  water permanently flows out of the ground>. 
HENE...LĮ ÍLE <X Y henęli íle Z ɂá: living being X feels something bad towards situation 
or entity Y because of Z>   
HENE...LĮ1   <X Y henelį: person X likes entity or X’s activity Y> 
HENE...LĮ2 <X henęlį: living being X feels something good for a long time> 
HHAHORE...ŁI <X Y hhórełi or X Z(N) hhórełi Y(Vsubj.agr=Z) ha:  person X is afraid that Z 
may cause situation Y which would be bad for X> 
HHÁRÁHONE...ɂÁ  <øsg/X  hharɂá:  there is an area / the land X in an area  goes down in 
places> 
HO...LTÚN  <X holtún: area X is very soft because there is a lot of water in every part of X> 
HO...ɂĄ   <X Y (k’é) hoɂą:  X, which is a compact object larger than a person but small 
enough to be seen at once, is on surface Y or in area Y> 
HO...BA  <øsg hoba:  there is very little light in the sky>.   
HOBA...DHI  <X hobádhi: living being X feels a desire to have sex> 
HODÁ-H-NE...ɂÁ  <øsg/X  hodáįɂá: there is an area that / the land X goes down in a place>. 
HODÁHOHE...ɂÁ  <øsg/X  hodóheɂá: viewed from above, there is / land X forms a gentle 
slope : 
HODÁHOHE...GAI  <øsg /X  hodóhegai: viewed from above, there is / land X forms a gentle 
slope much lighter in color than the surrounding land> 
HODEH...LGER  <øsg/X Y ts’én  horílger:  viewed from above, there is / land X forms a 
steep slope > 
HOKÁDE...DHÁ <øsg/X  hokáredhá: viewed from below, there is / land X forms a steep 
slope> 
HOKÁHOHE...ɂÁ <øsg /X  hokóheɂá: viewed from below, there is / land X forms a gentle 
slope> 
HORE...LɂĮ  <X Y horelɂį:  living being X feels a desire for Y> 
HOTE...ɂA1 <øsg/X  hotéɂa:  there is / land X forms a long narrow strip of empty regular 
land> 
HOTE...TS'ÍŁ <øsg hotéts'íł: tiny water drops fall from clouds in sky>  
HU...DHI <X Y hudhi:  disembodied entity X moves through area Y>  
HU...LĮ   <X Y hųlį:  X, which is a portion of entities or substance X, is in area Y> 
HLɂA <øsg hlɂa: there is a permanently watery area of land>. 
HUNE...LCH’OGH <X hųlch’ogh: X tends to speak in a way that makes other people feel 
bad, and tends to suddenly become very angry as if X is going to attack other people> 
HUNE...LCH’OGH <X hunelch’ogh: person X feels very angry many times because of 
situations that people do> 
HUNEH...LDAI <X Y ha huníldai: person X tends to have tantrums because of repeated 
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situation {Y}> 
Í...LCH’É <X Y ts’én hílch’é Z ɂá: person X starts to feel anger at person Y because of 
situation Z that Y did>  
Í...LTTH’E  <X híltth’e: X, which is a granular substance, moves toward the ground > 
Í...KAR  <X híkar: X, which is a large-flaked substance, moves toward the ground>  
–JERÉ <X obj.agrX–jeré:  living being X tends to say and do bad things to living beings {Y} 
whom X has contact with> 
JÍE TTHOGHÉ LÁHÓT’Į lit. “it looks like an orange”.  <X : X is of a color similar to the 
color of oranges>   
JÍETUÉ LÁHÓT’Į lit. “it looks like wine”.  <X : X is of a color similar to the color of purple 
grapes> 
K’É...LĮ1 <X Y k’élį: person X feels sad because X is sorry for situation Y that X caused and 
wishes X had not caused> 
K’ÉSE...LNI <X k’éselni: person X tends to be more worried about physical pain or the 
possibility pain than is normal> 
KANE..ɂÁ <X Y kaneɂá: living being X feels sad because X is no longer in contact with 
situation or entity Y> 
KANE...DHEN <X Y kanįdhen: person X feels a desire to obtain inanimate object Y that X 
needs> 
K'É  <[S] k'é: person X, who is the Speaker, feels surprise when X that situation S is 
happening / happened>     
K'ÉNE...TA2 <X Y k'énetą:  person X suddenly feels intensely afraid that something bad 
might happen or have happened to person Y after X has not been in contact with Y for a long 
time> 
K'ÉNE...TĄ1  <X Y k’énetą:  person X feels very sad because X suddenly wants to be in 
contact with person Y intensely a long time after X has lost Y> 
K'ENIRÉ...LYA ÍLE <X Y ghą k'énirélya: person X feels afraid because X thinks that 
something bad is happening or might happen to entity Y> 
–ŁCHUTH  <X Y k’é thełchuth: X fabriclike> Example Xs include ‘blanket’, ‘shingle’, and 
‘tarp’.   
–LGOL <X Y k'é helgol: X travels on surface Y by placing one of X’s four or more limbs in 
front of the others>  
–LGOS <X Y k'é helgos: X travels on surface Y by by placing two of  X's four feet in front of 
the others at a regular rhythm so quickly that all of X’s feet leave the ground at the same time 
between movements>  
–LKATH <X Y k'é helkath: X travels on surface Y by putting one of X’s four feet in front of 
the others at a regular rhythm without all X's feet leaving the ground at the same time>  
–ŁNETH  <X Y hełneth: living being X loves entity Y and depends on Y emotionally> 
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–ŁTĄ   <X Y k’é thełtą: X full large container>  
–ŁTS’I <øsg niłts’i:  air moves in a current>.    
NÁ...LCH’OGH <X nálch’ogh Z ɂá: person X feels intense anger at person [Y] because of 
situation Z that Y did>   
NÁ...ŁKEDH  <X náłkedh: X, which is, a full container, moves toward the ground> 
NA...LTŁÉS <X naltłés: thing X is very soft because X has a lot of liquid in it> 
NÁ...LTTH’I  <X náltth’i:  X, which is heavy, round or animate, moves toward the ground>  
NÁ...DHER3  <X Y nádher:  X, who is a living being, is in area Y> 
NÁ...GHEZ   <X nághez:  X, which is a standing sticklike object, moves toward the ground>  
NÁ...KEDH  <X nákedh: X, which is sticklike, moves toward the ground> 
NA...TSER3 <X Y nátser: people know liquid X has Y in it || liquid X has more [Y] in it than 
most Xs> 
NÁ...TŁ’Í2  <X natł’i: X, which is plural, moves toward the ground> 
NABÁ...DHI  <X Y Z nabádhi: person X tends to watch people [Y] do actions [Z] that X 
does not need to know because X wants to know that [Y] is doing something bad> 
NÁDENE...L CH’É <X nádenelch’é: X tends to suddenly become very angry with people, as 
if X is going to attack other people> 
NÁHE...ɂĄ <øsg / X náheɂą: the sun goes down>.   
NÁNI...ɂA   <X Y (k’é)  náįɂa:  X, which is an upright sticklike object of any size, stands on 
surface Y or in area Y> 
NE...LJER <X Y ch’á neljer: living being X feels afraid of Y>  
NE...DÁDH  <X nedádh: it is more diﬃcult to move X up from the ground than it is for most 
things the same size as X > 
NE...DDHÁ  <X  neddhá: X moves toward the ground more slowly than most things because 
X is very light> 
NE...ZǪ3 <X nezǫ: living being X tends to interact with others in a way that makes Y feel 
good, more than Y normally feels in interactions with others> 
NE...DHEN2 <X Y nįdhen:  person X feels a desire that event Y takes place in the future and 
is planning for Y> 
NĮ DÉ <[S] nį dé:  person X, who is the Speaker, feels a desire that situation S were 
happening / had happened / would happen>  
NÍNI...ɂA   <X Y nɂa:  X, which is a geographical feature too long to be seen at once, goes 
through area Y> 
SAHÓRE...LNI / SÓRE...LNI   <X Y ghą sahórelni:  person X intensely loves divine being 
Y> 
SĄNE...DHEN  <X Y sąnįdhen:  person X loves living being Y> 
SŁINI <‘X dene słini hęlį: X tends to intentionally do unjustified things that are very bad for 
other people> 
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TĄCH’AI LÁHÓT’Į lit. “it looks like leaves”.  <X : X is of a color similar to the color of 
vegetation>  
TADENE...CHÁ  <øsg tarįchá : tall lines of raised water move across the surface of the body 
of water> 
TARE...TĮ   <øsg taretį: there are lines of raised water moving across the surface of the body 
of water against the foot of land Y / into container Y>. 
TE...ŁGHETH   <X tełgheth Y ɂá: living being X suddenly feels intensely afraid because X 
saw or heard Y that X thinks could do something bad to X> 
TE...KAR  <X tekar: X, which has a wide surface, moves toward the ground so that all of 
X’s wide surface is in contact with the ground >  
THAIDÁHOHE...ɂÁ  <øsg thaidóheɂá: viewed from above, there is a sandy / the sand forms 
a gentle slope> 
TS’NE...T’Į  <øsg/X Y ts’nįt’į: there is an area  of trees that / trees X extend as as a long 
narrow area to area Y> 
TS’ÓNE...DHER <X Y ghą ts’ónįdher: person X gives other people less of X’s resources Y 
than people normally give each other> 
TS’ÚRE...DÍE <X ts’úredíe: living being X tends not to make a normal eﬀort to do work 
[Y]> 
TS'É...ɂAL  <øsg/{X} ts'éɂal: the sun is clearly visible>.   
TS'ÉNE...ɂA  <øsg/X Y yá hots’į ts'énįɂa: the sun comes out from behind Y>.   
TSÍŁ <øsg tsíł:  flakes of frozen water fall from the sky>.   
YÁ...ŁKĄ  <øsg yáłką:  most daylight appears at the beginning of the day>.   
YENORÍ...YA or NORÍ...YA  <X Y ghą yenoríya: person X feels surprise at entity or 
situation Y>. 
YÉTS  <øsg yéts: there is bright red light at the end of the sunset>.   
ɂÓRÍ  <[S] ɂórí: person X, who is the Speaker, feels surprise when X sees that situation S is 
happening / happened>      
 
 
X AHHE DÓHE...LɂĮ lit. “X pretends beauty”.  <Z ɂá X ahhe dóhelɂį: person X tends to 
want other people [Y] to think that X is more attractive than them in activity {Z}>; 
X AHHE HEREH...T’Į <X ahhe herít’į: person X tends to want other people [Y] to think that 
X is better than them> 
X BA EHHÚLE lit. “for X it is useless”.  <X ba ehhúle: X has a physical and mental 
problem that causes that X feels very sad and does not want to do anything> 
X DENE CH’Á NETHE...ŁɂÁ lit. “X pushes people away”.   <X dene ch’á nethełɂá: person 
X tends not to want to be with other people because X loves other people less than normal>  
X HA ASONE...T’Į ÍLE lit. “for X there is no problem”.  <person X feels that nothing bad is 
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happening> 
X HA DÚÉ2 lit. “for X it is bad”.  <ø-sg X ha dúé Y ɂá:  person X feels very sad because of 
situation Y> 
X HA HORÉ...LYĄ ÍLE lit. “for X [area] is not pleasant”.  <ø-sg X ha horélyą íle:  person 
X feels intense sadness and does not feel good towards all of the things that X often feels 
good towards> 
X HA SUGHA lit. “for X it is good”.  <person X feels something good>; 
 
X OBJ.AGRX-HENE...ŁKON  <X benełkon Z ɂá: person X feels angry because person [Y] 
does or did situation Z that some people sometimes do that many people feel is bad>; 
X OBJ.AGRX–INIÉ1 <X OBJ.AGRX–inié: person X feels something good for a short time> 
X OBJ.AGRX–INIÉ2 <X Y OBJ.AGRX–inié: living being X likes situation Y> 
X OBJ.AGRX–TÍ  <X betí: living being X tends to interact with others in a way that makes Y 
feel good, more than Y normally feels in interactions with others  > 
X OBJ.AGRX–HEDERÉDLĮNE  <X bederédlįne: people think that most people will behave 
like this | X tends to behave with other people in a way that makes other people feel good > 
X OBJ.AGRX–HÓRE...NI ÍLE  <X bóreni íle: X tends to want or try to hurt other people> 
X OBJ.AGRX–K’ÉHONÍ...GIS  <X Y ha bįní bek’éhonígis: X tends to suddenly become very 
angry with people over situation {Y} as if X is going to attack other people> 
 
X POX–DZIÉ NATSER ÍLE, lit. “X’s heart is weak”.  <X bedzié natser íle Y ha:  person X 
feels afraid because X knows that X will be in contact with situation Y which may be bad for 
X> 
X POX–ĮNÍ K'ÉCH'Á lit. “against X’s mind”.  <X bįni k’éch’á Z ɂá: person X feels angry 
because person [Y] does or did situation Z that X does not want> 
X POX–ĮNÍ ŁĄ lit. “X’s mind is much”.  <X bįní łą Y ɂá: X feels afraid for a long time 
because of continued situation(s) Y> 
X POX–ĮNÍ NÁTSER lit. “X’s mind is strong”.  <person X feels something good because X 
thinks that something diﬃcult will happen in a way that will be good for X> 
X POX–ĮNÍ NÁTSER ÍLE lit. “X’s mind is weak”.  <X bįní nátser íle: X feels very sad 
because many bad things have happened or many good things that X wanted to happen did 
not happen> 
X POX–ĮNÍ NETTHETH lit. “X’s mind is extinguished”.  <X bįní nettheth: X feels very bad 
because situation Y that X wanted to happen did not happen  
X POX–ĮNÍ SŁINI lit. “X’s mind is evil”.  <X bį̨ní słini: person X tends to say bad things to 
living beings {Y} whom X has contact with> 
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APPENDIX B 
The Dene Alphabet and Phonemes 
 
The Dene language data in this work are transcribed using the standard orthography 
official in Saskatchewan Dene communities.  This orthography, which contains 
numerous digraphs, is mostly similar to the orthography used in other Canadian 
provinces for Dene Sųłiné and closely related languages.  Below is list of corresponding 
segments in the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA).   
 
Official  IPA Official IPA 
a   /a/ n  /n/ 
ą  /ã/ o  /o/ 
b  /b/ ǫ /õ/ 
ch  /tʃ/ s  /s/ 
ch'  /tʃ’/ t /t/ 
d  /d/ t'  /t’/ 
dh  /ð/ th  /θ/ 
ddh  /dð/ tth  /tθ/ 
e  /e/ tth'  /tθ’/ 
ę  /ẽ/ tł  /tł/ 
g  /g/ tł'  /tł’/ 
gh  /ɣ/ ts  /ts/ 
h  /h/ ts'  /ts’/ 
į  /ĩ/ u  /u/ 
i  /i/ ų  /ũ/ 
j  /ʤ/ w  /w/ 
k /k/ hh /x/ 
k'  /k’/ y  /j/ 
l  /l/ z  /z/ 
ł   /ɬ/ ɂ /ɂ/ 
m  /m/   
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